

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HOW WE KEPT THE SEA

Commander E. H. Currey, R.N.





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
HOW WE KEPT THE SEA



ADMIRAL SIR JOHN JELlicoe.
(Photo, Speaight.)

HOW WE KEPT THE SEA

BY COMMANDER E. H. CURREY, R.N.



ILLUSTRATED BY A. S. FORREST
AND FROM PHOTOGRAPHS, ETC.

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CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

| | |
|---|---|
| SOME COMPARISON OF THE MAIN FLEETS OF GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY | 1 |
|---|---|

CHAPTER II

| | |
|--|----|
| THE BATTLE OF THE HELIGOLAND BIGHT | 10 |
|--|----|

CHAPTER III

| | |
|--|----|
| Eg torpedoes <i>Hela</i> —Loss of <i>Pegasus</i> at Zanzibar—Action between <i>Carmania</i> and <i>Cap Trafalgar</i> —Torpedoing and loss of <i>Aboukir</i> , <i>Hogue</i> , and <i>Cressy</i> —Naval Division at Antwerp—Capture of nine German merchant ships by <i>Cumberland</i> —Eg sinks German destroyer off the Ems River—Sinking of the <i>Hawke</i> —Action with and destruction of four German torpedo destroyers—Monitors on Belgian coast | 20 |
|--|----|

CHAPTER IV

| | |
|--|----|
| The Westfalens—Pre-Dreadnought armoured cruisers—Destroyers and submarines—The Monitors—Operations on the Belgian coast—Losses on board <i>Falcon</i> —Sinking of the <i>Hermes</i> —Death of Lieutenant Wauton—German submarine sunk by H.M.S. <i>Badger</i> —The <i>Amiral Ganteaume</i> , refugee ship, torpedoed by German submarine—Despatch of Rear-Admiral Hood—Bombardment of Zeebrugge—Retirement of Prince Louis of Battenberg—Appointment of Lord Fisher in his place—German squadron shells Yarmouth | 28 |
|--|----|

CHAPTER V

| | |
|--|----|
| The battle of Coronel on the Chilean coast—Sinking of H.M. Ships <i>Good Hope</i> and <i>Monmouth</i> —Death of Rear-Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock—Loss of H.M.S. <i>Bulwark</i> at Sheerness by explosion; finding of the Court of Inquiry—Destruction of U18 by H.M.S. <i>Garry</i> ; crew taken prisoners—Escape of the R.M.S.P. s.s. <i>Ortega</i> from German cruiser—Splendid seamanship of her Captain—The action off the Falkland Islands between Vice-Admiral Sir F. D. Sturdee and Admiral Graf von Spee | 37 |
|--|----|

CHAPTER VI

| | |
|---|----|
| The battle of Coronel, concluded—The story of the <i>Emden</i> —Operations at the head of the Persian Gulf and on the Shatt-el-Arab and Tigris Rivers—The fight in the Cameroons; ascent of the Cameroon River and capture of the capital, Dualla | 45 |
|---|----|

CHAPTER VII

| | |
|--|----|
| German bombardment of Hartlepool, Whitby, and Scarborough—Aeroplanes, light cruisers, destroyers, and submarines at Cuxhaven—Loss of the <i>Formidable</i> , torpedoed in the Channel—Rescue of seventy men by the <i>Providence</i> , Brixham smack—Escape of the <i>Goeben</i> and <i>Breslau</i> in the Mediterranean | 54 |
|--|----|

CHAPTER VIII

| | |
|--|----|
| Beatty's battle cruiser action in the North Sea—British naval raid on Alexandretta—What the Mushir of Damascus said—A snapshot from the Suez Canal | 62 |
|--|----|

CHAPTER IX

| | |
|---|----|
| Forecast of the Scarborough raid—Distances steamed by our ships in the North Sea—The destruction of the <i>Königsberg</i> —The <i>Karlsruhe</i> —The sinking of the <i>Dresden</i> — <i>Prinz Eitel Friedrich</i> interned at Newport News; her career—The <i>Kronprinz Wilhelm</i> interned at Hampton Roads, U.S.A. | 68 |
|---|----|

CHAPTER X

| | |
|---|----|
| OPERATIONS IN DISTANT SEAS—THE BOMBARDMENT OF THE DARDANELLES | 75 |
|---|----|

CHAPTER XI

| | |
|--|----|
| Experience of a destroyer in the Mediterranean—The attack on the Narrows in the Dardanelles—Loss of the <i>Irresistible</i> , <i>Ocean</i> , and French battleship <i>Bouvet</i> —The deadly work of the floating mine | 83 |
|--|----|

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| CHAPTER XII | | PAGE |
|--|--|------|
| SUBMARINE BLOCKADE—SPEECH OF THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY | | 90 |
| CHAPTER XIII | | |
| Submarine blockade—Raiding cruisers—Amount of losses through their activities—Sinking of neutrals by U boats—Evolution of the German submarine—Loss of the <i>Léon Gambetta</i> —Sir James Domville's fight in a trawler with two German torpedo boats—Appointment of Sir Henry Jackson as First Sea Lord—Destruction of <i>Princess Irene</i> by explosion in Sheerness Harbour—The Dardanelles bombardment and landing of troops on April 25-26—The <i>River Clyde</i> , Commander Unwin, midshipmen, and seamen gain the V.C. | | 100 |
| CHAPTER XIV | | |
| Dardanelles (<i>continued</i>)—King's message—Woodgate of the <i>Koorah</i> —How the battleships towed the boats into action—The landing on the beaches—The bombardment of April 27—Loss of the <i>Goliath</i> —E14: Commander Boyle's V.C.—Loss of the <i>Triumph</i> —Loss of the <i>Majestic</i> —E11: Lieutenant-Commander Nasmyth's V.C.—Germany's crowning deed of shame, the sinking of the <i>Lusitania</i> | | 109 |
| CHAPTER XV | | |
| Summing up in the <i>Lusitania</i> case—Attacks by submarines—Murder of fishermen—Loss of the <i>Manitou</i> —Loss by grounding of E15—Cutting-out expedition to destroy her—Reported additions to the German Fleet—German transport torpedoed—List of ships employed in Dardanelles—Many ships sunk by submarines—The position of America with regard to the submarine | | 117 |
| CHAPTER XVI | | |
| The <i>Dreadnought</i> and its effects on the Kiel Canal—The Russian Fleet in the Baltic—E13: half her crew murdered—List of Russian Baltic Fleet | | 125 |
| CHAPTER XVII | | |
| Count Reventlow and Mr. Balfour—Progress of sea murder by submarines—The story of the <i>Anglo-Californian</i> —Opinions of Captain Persius—The Turkish battleship <i>Kheyr-ed-Din Barbarossa</i> torpedoed and sunk—Sinking of the transport <i>Royal Edward</i> and loss of 1000 lives—The Australians on board the torpedoed <i>Southland</i> —Loss of the armed auxiliary <i>India</i> —Twenty ships sunk in two days—Letter from the First Lord | | 132 |
| CHAPTER XVIII | | |
| OPERATIONS ON THE BELGIAN COAST | | 142 |
| CHAPTER XIX | | |
| Lieutenant Guy D'Oyley-Hughes damages Ismid railway, swimming from submarine—Granted D.S.O.—Turkish destroyer <i>Yar Hissar</i> sunk by British submarine—Loss of E20 and destroyer <i>Louis</i> —Armed boarding steamer <i>Tara</i> sunk—German gunboat captured on Lake Tanganyika by British motor-boats— <i>Natal</i> destroyed by explosion—P. and O. s.s. <i>Persia</i> sunk off Crete—Unarmed ships sunk without warning by German submarines—Evacuation of Gallipoli—Loss of <i>King Edward VII.</i> —Exploit of the raider <i>Möwe</i> —Splendid fight of the <i>Clan MacTavish</i> | | 149 |
| CHAPTER XX | | |
| The <i>Alcantara</i> and the <i>Greif</i> —Supply of men to the Navy: First Lord's speech—Loss of <i>Coquette</i> and T.B. 11—Portugal comes in—Losses of merchant shipping—Raid on Lowestoft and Yarmouth—Scouting by Zeppelins—Capture of Casement—The <i>Wandle</i> —Loss of H.M.S. <i>Russell</i> —Rear-Admiral Sir Dudley de Chair on the blockade | | 157 |
| CHAPTER XXI | | |
| THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND BANK | | 164 |
| APPENDIX I. ADMIRALTY MESSAGE OF APPROVAL | | 174 |
| APPENDIX II. SHIPS THAT HAVE BEEN LOST IN THE WAR | | 174 |

LIST OF PLATES

| | |
|---|---------------------|
| ADMIRAL SIR JOHN JELlicOE | <i>Frontispiece</i> |
| ADMIRAL SIR DAVID BEATTY, COMMANDING THE FIRST BATTLE-CRUISER SQUADRON | 8 |
| HOW THEY KEPT THE FLAG FLYING ON H.M.S. "PEGASUS" | 20 |
| A BRITISH DESTROYER IN ACTION | 32 |
| THE SINKING OF THE "NÜRNBERG" BY THE BRITISH LIGHT CRUISER "KENT." Drawn by Montagu Dawson from a sketch by an eye-witness | 48 |
| DESTRUCTION OF THE GERMAN RAIDER "EMDEN" BY H.M.S. "SYDNEY" OF THE AUSTRALIAN NAVY, NOVEMBER 9, 1914 | 52 |
| THE LAST MOMENTS OF THE "BLÜCHER" | 64 |
| AT THE DARDANELLES—THE "IRRESISTIBLE" AND THE "OCEAN" SHELLING THE FORTS ON THE ASIATIC SIDE. Taken from the deck of a British warship | 80 |
| THE BRITISH AND FRENCH FLEETS ADVANCING TO THE ATTACK OF THE DARDANELLES | 88 |
| A CRUISER RAMMING A SUBMARINE | 96 |
| THE "EYES" OF THE SUBMARINE—THE PERISCOPE. Drawn by H. W. Koekkoek | 116 |
| THE PATH OF A SUBMARINE'S TORPEDO | 116 |
| EFFECT OF A TORPEDO: A LARGE CARGO STEAMER BROUGHT SAFELY INTO DOCK | 124 |
| A DESTROYER NARROWLY ESCAPES BEING STRUCK BY A TORPEDO. Drawn by Norman Wilkinson | 136 |
| LIEUTENANT GUY D'OYLEY HUGHES STARTING OFF WITH HIS RAFT | 148 |
| SERVING THE GUNS TO THE LAST. From the Drawing by F. Matania | 164 |
| A MODERN BATTLESHIP FIRING A BROADSIDE. Drawn by Charles J. de Lacy | 172 |

HOW WE KEPT THE SEA

CHAPTER I

SOME COMPARISON OF THE MAIN FLEETS OF GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY

"MONSIEUR, it is war; the orders for mobilisation have come. I myself start to-night." Thus was the information that Armageddon, so long expected, so much dreaded, had come at last, conveyed to a party of English people in a modest café of a small fishing village in the neighbourhood of Boulogne by a young man who brought them coffee and rolls for "le five o'clock." It was August 1, 1914. From the café they passed along the sunlit street and stopped at the Mairie to read the *affiche* on the wall calling out the manhood of "la belle France." As the little coastal tramway bore them back to Boulogne, that small coterie of English men and women sat and speculated as to the course that events were likely to take; principally and naturally as to whether their own country was likely to join in the fray, and, if so, when? This happened on a Saturday, and that night the cross-Channel steamer was crowded to the rail with people arriving from all parts of the Continent to return to England. All Sunday and Monday an orderly bustle pervaded the French seaport, and gradually all the male inhabitants became soldiers. That night at one of the principal cafés the English people sat next to men in brand-new uniforms; and the red trousers and the blue coats of these newly-joined "piou-pious" were not of a fit that would have done credit to Bond Street, Conduit Street, or Hanover Square. Also it

seemed strange to see private soldiers reading the *Times* with absorbed interest, or to notice how from the rough recesses of an infantryman's uniform a gold watch of the most expensive type was produced. That night the quay was crowded to suffocation, motor cars were arriving by the score, whole armies of the English were disgorged by the trains into the waiting boat. The British Consul was besieged with people, men and women who desired to know "what they were to do"; were they to go away at once, or was it safe for them to stay? A politely worded notice from the Mayor put an end to all doubt on this subject: his Worship considered it better that all foreigners should leave the town; and they accordingly left.

They stood not on the order of their going, but went at once; and one most poignant memory remains. There was in the bureau of the hotel a girl round whom life had revolved; she was capable, charming, and pretty, and as the party filed out on its way to the steamer and England, she barred the way. Her eyes were full of tears as she asked, "What will England do? It is not credible that she will desert France now?" But England's declaration of war had not matured; and how could any one know that at that moment Berlin was digesting, with what appetite it might, the ultimatum that it had that morning received. War was not forty-eight hours old, and yet change had

come. The wise man did not attempt to register his baggage on Boulogne Quay that bright August morning ; he slung it over the side of the steamer himself and then followed it in person. One formality, that of the registration of baggage, had gone by the board. Out in the Channel the steamer ran athwart the course of a detachment of

transports were ready ; there was much consolation in that thought.

At midnight the ultimatum to Germany expired, and the United Kingdom, and all that those two words connote, was firmly ranged on the side of France and Russia. It is no figure of speech to say that a sigh of relief went up when the definite decision



STOPPED AT THE MAIRIE TO READ THE AFFICHE ON THE WALL (P. I).

"l'Escadre du Nord," six armoured cruisers patrolling the coast, and she went close enough for her passengers to send up a full-throated cheer that was answered by the nearest of the men-of-war.

In London no one could give change for a five-pound note, and the Club was full of men who gloomily demanded why we had not "come in." All the same it was known beyond the shadow of a doubt that the

became known. To the extreme verge of weakness England had striven for peace ; she decided for war only when any other course would have been an infamy. There are times in our history, so rare as to occur perhaps only once in a man's lifetime, when behind the Government of the day the whole nation stands solid as a wall ; it was so on August 4, 1914. It is quite true that few, very few, of His Majesty's lieges had any

idea of the magnitude of the events that were to follow; but the incident of peace was closed, the arbitrament of war had been chosen, and "to the last man and the last shilling," to use the words of the Prime Minister, the people of Britain were ready to go.

To those who made a study of naval affairs for years before the war, one fact stood out pre-eminently above all others. This was that Germany was not only preparing for war in general, but also for war with this country in particular. Looking back, it seems impossible to understand how it came to pass that persons in England could have allowed themselves to believe that this was not the case; the more particularly so as all the time the *Flottenverein*—or German Navy League—was preaching throughout the length and breadth of Germany "the bitter need" for a fleet commensurate with the ambitions of the Fatherland. We cannot, and we ought not, to forget that in *Germany and the Next War* Bernhardt proclaimed that "world dominance or nothing" was the goal to which to attain. We paltered with illusive agreements, we tried to establish a ratio between the German and the British Fleets: this served to amuse us for the time, while the Teuton on his side of the North Sea continued to build and to talk extravagantly of peace and goodwill.

At the back of everything was the fixed idea that England was the lion which barred the path of the expansion of Germany; therefore at all costs she must if possible be kept quiet until the Continent of Europe had been subdued to the German hand. When that had been accomplished, her turn was to come.

War has proved at one and the same time the strength and the weakness of the enemy. Materially and scientifically her power seemed illimitable. Had her psychologic sense been equal to these, it is possible that the world might have been laid at her feet. Most of all did she rely on the decadence of England. For this we ourselves are much to blame, as

the national habit of self-depreciation had, before the war, reached almost to the proportion of a mania. If we considered that we were no good, that our sun had long since reached its zenith and was therefore bound to decline, who was more ready to believe this than the self-confident and boastful Teuton?


A generation had grown up in the German Empire fed on the traditions of Bismarck, who looked back and remembered how in 1864 Denmark had been vanquished, in 1866 Austria had been stricken to the ground in a whirlwind campaign, and in 1870-71 France had been humbled to the dust and two of her fairest provinces reft from her. All this was eminently satisfactory, but there was yet "a fly in the apothecary's ointment," for England remained mistress of the seas and the owner of the proudest Empire in the world. Therefore "the last and greatest settlement of all," as Treitschke, the German historian, put it, must be with England. For this purpose, and for this purpose alone, was built up that mighty armada owned by the German Empire. Let us recollect that at the time of the Franco-Prussian War there was—it is hardly too much to say—no German Navy at all; that even twenty years after this date it was a force that hardly counted; and then we are confronted with the position that this new peril to European peace occupied in August 1914. Even so short a time ago as the beginning of the present century, the German Navy was vastly inferior to that of France, the biggest ships of which she could then boast being only 12,000 tons, and her biggest guns then afloat being the 9.4-inch 40-calibre weapons, throwing a projectile of 474 pounds weight; and the 11-inch, which threw a projectile of 562 pounds. At this date England's heaviest ships were 15,000 tons, and her most powerful guns the 16.25-inch, 1800-pound projectile; 13.5-inch, 1250-pound projectile, and 12-inch, 850-pound projectile. There was then no sort of comparison possible between the two Navies.

It is necessary here to give some idea of

the forces arrayed against one another at sea when the war broke out, but for this purpose there is no intention to enter on a series of statistical tables. These can be studied in any of the admirable books of reference on naval subjects, such as the late Mr. Jane's *Fighting Ships*, the *Naval Annual*, the *Navy League Annual*, and other kindred publications.

At the risk of repeating what has often been set before the public, attention will now be drawn to the year 1906. By this time

capital ships, including those of her own country, "back numbers"; and what her advent on the scene really meant was neither more nor less than the entire reconstruction on modern lines of all the navies of the world. To a certain extent this was to the detriment of the mistress of the seas, and severe things were said at the time on embarking on so novel and costly a policy of national insurance. But the British Admiralty of the day was fully justified in the course that they took. They recog-



H.M.S. DREADNOUGHT.

ambitious programmes had already been completed by the Germans, and others were in course of completion; battleship-building was in full swing. And then one fine day the "Marineamt" awoke and found that England had put in commission a new type of capital ship in the shape of H.M.S. *Dreadnought*.


We have first to realise what this meant to Germany, then to observe the manner in which this new departure was met in the Fatherland. The *Dreadnought*, of 17,900 tons, armed with ten 12-inch guns, and with a speed of 21 knots, had from the moment of her commissioning rendered all other

nised, with a wisdom that does not always obtain among the departments of State, that progress was in the air, that if they did not take the initiative some one else would, and in sea matters it was the duty of Britain to lead. Therefore, in an incredibly short space of time, the new ship was laid down and completed, the date of her commencement being December 1905, that of her completion October 1906.

Germany was entirely outclassed before the *Dreadnought* was built; the coming of that ship left her hopelessly in the rear, unless?—unless she were prepared to face the music and begin at once to compete on

that new plane to which battleship-building had been raised. For her the decision to be taken was doubly momentous. Not only was she confronted with the fact that an entirely new fleet had to be built, that those units which she then possessed were worth little more than their weight in scrap-iron, but, further, if she were to be true to the strategical idea she had laid down for her own guidance, it was absolutely necessary to double the size of the recently completed Kiel Canal on the spot. These two things she must do, and do at once, or sink back to the negligible naval position that she erst-

hard upon her heels, embodying all the improvements experience suggested to those modern wizards, the builders of the big ships and the big guns. In rapid succession came the three *Temeraires* (1907), and the three *St. Vincents* (1908)—the former class of 18,600 tons, the latter of 19,250 tons; the main armament in guns and the placing thereof being the same. In all these ships the ten 12-inch guns are contained in five turrets, three on the midship or keel line of the ship, and one on each broadside opposite to one another, just abaft of the foremost of their two funnels. It will be noticed that



THE DREADNOUGHT ON HER FIRST VOYAGE.

while occupied. Rightly or wrongly, for good or for evil, her decision was instant; even it seemed as if she welcomed the new departure, and a whisper ran around that now all the nations could start on a new race of sea armament, and in this Germany would not allow herself to be distanced.

But England, although she held no patent rights in the idea of a specially big man-of-war armed in a particular way, did not rest on her oars as soon as the first of the modern battle units, which has bestowed her name on the class abroad as well as at home, was afloat and in commission. As an experimental ship she was extraordinarily successful, but others of an improved type followed

eight guns out of the ten can be fired on each broadside.

In 1909 a single ship, the *Neptune*, of 19,900 tons was built, her armament being the same as the ships by which she had been preceded; she embodied, however, a new idea. Designers were not satisfied with the fact that out of ten big guns of the primary armament only eight could be used on a broadside. Accordingly in the *Neptune*, and the ships by which she was immediately succeeded, the *Colossus* and *Hercules*, the plan was adopted of placing the two midship turrets *en echelon*, one on the port side, forward, and one on the starboard side, abaft of the foremost funnel. Also the two

after turrets on the keel line were what is known as superimposed, that is to say, one turret being above and immediately behind the other, in this manner firing over its twin. The last of these ships was completed in August 1911, and the next class to be built—the Orion class of four ships, 22,500 tons—was an immense step forward in two respects. The first was constructional, the second in the calibre of the weapons carried. Although in the *Neptune* and her two immediate successors it was possible to fire all ten 12-inch guns on the same broadside, still to do this one of the échelon turrets had to be trained across the deck. The obvious disadvantage of this lay in the fact that, say the port turret was trained to fire on the starboard beam, or the starboard turret to fire on the port beam, the muzzles of the two 12-inch guns were actually over a wide stretch of the deck. Consequently, when the guns were fired an enormous disruptive force was exercised downwards, tending to break in the deck, which had in consequence to be specially strengthened from below. There were besides other disadvantages to be overcome into which it is not necessary to enter, the initial cause of the dislike of the constructors for this design being sufficiently plain.

The main constructional difference between the Orion class of four ships—22,500 tons—and their predecessors was in the placing of the turrets, all five of which are on the keel line. This is obtained by having two superimposed twin turrets at bow and stern, and one single one amidships. By this arrangement all ten guns can be fired on either broadside at will, and the muzzles of all the guns are clear of the ship's side when in the firing position on the broadside. Of course when firing right ahead or right astern, firing over the deck cannot be avoided. But with this constructional difference came another innovation of the greatest importance. The earlier ships had all carried the 12-inch as the gun of the main armament; in the Orions this was replaced by the 13.5, a weapon discharging a projectile of 1250

pounds in weight. While these ships were building, their main armament was officially described as the "12-inch A," and it was not until they were in commission that it was discovered that the calibre of their guns had been increased by one and a half inches. This caused great irritation in Germany, another instance of the perfidy of Albion! After the Orions came the four ships of the King George V. class, which differed from their predecessors in only one respect, namely, that their 13.5-inch guns discharge a projectile weighing 1400 pounds instead of one weighing 1250 pounds. The next class are the Iron Dukes, of 25,000 tons, four ships carrying the same main armament. There is here, however, a wide difference in the secondary armament, as whereas the King George class carry sixteen 4-inch (25-pound projectile), the Iron Dukes carry twelve 6-inch (100-pounders). The Queen Elizabeth class are of 27,500 tons, and are armed with eight 15-inch guns, the projectiles from which weigh very nearly a ton; there are five of these vessels.

Speaking of capital ships, it is necessary before leaving the subject to deal with the battle cruiser, as the difference between this class of vessel and the battleship is by no means clear to many minds. Immediately following the *Dreadnought* in the year 1907, there were laid down three ships, the *Invincible*, *Inflexible*, and *Indomitable*, that were denominated "battle cruisers." All ships of war being units into which the element of compromise enters, let it be understood that the three main factors of efficiency reside in offensive power—that is to say, the weapons carried; in protection—that is to say, armour, protective decks, and subdivision of the hull; and speed. In the battleship speed is sacrificed to a certain extent to offensive and defensive power; in the battle cruiser offensive and defensive power is sacrificed to a certain extent to speed. The analogy between the *Dreadnought* and the *Invincible* is as follows. In the *Dreadnought* we have a ship carrying ten 12-inch guns, with a main armoured belt amidships of 11 inches, taper-

ing to 6 inches at the bow and 4 inches at the stern. Her designed speed is 21 knots, though this has been exceeded. The *Invincible* is 17,250 tons, roughly the same size as the *Dreadnought*, and carries eight 12-inch guns. Her main armoured belt is 7 inches amidships, tapering to 4 inches at bow and stern. Her speed is 28 knots. The battle cruiser has been developed *pari passu* with the battleship, and tactically the value of her immensely superior speed has been proved, especially on the occasion of the battle off the Falkland Islands. Thus briefly has been set down the evolution of the modern capital ship in our own country. As every one is aware, our lead in this respect has been followed, not only by the great Powers of Europe, but by all the nations of the world which are anxious to maintain a navy. But of all those to whom this new departure proved a stimulus exciting them to increased activity in the matter of naval armaments, none proved so apt a pupil as did Germany. Her immense and newly-acquired wealth, her boundless ambition to lead the world in arms, her ill-concealed jealousy of Great Britain led her to follow where that country was leading.

In a few years the great mid-European Empire jumped from the fifth to the second place in the power of her military navy and the tonnage of her mercantile marine. To the largest and most powerful of modern conscripted armies she was bent on adding a navy with which to strike down that most hated of all her rivals, England. Methodically and with German thoroughness she set to work. Undaunted by the fact that even a *Dreadnought* cost one million sterling; that the doubling in size of the Kiel Canal for a purely strategical purpose ran away with uncounted gold; heedless that from one million the price of the capital ship had run up to two and half and three times the cost of the original unit, she pursued her way unrelenting. "For," said the Emperor William II., "the trident must be in our fist." With this laudable end in view the first of the German *Dreadnoughts* were laid down in 1907. These


four ships, though steady gun-platforms, were not eminently successful, as they drew fully a foot more than originally designed, and were very cramped for the accommodation of their large crews. Their twelve 45-calibre 11-inch guns throw a projectile weighing 675 pounds; their armoured protection is good, and their speed somewhat less than that of the *Dreadnought*. Following this (the Nassau class, 18,900 tons) came the *Helgolands*, four ships of 21,000 tons armed with twelve 12-inch guns. Next came the five *Kaisers* of 24,700 tons, carrying ten 12-inch guns, and then the *Königs*, 25,500 tons, with ten 12-inch guns. These were the most modern of their ships at the outbreak of the war, and also the first in which the keel-line superimposed turrets were introduced into the German Imperial Navy. There were building at this time three vessels of 28,000 tons, destined to be armed with eight 15-inch guns. Germany also embarked on the building of battle cruisers, of which the *Von der Tann* will be remembered as the show German ship at the Coronation Fleet Review of His Majesty King George at Spithead. She is 19,400 tons, and is armed with eight 11-inch guns. Her date is 1908, and she was followed by the *Moltke* and *Goeben*, of 23,000 tons, with ten 11-inch guns. Next came the *Seydlitz*, 25,000 tons, ten 11-inch guns, dating April 1912, and in 1913 the *Derfflinger* and *Lützow* and *Hertha*, of 28,000 tons, with eight 12-inch guns.

These facts concerning German battleships and German battle cruisers are important, showing as they do that not only was the enemy Navy inferior to that of England in numbers, but also that the units of which it was composed were not so powerful.

It was, of course, recognised that there was no chance of waging successful war against England at sea at the time war broke out, in August 1914; it is, in fact, fairly certain that the naval authorities were opposed to conflict at this date; but circumstances were too strong for them, and they had to accept the strife which they gladly would have avoided. With that thoroughness and far-

sighted wisdom with which German plans were laid, there was, as far back as 1912, a scheme for the construction and maintenance of a foreign service fleet, which was to surpass in strength and in numbers that of any other nation whatsoever, not excluding England. Great as the calamity of war has been, it would have been far greater had this plan been allowed time to come to fruition. We all know the difficulty, and the cost in precious lives and in treasure, that those ships of the enemy which were in foreign waters

equality, and a few more years would have given them what they so much desired. But the real rulers of Germany were the soldiers and not the sailors, and the military caste has all along regarded the adventure of the building of the Fleet with a jealous and suspicious eye. To begin with, the new arm swallowed an immense number of millions of marks per annum, and to continue, it withdrew from the military machine a certain portion of the population which they considered would have been more usefully



THE VON DER TANN (P. 7).

at the outbreak of hostilities cost us before they were rounded up and destroyed. Had Germany then, as she intended to have had in the near future, possessed a squadron of 30-knot 30,000-ton battle cruisers in the out-seas, the problem would have been intensified to an enormous degree both for Great Britain and for her Allies. As it was, at the beginning of the war, the German Fleet was immobilised, with the exception of those vessels that were actually abroad at the time. It had been the hope of the Kaiser and his naval supporters all along that war might be delayed until they could meet England at sea with such force as would mean a reasonable

employed on land. As, however, it was the whim of "the All-Highest," they shrugged their shoulders and submitted to fate and the demands of Grand Admiral von Tirpitz. It will be a nice point for future historians and strategists to decide as to whether the Fleet of Germany was of sufficient value to her in war to justify the enormous expenditure of its inception and upkeep.

As it was in the days of the great Napoleon, so it has been in our modern Armageddon, the enemy has attempted to wear down the resistance of Britain and her Dominions by means of a war on commerce. But even as Napoleon failed, so also have the Germans.



ADMIRAL SIR DAVID BEATTY, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE GRAND FLEET.

Injury and loss, of course, was inflicted, but in war success is only obtained by striking down the armed forces of the enemy. There is no doubt, however, that the continued inactivity of the German Fleet was one of the prime surprises of the war. No one will deny to the officers and men of that force that they possess the attribute of personal bravery to as full an extent as their comrades on land who gave so many proofs of their heroism. Still, as the months went by, men wondered. It is quite possible that they might not have done so had it not been for the brag and the swagger of the pre-war days. We heard then so much of the headlong offensive, of closing with the enemy, of mad daring rushes by the torpedo flotillas, that when peace was succeeded by the real thing, when the theory of war on the water was to be put into practice, there is no doubt that we were amazed. It is perhaps too much to say that the public expected a general action at the very inception of hostilities, but no doubt what it did *not* expect was that these mad daring heroes should dig themselves in and remain absolutely immobile behind the lines of their defended harbours.

That it was no want of pluck and enterprise on the part of the fighting men we can all readily concede ; but what had happened was that the Great General Staff, fully occupied with a war on two frontiers, had neither the time nor the inclination to think out a plan of co-ordination with the Fleet. Even had they been free to take the matter into consideration it is difficult to say what they could have done, as the problem was that insoluble one of attempting to make a boy do the work of a strong man. The problem at sea was further complicated by the fact that allied to England was France, whose Fleet “contained” the ships of Austria-Hungary with the same ease as did the Grand Fleet of Admiral Jellicoe “contain” the squadrons of the Fatherland ; and last of all there was the fleet of Russia, that could by no means be disregarded either in the Baltic or the Black Sea.

When a man is abnormally clever and

absolutely unencumbered with scruples it is certain that he will have success in the world ; he may at some period of his career be tripped up and handed over to the unsympathetic myrmidons of the law, who will not be the least affected by his pathetic plea of necessity, which, he will observe, knows no law. Necessity was the plea of our enemy when he entered on his infamous campaign of sea murder by means of his submarines. Learned jurists have informed us, by the medium of grave and responsible newspapers, that the term “pirate” should not be applied to the men who torpedoed our merchant ships, who sank fishing smacks with their entire crews, who blew up a refugee ship filled with women and children, who fired at, but fortunately missed, a hospital ship, who also performed many other deeds of a similar character that it is not necessary to specify. The German nation and its rulers behaved collectively, under the stress of war, as the man we have spoken of behaved. For this great and civilised Power gave out cynically and shamelessly that the end justified the means, that they were determined to starve Great Britain into surrender, and that they were quite indifferent to all laws human and divine, always supposing that their object were accomplished. The psychological problem, that of the state of mind of a people who until the test of war came were supposed to be reasonably humane, is not one into which it is possible to enter in this volume. It is, however, permissible to remark that it is curious so acute a nation should have dreamt that the conquest of the world was to be accomplished by the negation of all morality, by disregard for the laws of war, by the utter suppression of the chivalric idea concerning the enemy. History records many acts of cruelty and tyrannous oppression practised by one nation at the expense of another. But these acts were performed for the most part before civilisation had been introduced among the dwellers in Europe ; and further than this, it has always been the case that a nation so conquered and oppressed has had to be held down by armed force, lest

happily its wretched inhabitants should rise and seek death rather than the misery ordained for them by their conquerors. It was "world dominance or nothing" that the enemy sought to gain; according to his militarist prophet nothing less would satisfy him; and on sea as well as on land it was to

be obtained by the methods of "frightfulness"; and the world has been shocked and appalled by the spectacle of cold-blooded murder being wrought, amid the applause of those who set in motion the legions and the ships of the nation that boasted of the leading place it held in all the arts of peace

CHAPTER II

THE BATTLE OF THE HELIGOLAND BIGHT

It has been one of the surprises of this war that the Germans have been in the habit of announcing beforehand the procedure that they intended to adopt. Those who had studied the pronouncements of German naval writers in the years preceding hostilities awaited the onset, the headlong offensive that they had been taught to expect; but they waited in vain. There was a reason, and a good one, for this. The enemy had always counted on hostilities breaking out at her own "selected moment"; of catching the Fleet of Great Britain unawares. It does not argue much for the intelligence of the people who thought that England's Navy could be caught napping, but that is by the way. There can be little doubt that the "Marineamt" in Berlin reckoned on repeating the *coup* carried out by the Japanese at Port Arthur, on February 8, 1904, when the Russian battleships were torpedoed at anchor. But the Germans were not given the chance. Very fortunately a complete mobilisation of the British Fleet had taken place in July, with the result that—from the naval point of view—England was ready and waiting.

His Majesty the King, on August 5, 1914, communicated to the senior naval officer at all stations the following message:

"At this grave moment in our national history I send to you, and through you to the officers and men of the fleets of which you have assumed command, the assurance of my confidence that under your direction they will revive and renew the old glories

of the Royal Navy, and prove once more the sure shield of Britain and her Empire in the hour of trial."

It would have been impossible to improve upon this message, so simple, so direct, and so inspiring, and the Fleet to whom it was addressed felt that not only was here the King Emperor addressing his subjects, but also that sailor was speaking to sailor. On the same date as that of the proclamation of the message of His Majesty, the Admiralty issued the following appointments:

"With the approval of His Majesty the King, Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., has assumed supreme command of the Home Fleets, with the acting rank of Admiral, and Rear-Admiral Charles E. Madden, C.V.O., has been appointed to be his Chief of the Staff."

On Monday, August 3, 1914, the *London Gazette* published the following proclamation:

1. Men of the Royal Naval Reserve and Royal Fleet Reserve, and officers and men of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, are called out "into actual service."

2. Officers of the Royal Naval Reserve are called out "for actual service."

3. The term of service of time-expired men in the Royal Navy is extended for five years, should their services be so long required.


4. The Admiralty may requisition for use as transports, and for similar purposes, any British ship or British vessel within the British Isles, "or the waters adjacent thereto"; payment on terms to be agreed afterwards to be made for such use.

This was followed by a supplementary proclamation: "For extending the services of time-expired men in the Royal Navy." An Admiralty notice calling out the reserves had been published in the *Times* on the previous day.

It is necessary here to say a few words concerning the Naval Reserve. The establishment of officers of the Royal Naval Reserve on the Active List is fixed by Order in Council, and the numbers authorised from time to time are published by the Admiralty. The classes of officers are: Commanders, Lieutenants, Sub-Lieutenants,

they possess either an ordinary Master's Certificate, or provisional Certificate of competency as Master.

Royal Naval Reserve Officers are called out for actual service by the issue of the Proclamation followed by the issue of a notice through the Registrar-General to each officer whom the Admiral Commanding thinks fit to call upon to join, at a time and place to be fixed by such notice. They will be liable to serve during the continuance of any national emergency, or until discharged by the direction of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.



THE *AMPHION* STRIKES A MINE.

Midshipmen, Senior Engineers, Engineers, Assistant Engineers, Warrant Officers, Staff Paymasters, Paymasters, and Assistant Paymasters. The officers of the Royal Naval Reserve rank with, but after, officers of the Royal Navy, and of the Royal Indian Marine of their corresponding ranks. The regulations provide that no applicant will be appointed to this force who is not a British subject. Second and third mates of British ocean-going passenger steamers, and fourth mates of such steamers if over 5000 tons gross, are eligible to become Sub-Lieutenants, provided that (a) they have served not less than six years at sea, excluding time of apprenticeship; (b) that they bear a very good character; (c) that

The Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve is divided into Divisions stationed for purposes of drill and command at the following places: London, Clyde, Mersey, Sussex, Tyneside, and Bristol. The volunteers are instructed by Commander Instructors, all of whom are retired naval officers.

We had not very long to wait after the declaration of war to have an indication of the purpose of the enemy. On August 6, H.M.S. *Amphion* and the third torpedo flotilla came up with the Hamburg-Amerika passenger steamer, *Königin Luise*, of 2163 tons and 20-knot speed, which vessel was employed in laying mines. Summoned to surrender she attempted to escape, and was sunk by gunfire. But her loss to the enemy

was more than made up to them the following day, when H.M.S. *Amphion* struck a mine and foundered. On this occasion the forepart of the ship was completely shattered, and of those who lost their lives, consisting of Paymaster Gedge and over 100 men, nearly all were destroyed by the explosion. Twenty German prisoners who were confined in the forepart of the ship also perished; the captain, 16 officers, and 135 men were saved. The *Amphion* was one of a class of three light cruisers of 3440 tons, dating from March 1911. She was armed with ten 4-inch 31-pounder guns, and carried two torpedo tubes for discharging the latest pattern of 21-inch torpedo; her speed was 27 knots. This first instance of the power of the modern floating mine showed how deadly is the effect of these contrivances, as the *Amphion's* bow was literally blown off, and she sank immediately. Her loss was immediately made good by a vessel building for Chile in a private yard. It was the first indication in the war at sea how costly in human life the combat was likely to prove. As we have seen, over one hundred and twenty persons perished in the *Amphion*, not drowned, but blown into fragments by the detonation of the mine.

During the course of the war we have heard a great deal concerning German submarines, especially, of course, since the famous declaration of the submarine blockade of our country on February 18, 1915. Germany, with her usual hard-headed practical economy, did not begin the building of under-water craft until long after other maritime Powers. She waited and allowed them to develop at the expense of England, France, and the United States of America. When they reached what the eminently practical Teuton regarded as the useful—as opposed to the experimental and preliminary—stage, he began to build on his own account. At first, however, in the early stages of the war, when apparently all was going well on land, the use of these craft was confined to the legitimate object of the destruction of the warships of the foe; what

it was afterwards we shall come to in due time.

On Sunday, August 9, an attack was made by German submarines on the first light cruiser squadron, but this ended disastrously for the foe, as the only result was the sinking of the *U15*. The First Lord of the Admiralty subsequently telegraphed to the Lord Mayor of Birmingham: "Birmingham will be proud to learn that the first German submarine destroyed in the war was sunk by H.M.S. *Birmingham*." The sinking of the *Königin Luise* in the neighbourhood of the estuary of the Thames, a vessel which was carrying some four or five hundred mines, demonstrated at once the reliance that the enemy placed on this form of maritime destruction. Reckless as to whom he destroyed, he sowed his mines broadcast, certain that whatever ship was sunk it was not likely to belong to his own mercantile marine, which ceased to use the seas as soon as war was declared. At one fell swoop some five million tons of shipping had been cut off from, and had ceased to traverse, the ocean, and sea communication between Germany and the rest of the world was at an end. The British Admiralty lost not a moment in countering the terrible danger to shipping that was offered by mines; and a special section of the Royal Naval Reserve was mobilised for mine-sweeping. At the beginning of the war there were 142 officers and 1136 men employed on this duty alone, and, as time went on and the nuisance became intensified, these numbers were very largely increased.

These officers and these men came, for the most part, from our fishing population, and to no class of fighters does the kingdom owe more than to them. The work was at one and the same time incredibly hard and appallingly dangerous, yet these gallant fellows faced winter gales, spring fogs, and summer suns while they fished for mines as unconcernedly as if they had been turbot. Considering the nature of this occupation it is wonderful how few, comparatively, were lost. Yet there were men who were blown

up and who unconcernedly shipped in another mine-sweeper, some not only once but two and even three times. The British fisherman, whatever else he may lack, cannot be described as wanting in nerve!

Although as peaceful traders the merchant ships of Germany had ceased to sail the seas, there were still many vessels which it was necessary the British Navy should destroy before our own commerce could resume uninterrupted communication between the United Kingdom and the rest of the world. There were enemy squadrons for which to account; there were armed merchant cruisers which had to be captured or sunk; and in the outer seas things were happening. On August 27, 1914, the First Lord of the Admiralty made the following statement to the House of Commons:

“The Admiralty have just received intelligence that the German armed merchant cruiser, *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*, of 14,000 tons, and armed according to our information with ten guns of, approximately, 4-inch calibre, has been sunk by H.M.S. *Highflyer* off the Oro River, on the west coast. This is the vessel which has been endeavouring to arrest traffic between this country and the Cape, and is one of the few German armed auxiliary cruisers which have succeeded in getting to sea. The survivors were landed before the vessel sank.”

On the same evening the Press Bureau issued the following: “Admiralty to *Highflyer*—Bravo! You have rendered a service not only to Britain but to the peaceful commerce of the world. The German officers and crew appear to have carried out their duties with humanity and restraint, and are therefore worthy of all seamanlike consideration.” The *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* had captured and sunk the New Zealand Shipping Company’s vessel, *Kaipara*. The big German ship was caught while coaling and put up a gallant defence; also the Captain transferred his prisoners from the *Kaipara* to the colliers before the action began—a humane action in startling contrast to the usual practice of his fellow-countrymen.

On August 19 it was reported from the Admiralty, through the Press Bureau, that “a certain liveliness” was noticeable in the North Sea. Enemy vessels, it appeared, had ventured out of their fortified harbours, and cruisers under the black, white, and red ensign had exchanged shots at long distances with British destroyers, which latter vessels had invited their larger antagonists to leave the shelter of the shore and chase them out into the open water. These invitations were, however, declined; the cruisers were not to be decoyed, and the main Fleet made no demonstration at all. Then in the third week of August a sweep was made of the waters lying between England and Germany, but nothing was swept up—Admiral von Ingenohl and all his ships preferring the sanctity of the fortified ports and the Kiel Canal to those spaces where his enemy ranged uncontrolled. These preliminaries on the part of our Fleet led up to what is known as the Battle of the Heligoland Bight—an action which inflicted considerable damage on the foe, and showed the sterling metal of our officers and men who were there engaged.

There are four official despatches on which to base the account of this action: those of Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, K.C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O., H.M.S. *Lion*; of Rear-Admiral Arthur H. Christian, M.V.O., H.M.S. *Euryalus*; of Commodore Reginald Y. Tyrwhitt, H.M.S. *Arethusa*; and Commodore Roger J. B. Keyes, C.B., M.V.O., H.M.S. *Maidstone*. The two last-named officers commanded respectively the destroyer and submarine forces.

The opening paragraph of the despatch of Commodore Keyes calls first for notice. He says: “Three hours after the declaration of war, submarines E6, Lieutenant-Commander Cecil P. Talbot, and E8, Lieutenant-Commander Francis H. H. Goodhart, proceeded unaccompanied to carry out a reconnaissance in the Heligoland Bight. These two vessels returned with useful information, and had the privilege of being the pioneers on a service which is attended by some risk.”

The word *naïveté* is described in the dictionary as "native unaffected simplicity and ingenuousness," and we can certainly attribute this quality to the commodore of the submarines when he describes the adventure of E6 and E8 as being "attended by some risk"! The next paragraph of his despatch is almost equally interesting: "During the transportation of the Expeditionary Force the *Lurcher* and *Firedrake* (destroyers), and all the submarines of the eighth submarine flotilla, occupied positions from which they could have attacked the High Sea Fleet, had it emerged to dispute the passage of our transports. The patrol was maintained day and night without relief, until the personnel of our Army had been transported and all chance of effective interference had disappeared."

No doubt this danger from submarines had been reckoned with by the enemy. All the same it seems extraordinary that the mighty Fleet of Germany submitted tamely to the spectacle of the transport of our troops, without any sort of effort to prevent them reaching France and reinforcing our ally. Had we not been regaled in time of peace—*ad nauseam*, it may be said—with tales of the terrible offensive that was to be taken by the German Navy on the outbreak of war, of the "mad daring hussar strokes" that were to be performed, we should not perhaps have been so much surprised at this prudence as we were. But apart altogether from the psychological aspect of the affair, it seems strange indeed that no determined and concerted attack was ever made while our soldiers were being transported to the Continent. The despatch continues:

"These submarines have since been incessantly employed on the enemy's coast in the Heligoland Bight and elsewhere, and have obtained much valuable information regarding the composition and movement of his patrols. They have occupied his waters and reconnoitred his anchorages, and, while so engaged, have been subjected to skilful and well-executed anti-submarine tactics, hunted for hours at a time by

torpedo craft, and attacked by gunfire and torpedoes."

We can gather from this sketch of the activities of our submarines during the early days of the war that those by whom they were manned were certainly performing "a service which was attended by some risk"; also that the handling of these craft by the young officers in command must have been as skilful as it was daring. The submarine commander is "made" by training in this particular unit of the Fleet; but in addition to this he is also "born," in the sense that all above-water sailormen are not found to be equally efficient when entrusted with the management of the craft which has to exchange the free air of heaven for blind groping beneath the surface of the sea.

Before proceeding with the description of the operations in Heligoland Bight attention may be drawn to a paragraph in the despatch of Commodore Keyes, which is eloquent of the acute discomforts, as well as the ever-present dangers, to which those engaged in the submarine service are exposed. He says:


"During the exceptionally heavy westerly gales which prevailed between the 14th and 21st September, the position of the submarines on a lee shore, within a few miles of the enemy's coast, was an unpleasant one. The short steep seas which accompany westerly gales in the Heligoland Bight made it difficult to keep the conning tower hatches open. There was no rest to be obtained, and even when cruising at a depth of 60 feet the submarines were rolling considerably and pumping—*i.e.* vertically moving—about 20 feet. I submit that it was creditable to the commanding officers that they should have maintained their stations under such conditions."

Here, in a few words, we get a perfectly clear picture of what life in a submarine is under bad weather conditions. Boxed up in their steel cigar, rolling and "pumping" even when submerged to a depth of 60 feet, unable to open their hatches to admit fresh air, these gallant fellows hung on for a week under conditions which must have rendered

life altogether intolerable. The commodore considers their action "creditable." No one will disagree with his verdict. But perhaps those not bound by the invincible modesty of this least dithyrambic of commodores, might be permitted to substitute for "creditable" another adjective, to wit, magnificent.

At midnight on August 26 Commodore

morning. At daylight on August 28 the *Lurcher* and *Firedrake* searched the area through which the battle cruisers were to advance, for hostile submarines, and then proceeded towards Heligoland in the wake of submarines E6, E7, and E8, which were exposing themselves with the object of inducing the enemy to chase them to the



AT MIDNIGHT, AUGUST 26, THE *LURCHER*, *FIREDRAKE*, AND SUBMARINES PROCEEDED TO TAKE PART IN THE OPERATIONS IN THE HELIGOLAND BIGHT.

Keyes embarked in the *Lurcher*, and, proceeded in company with the *Firedrake* and submarines D2, D8, E4, E5, E6, E7, E8, and E9 of the eighth submarine flotilla, to take part in the operations in the Heligoland Bight arranged for August 28. The destroyers scouted for the submarines until nightfall on the 27th, when the latter proceeded independently to take up various positions from which they could co-operate with the destroyer flotillas on the following

westward. On approaching Heligoland, the visibility, which had been very good to seaward, reduced to 5000 to 6000 yards, and this added considerably to the anxieties and responsibilities of the commanding officers of submarines, who handled their vessels with coolness and judgment in an area which was necessarily occupied by friends as well as foes. Low visibility and calm sea are most unfavourable conditions under which submarines can operate, and no opportunity

occurred of closing with the enemy's cruisers to within torpedo range. Lieutenant-Commander Ernest W. Leir, commanding submarine E4, witnessed the sinking of the German torpedo-boat destroyer U187 through his periscope, and, observing a cruiser of the Stettin class (a class of three light cruisers, 3450 tons, armed with ten 4.1-inch guns, speed 25 knots) close, and open fire on the British destroyers which had lowered their boats to pick up the survivors, he proceeded to attack the cruiser, but she altered course before he could get within range. After covering the retirement of our destroyers, which had had to abandon their boats, he returned to the latter, and embarked a lieutenant and nine men of *Defender*, who had been left behind. The boats also contained two officers and eight men of U187, who were unwounded, and eighteen men who were badly wounded. As he could not embark the latter, Lieutenant-Commander Leir left one of the officers and six unwounded men to navigate the British boats to Heligoland. Before leaving he saw that they were provided with water, biscuit, and a compass. One German officer and two men were made prisoners of war. This portion of the commodore's report ends with the following words: "Lieutenant-Commander Leir's action in remaining on the surface in the vicinity of the enemy, and in a visibility which would have placed his vessel within easy range of an enemy appearing out of the mist, was altogether admirable. This enterprising and gallant officer took part in the reconnaissance which supplied the information on which these operations were based, and I beg to submit his name, and that of Lieutenant-Commander Talbot, the Commanding Officer of E6, who exercised patience, judgment, and skill in a dangerous position, for the favourable consideration of their Lordships."

The action of the Heligoland Bight is referred to in the official despatch of Rear-Admiral A. H. Christian, as "a reconnaissance in force with the object of attacking the enemy's light cruisers and destroyers."

Sir David Beatty reports from *Lion* flagship of battle cruiser squadron that, "at 4 A.M. on August 28 the movements of the flotillas commenced as previously arranged, the battle cruiser squadron and light cruiser squadron supporting. The Rear-Admiral *Invincible*, with *New Zealand* and four destroyers, having joined my flag, the squadron passed through the prearranged rendezvous."

Commodore Tyrwhitt reports that, "at 5 A.M. on Thursday, August 27, I sailed in *Arethusa* in company with first and third flotillas (of destroyers) except *Hornet*, *Tigress*, *Hydra*, and *Loyal*, to carry out prearranged operations. *Fearless* joined the flotillas at sea that afternoon."

It may here be mentioned that the *Arethusa* was a brand-new ship, only forty-eight hours out of the hands of the dockyard. Consequently she went into action with a crew strange to their officers, with all hands ignorant of the capabilities of the craft in which they were serving. As a rule, a newly commissioned ship takes time to perform the operation known as "shaking down"; in the case of the *Arethusa* she went straight into action almost before there had been time to tell off the ship's company to their stations. The manner in which she was handled, the behaviour of all on board in a hardly-contested fight in which she came in for more than her share of hard knocks, is an eloquent testimony, not only to the individual efficiency and gallantry of her crew, but also to the service which can produce such battle efficiency with no notice at all.

There is no doubt that what men and women principally desire when hearing of warlike operations is the personal touch; the actual testimony of one who was there, speaking freely and unrestrainedly as one friend to another. The grave and measured language of despatches leaves much to be desired. The voice of the higher command speaking to official chiefs, who in their turn represent the nation, must necessarily be confined to generalities to a large extent, and is bound to lack a warm, intimate, and human

touch. With whatever skill they may be compiled we are conscious that much remains to be told. We long for those more graphic details which can only be supplied from a private source. Floods of ink have been poured out over miles upon miles of paper concerning all the happenings of the war ; but there has been nothing written which is more graphic, more illuminating, more entirely satisfying, from every point of view, than a letter from an officer serving in a destroyer to the *Morning Post*. It is concerned with the battle of the Heligoland Bight, and we take the liberty here to reproduce it *in extenso*. There is in this remarkable document so much to admire. As narrative it is absolutely first-class, for we live and move for the time being with the author ; we sympathise with his every mood, we note his frank admiration of his captain, who gives him " the impression of a Nelson officer who has lived in a state of suspended animation since, but yet has kept pace with the times, and is nowise perturbed at finding his frigate a destroyer." When they swing round at right angles and charge full speed at the enemy, you seem actually to see the white water boiling around the rudders and to hear the thresh of the screws driven by those racing oil-fired turbine engines. The whole is informed with a gentle humour and a real solemnity that is infinitely attractive, and the manner of the telling of this epic tale is as attractive as the matter. Also we note how the writer never, through it all, loses his sense of proportion, and speaks quite rightly of the whole business as " an affair of outposts." Such writing as this deserves more than ephemeral existence, even in the columns of a great London daily. Let readers of this chronicle now decide whether too much praise has been given to an anonymous communication to the press.

" As to our fight off Heligoland, I must be guarded in my statements, even uncensored. But I think I can say that the papers are magnifying what was really but an affair of outposts. We destroyers went in and lured the enemy out, and had lots of excitement.

The big fellows then came up and did some excellent target practice, and we were very glad to see them come ; but they ought not to consider we had a fight, because it was a massacre, not a fight. It was superb generalship having overwhelming forces on the spot, but there was really nothing for them to do except shoot the enemy, even as Pa shoots pheasants. For us who put up the quarry in its lair there was no doubt more to do than ' shoot the enemy,' for in our case the shooting was passive and not active only ! For that very reason the fight did us of the destroyers more good than it did our big fellows, for my humble opinion, based on limited observation, is that no ship is really herself until she has been under fire. The second time she goes into action you may judge her character ; she is not likely to do normally well the first time. We all need to be stiffened and then given a week or two to take it all in. After that we are ' set.' A ship will always do better her second action. To see the old *Fearless* charging around the field of fight (it was her second engagement), seeking fresh foes, was most inspiring. Till the big brothers came up she was absolutely all in all to us, and she has no bigger guns than we have. I also learn that there is all the difference in the world between a 4-inch gun in a cruiser and a 4-inch gun in a destroyer. I would regard a cruiser armed with a 3-inch as about a match for a destroyer with a 4-inch ; but then I have personally only looked at it from the destroyer point of view. But it must be more unpleasant to have half-a-dozen shots plumped accurately and together at you with a well-arranged ' fire control ' guiding them, watching their fall and applying corrections to the range scientifically and dispassionately, rather than to have isolated shots banged off from a vibrating, pulsing destroyer, turning this way and that, with no one to look where the shot falls, except perhaps the Captain, who has a lot of other things to attend to. We have no spare personnel and no range-finder, and no masts to look down from ; and no destroyer to-day will ever engage a cruiser, even of the

lightest, by the daylight, save at a very great disadvantage and with very great risk to herself.

"Have you ever noticed a dog rush in on a flock of sheep and scatter them? He goes for the nearest and barks, and it goes so much faster than the flock that it bunches up with its companions; the dog then barks at another, and the sheep spread out fan-wise, so that all round in front of the dog there is a semicircle of sheep and behind him none. That was much what we did at 7 A.M. the 28th. The sheep were the German torpedo craft, who fell back just on the limits of range and tried to lure us within fire of the Heligoland forts. *Pas si bête!* but a cruiser came out and engaged our *Arethusa*; they had a real heart-to-heart talk while we looked on, and a few of us tried to shoot at the enemy, too, though it was beyond our distance. We were getting nearer and nearer Heligoland all the time; there was a thick mist, and I expected every minute to find the forts on the Island bombarding us; so *Arethusa* presently drew off, after landing at least one good shell on the enemy. Seeing our papers admit it, so may I; our fellows got a quite nasty 'tummy'-ache. The enemy gave every bit as good as he got there. We then re-formed, but a strong destroyer belonging to the submarines got chased, and *Arethusa* and *Fearless* went back to look after her, and we presently heard a hot action astern. So the Captain who was in command of the flotilla turned us round and we went back to help, but they had driven the enemy off, and on our arrival told us to form up on the *Arethusa*. When we had partly formed and were very much bunched together, a fine target, suddenly out of the 'everywhere' arrived five or six shells not 150 yards away. We gazed at whence they came, and again five or six stabs of fire pierced the mist, and we made out a four-funnelled cruiser of the Breslau class. Those five stabs were her guns going off, of course. We waited fifteen seconds, and the shots and the noise of the guns arrived pretty well simultaneously, 50 yards away.

Her next salvo went over us, and I personally ducked as they whirred overhead like a covey of fast partridges. You would have supposed the Captain had done this sort of thing all his life; he gives me the impression of a Nelson officer who has lived in a state of suspended animation since, but yet has kept pace with the times, and is nowise perturbed at finding his frigate a destroyer. He went full speed ahead at once at the first salvo to string the bunch out and thus offer less target, and the Commodore from the *Arethusa* made a signal to us to attack with torpedoes.

"So we swung round at right angles and charged full speed at the enemy, like a Hussar attack. We got away at the start magnificently, and led the field so that all the enemy's firing was aimed at us for the next ten minutes. When we got so close that the *débris* of their shells fell on board we altered course, and so threw them out in their reckoning of our speed, and they had all their work to do over again. You follow, that with a destroyer coming at you at 30 knots it means that the range is decreasing at the rate of about 150 yards per ten seconds. When you see that your last shot fell, say, 100 yards short, you put up 100 extra yards on your sights, but this takes five seconds to do. . . . When you have in this way discovered his speed you put that correction in automatically; a cruiser can do this, a destroyer has not the room for the complicated apparatus involved. . . . Humanly speaking, therefore, the Captain by twisting and turning at the psychological moment saved us; actually I feel we are in God's keeping these days. After ten minutes we got near enough to fire our torpedo, and then turned back to *Arethusa*. Next our follower arrived just where we had been, and fired his torpedo, and, of course, the enemy fired at him, instead of at us—what a blessed relief! It was like coming out of a really hot and oppressive orchid-house into the cool air of a summer garden. A 'hot' fire is properly descriptive; it seems actually to be hot!

"After the destroyers came the *Fearless*, and she stayed on the scene, and soon we

found she was engaging a three-funneller, the *Mainz*. So off we started again to go for the *Mainz*, the situation being, I take it, that crippled *Arethusa* was too 'tummy'-aching to do anything but be defended by us, her children. Scarcely, however, had we started (I did not feel the least like another gruelling) when from out the mist and across our front in furious pursuit came the first cruiser squadron, the town class, *Birmingham*, etc., each unit a match for three *Mainz*, and as we looked and reduced speed they opened fire, and the clear bang, bang of their guns was just a cooling drink ! To see a real big four-funneller spouting flame, which flame denoted shells starting and those shells not aimed at us but for us, was the most cheerful thing possible. Even as Kipling's infantryman under heavy fire cries 'The Guns, thank Gawd, the Guns,' when his own artillery had come into action over his head, so did I feel as those 'Big Brothers' came careering across.

"Once we were in safety I hated it. We had just been having our own imaginations stimulated on the subject of shells striking us, and now a few minutes later to see another ship not three miles away reduced to a piteous mass of unrecognisability, wreathed in black fumes from which flared out angry goutts of fire, like Vesuvius in eruption, as an unending stream of hundred-pound shells burst on board ; it just pointed the moral and showed us what might have been ! The *Mainz* was immensely gallant. The last I saw of her absolutely wrecked alow and aloft, her whole midships a fuming inferno. She had one gun forward and one aft still spitting forth fury and defiance, 'like a wild cat mad with wounds.' Our own four-funnelled friend recommenced at this juncture with a couple

of salvos, but rather half-heartedly ; and we really did not care a d—, for there, straight ahead of us in lordly procession, like elephants walking through a pack of 'pi-dogs,' came the *Lion*, *Queen Mary*, *Invincible*, and *New Zealand*, our battle cruisers. Great and grim and uncouth as some antediluvian monsters, how solid they looked, how utterly earthquaking ! We pointed out our latest aggressor to them, whom they could not see from where they were, and they passed down the field of battle with the little destroyers on their left and the destroyed on their right, and we went west while they went east, and turned north between poor four-funnels and her home, and just a little later we heard the thunder of their guns for a space, then all silence, and we knew. Then wireless—'*Lion* to all Ships and Destroyers : Retire.'

"That was all. Remain only little details ; only one of which will I tell you. The most romantic, dramatic, and piquant episode that modern war can ever show. The *Defender*, having sunk an enemy, lowered a whaler to pick up her swimming survivors ; before the whaler got back an enemy's cruiser came up and chased the *Defender*, and thus she abandoned her whaler. Imagine their feelings ; alone in an open boat without food, 25 miles from the nearest land, and that land the enemy's fortress, with nothing but fog and foes around them. Suddenly a swirl alongside and up, if you please, pops His Britannic Majesty's submarine E4, opens his conning tower, takes them all on board, shuts up again, dives, and brings them home 250 miles ! Is not that magnificent ? No novel would dare face the critics with an episode like that in it, except, perhaps, Jules Verne ; and all true ! "

CHAPTER III

Eg torpedoes *Hela*—Loss of *Pegasus* at Zanzibar—Action between *Carmania* and *Cap Trafalgar*—Torpedoing and loss of *Aboukir*, *Hogue*, and *Cressy*—Naval Division at Antwerp—Capture of nine German merchant ships by *Cumberland*—Eg sinks German destroyer off the Ems River—Sinking of the *Hawke*—Action with and destruction of four German torpedo destroyers—Monitors on Belgian coast.

CONTROVERSY, both before and during the war, raged around the relative merits of the battleship and the submarine. Facts are stubborn things and speak for themselves, and those who pinned their faith on the under-water craft seemed for a time to be justified in the faith that they held; besides, had they not the backing of no less an authority than Admiral Sir Percy Scott in his famous letter to the *Times* of June 6, 1914?

We have here, however, to record facts, not to discuss theories. All the same, it may be permissible to remark that much more was seen of the effectiveness of the torpedo and the mine than of the heavy ship and the gun; but for this there was a very adequate reason. Advancing our story six months, we find that the enemy announced his intention of torpedoing all ships found in what he was pleased to denominate "the war area." Few things are easier to accomplish than the torpedoing of an unresisting ship at sea. It resembles going into a fowl-yard and blowing a sitting hen to pieces with a twelve-bore! Because this was done—that is to say, the torpedoing of unarmed merchantmen—on a large scale the land folk lost, more or less, their sense of proportion with regard to the rival sea weapons.

Regarding the hostilities at sea we have to recollect that this war stands by itself in history. It is true that in old days England might be at war with France, or Spain, or whomsoever it might be; and yet people in rural England or Scotland or Wales or Ireland might scarcely be aware that battles were in progress. This conflict, on the contrary, has indeed been a war of nations; and there has been no man or woman so unintelligent, during its progress, as not to

know the terrible significance it held for them and theirs individually. No one was more alive to this fact than our remorseless and vigilant enemy; and as he could not face the might of the sea-power of the British Empire in the open, he sought by means of the mine and the torpedo, not only to redress the balance from the military point of view, but to equalise matters commercially by the destruction of the sea-borne commerce of our country.

On September 3, 1914, the Government issued the following notice: "A report from the Commanding Officer of H.M.S. *Speedy* states that the Steam Drifter *Linsdell* struck a mine this morning 30 miles off the East Coast and sank. A quarter of an hour later H.M.S. *Speedy* also struck a mine and sank." The casualties on this occasion numbered the skipper and four members of the crew of the *Linsdell* missing—the remainder of the crew had been picked up by the *Speedy*—and one warrant officer, Mr. A. Bright, and two men seriously injured of the crew of the man-of-war. The *Speedy* was a torpedo gunboat of an old-fashioned type, and was at the outbreak of war employed on fishery protection duty in the North Sea. Immediately on the heels of this, on September 5, another catastrophe occurred, for H.M.S. *Pathfinder* struck a mine about twenty miles from the East Coast, and foundered with heavy loss of life. The *Pathfinder* was a greater loss to the country in every respect than was the *Speedy*. She was a light cruiser of 2940 tons, 25-knot speed, and mounted nine 4-inch guns. She was eleven years old, having been built at Birkenhead in 1903. The catastrophe took place off May Island, Firth of Forth, and it was reported at the time that the chief coastguard officer at May Island saw the



HOW THEY KEPT THE FLAG FLYING ON H.M.S. "PEGASUS."

explosion, and said that bodies and wreckage went quite 180 feet into the air.

On September 11, Admiral Patey, commanding the Australian Squadron, announced the occupation of Herbertshohe in the island of Neu Pommern (formerly New Britain), the largest island in the Bismarck Archipelago. This island lies due east from German New Guinea. A naval landing-party which proceeded to capture the wireless station some four miles inland was stoutly opposed, and the tower and station were somewhat damaged before they were taken. Two officers and four seamen were killed; one officer and three seamen wounded in this affair.

On September 16, Submarine E9 returned safely from the enemy coast, having torpedoed a German cruiser, believed to be the *Hela*, six miles south of Heligoland. The loss of this cruiser had been officially notified from Berlin, but until the return of E9 it was not known in what manner she had been destroyed. The submarine and her captain, Lieut.-Commander Max Kennedy Horton, arrived in Harwich Harbour, and was loudly cheered by the warships there assembled. She reported having sighted the *Hela* at ten o'clock on Sunday morning; she fired two torpedoes at her, one striking the cruiser's bow, and the other getting home amidships. The *Hela* burst into flames, and a number of German merchant vessels that were in the vicinity went to her assistance. She sank, however, within an hour. To the captain of E9 belongs the honour of having sunk the first enemy warship in the war by submarine acting alone.

On September 17 came the news that H.M.S. *Pegasus* had been disabled and sunk at anchor at Zanzibar by the German cruiser *Königsberg*, having 25 killed and 80 wounded out of her small company. The *Pegasus* was a light cruiser of an old type (dating from 1897) of 2135 tons, with a complement of 224. Her armament consisted of eight 4-inch and eight 3-pounder guns. She was lying in the harbour of

Zanzibar on the east coast of Africa effecting a refit when she was attacked by the *Königsberg*, a German light cruiser of 3400 tons, armed with ten 4.1-inch guns. The German was eight years more modern than the *Pegasus*, and outranged her with forty-calibre 4.1's. She had also the advantage of being under way, while her opponent was at anchor. She began shooting at 9000 yards ($4\frac{1}{2}$ miles), closed to 7000, and by the time she reached the shorter range had all the broadside guns of her antagonist disabled; that is to say, all those on the only broadside that she could bring to bear. Impotent to strike a blow in self-defence, the British cruiser hung on grimly, while one-half of her complement lay dead or wounded on her deck, which was converted into a veritable shambles in very few minutes. Her ensign was shot away, but was retrieved and held aloft by marines, standing defiantly on that blood-stained deck. The *Königsberg*, having completely disabled the *Pegasus*, made off, apparently fearing that other English ships were in the neighbourhood; while the British cruiser, after having been beached, was driven off by wind and tide and sank in deep water. Caught at a disadvantage, which rendered her practically a helpless target for the foe, the *Pegasus* acted according to the best traditions of the service to which she belonged. Overwhelmed by a fire to which she could not reply, she sank, it is true, but her assailant had not the satisfaction of seeing the White Ensign, which bears the blood-red cross of St. George and the Union Jack, lowered. Borne aloft in the hands of those valiant sea-soldiers—who have never failed the Navy yet, and who it may be confidently asserted never will—it waved over an unbeaten company who proved once again with what serenity the British seaman can die for the honour of his country and the glory of the flag that is his. There are times when defeat is more glorious than victory, and this we can claim most surely for Commander J. Ingles, and that very valiant company he commanded.

Single-ship actions have always had a fascination for the sailor; that is to say, when conditions are fairly equal and both ships are able to manœuvre.

From the very start of the war it was recognised by the Admiralty that to protect our trade routes it would be necessary to avail themselves of the services of armed merchant vessels. With an unbeaten German Navy to watch—and sink when opportunity offered—we had not sufficient cruisers for the purpose of safeguarding our commerce. In consequence many splendid ships were diverted from the paths of peace to take their place in the arbitrament of war. One of these, H.M.S. *Carmania*, a fine Cunarder of 19,524 tons, commanded by Captain Noel Grant, R.N., sighted off the coast of South America on September 14 the armed German merchantman *Cap Trafalgar*, who, at the time that she was made out by the *Carmania*, was engaged in coaling at sea. Instantly she cast off the colliers, and the three ships scattered in different directions; the *Cap Trafalgar*, after a preliminary attempt at escape, heading for the English ship. She was a brand-new liner of 18,170 tons, mounting eight 4-inch guns and pompoms. The action began at 8500 yards, and the ships gradually closed one another. Almost equally matched in armament and speed, both ships enormous targets, the battle was likely to go to the better seaman, and so it proved. When the range shortened to just over 3000 yards, Captain Grant found that he was in range of the pompoms, and hauled farther out, clear of this annoyance. The German gunners were firing five shots to the *Carmania's* one, and one hit which they scored proved very disagreeable to the English ship, as it started a fire under her fore-bridge which could not be then extinguished, as the fire-main (used for fire-extinguishing purposes) had been shot through. This fire became so bad that the ship had to be conned from the after-bridge. Captain Grant handled his big ship with the greatest ability and discretion, keeping her as far as possible

bows on, in which position he could use four guns. The action lasted an hour and forty minutes, when the *Cap Trafalgar* turned on her side and sank. No effort could be made on the part of the *Carmania* to pick up survivors, as she had immediately to turn her stern to the wind in order to grapple with the fire. She was hit by seventy-nine projectiles, which made three hundred and four holes. Nine men were killed and twenty-six wounded on board the ship. What the casualties were on board the *Cap Trafalgar* was never known, but one of the attendant colliers picked up and landed at Buenos Aires two hundred and seventy-nine officers and men. Under the Naval Prize Act the *Carmania* was awarded £2115 for the sinking of the *Cap Trafalgar*.

On September 22 it was reported that H.M. ships *Aboukir* (Captain John E. Wilmot), *Hogue* (Captain Wilmot S. Nicholson), and *Cressy* (Captain Robert W. Johnson), had been sunk by submarines in the North Sea. The *Aboukir* was torpedoed, and whilst the *Hogue* and *Cressy* had closed, and were standing by to save the crew, they also were torpedoed. A considerable number were saved by H.M.S. *Lowestoft* (Captain Theobald W. B. Kennedy), and by a division of destroyers, trawlers, and boats. The three ships sunk were armoured cruisers of an obsolescent type fourteen years old. They were 12,000 tons, 18-knot speed, and were armed with two 9.2 and twelve 6-inch guns. In this truly disastrous affair, 60 officers and 1400 men lost their lives. Neither *Trafalgar* nor any of the sea battles of the Nelsonian era can parallel this, the only record by which it is surpassed in history being the battle of Lepanto in 1571, when Don John of Austria defeated the forces of Solymán the Magnificent in the Eastern Mediterranean. The published despatches of Commander Nicholson of the *Cressy*, and Commander Norton of the *Hogue*, tell the whole story in detail, but for their despatches there is no room here. Suffice it to say that all the evidence went to show that the best traditions of the Service were acted up to, the

men obeying the orders of their officers to the last, not only before the ships sank, but actually while they were in the water. Many cases of individual gallantry were noticed, and Commander Norton reports that Farmstone, an Able Seaman of the *Hogue*, actually jumped overboard from the launch, where he was in safety, in order to make room for those whom he considered to be weaker than himself! To the great surprise of the Service no court-martial was held on the survivors of the three cruisers, to endeavour to elucidate the facts connected

by the Press Bureau. It was to the effect a Naval Division was to be formed of 15,000 men, divided into the First and Second Naval Brigades and the Royal Marine Brigade, and that the uniform to be worn was "naval uniform executed in khaki." Before this Naval Division—so called—had received any adequate training, a Brigade of 2200 of all ranks were sent across the sea to assist in the defence of Antwerp. They arrived on the night October 3-4, and immediately occupied the advanced trenches, in company with the 7th Belgian Regiment,



ABOUKIR, HOGUE, AND CRESSY TORPEDEED IN THE NORTH SEA.


with so serious a disaster to our arms at sea. The Germans claim, and the claim, so far as is known, has never been disputed, that all three vessels were torpedeed and sunk by one submarine. An elaborate description of the occurrence was published in a New York newspaper shortly after, giving a description by the submarine commander who accomplished the feat. The numbers saved from each ship were as follows: *Aboukir*, 17 officers, 237 men, total 254; *Cressy*, 14 officers, 190 men, total 204; *Hogue*, 29 officers, 352 men, total 381. Totals 60 officers, 779 men. Grand total 839.

On September 5 a communication from the Secretary of the Admiralty was published

facing Lierre, and another advanced post on the River Nethe, relieving some exhausted Belgian troops. The despatch of General Paris, C.B., commanding the Naval Division, relates that "the outer forts on this front had already fallen, and the bombardment of the trenches was in progress. This increased in violence during the night and early morning of October 5, when the advanced posts were driven in, and the enemy effected a crossing of the river, which was not under fire from the trenches." This was the beginning of the end, as "the few troops now capable of another counter-attack were unable to make any impression, and the position of the Marine Brigade became

untenable. The bombardment too was very violent, but the retirement of the Brigade was well carried out, and soon after mid-day (October 6) an intermediate position which had been hastily prepared was occupied. The two Naval Brigades reached Antwerp during the night October 5-6. The first brigade moved out in the afternoon of the 6th to assist the withdrawal of the main second line of defence. The retirement was

Much controversy ensued in England concerning the sending of untrained men to take part in so desperate an enterprise as this proved to be. The then First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. Winston Churchill, whom most persons held responsible for the move, made a spirited defence of his action in the House of Commons on November 16. On December 5 there was issued as a supplement to the *London Gazette*, a despatch from



THE NAVAL BRIGADE AT ANTWERP. BUILDING TRENCHES.

carried out during the night October 6-7, without opposition, and the Naval Division occupied the intervals between the forts on the second line of defence." On the 8th it became evident that the Belgians could hold the forts of the second line no longer, and General Paris considered that "to avoid disaster an immediate retirement under cover of darkness was necessary." The result of this retirement was that the First Naval Brigade, losing their way in the darkness, crossed the Dutch frontier, and were in consequence interned in Holland.

Field-Marshal Sir John French, Commander-in-Chief. After stating that "the force of Marines and Naval Brigades which assisted in the defence of Antwerp was handled by General Paris with great skill and boldness," the Field-Marshal proceeds: "Although the results did not include the actual saving of the fortress, the action of the force under General Paris certainly delayed the enemy for a considerable time, and assisted the Belgian Army to be withdrawn in a condition to enable it to reorganise and refit, and regain its value as a fighting force. The

destruction of war material and ammunition—which, but for the intervention of this force, would have proved of great value to the enemy—was thus able to be carried out. The assistance which the Belgian Army has rendered throughout the subsequent course of the operations on the canal and the Yser River has been a valuable asset to the Allied Cause, and such help must be regarded as an outcome of the intervention of General Paris's force. I am further of opinion that the moral effect produced on the minds of the Belgian Army by this necessarily desperate attempt to bring them succour, before it was too late, has been of great value to their use and efficiency as a fighting force."

To a desperate disease a desperate remedy was applied. It failed, and in consequence raised a storm of denunciation in this country. The failure, however, was most gallant, and it showed, as the Field-Marshal points out, that England was ready for any venture in her desire to help the sorely tried Belgians. Of one thing we may be certain, that no matter how much it was reprobated in England, the effort was fully appreciated in Belgium.

On September 30 the news came that Captain Cyril Fuller in H.M.S. *Cumberland* had captured the following enemy merchant steamers off the Cameroon River: the *Max Brock*, *Renata Ansinck*, *Paul Worman*, *Erna Worman*, *Henriette Worman*, *Aline Worman*, *Hans Worman*, and *Jeanette Worman*, all of the Worman line, and the *Arnfield* of the Hamburg-Amerika line. This was a notable haul as the total tonnage of these fine steamers amounted to 30,915. They were all in excellent order and running condition, containing valuable outward and homeward cargoes. At the same time the small gun-boat *Soden* was captured and recommissioned for British service. As the Worman fleet consisted of thirty vessels, that firm received a blow from which it will be difficult to recover. The *Emden*, to the career of which ship we shall presently come, was obliged to sink all her captures. The ships taken by Captain Fuller were added to the British Mercantile

Marine, and did good service for England as cargo-carriers after they were sent to the United Kingdom.

On October 7 the following announcement appeared. "The Admiralty announce that Submarine E9, Lieutenant-Commander Max Horton, has returned safely after having torpedoed and sunk a German torpedo boat destroyer off the Ems River." A Dutch paper, the *Nieuws Van Den*, reported the circumstances as follows: "This morning about eleven o'clock a German torpedo boat (all torpedo craft in the German service are called 'torpedo boats,' they have never adopted the term 'destroyer') was patrolling before the mouth of the River Ems at a distance of between ten and twelve kilometres north-east of the island (the Island of Schiermonnikoog), in clear weather, when suddenly an explosion was heard. The torpedo boat capsized and sank in three minutes. A short time afterwards two submarines were seen, but their nationality could not be observed, and it is possible that the German torpedo boat struck a German or an English mine and was afterwards assisted by German submarines. After a short time a German cruiser steamed to the place of the disaster and succeeded in saving a number of the crew." According to information subsequently disclosed, it appears that the German boat was travelling at a high rate of speed, which made Commander Horton's performance doubly meritorious. The sunken German was torpedo boat S126, a vessel ten years old built at Ebling. She was 420 tons displacement, 30-knot speed, and carried three 6-pounder guns in addition to her three torpedo tubes. It shows how close a watch our submarines were keeping on the enemy when we reflect that this occurrence took place at the very mouth of the Ems River.

On October 15 it was reported that "H.M.S. *Theseus* (Captain Hugh Edwards, R.N.) was attacked by submarines in the northern waters of the North Sea, but was missed. H.M.S. *Hawke* (Captain Hugh P. E. T. Williams, R.N.) was attacked at about

the same time and was sunk. In this disastrous affair nearly 500 officers and men lost their lives. Twenty men were saved from a raft, and the Aberdeen steam trawler *Ben Rinnes* landed at Aberdeen 48 survivors of the sunken warship. The *Hawke* was one of a class of five cruisers, built 1890-92, of 7350 tons, armament two 9.2 and ten 6-inch guns, speed 19.5 knots.

The extreme deadliness of naval warfare was exemplified in the case of the *Hawke*, as in the already noticed sinking of the three cruisers. The power of the modern high explosive is such that few ships that strike a mine or are struck by a torpedo survive to tell the tale. When either mine or torpedo gets right home, a hole 35 by 25 feet is an average result. Also there is no excitement of battle, none of "the thunder of the captains and the shouting," but a ship goes to her long home, stricken as with the dagger of the assassin from below.

A tendency which was prevalent during the continuance of hostilities, to describe such a ship as the *Hawke* as "of small military value" and merely to deplore the loss in men was distinctly unintelligent. If there be one lesson more plainly indicated than any other in the great war, it has been that no ship is a negligible unit that can be used for the discomfiture of the enemy.

Two days after the loss of the *Hawke* there came more cheering intelligence; for the light cruiser *Undaunted*, in company with the four destroyers *Lance*, *Lennox*, *Legion*, and *Loyal*, had engaged and sunk four German destroyers off the Dutch coast; and further, that it had been accomplished at very small cost, only one British officer and four men being wounded. There were thirty-one German survivors, prisoners of war. In this action we must give credit to the enemy, who fought most gallantly, although outnumbered and outgunned.

It was officially reported from Berlin that the German destroyers sunk were S115, S117, S118, S119. They were 350 tons displacement, and were armed with three

3-pounders and three torpedo tubes. Against them were pitted four of our newest L class destroyers of 807 tons, armed with three 4-inch guns and four torpedo tubes for the 21-inch torpedo; there was also the light cruiser *Undaunted*, of 3520 tons, armed with two 6-inch, six 4-inch semi-automatic guns, and four above-water torpedo tubes firing the 21-inch torpedo. In a description of this action, contributed to the *Times* by an officer of the *Undaunted*, it is stated that "our captain formed our flotilla on either bow, and once within effective range, our semi-automatic 4-inch guns blazed away, the destroyers acting independently. The German destroyers, seeing themselves cornered, altered their course, with the intention of obtaining a better strategic position. They opened fire on us, most of the shooting being aimed at the destroyers. Lusty cheers rang from our ships as the first German destroyer disappeared—a 6-inch shell struck her just below the bridge. She toppled over on her beam-ends like a wounded bird, then righted herself level with the water, and finally plunged bow first, all in the space of about two minutes. We had by this time closed in, and the enemy commenced firing their torpedoes. As best we could judge, they must have discharged at least eight, one missing our stern only by a few yards. At 2.55 P.M. the second of the enemy's vessels was seen to be out of action, being ablaze fore and aft, showing the fearful havoc our lyddite shells were making. As each shell hit its mark, funnels, bridge, torpedo tubes, and all the deck fittings disappeared like magic: dense fumes from the explosive, the deadliest of its kind, covering the ships fore and aft. We actually passed over the spot where the first vessel had sunk, and just for the space of a couple of seconds, as we were tearing through the water at over 30 knots an hour, we caught sight of poor wretches floating about and clinging to charred and blackened débris and wreckage. This was a truly pitiable sight, but as we had two more combatants to put out of action, to stop at such close range,

even to save life, would have been courting disaster. We should have been merely exposing ourselves to torpedoes. We had to tear along and forget the gruesome result of our work. The second ship, now a mass of seething flames, sank quite level with the water, and we soon had the remaining two literally holed and maimed. Their firing was very poor and inaccurate, although several shells flew around throwing shrapnel bullets about. It was a marvel that none struck us.

"The destroyers *Lennox* and *Loyal* got in proximity to one of the German ships. The surviving German fired her last torpedo, which, however, went wide of the mark. During these activities we had closed up

by the Secretary of the Admiralty that "Submarine E3, Lieut.-Commander George F. Cholmley, R.N., is now considerably overdue, and it is feared that she has been sunk in the North Sea." This news was confirmed later by German wireless, stating that E3 had met her end "in a German Bay in the North Sea, and that there had been no losses on the German side."

On October 23 it was announced that "eight or nine German cruisers are believed to be at large in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans. Searching for these vessels, and working in concert under the various Commanders-in-Chief, are upwards of seventy British (including Australian), Japanese,



ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN DESTROYERS OFF THE DUTCH COAST.

with the last of the Kaiser's destroyers, and placed her *hors de combat*. The *Legion* had two men wounded. By 3.30 the action was over, and the German fleet had been reduced by four units."

The admirable gunnery of the British vessels, and the truly awful effect of the lyddite shells, are the two outstanding features of this engagement. At a speed of 30 knots the English ships hit and hit and went on hitting, while the practice of their opponents seems to have been as bad as theirs was good. When it is considered that the modern warship is constructed of steel plating, and that nominally there is nothing inflammable about in material, it is wonderful to read of what the latest high explosive is capable, and that a non-inflammable ship can be made to burn like a torch!

On October 18 the sad news was published

French, and Russian cruisers, not including auxiliary cruisers. Among these are a number of the fastest British cruisers. The vast expanses of sea and ocean, and the many thousands of islands of the Archipelagoes, offer an almost infinite choice of movement to the enemy's ships. In spite of every effort to cut off their coal supply it has hitherto been maintained by one means or another, in face of increasing difficulties. The discovery of these few enemy cruisers is, therefore, largely a matter of time and patience."

Following upon this the following telegrams passed between the First Lord of the Admiralty and Vice-Admiral Yashiro, the Japanese Minister of Marine. Mr. Churchill said: "I desire, on behalf of the British Admiralty and the Royal Navy, to express at this crucial stage of the war our deep

sense of the efforts and energy with which the Japanese Navy has sustained the cause of their Allies. Apart from the great object of the extermination of the main German base in the Pacific, Japanese ships and squadrons are everywhere giving us help of an invaluable character in the protection of trade, the search for enemy ships, and the convoy of troops to the decisive theatre of the conflict."

Vice-Admiral Yashiro's reply was as follows: "On behalf of the Imperial Japanese Navy, I tender my warmest thanks for your sincere and cordial message, and assure you that it is a matter of the utmost satisfaction to us both that perfect harmony and brotherhood exists everywhere between the two Allied Navies, which strike the true note of the main object of the compact, and which

will certainly tend to hasten the attainment of the ultimate goal. I earnestly hope that it will not be long before this end is successfully accomplished."

On October 21 we get the first official notice of the "monitors," when it was announced that the *Severn*, *Humber*, and *Mersey* "have recently been engaged in operations on the Belgian coast, firing on the right flank of the German Army. Owing to their light draught they have been able to contribute materially to the success of the operations in this district, and they have already abundantly justified their acquisition on the outbreak of war. In addition, detachments with machine guns have been landed from these vessels to assist in the defence of Nieuport, where they performed meritorious service."

CHAPTER IV

The Westfalens—Pre-Dreadnought armoured cruisers—Destroyers and submarines—The Monitors—Operations on the Belgian coast—Losses on board *Falcon*—Sinking of the *Hermes*—Death of Lieutenant Wauton—German submarine sunk by H.M.S. *Badger*—The *Amiral Ganteaume*, refugee ship, torpedoed by German submarine—Despatch of Rear-Admiral Hood—Bombardment of Zeebrugge—Retirement of Prince Louis of Battenberg—Appointment of Lord Fisher in his place—German squadron shells Yarmouth.

IN a previous chapter some account was given of the larger units of the German Navy; here those of smaller size may be dealt with briefly. First of all it may be said that whatever originality the Teuton may display in shore-going affairs, it is far to seek when he comes to deal with matters connected with the sea. It is not too much to say that the whole of the formidable armada he has constructed is a slavish copy of the premier Navy of the world. When the *Dreadnought* was built her completion administered a knock-out blow to the naval architects of all foreign Powers. They had to recognise, and they did recognise, that, in a few brief years, ships of the pre-Dreadnought era would be about as useful in a modern sea battle as Nelson's *Victory*; but, as has been remarked in a previous chapter, Germany rose to the occasion. Her first essay in

the building of a class of all-big-gun ships was not particularly happy. These were the four ships of the Westfalen class, of 18,900 tons, armed with twelve 11-inch guns.


The late Mr. Jane in the last volume (alas!) of his admirable publication, *Fighting Ships*, has the following note concerning these vessels. "These vessels steam well, but they draw more than the designed draught by at least a foot. They are very cramped internally, and it is difficult to accommodate the crews. They are only moderately successful, being over-gunned for their displacement, but they are extremely steady gun platforms. The shooting of these ships always averages better than from any others."

The German 11-inch 45-calibre gun throws a projectile of 760 pounds weight, while the

English 12-inch discharges one of 850 pounds, as has already been set down in Chapter I. It is therefore the fact that, for two extra heavy guns in the *Westfalens*, the extra weight of metal discharged from all their big guns only amounts to 380 pounds more than the Dreadnought fires with her ten guns. Analysis and comparison of guns carried, and weight of metal discharged is too long a process to be entered into here, besides which it would tend to weary the reader. Speaking generally, however, the tendency of the Germans—before the war—was to over-gun their ships and to place

armed with twelve 45-calibre 8.2 and eight 6-inch guns, and the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, of 11,600 tons, carrying eight 8.2's and six 6-inch. As we know, the *Blücher* was sunk in Beatty's action, and the other twain by Sturdee in the battle of the Falkland Islands, after the *Good Hope* and the *Monmouth* had been sunk by the twin German ships. All these catastrophes were due to the ship sunk having met with and engaged vessels possessed of superior artillery.

Everything was expected from the German destroyers. This was in a way the crack



THE WESTFALEN CLASS.

more reliance in numbers and moderate calibre than in fewer and heavier pieces. After the advent of the all-big-gun battleship the next problem presented to the Teuton was that of the battle cruisers, of which ships tonnage and gun-power have already been given. Again the lead of England was followed, but the German was learning his lesson, and they were armed with the 50-calibre 12-inch gun. We need not linger over the pre-Dreadnought battleships of the enemy from 13,200 tons to 4150 tons, for they hardly count in the present day as ships fit to lie in the line of battle.

The best of the pre-Dreadnought armoured cruisers possessed by the enemy on the outbreak of war were the *Blücher*, of 15,500 tons,

service in the Navy of the Kaiser. It had more sea-going time, it was practised more assiduously, it underwent—if possible—a more intensive training than any other class of vessels in the fleet. On it the highest hopes were based; with it the pride of England's seamen was to be humbled in the dust. It was axiomatic in the Teuton sea service that "men are everything," and the lieges of the Fatherland looked forward to wonderful deeds when once the destroyers were loosed upon the war-path. Yet, at all events in the earlier stages of the war, when, if ever, their utility was to be proved, they accomplished little or nothing. It is impossible to believe, almost, that professional men believed in the flapdoodle that

was ladled out to the public by the Flottenverein, and the obedient henchmen of the "Marineamt," to the German public. And yet in *The Naval Annual* the year before the war, Captain von Kuhlwetter wrote an article on the personnel of the service to which he belonged, stating from whence and from what class the men were drawn who manned the fleet of his country, and expressing himself as being perfectly satisfied with them, and that he confidently awaited any test to which, in the future, they might be put.

Of the submarines we know that this arm had been more or less neglected until war came. The frugal German preferred that England, France, and America should spend the money in the preliminary experiments, and that he should in the future reap the benefit of their researches. At the outbreak of war Germany possessed—officially—thirty of these craft. How they subsequently increased and multiplied, and the foul uses to which they were put, is common knowledge.

When the monitors with their heavy guns arrived on the Belgian coast they came as an unpleasant surprise to the enemy. Their losses on the coast from the fire of these craft, which with their light draught were enabled to get close inshore, were enormous. Closing in on the right of the land forces close inshore between Ostend and Nieuport, they obtained during the night the exact range of the German camps. At dawn they started shelling, and immediately horses were stampeding, tents were blazing, and the occupants of these shelters were killed and wounded by the hundred. In this attack in the last days of October it was reported that 1600 Germans were placed *hors de combat*. On October 29 it was reported that "the British naval flotilla continues to support the Allies' left, and since the morning of the 27th the fire of 12-inch guns has been brought to bear upon the German positions and batteries. . . . The casualties have been very slight throughout, but one shell, exploding on the destroyer *Falcon*, killed one officer and fifteen men."

On October 31 the light cruiser *Hermes*, used as a seaplane-carrying ship, was reported as having been sunk in the Channel by a torpedo fired from a German submarine; she was a vessel of 5600 tons, dating from 1896. She was struck by two torpedoes, the first of which exploding under the stern rendered her propellers useless; she was thus an unresisting target to the second torpedo, which struck her amidships in the vicinity of the engine-room. She fortunately remained afloat nearly an hour, and so most of her crew were saved; the casualties were reported to be two killed, two wounded, and forty missing. Considering that there was a strong wind, a fairly heavy sea, and pouring rain at the time, it was fortunate that so many (400) were saved.

The bombardment of the Belgian coast at this time, although it inflicted severe damage on the enemy, was by no means without loss on our side. The death of Lieutenant Wise, R.N., was thus described by a correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph*: "This officer came ashore from the monitor *Severn* with twenty men and three machine guns. Reaching Nieuport, he saw that in losing Grootebamberge Farm that morning the Belgians had weakened their position. Accordingly he started with his twenty men across the bullet-swept area right to the trenches. Men who were there say he walked as calmly as if on a tour of inspection, calling orders to his men and signalling with his hands. In vain the Belgian officers shouted that the position was already occupied by the Germans. Either he did not hear or he was determined to accomplish the task at all costs. When fifty yards from the coveted goal the young officer fell dead—a bullet having struck him between the eyes. The men retreated, still carrying the guns with them, and the memory of a hero in their minds. The young officer was Lieutenant Wise."

A petty officer of H.M.S. *Falcon* thus described to a correspondent of the *Morning Post* the tragic happening on board that ship: "It was on Monday the 27th that

we began to act in co-operation with the land forces and brought our guns to bear on the enemy's trenches and their hidden batteries. After patrolling the shore the *Falcon* took up a position about two miles off Nieuport. A mile nearer the shore were the monitors. They opened the attack and we fired over them. We could see nothing of the batteries or the trenches, but we soon found the range and were told by our officers we were dropping our shells right amongst the entrenched Germans. On the first day we fired over a thousand shells, and other guns picked up the ranges, while the ships were proceeding at high speed to and fro along the coast-line. The Germans brought to bear on us some of their heavier guns which they used at Antwerp and they dropped their shells all round us. Several struck us but did little damage. On Wednesday we continued the shelling, and about mid-day the Germans at last dropped a shell on board near the bridge, which exploded and killed Lieutenant Wauton and eight men, and wounded fifteen others. Don't think the crew of the *Falcon* are cowards when I tell you many of them had tears in their eyes when they knew that the lieutenant was dead. He was one of the finest officers a sailor ever set sail under. He was kindness itself, and very thoughtful for his men. His death for a time cast a gloom over the crew, but we did not cease to reply to the German shells."

We are an unemotional race, but is there a man or a woman who reads this tribute from a sailor to his officer that can do so without emotion? Truly Lieutenant Wauton and those who passed with him into the valley of the shadow made a good end; and what finer epitaph need any man desire than these heartfelt—in the truest sense of that adjective—words of the man who fought by his side.

As the war went on it is known to every one that no reports were made by the Admiralty as to the sinking or destruction of enemy submarines. In the earlier stages this was not the case, and we find the

Secretary of the Admiralty making the following announcement on October 25: "A German submarine has been rammed and sunk by the destroyer *Badger*, Commander Charles Fremantle, R.N., off the Dutch coast. The *Badger's* bows were somewhat damaged." The Secretary of the Admiralty also announces that the following telegram has been sent to H.M.S. *Badger*: "Admiralty are very pleased with your good service." The *Badger* arrived at Sheerness for repair of her damaged bows. The crew had an enthusiastic reception. The German submarine sunk by the *Badger* apparently was on the look-out for a larger prey, one of the cruisers reported to be on watch in the vicinity. On seeing the *Badger* the enemy ship fired a torpedo which missed the mark. The *Badger* made a dash at the U boat and struck her with such force that she (the destroyer) was brought up all standing; then she backed out and riddled the submarine with her fire. Not much in the way of repair was necessary in Sheerness dockyard, and the *Badger* was soon back in the fighting line again.

On October 26 the s.s. *Amiral Ganteaume*, carrying 2000 unarmed refugees—men, women, and children—was sunk by a German submarine which, without warning, fired a torpedo into the steamer. The comments of the Naval Correspondent of the *Times* on this occurrence are so clear and define so exactly the conditions of honourable warfare as opposed to piracy, that it is well that they should be here reproduced. "The submarine ought of course to have risen to the surface, hoisted her colours, and signalled the French steamer to stop. If the summons were disobeyed, the submarine would be justified in firing a shot across her bows. Should the submarine have no gun, that is her affair. She must then somehow convey to the merchant ship that the said ship will be torpedoed if she does not obey orders. *The merchant ship is entitled to disobey and to resist.* But if she chooses to surrender, the submarine must either place a prize crew on board to navigate her to the nearest

German port, or persuade the captain of the merchant vessel to go there of his own accord. If the submarine can do neither of these things, she must let the ship go in peace. These are the rules of international law."

Ever since there has been such a thing as international law these are the rules that have governed the action of belligerents at sea; and it is well that they should be here repeated, as during the war the Germans made up their international law as they went along, and, having done this, tried to persuade the world in general, and neutrals in particular, that they were the sufferers who were so hardly done by, by the customs of the Allies at sea.

As a short synopsis of the work of the blockading squadron off the Belgian coast, we cannot do better here than append the despatch of Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace L. A. Hood:

"OFFICE OF REAR-ADMIRAL,
DOVER PATROL,
November 11, 1914.

"SIR—I have the honour to report the proceedings of the flotilla acting off the coast of Belgium, between October 17 and November 9.

"The flotilla was organised to prevent the movement of large bodies of German troops along the coast roads from Ostend to Nieuport, to support the left flank of the Belgian Army, and to prevent any movement by sea of the enemy's troops.

"Operations commenced during the night of October 17, when the *Attentive*, flying my flag, accompanied by the monitors *Severn*, *Humber*, and *Mersey*, the light cruiser *Fore-sight*, and several torpedo-boat-destroyers, arrived and anchored off Nieuport Pier.

"Early on the morning of October 18 information was received that German infantry were advancing on Westende village, and that a battery was in action at Westende Bains. The flotilla at once proceeded up past Westende and Middlekirke to draw the fire and endeavour to silence the guns.

"A brisk shrapnel fire was opened from

the shore, which was immediately replied to, and this commenced the naval operations on the coast which continued for more than three weeks without intermission.

"During the first week the enemy's troops were endeavouring to push forward along the coast roads, and a large accumulation of transport existed within reach of the naval guns.

"On October 18 machine guns from the *Severn* were landed at Nieuport to assist in the defence, and Lieutenant E. S. Wise fell, gallantly leading his men.

"The *Amazon*, flying my flag, was badly holed on the waterline and was sent to England for repairs, and during these early days most of the vessels suffered casualties, chiefly from shrapnel shell from the field guns of the enemy.

"The presence of the ships on the coast soon caused alterations in the enemy's plans, less and less of their troops were seen, while more and more heavy guns were gradually mounted among the sand dunes that fringe the coast.

"It soon became evident that more and heavier guns were required in the flotilla. The Scouts therefore returned to England, while H.M.S. *Venerable* and several older cruisers, sloops, and gunboats arrived to carry on the operations.

"Five French torpedo-boat-destroyers were placed under my orders by Admiral Favereau, and on October 30 I had the honour of hoisting my flag in the *Intrépide* and leading the French flotilla into action off Lombartzyde. The greatest harmony and enthusiasm existed between the Allied flotillas.

"As the heavier guns of the enemy came into play it was inevitable that the casualties of the flotilla increased, the most important being the disablement of the 6-inch turret and several shots on the waterline of the *Mersey*, the death of the Commanding Officer and eight men and the disablement of sixteen others in the *Falcon*, which vessel came under a heavy fire when guarding the *Venerable* against submarine attack; the



A BRITISH DESTROYER IN ACTION.

Wildfire and *Vestal* were badly holed, and a number of casualties caused in the *Brilliant* and *Rinaldo*.

"Enemy submarines were seen and torpedoes were fired, and during the latter part of the operations the work of the torpedo craft was chiefly confined to the protection of the larger ships.

"It gradually became apparent that the rush of the enemy along the coast had been checked, that the operations were developing into a trench warfare, and that the work of the flotilla had, for the moment, ceased.

"The arrival of Allied reinforcements and the inundation of the country surrounding Nieuport rendered the further presence of the ships unnecessary.

"The work of the squadron was much facilitated by the efforts of Colonel Bridges, attached to the Belgian Headquarters, and to him I am greatly indebted for his constant and unfailing support.

"GALLANT DEEDS

"I would like especially to bring to your notice :

"Capitaine de Frégate RICHARD, of the *Dunois*, Senior Officer of the French flotilla, whose courtesy and gallantry assisted to make the operations a success.

"Captain C. D. JOHNSON, M.V.O., in charge of 6th Destroyer Flotilla.

"Commander ERIC J. A. FULLERTON, in command of the monitors, whose ships were constantly engaged in the inshore fighting.

"Commander A. D. M. CHERRY, of the *Vestal*, who commanded the sloops, which were constantly engaged for the whole period. He remained in command of the flotilla after my departure on November 7, and continued the bombardment on November 8, returning to England the next day.

"Commander H. C. HALAHAN, of the *Bustard*, whose gunboat was constantly in action close to the shore.

"Commander A. L. SNAGGE, of the *Humber*.

"Commander H. G. L. OLIPHANT, of the *Amazon*.

"Lieutenant-Commander R. A. WILSON, of the *Mersey*.

"Lieutenant-Commander G. L. D. GIBBS, of the *Crusader*, in which ship my flag was hoisted during most of the operations.

"Lieutenant-Commander J. B. ADAMS, R.N.R., on my staff.

"Lieutenant H. O. WAUTON, of the *Falcon*, who maintained his position in a heavy fire on the look-out for submarines, and was unfortunately killed.

"Lieutenant H. O. JOYCE, of the *Vestal*, who was badly wounded by a shell, but rallied his men to attend to the wounded, and then got his gun again into action.

"Sub-Lieutenant C. J. H. DUBOULAY, of the *Falcon*, who took command of his ship after the Captain and twenty-four men were killed and wounded.

"Petty-Officer ROBERT CHAPPELL, O.N. 207788, of the *Falcon*, who, though both legs were shattered and he was dying, continued to try and assist in the tending of the wounded. He shortly afterwards died of his wounds.

"Petty-Officer FREDERICK WILLIAM MOTTERAM, of the *Falcon*, O.N. 183216, for immediate attention to the wounded under fire on October 28.

"Able Seaman ERNEST DIMMOCK, of the *Falcon*, O.N. 204549, who directly the casualties occurred in *Falcon*, finding himself the only person unwounded on deck, went immediately to the helm and conned the ship."

Towards the end of November the British Fleet began to take the efforts of the Germans to fortify Zeebrugge, and to turn it into a base for submarines, with the seriousness that it deserved ; and on November 25 the following statement was issued by the Admiralty : "On Monday all the points of military significance in Zeebrugge were subjected to severe bombardment by two British battleships. The German opposition was feeble, the extent of the damage is not known. The British ships returned safely."

The following account is from the *Daily Chronicle*, and gives a graphic picture of these happenings :

"ROTTERDAM, Tuesday.

"Germany's scheme for establishing a naval base at Zeebrugge (15 miles north-east of

Ostend) has been thwarted by shells from the British warships on the coast.

"Zeebrugge is burning. The Solvay works near the Bruges ship canal are a heap of ruins. The sections of six submarines which had been brought there have been reduced to twisted iron and a large quantity of stores has been destroyed. From 2 till 5 yesterday afternoon shells were rained on the town.

"Steaming well out at sea, beyond the German mine-field, a British ship used her big guns. In less than an hour the coast-guard building and the public schools were destroyed. The military trains at the Solvay works were blown to fragments, and a large crane which was being used for putting the submarines together has simply disappeared.

"The German batteries hiding in the dunes near Blankenberg tried to reply to the fire of the swift-moving ships, which could just be discerned, but in a short time the German guns were knocked over like nine-pins. The guns near Heyst also replied, and a shot from the fleet struck the church tower there.

"The Germans in Zeebrugge became demoralised. In desperate haste they attempted to remove their stores to Bruges, including the apparatus for making hydrogen for Zeppelins, but a section of the railway had been blown up. No shelter could be obtained from the shells, the explosive force of which was terrific.

"Earlier in the day the fleet bombarded the coast from Middelkerke northwards to the Dutch frontier, clearing the dunes of the Germans' advanced right wing. For several weeks the enemy have been collecting stores and fortifying Zeebrugge in the hope of making it a strong naval base. Now they are thrown back on Bruges.

"The bombardment of the Belgian coast from Middelkerke to Knocke, a distance of about 20 miles, has been continued. All the coast towns, including Ostend, which came under the fire are now denuded of civilians. Blankenberg, where the Germans tried to bring their 12-inch guns into play, was severely shelled, the inhabitants flying in a panic.

"The naval guns have been raking the coast, searching the dunes for German troops.

"At Ostend many motor-boats armed with machine guns in the bows, intended for use on the Yser, have been destroyed by the British fire. German guns which had been placed on the promenade at Ostend were demolished by naval shells to-day. Before the bombardment the British warplanes scouted the north-west of Belgium, giving the disposition of the troops and guns."

In spite of the severe handling of troops and material by our coastal attacks the enemy persevered in the mounting of heavy guns on the shore; or, to speak more correctly, in concealed positions from which he could reply to the fire from the ships. From the first appearance of our ships upon the coast up till the end of the year the monitors, battleships, and destroyers were continuously on the watch. The guns then mounted by the Germans were outranged by the naval artillery; and the trenches at Slype and Middelkerke and other adjacent places formed admirable targets. It is not too much to say that our ships and guns rendered the advance on Calais, at that time proclaimed to be the objective of the forces of the Kaiser, an impossibility. Not only at Zeebrugge, but all along the coast, fifteen miles south-west to Ostend, at Westende, and at Lombartzyde, the ships worked back and forth; not only attacking these places, but, assisted by airmen, clearing the country of the foe to facilitate the advance of our own troops on the Yser. Three of the older class of pre-Dreadnought battleships were engaged in this work, with three monitors, a cruiser, several gunboats and sloops, and a flotilla of destroyers. Our French Allies also assisted in this work with a flotilla of destroyers. During these operations the ships engaged were never attacked by surface vessels; which demonstrates the closeness of the watch kept on German outlets during this period.

On October 28 H.S.H. Admiral Prince Louis of Battenberg announced in the follow-

ing letter his resignation of the post of First Sea Lord of the Admiralty :

"October 28, 1914.

"DEAR MR. CHURCHILL—I have lately been driven to the painful conclusion that at this juncture my birth and parentage have the effect of impairing in some respects my usefulness on the Board of Admiralty. In these circumstances I feel it to be my duty, as a loyal subject of His Majesty, to resign the office of First Sea Lord, hoping thereby to facilitate the task of the administration of the great service to which I have devoted my life and to ease the burden laid on H.M. Ministers.—I am yours truly,

"LOUIS BATTENBERG,
"Admiral."

To this Mr. Churchill replied, under date October 29, 1914 :

"MY DEAR PRINCE LOUIS—This is no ordinary war, but a struggle between nations for life or death. It raises passions between races of the most terrible kind. It effaces the landmarks and frontiers of civilisation. I cannot further oppose the wish you have during the last few weeks expressed to me to be released from the burden of responsibility which you have borne thus far with so much honour and success. The anxieties and toils which rest upon the naval administration of our country are in themselves enough to try a man's spirit, and when to them are added the ineradicable difficulties of which you speak I could not at this juncture in fairness ask you to support them. The Navy of to-day, and still more the Navy of to-morrow, bears the imprint of your work. The enormous impending influx of capital ships, the score of 30-knot cruisers, the destroyers and submarines unequalled in modern construction which are now coming to hand, are the result of labours which we have had in common, and in which the Board of Admiralty owe so much to your aid. The first step which secured the timely concentration of the Fleet was taken by you. I must express publicly my deep indebtedness to

you, and the pain I feel at the severance of over three years' official association. In all the circumstances you are right in your decision. The spirit in which you have acted is the same in which Prince Maurice of Battenberg has given his life to our cause, and in which your gallant son is now serving in the Fleet. I beg you to accept my profound respect and that of our colleagues on the Board.—I remain yours very sincerely,

"WINSTON S. CHURCHILL."

On the following Monday this intimation was made: "The Secretary of the Admiralty announces that the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleets, has addressed the following telegram to H.S.H. Admiral Prince Louis of Battenberg :

" 'Have received with the most profound sorrow the information contained in your telegram. The whole Fleet will learn the news when published with the deepest possible regret. We look to you with the greatest loyalty, respect, and gratitude for the work you have accomplished for the Navy.' "

Few men have been more popular, in the best sense of that much-abused word, than was Prince Louis—as he was always called—during the whole period of his service. If to his princely rank he owed some swiftness of advancement, it is not too much to say that he more than made up for this by his striking ability, his indefatigable zeal, his enthusiasm for all that was best in the service. Exceptionally gifted, his worth was recognised in whatever rank he served, being possessed of an originality of mind not always found in so conservative (in the non-political sense of the word) a profession as the Navy. In his honourable retirement he carried with him the admiration and affection of the whole Navy, mingled with a deep regret that he felt called upon to act in the manner which he did.

On the following Friday it was officially announced that: "The King has approved the appointment of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone, G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O., LL.D., to be First Sea Lord of the

Admiralty, in succession to Admiral H.S.H. Prince Louis of Battenberg."

On November 2 an enemy squadron appeared off Yarmouth and opened a furious cannonade shorewards, but did not succeed in hitting anything except the coastguard gunboat *Halcyon*, which was slightly damaged. One of the crew of this ship was seriously wounded. A few hours after the departure of the German ships a British submarine, D5,

German squadron seems to have been beneath contempt, and they were in such a hurry to get back home that they did not even stop to sink the little *Halcyon*, which ship would have been an easy prey for them. As it was, one shot struck the mast, putting her wireless gear out of action; one shot passed through the funnel, and another burst near the bridge. Six men, in addition to the one already mentioned, were very slightly



STEAM DRIFTER STRIKES A MINE.

struck a mine dropped by the retreating cruisers off Yarmouth, and sank, with the loss of all on board except two officers and two men. Two steam drifters, the *Copious* of Yarmouth and the *Fraternal* of Lowestoft, struck mines about the same time in the same waters, and sank. Only one of the crew of the *Copious*, out of ten, was saved. Four men were saved from the *Fraternal* and six were drowned. The shooting of this

wounded, including her commander, who was just scratched by a splinter from the bridge. From the calculations of fishermen, who saw the whole affair, some hundred and twenty shots in all were fired. The fishermen in the first instance mistook them for British ships, and one man, as they passed close by, waved a friendly teapot at them; to which the German sailors replied by shaking their fists!

CHAPTER V

The battle of Coronel on the Chilean coast—Sinking of H.M. Ships *Good Hope* and *Monmouth*—Death of Rear-Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock—Loss of H.M.S. *Bulwark* at Sheerness by explosion; finding of the Court of Inquiry—Destruction of U18 by H.M.S. *Garry*; crew taken prisoners—Escape of the R.M.S.P. s.s. *Ortega* from German cruiser—Splendid seamanship of her Captain—The action off the Falkland Islands between Vice-Admiral Sir F. D. Sturdee and Admiral Graf von Spee.

ON November 6, 1914, the Secretary of the Admiralty made the following announcement: "The Admiralty have received trustworthy information about the action on the Chilean coast.

nearly dark, when a serious explosion occurred on the *Good Hope*, and she foundered. The *Monmouth* hauled off at dark, making water badly, and appeared unable to steam away. She was accom-



THE *MONMOUTH* HAULED OFF AT DARK.

" During Sunday, November 1, the *Good Hope*, *Monmouth*, and *Glasgow* came up with the *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, *Leipzig*, and *Dresden*. Both squadrons were steaming south in a strong wind and considerable sea. The German squadron declined action until sunset, when the light gave her an important advantage. The action lasted an hour. Early in the action both the *Good Hope* and the *Monmouth* took fire, but fought on till

panied by the *Glasgow*, who had meanwhile during the whole action fought the *Leipzig* and the *Dresden*. On the enemy again approaching the wounded *Monmouth*, the *Glasgow*, who was under fire from one of the armoured cruisers, drew off. The enemy then attacked the *Monmouth* again, with what result is not definitely known. The *Glasgow* is not severely damaged, and has very few casualties. Neither the *Otranto*

nor the *Canopus* was engaged. Reports received by the Foreign Office from Valparaiso state that a belligerent warship is ashore on the Chilean coast, and it is possible that this may prove to be the *Monmouth*. Energetic measures are being taken on this assumption to rescue any survivors. The action appears to the Admiralty to have been most gallantly contested, but in the absence of the *Canopus* the enemy's preponderance in force was considerable."

Some description of the ships by which this action was fought here becomes necessary. The *Good Hope* was one of a class of four armoured cruisers built at Fairfield and completed in 1902. She was 515 feet in length; beam, 71 feet; maximum draught, 28 feet; length over all, 529½ feet; displacement tonnage, 14,100; complement, 900. She was armed with two 9.2-inch and sixteen 6-inch guns, twelve 12-pounders, three 3-pounders, and carried two submerged torpedo tubes firing the 18-inch torpedo. Her full speed on trial was just over 23½ knots. These ships were weakly armed for their tonnage; they presented an immense target to the enemy, and their 6-inch guns were mounted in casemates one over the other, in pairs. The result of this arrangement was that in heavy weather, such as prevailed at the battle of Coronel, the lower of the two guns could not be worked, owing to being flooded out by the sea.

The *Monmouth* was practically of the same date as the *Good Hope*, having been completed in Glasgow in 1903. Her length over all was 448 feet; beam, 66 feet; mean draught, 24½ feet; displacement tonnage, 9800. She was even more weakly armed than the *Good Hope*, her artillery consisting of fourteen 6-inch guns with nine 12-pounders and three 3-pounders. Her trial speed was just under 24 knots. Of her fourteen 6-inch guns, twelve were mounted in twin turrets electrically controlled; she was armoured to the extent of a 4-inch belt amidships, 2 inches bow, and 5 inches bulkhead aft.

The *Glasgow* was a light cruiser, one of a

class of five ships, and was completed at Fairfield in January 1911. Length over all, 453 feet; beam, 47 feet; mean draught, 15½ feet; displacement tonnage, 4800. She carried two 6-inch and ten 4-inch guns, four 3-pounders and two submerged tubes firing the 18-inch torpedo. Her trial speed was just over 26.5 knots, complement, 376.

The *Canopus*, which ship was sent out to reinforce this squadron, and which was not present at the battle, was an obsolescent battleship, dating from 1897, armed with four 12-inch and twelve 6-inch guns. Her best trial speed was 16.5 knots. Apparently some one in authority had recognised—extremely belatedly—that the squadron under the command of Rear-Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock was no match for the German cruisers that he was called upon to meet, and the *Canopus* was sent out to him as a reinforcement. Had she been present at the engagement her four 12-inch guns might well have turned the scale in favour of Cradock, but—alas!—it was not to be.

Turning now to the German armoured cruisers engaged, the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, we find that these vessels were of the following dimensions: Length, 449½ feet; beam, 71 feet; mean draught, 25 feet; displacement tonnage, 11,600. The armament of these ships was eight 8.2-inch guns—40 calibre; weight of projectile, 242 pounds, six 6-inch, twenty 24-pounders, four machine, four submerged torpedo tubes for the 18-inch torpedo. The best speed of the *Gneisenau* was 24.8 knots; but the *Scharnhorst* having grounded badly in 1909 was not good for more than 21 knots.

The *Dresden* was a light cruiser dating from 1907 of 3600 tons, mounting ten 4.1-inch guns, eight 5-pounders, and four machine. Her speed was 25 knots. She was sister ship to the more celebrated *Emden*. The *Leipzig* was 3250 tons, carrying the same number of 4.1's and ten 1-pounders. Her speed was just over 23 knots.

It has been proved, not once but over and over again in this war, that no skill and no valour is proof against superior armament.

It was so in the Heligoland Bight, again in the action with the four destroyers. It was so in this case, and also in Sturdee's action off the Falklands. Given even respectable shooting, and the end in the action between Cradock and von Spee was a foregone conclusion, the more particularly as the German vessels were the crack shooting ships of the Navy of the Kaiser. The weight of broadside of the *Scharnhorst* and her sister ship and that of the *Good Hope* are not so very different when set down on paper. It was 1752 pounds for the two German, and 1460 for the English ship, but they were two to one, and the broadside of the *Monmouth* was only 700 pounds. The total weight of metal that could be thrown by von Spee was accordingly 3504 pounds, while Cradock could discharge 2160. But this difference in actual weight of broadsides—namely 1344 pounds—was by no means the end of the argument, as owing to the heavy sea that was running at the time the lower 6-inch gun in each of the casemates of the *Good Hope* was practically out of action.

A more gallant officer than Cradock never stood on the deck of a British man-of-war, but it cannot be denied that he committed an error in judgment in engaging von Spee. He knew, as well as did his adversary, that nothing short of a miracle could give him the victory; that the forces of which he disposed were totally inadequate to the task, and yet in face of these facts he accepted action and lost his own ship and the *Monmouth*. It was a game of long bowls in which the Germans stood off and pounded their opponents into blazing wrecks of steel and splinters, they themselves receiving but little damage. The *Glasgow* left Coronel on the coast of Chile at 9 A.M. on November 1, and about 4 P.M. sighted four cruisers in line ahead; she immediately called up the British squadron by wireless. In the course of an hour or so Cradock's flagship *Good Hope* joined up with *Monmouth*, *Glasgow*, and the armed merchantman *Otranto*; all these ships proceeded in line ahead on a southerly course, with the enemy seven miles

off to the east, also steaming south. The sun was low on the starboard hand of the British ships, silhouetting them against the sky, they, in consequence, presenting the most admirable target to the foe. It was at 6.40 P.M. that the German squadron closed in to about ten thousand yards, and the action began shortly afterwards. It would appear that not only were the Germans much the stronger force, but they also proved to be the speedier.

Between 6.40 and 7 P.M. both squadrons were steaming in a southerly direction, gradually converging the one upon the other; they were in line ahead, the *Scharnhorst* was leading the Germans, followed by *Gneisenau*, *Dresden*, and *Nurnberg*, in the order named. Cradock, leading in the *Good Hope*, was followed by *Monmouth*, *Glasgow*—with her ridiculous 4-inch guns—and finally the armed merchantman, *Otranto*. Just as the action began this vessel was ordered away, and left the line. The Germans opened the ball with a salvo at 15,000 yards, which fell 1000 yards short: this was while the *Otranto* was in the firing line, and just before she was ordered to quit. At 12,300 yards the Germans fired a salvo which went over, another which fell short, and a third that hit both *Good Hope* and *Monmouth*, both ships bursting into flame, the fore turret of the *Good Hope* being ablaze. It is noted in the German account of the battle that "Gradually the two lines came nearer to each other, and the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* simultaneously let go their twelve 8-inch guns, which they concentrated on the *Good Hope*. Firing continued for several minutes without damage, and the German shots fell short. The smaller cruisers were far out of range, but slowly the vessels drew nearer, and when the two units were but 6000 yards apart, the *Good Hope* fired her two 9.2-inch guns. *She was still unable to use her eight 6-inch guns which were on the main deck*, and so near the water-line that as the vessel rolled they were almost awash. A terrible broadside from the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* crippled the British flagship and her engines."

There is no doubt that von Spee handled

his squadron with great discretion and intelligence. He had the speed as well as the superior gun power, and he threw away no advantage that he possessed. Thus, when Cradock altered course four points (*i.e.* 45 degrees) to port to engage the enemy, the German Admiral did the same, his reason being that at that time the English had the advantage of the light. Later, when the sun had sunk still more, and Cradock's ships were silhouetted against the western sky, he accepted battle. One of the mysteries of this action is how the *Glasgow* escaped. She was at one time engaged by both the *Nurnberg* and the *Dresden*, in addition to receiving attention from time to time from the big cruisers, and yet she lived to tell the tale. Remain on the field of battle she could not; as when both her consorts were hopeless, blazing wrecks such conduct would have been equivalent to useless suicide. This gallant little cruiser actually stood by for a quarter of an hour, and then seeing that the day was lost, reluctantly steamed away. She was hit aft, where there was a hole three feet by two, two shots in her bunkers, and two on her upper works. An eye-witness says that "we could hardly see the Germans, while the English ships were a beautiful target." Another account says: "When we think of the action again we all wonder how we got away as we did. The whole fire of five ships was concentrated on us, and only the rolling of the ship saved us from being riddled by the salvos which they were firing. We were the last ship in the line of battle, and we had to tackle two for a start, and jolly soon we put one of them out of action, but she came back again afterwards, only firing one gun. The poor old *Good Hope* and *Monmouth* were subjected to a terrific fire, and the Admiral's last words were, 'Get away at full speed,' but our skipper turned to his first lieutenant, and asked, 'Am I to leave the Admiral?' But the case was hopeless. It would have been certain suicide. We tried to distract attention to us by having flames from our funnels, so as to make a target, because it became

dark about 8 P.M.; and then some of the enemy ships, seeing the state of the *Good Hope*, chased us and the *Monmouth*. The *Monmouth* was making water very badly, and at her best could only have done 12 knots, whilst our engines were still safe, and we could go. So the Captain of the *Monmouth*, like the brave man that he was, signalled his last message, 'I can't get away because my ship is making water rapidly forward, so I shall go back and engage the enemy' (thus allowing us to escape) 'and endeavour to ram or torpedo one of them.'" That the *Glasgow* lived to fight another day we shall see as this history proceeds.

On November 26 the battleship *Bulwark* (Captain Guy L. Sclater), which was lying at Sheerness, blew up and sank with terrible loss of life. The news was conveyed to the general public in London by a statement made by Mr. Churchill in the House of Commons. He said:

"I regret to say that I have some bad news for the House. The *Bulwark*, battleship, which was lying in Sheerness this morning, blew up at 7.53 o'clock. The Vice- and Rear-Admirals, who were present, have reported their conviction that it was an internal magazine explosion which rent the ship asunder. There was apparently no upheaval in the water, and the ship had entirely disappeared when the smoke had cleared away.


"An inquiry will be held to-morrow, which may possibly throw more light on the occurrence. The loss of the ship does not sensibly affect the military position, but I regret to say the loss of life is very severe. Only twelve men are saved. All the officers and the rest of the crew, who, I suppose, amounted to between seven and eight hundred, have perished. I think the House would wish me to express on their behalf the deep sorrow with which the House heard the news, and their sympathy with those who have lost relatives and friends."

The Court of Inquiry which was appointed to inquire into the loss of the *Bulwark*, reported that it was clear from the evidence

which was tendered that the explosion which caused the loss of the ship was due to accidental ignition of ammunition on board the ship. The Court found that there was no evidence to support the suggestion that the explosion was due either to treachery on board the ship or to an act of the enemy. At the coroner's inquest, which was held at Sheerness on recovered bodies from the ill-fated battleship, Rear-Admiral Gaunt, who was President of the Court of Inquiry which sat to investigate the causes of the disaster,

was a mystery at the time, and has remained a mystery ever since.

It may be remembered that some time before the war broke out, there were a number of explosions on board French warships—one of these caused terrible loss of life and damage to the *Iéna*, cruiser—and they culminated in the destruction of the fine new battleship *Liberté* in Toulon harbour. There was, however, a cause for these disasters in the instability of the notorious "Poudre B," then in use in the French



THE *BULWARK* LYING AT SHEERNESS.

said that exhaustive and scientific investigation took place. The Court was satisfied that nothing came alongside the *Bulwark* on the morning of the explosion. There was nothing to show the explosion was external, but the evidence pointed to its having occurred inside the ship. There was no evidence of treachery. There was no evidence of loose cordite, but there was evidence of loose cartridges in the cross ammunition passages. The Admiral was asked many questions by the members of the jury, but nothing further could be elicited. The explosion on board the *Bulwark*

Navy. After these lamentable occurrences an even stricter watch than before was kept in all the magazines of British warships, ventilation and cooling being reduced to a science, and the most meticulous care was, and is, taken to see that no excessive temperatures prevail: for the reason that great heat disintegrates the cordite and renders it unstable.

The destruction of one of the largest submarines of the German Navy was announced on November 24, 1914, as follows:

"The Secretary of the Admiralty states that the German submarine U18 was

reported on the northern coast of Scotland yesterday morning. At 12.20 the British patrolling vessel reported having rammed her. She was not sighted again until 1.20, when she was seen on the surface, crew on deck, and flying the white flag. Shortly after this she foundered, just as the destroyer *Garry* came alongside and rescued three officers and twenty-three of her crew, one only being drowned. The *U18* had a displacement on the surface of 650 tons and 750 tons submerged; her speeds on the surface and submerged were 14 and 8 knots respectively. She carried four torpedo tubes and had a radius of action of 2000 miles."

Speaking on the work of the Navy at the end of November, Mr. Churchill put the situation, as it then existed, fairly and squarely before the nation. In an interesting passage he dealt with what is known as "the process of attrition"; proving that relatively the strength of Great Britain had grown during the war; but there is no room here for more than the closing sentence of this official pronouncement:

"There is every reason for complete confidence in the power of the Navy to give effect to the wishes and the purposes of the State and Empire. We have powerful Allies on the seas. The Russian Navy is developing in strength. The French Navy has complete command of the Mediterranean. The Japanese Navy is effective on the Pacific. The utmost cordiality characterises the working of the Admirals of the four Powers. But even if we were single-handed, as we were in the days of Napoleon, we should have no reason to despair of our capacity to go on indefinitely—though no doubt we should suffer discomfort and privation and loss—drawing our supplies from wherever we needed them, and to continue this process with a strength which would grow stronger with each month the war continues, until the end, perhaps not at any very distant date, the purposes for which we are fighting are achieved."

All through the continuance of the sea war the lies of our Sailor King have been

called upon to admire the dauntless courage and devotion to duty of the officers and men of the mercantile marine. The merchant seaman, be it remembered, is always in the war area, perpetually exposed to attack by prowling enemy cruisers. Summoned to surrender, he knows that if obedience is not instant he will be sunk if he attempts to escape; he has no means of retaliation, and is nothing but an unresisting target to the warship. If all the gallant deeds of our merchant sailors could be set forth during the course of the Great War, they would fill a volume larger than this. Let us find room for the escape of the *Ortega* of the Pacific Steam Navigation Company. What follows is an extract from a letter from the British Consul-General at Rio de Janeiro to the Foreign Secretary:

"The *Ortega* sailed from Valparaiso with some 200 French reservists on board. When she had arrived at the western entrance to the Straits of Magellan, a German cruiser of the Dresden class suddenly appeared and gave chase. Be it remarked that the normal speed of the *Ortega* is only some 14 knots, whereas the speed of the German cruiser was at least 21 knots. Under these circumstances the master of the *Ortega* took a heroic resolve. He called for volunteers to assist in stoking his vessel. That appeal met with a hearty response. Firemen, engineers, and volunteers stripped to the waist and set to work with a will, and the master assured me that they actually succeeded in whacking the old ship up (she was built in 1906) to a good 18 knots. The master headed his ship straight for the entrance of a passage known as Nelson's Strait, and he made for the Strait at full speed, hotly pursued by the German cruiser, which kept firing at him with two heavy guns." Now Nelson's Strait is entirely uncharted, and forms a veritable nightmare for the navigator, bristling as it does with reefs and pinnacle rocks, around which sweep hungry and ferocious currents: it is the home of the deadly tide-rip and the pernicious overfall; is bounded by steep-to cliffs, and nowhere within its boundaries is

any anchorage. And into this agreeable passage did Captain Douglas Reid Kinnear plunge at 18 knots. Luck stood to that splendid, fearless seaman. Once inside, the German cruiser hauled off, and, with infinite caution, sending his boats ahead to sound, did Kinnear work his way, until he emerged into Smythe's Channel, without so much as a scratch on one of his plates; eventually arriving triumphantly at Rio de Janeiro. Thus was the *Ortega* saved, and also the French reservists, so sorely needed in their own country.

We now come to the action fought off the Falkland Islands, in which Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick Doveton Sturdee avenged the sinking of the *Good Hope* and the *Monmouth*.

The following announcement was made by the Secretary of the Admiralty:

"At 7.30 A.M. on December 8, the *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, *Nurnberg*, and *Dresden* were sighted near the Falkland Islands by a British squadron under Sir Frederick Sturdee. An action followed, in the course of which the *Scharnhorst* (flying the flag of Admiral Graf von Spee), the *Gneisenau*, and the *Leipzig* were sunk. The *Dresden* and the *Nurnberg* made off during the action, and are being pursued. The colliers also were captured. The Vice-Admiral reports that the British casualties are very few. Some survivors have been rescued from the *Gneisenau* and the *Leipzig*."

On the following day this report was thus amplified:

"A further telegram has been received from Vice-Admiral Sturdee reporting that the *Nurnberg* was also sunk on December 8, and that the search for the *Dresden* is still proceeding. The action lasted five hours, with intervals. The *Scharnhorst* sank after three hours, and the *Gneisenau* two hours later. The enemy's light cruisers scattered, and were chased by our cruisers. No loss of any British vessel is reported."

Upon the receipt of the news in London the King was graciously pleased to send a message of congratulation to Vice-Admiral Sturdee, his officers and men. Messages of congratulation were also sent from Field-Marshal Sir John French on behalf of the Army in France; from the French Minister of Marine, addressed to the First Lord of the Admiralty; from the Board of Admiralty itself; from the Soudan Government, Khartoum; from the Imperial Japanese Navy; and from the Grand Duke Nicholas.

After von Spee had disposed of the *Good Hope* and the *Mon-*

mouth, there remained a time when he and his squadron were—so to speak—in the air. But the German Admiral decided on a bold stroke, and early in December was round the Horn and steering for the Falkland Islands. These he had determined to seize upon as a base; and had



VICE-ADMIRAL SIR FREDERICK DOVETON STURDEE
IN THE UNIFORM OF A POST-CAPTAIN.

it not been for the timely arrival of the ships under the command of Vice-Admiral Sturdee, it is more than likely that he would have accomplished his purpose. Von Spee arrived off the Falklands on the morning of December 8; but, unfortunately for him, Sturdee had arrived the day before. The British ships were coaling, and to begin with, approaching Stanley Harbour from the south, the Germans could only see the *Canopus* over a neck of low-lying land. At 8 A.M. on Tuesday, December 8, a signal was received by the Admiral from the Signal Station: "A four-funnel and two two-funnel men-of-war in sight from Sapper Hill, steering northwards."

At this time the positions of the various ships of the squadron were as follows: *Macedonia*, at anchor as look-out ship; *Kent* (guard ship), at anchor in Port William; *Invincible* and *Inflexible* in Port William; *Carnarvon* in Port William; *Cornwall* in Port William; *Glasgow* in Port Stanley; *Bristol* in Port Stanley.

It may here be remarked that Stanley Harbour in the Falklands is divided into two portions, one of which is known as Port Stanley, the other as Port William. The entrance to the harbour faces as nearly as possible due east. At 9.20 A.M. the two leading ships of the enemy—*Gneisenau* and *Nurnberg*—with guns trained on the wireless station, came within range of the *Canopus*, who opened fire at them across the low land at a range of 11,000 yards. The enemy at once hoisted colours and turned away. At this time the masts and smoke of the enemy were visible from the upper bridge of the *Invincible* at a range of approximately 17,000 yards (i.e. 8½ sea miles) across the low land to the south of Port William. The *Kent*, meanwhile, had weighed, passed down the harbour, and taken up an observing station at the entrance of the harbour. The two leading Germans altered course to port so as to close the *Kent* at the entrance of the harbour; but as they did so must have caught sight of the two battle cruisers, as they altered course again seawards and in-

creased speed to rejoin their consorts. At 9.45, so says the despatch of the Admiral, the squadron—less the *Bristol*—weighed and proceeded out of harbour in the following order: *Carnarvon*, *Inflexible*, *Invincible*, and *Cornwall* . . . the visibility was at its maximum, the sea was calm with a bright sun and a clear sky, and a light breeze from the north-west. By this time von Spee knew, to use a naval idiom, that "his number was up." Behind him ravened two British battle cruisers who had the speed of him by seven or eight knots; who were armed with eight 12-inch guns to his 8.2's, and who were burning to avenge the untimely end of their comrades of the *Good Hope* and the *Monmouth*. The trapper was trapped with a vengeance; and many must have been the surmises on board his fleet as to how Sturdee could have arrived at so inopportune a moment for them?

There was no doubt that the secret was well kept of the departure of the two battle cruisers *Invincible* and *Inflexible* from England. Whether through their spies the enemy knew of their departure is a moot point; the main thing was that von Spee had no idea that the avenger of Cradock was on his track until that fateful morning of December 8. It was, however, a near thing. Admiral Sturdee in his despatch states that:

"The squadron, consisting of H.M. ships *Invincible*, flying my flag; *Inflexible*, Captain Richard F. Phillimore; *Carnarvon*, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Archibald P. Stoddart; *Cornwall*, Captain Walter M. Ellerton; *Kent*, Captain John D. Allen; *Glasgow*, Captain John Luce; *Bristol*, Captain Basil H. Fanshawe; and *Macedonia*, Captain Bertram S. Evans, arrived at Port Stanley, Falkland Islands, at 10.30 A.M. on Monday, December 7, 1914. Coaling was commenced at once, in order that the ships should be ready to resume the search for the enemy's squadron the next evening, December 8."

Von Spee, as we have seen, saved further trouble by turning up in the morning, and putting his head into a trap, of the existence of which he had no idea. This was a stroke

of luck as good as it has been rare during the continuance of the war. The action now developed, and it is divided into three periods by the Vice-Admiral: namely, preliminary movements; action with the armoured cruisers; action with the light cruisers; and—supplementary—action with enemy transports. At 10.20 the signal for a general chase was made. The battle cruisers quickly passed ahead of the *Carnarvon* and overtook the *Kent*. The *Glasgow* was ordered to keep two miles from the *Invincible*, and the *Inflexible* was stationed on the starboard quarter of the flagship. Speed was eased to 20 knots at 11.15 A.M. to enable the other cruisers to get into station. At this time the enemy's funnels and bridges showed just above the horizon. At 11.27 the Admiral was informed by the *Bristol* that three enemy ships had appeared off Point Pleasant.

Bristol and *Macedonia* were ordered to proceed and destroy them. At 12.20 the Admiral found that the enemy was still maintaining his distance; he accordingly decided to go ahead with the two battle cruisers and the *Glasgow*. At 12.47 he made the signal "open fire and engage the enemy." At 12.55 *Inflexible* opened fire from her fore turret at the right-hand ship of the enemy, a light cruiser; a few minutes later the *Invincible* opened on the same ship; the range was 16,500 to 15,000 yards.

The target was a light cruiser, the *Leipzig*, who, when she discovered 12-inch shells dropping alongside, turned away with the *Nurnberg* and *Dresden* to the south-west. A signal from the Vice-Admiral sent the *Kent*, *Glasgow*, and *Cornwall* in pursuit: the action thus developing into three separate encounters.

CHAPTER VI

The battle of *Coronel*, concluded—The story of the *Emden*—Operations at the head of the Persian Gulf and on the Shatt-el-Arab and Tigris Rivers—The fight in the Cameroons: ascent of the Cameroon River and capture of the capital, Dualla.

As in the battle of *Coronel* so in the Falkland Islands encounter, superior speed and heavier metal told their tale at once. The *Inflexible* and *Invincible* were 28-knot ships, and in consequence were able to choose their range, forcing the German cruisers to conform to their movements.

Fire was opened from the English battle cruisers at 12.55 P.M.; at 1.25 P.M. the two big Germans turned to port 7 points in succession, into line ahead (i.e. one ship following the other), and opened fire at 1.30 P.M. Sturdee eased speed to 24 knots, the battle cruisers turning together bringing them into line ahead, with *Invincible* leading. The range at this time was 13,500 yards, and increasing; at 2 P.M. it was 16,450 yards. At 2.10 P.M. the enemy turned away 10 points to starboard, and a second chase ensued, until 2.45 P.M. when the battle cruisers again opened fire. This caused the

enemy to turn into line ahead to port and open fire at 2.55 P.M. The *Scharnhorst* caught fire forward but not seriously, and her fire slackened perceptibly; the *Gneisenau* was badly hit by the *Inflexible*. At 3.30 P.M. the *Scharnhorst* led round about 10 points to starboard; just previously her fire had slackened perceptibly, and one shell had shot away her third funnel; some guns were not firing, and it would appear that the turn was dictated by a desire to bring her starboard guns into action. The effect of the fire on the *Scharnhorst* became more and more apparent in consequence of smoke from fires, and also escaping steam. At times a shell would cause a large hole to appear in her side, through which could be seen a dull red glow of flame. At 4.44 P.M. the *Scharnhorst*, whose flag remained flying to the last, suddenly listed heavily to port, and within a minute it became clear that she was a doomed ship,

for the list increased very rapidly until she lay on her beam ends, and at 5.17 she disappeared. The *Gneisenau* passed on the far side of her late flagship, and continued a determined but ineffectual effort to fight the two battle cruisers. At 5.8 P.M. the forward funnel was knocked over and remained resting against the second funnel. She was evidently in serious straits, and her fire slackened very much. At 5.15 P.M. one of the *Gneisenau*'s shells struck the *Invincible*; this was her last effective effort. At 5.30 P.M. she turned towards the flagship with a

then walking on her side as she lay on her beam ends before sinking, for a minute. The prisoners of war from the *Gneisenau* reported that by the time the ammunition was expended, some 600 men had been killed or wounded. The surviving officers and men were ordered on deck, and told to provide themselves with hammocks and any articles that could support them in the water. When the ship capsized and sank there were probably some 200 unwounded survivors in the water, but owing to the shock of the cold water many were drowned within sight of



AT 5.15 ONE OF THE *GNEISENAU*'S SHELLS STRUCK THE *INVINCIBLE*.

heavy list to starboard, and appeared stopped, with steam pouring from her escape pipes, and smoke from shell and fires rising everywhere. About this time the Admiral ordered the signal "cease fire" to be made, but before it was hoisted the *Gneisenau* opened fire again, and continued to fire from time to time from a single gun.

At 5.40 P.M. the three ships (*Invincible*, *Inflexible*, and *Carnarvon*) closed in on the *Gneisenau*, and at this time the flag flying at her foretruck was apparently hauled down, but the flag at the peak continued flying. At 5.50 P.M. "cease fire" was made. At 6 P.M. the *Gneisenau* heeled over very suddenly, showing the men gathered on her decks and

the boats and ship. Every effort was made to save life as quickly as possible, both by boats and from the ships; lifebuoys were thrown and ropes lowered, but only a proportion could be rescued. The *Invincible* alone rescued 108 men, fourteen of whom were found to be dead after being brought on board; these men were buried at sea the following day with full military honours.

This singularly clear and interesting description of the action of the battle cruisers is taken from the official despatch on the subject.

Midshipman John Esmonde, in a letter to his father, Sir Thomas Esmonde, subsequently republished in the *Manchester*

Guardian, gives details which find no place in the cold correctitude of the official communication.

Being a midshipman, of course he climbed on to the top of his turret to have a look round, and says: "I could see all the shells coming at us (*Invincible*) and I felt that they were all coming straight at me. However, they all missed except one, which hit the side of the ship near the ward-room, and made a great green flash and sent splinters flying all round. I hopped below armour quickly and started working again. We were nearing the *Scharnhorst*, and began firing for all we were worth. We hit again and again. First our left gun sent his big crane spinning over the side; then our right gun blew his funnel to atoms; and then another shot from the left gun sent her bridge and part of her fore-castle sky high. We were not escaping free, however; shots were hitting us repeatedly, and spray from the splashes of their shells was hiding the *Scharnhorst* from us. Suddenly a great livid flame rushed through the gun-ports, and splinters flew all round, and we felt the 150 or 200 tons of the turret going up in the air. We thought we would go over the side and get drowned like rats in a trap. However, we came down again with a crash that shook the turret dreadfully, and continued firing as hard as ever. Nothing in the turret was out of order at all. The range continued to come down, and the whistles of the shells that flew over us grew into a regular shriek. Down came the range—11,000, 10,000, 9,000, 8,800. We were hitting the *Scharnhorst* nearly every time. One beauty from our right gun got one of their turrets fair and square and sent it whizzing over the side."

There is no space here for the whole of this admirable and very human description of this memorable sea battle, but what the shooting of the *Invincible* must have been like is instanced for us by a leaf from a German officer's note-book (just before the *Gneisenau* sank): "5.10, hit; 5.12 hit; 5.14, hit, hit, hit again; 5.20, after turret gone; 5.40, hit, hit, on fire everywhere; 5.41, hit,

hit, burning everywhere and sinking; 5.45, hit, hit, men lying everywhere; 5.46, hit, hit: 'it ends just before the ship sank. The officer is on board here now.' A pretty cool observer must have been this German officer to take notes in such a scene as that by which he was surrounded.

While the action was proceeding between the big ships the *Glasgow*, *Kent*, and *Cornwall* proceeded in chase of the *Dresden*, *Nurnberg*, and *Leipzig*. In the race that ensued the speedy little *Glasgow* went ahead, and at 3 P.M. exchanged shots with the *Leipzig* at 12,000 yards. At 4.17 the *Cornwall* also opened fire on the *Leipzig*. At 7.17 the *Leipzig* was on fire fore and aft, and the *Glasgow* and the *Cornwall* ceased fire; the *Leipzig* turned over on her port side and disappeared at 9 P.M. Seven officers and eleven men were saved. Owing to the excellent and strenuous efforts of the engine-room department of the *Kent*, she was able to get within range of the *Nurnberg* at 5 P.M. At 6.35 the *Nurnberg* was on fire forward and ceased firing. The *Kent* also ceased firing and closed to 3300 yards. As the colours were observed to be flying on the *Nurnberg* the *Kent* opened fire again. Fire was finally stopped five minutes later on the colours being hauled down, and all preparation made for saving life. At 7.27 the *Nurnberg* sank. Twelve men were rescued, but only seven survived.

The *Dresden* escaped. She was the speediest of the German light cruisers, and the *Glasgow*, the only one of ours who might have overtaken her, was, as we have seen, fully occupied elsewhere. The *Bristol* and *Macedonia* chased and sank—after the crews had been removed—the two German colliers, *Baden* and *Santa Isabel*. Special commendation was awarded by the Admiral to the engine-room staff of the *Kent* for the fine steaming that she did in the pursuit. To quote Midshipman Esmonde once more, this is what he says concerning the wonderful dash of this cruiser:

"The *Kent*, a 21-knot cruiser, was ordered to chase the *Nurnberg*, a 25-knot ship, and

also a much more modern one than the *Kent*. She had only a few hundred tons of coal on board to catch the *Nurnberg* with. The old *Kent* set off, and they worked up to 22, more than she had ever done on trials. Then the word was passed up that there was hardly any coal left. 'Well,' said the Captain, 'have a go at the boats.' So they broke up all the boats, smeared them with oil and put them into the furnaces. Then in went all the arm-chairs from the ward-room, and then the chests from the officers' cabins. They next burnt the ladders and all—every bit of wood was sent to the stokehold. The result was that the *Kent's* speed became 24 knots, and she caught the *Nurnberg*, and after a stiff fight, in which several men were killed, she sank the *Nurnberg*."

This truly wonderful performance on the part of the engine-room staff of the *Kent* meant far more than the fact that all hands worked like demons for a few hours during the action. It demonstrated the wonderful attention that had been devoted in the past to the care and maintenance of both engines and boilers, and further, it was a triumph for the designers and builders of those engines, that they should have stood up to the terrific strain that they were called upon to endure. The ward-room officers had no arm-chairs to sit in that night, neither had they bunks in which to sleep, and their clothes were in tumbled heaps on the floors of their chairless cabins; yet it would not be too much to say that there were fewer more contented people floating on the surface of the sea that night than the officers and crew—who had also seen their mess-tables and stools taken to feed the maw of the hungry furnaces—of this particular British cruiser.

On November 7 it was announced in Tokyo that Tsingtau—or Kiaouchau—had surrendered to the British and Japanese forces. This important port and arsenal had been stolen by Germany from China in 1898 as compensation for the murder of two missionaries. During the operations the enemy ships *Kaiserin Elisabeth* and *Cor-*

moran, cruisers, and the *Lucks*, *Tiger*, *Jaguar*, and *Illis*, gunboats, had been sunk in the harbour.


On August 30 German Samoa surrendered to the British Australian Fleet under the command of Rear-Admiral Sir G. E. Patey, K.C.V.O.

Although overshadowed by the naval battles, the capture of German colonies, and other more important happenings of the sea war, there is one episode which will always be remembered, both by the landfolk and the mariner. This is the strange and meteoric career of the German light cruiser *Emden*. Never since Semmes took the sea in the *Alabama* in the War of Secession in America, has there been any parallel to the exploits of that famous ship, until von Müller in his light cruiser demonstrated to the world the damage that might be done to maritime commerce by one swift ship, commanded by a man of surpassing ability as a guerilla fighter. Of von Müller it might be written :

If you have writ your annals true, 'tis there,
That, like an eagle in a dovecot, I
Fluttered your Volscians in Corioli.

Escaping from the China station in the early days of the war, the *Emden*, with a dummy funnel rigged, and flying British colours, passed a Japanese cruiser close by, and was cheered by the Eastern sailors, under the impression that she was a British man-of-war. And then began a career of devastation that caused John Bull the most acute annoyance, while at the same time he could not help being ruefully amused at the shifts and devices of this most elusive of German captains. On September 20 the Secretary of the Admiralty issued the following :

"On September 10 the *Emden* from the China station, after being completely lost for six weeks, appeared suddenly in the Bay of Bengal, and during the period September 10-14, captured six British ships as follows: *Indus*, *Lovat*, *Killin*, *Diplomat*, *Trabcock*, and *Kabanga*, of which five were sunk and the sixth sent in to Calcutta with



THE SINKING OF THE "NÜRNBERG" BY THE BRITISH LIGHT CRUISER "KENT."
(Drawn by Montagu Dawson from a sketch by an eye-witness. By permission of The Sphere.)

the crews. The *Emden* is now reported at Rangoon, and it is possible she has made some other captures."

Nothing seems to have been heard of the *Emden* after the 14th of the month until September 22, when she turned up at Madras, bombarded the town, and set fire to a number of oil-tanks on shore. The bombardment only lasted 15 minutes. Interest in this audacious cruiser redoubled. She was likened to a weasel in a chicken-run, and homeward rates of insurance from the Far East soared like rockets at a Brock's benefit. On September 30 seven British steamers were captured, of which five were sunk and two released.

On October 15 a further communication from the Admiralty was made. It ran: "H.M.S. *Yarmouth*, Captain Henry L. Cochrane, has sunk the German Hamburg-Amerika Line steamer, *Markomannia*, in the vicinity of Sumatra, and has captured and is taking into harbour the Greek steamer *Pontoporos*. Both these vessels have been previously reported as accompanying the German cruiser *Emden*. H.M.S. *Yarmouth* has sixty German prisoners of war on board." The Secretary of the Admiralty also states that a communication has been received from the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia from the Administrator at Rabaul, reporting the capture of the small German sailing vessel, *Comet*, which was found to have a complete wireless telegraph station on board. This was the blow which did much to aid in the capture of the *Emden* in the end. Two things were indispensable for her continued career: the one was food and ammunition, supplied by ships like the *Markomannia*, the other was information that was gathered by such apparent innocents as the *Comet*. On October 20 the *Emden* made another great haul of seven British steamers, two of which were not sunk; and then came the culmination of her career. On October 28 she steamed into Penang Roads in broad daylight and sank a Russian cruiser and a French destroyer. The story was thus told by a correspondent


of the *Morning Post*, who begins his narrative by stating that no one in Penang was the least nervous about the *Emden*, although she was known to be in the vicinity, on account of the Russian cruiser *Jemchug*, three French destroyers, and a gunboat being in the harbour. Everybody was awakened at half-past five o'clock on the morning of October 28 by gun-firing, and when he with others, partially dressed, had assembled on the sea-front they were told that a warship had been sunk. The letter continues:

"Not a mile away there was a dense pall of black smoke where I knew the *Jemchug* had been anchored, and suddenly a four-funnelled cruiser appeared in view proceeding out of the harbour. When the smoke cleared no Russian cruiser was to be seen. The only four-funnelled warships in this neighbourhood were those of the Allies. Had a terrible mistake been made? for the victorious cruiser, to the layman and in the semi-darkness of dawn, seemed to resemble the British *Yarmouth*. No, for the mystery was soon solved: the fourth funnel disappeared, and the dread cry of *Emden* was at once on everybody's lips. Would she shell the defenceless town? was our next thought, and what were the French torpedo vessels doing?

"Meantime the hapless survivors of the *Jemchug* were in the water, and with a friend I went down to the wharf to see if I could be of any assistance. A man in our office had commandeered a launch, and asked us to help him. We at once went out to the scene of the disaster, the *Emden* then being about a mile and a half away. There were already some ships' boats out picking up the survivors, but our launch was the first steamboat, and being big we were able to rescue eighty-six officers and men, some dreadfully wounded, and as other launches were then on the scene we returned to the jetty to secure medical aid for the injured. The Russians were very brave, and were most unselfish in the water. They helped the wounded to keep afloat, and every man

took his turn to be picked up. There was no bustle or rush to get on to the launch before others, and not a moan escaped those who must have been in dreadful agony. Some had legs blown off, others fearful gashes from pieces of shell, and shrapnel wounds were on many. Altogether about 260 were rescued: 150 uninjured, about sixty or seventy slightly wounded, the rest more or less severely. Some seven have since died in hospital, and were buried with full military honours. One of the officers,

been well supplied with information by spies as to the state of unpreparedness on the warships here, and perhaps even sent a boat in to reconnoitre. Soon after 5 A.M. she got under way, the dummy funnel having been raised, and entered the harbour as if to anchor. She was challenged by the *Jemchug*, and replied she was the *Yarmouth* coming to anchor. The Russians, however, smelt a rat, and opened fire with one gun just as the *Emden* discharged a torpedo, which entered the *Jemchug's* engine-room and disabled the



THE END OF THE *EMDEN*.

Engineer-Lieutenant Gibner, speaks English well, and remains here in charge of the men, such as are not fit to be sent off to Hong-Kong. He was one of the men we rescued, and he is very grateful. He had a wonderful escape, as shells burst all around him on the deck, which was covered with the arms and legs of sailors who had been struck. He was uninjured, and the only man who retained his cap and shoes in the water.

"Now what had happened was this. The *Emden* arrived off Penang on the night of the 27th, and anchored a few miles out about 2 A.M. the following day. She had doubtless

machinery for hoisting ammunition. The Russian cruiser listed, rendering aim very difficult, the *Emden* meanwhile pouring in a hurricane of shells from a distance of from 250 to 350 yards. The German then turned and discharged a second torpedo, which exploded the *Jemchug's* magazine, and she then sank in fifteen fathoms of water. The whole engagement did not occupy more than fifteen minutes, and now only the top of the *Jemchug's* mast remains above water as a memorial of the awful scene of carnage that had taken place about half a mile from the wharf here.

"Strange to say, the *Emden* did not fire on the French gunboat nor on the two destroyers, which had not got steam up, and were therefore powerless to attack: it was not until after 7 A.M. that these were able to proceed to sea. On the way out of the harbour the *Emden* partly turned round and discharged a broadside. It was a moment of horror. Was she firing on our launch or on the town? No, a patrol boat was the object of her attentions, and she fatally wounded a Chinese engineer on board. She then went out to meet a steamer called the *Glenturret*, which was coming in. That vessel was stopped, and would certainly have been sunk but that the remaining French destroyer, the *Mousquet*, was seen coming in at full speed. The *Emden* went out to meet her, and after firing about fifty shots sank the gallant little vessel.

"The Frenchmen had a very poor chance of getting in close enough to use their torpedoes, but like heroes they did not hesitate to do their best to sink the enemy. The captain had his legs blown off, but at his own request was tied to the rails to direct operations until the waves closed over him and his men. The *Emden* saved over 30 of the crew; the rest, some 35, were lost. There can be no doubt that but for the gallantry of the *Mousquet* in attacking her huge enemy, Penang itself would have been bombarded, and perhaps many of us killed in attempting to defend the Cable Station. The *Glenturret* had on board about 200 tons of explosives, and had she been sunk the dynamite on board would perhaps have caused great damage here."

As a *ruse de guerre* the captain of the *Emden* was quite within his rights in entering Penang under a false flag, provided that he hauled this down and hoisted that of his own nation before opening fire. There seems to be a conflict of opinion as to whether he did this, or whether he did not. Von Müller on occasions was possessed of a freakish humour, which he displayed just after the Madras raid at the expense of the Marine Department in Calcutta. He despatched a wireless

message, purporting to come from a British cruiser, which on her way up from Singapore had run out of coal. The Department put on an army of coolies to Diamond Harbour, and coal was sent down by train with the least possible delay. There was no cruiser, and no necessity in consequence for any coal!

The *Emden* came by her end in an adventure thoroughly characteristic of the enterprise and bravery of her commander. In an attempt to destroy the wireless station at Cocos Keeling Islands, she was caught by the *Sydney* and destroyed. These remote islands are a group of twenty-three atolls south of Sumatra, owned by Mr. Sydney Clunies-Ross, whose grandfather, Mr. John Clunies-Ross, a Shetland sea captain, settled in the islands in 1823 and married a Malay Princess. In 1856 the islands became a British protectorate, and in 1882 were placed under the Governor of the Straits Settlements. There is a population of 600, chiefly engaged in the copra industry, which is considerable, and which Mr. Clunies-Ross has developed.

On November 9 Reuter's Agency reported to a much-relieved commercial community that the end of the *Emden* had come. It appears that on the morning of November 9 the cable operator at Singapore was talking to Cocos Island, when suddenly he was astonished to decipher this message: "*Emden* at Cocos landing armed party." Then Cocos was silent and there was no more news throughout the day. At 9.15 P.M., however, Singapore, suspecting that the regular cable instruments had been thrown out of gear, started to work the old mirror instrument which had been out of use for a considerable time. From Cocos a reply came which said: "Been unable to communicate; everything smashed; no light. Will get an instrument up at daylight. Report us all well. *Emden* engaged by British cruiser; result unknown. Landing-party commandeered schooner *Ayesha*."


The *Emden* arrived off the island about 6 A.M., and immediately sent off two boats

with three officers and forty men and four Maxim guns. The telegraphists seeing them coming sent out a call for help, which was received by the cruiser *Minotaur*, and by her passed on to the Australian cruiser *Sydney*. The Germans landed and started to smash up the telegraph instruments, a process that those in charge were quite powerless to prevent. Suddenly the boats were recalled and the *Emden* put to sea, leaving behind her the landing-party. These men laid hands on the schooner *Ayesha* and made good their escape in her. H.M.S. *Sydney*, which ship was on escort duty with a convoy, picked up the wireless message from Cocos at 6.30 A.M. on Monday, November 9, and proceeded full speed for that island. At 9.15 the *Emden* was sighted and at 9.40 the first shot was fired. The action was not of long duration, as the *Emden* was altogether overmatched by the 6-inch guns of the *Sydney*. The German cruiser made for the beach of North Keeling Island, where she grounded at 11.20 A.M. Eventually all the remainder of the *Emden's* crew were transferred to the *Sydney*. The *Emden* had 7 officers and 108 men killed in the action, and 3 officers and 53 men wounded. The casualties of the *Sydney* amounted to 4 killed and 12 wounded. The captain of the *Emden* was among those saved. Von Müller, as has been remarked before, will go down in history as one of the most capable guerilleros who ever sailed the seas. Neither was his record sullied by cruelty or harshness to his victims. The value of the captures that he made has been estimated at £650,000, and to this must be added some £3,000,000 for the cost of cargoes destroyed. The following is a list of the ships captured and sunk in the ninety-seven days that the *Emden* was at large after the declaration of war: *Indus* 3393 tons, *Lovat* 6102, *Killin* 3514, *Diplomat* 7615, *Trabcock* 4014. All these ships were taken and destroyed in the Bay of Bengal September 10-14, 1914. *Kabinga*, 4657, was taken and released September 12. *Clan Matheson*, 4775, was sunk September 14. *King Lud* 3650, *Foyle* 4147, *Riberia* 4147,

and *Tymeric* 3314, were all sunk September 30. *Gryjedale*, 4437, taken and released September 30. *Troilus* 7652, *Clan Grant* 3948, *Benmohr* 4806, *Chilkana* 5146, *Pourabbel* 473, were captured and sunk October 20. *Exford* 4542, *Saint Egbert* 5526, were captured October 20. The *Jemchug*, Russian cruiser, and *Mousquet*, French destroyer, were sunk at Penang October 30.

On November 8 the town of Fao, at the head of the Persian Gulf, was captured after the Turkish guns had been silenced by the fire of the small naval squadron that accompanied the transports conveying the expedition that penetrated into Mesopotamia. The Shatt-el-Arab, the stream formed by the junction of the rivers Tigris and Euphrates, was then ascended, and on November 21 Basra—or Bussorah—was occupied by the combined naval and military forces. This was a very important capture. Basra was to have been the terminus of the German section of the Bagdad Railway. It is the centre of the date industry, and the annual trade of the town is over £2,000,000. The disadvantage under which it labours is that no vessel drawing more than 18 feet of water can reach its quays. The operations on the Tigris hardly belong to the subject of this book, which is concerned with the sea war. All the same a large number of naval officers and men were employed in these operations, which, had it not been for the overwhelming and overmastering interest excited by the gigantic struggle in Europe, would no doubt have filled the columns of our newspapers at the time this war was in progress to the exclusion of aught else. We note, however, in passing, the following remark made by an officer serving with the Indian Expeditionary Force in Mesopotamia:

"Our advance to Amara, and the maintenance of our communications on the 136 miles of river which separates this place from Basra, would not have been possible without the assistance of a number of river steamers which were brought round from Burma where they were purchased by the Irrawaddy Flotilla Company. It was this




DESTRUCTION OF THE GERMAN RAIDER "EMDEN" BY H.M.S. "SYDNEY" OF THE AUSTRALIAN NAVY, NOVEMBER 9, 1914.

company's vessels which rendered the invasion and conquest of Upper Burma possible in 1885."

Owing to Turkish misrule in Mesopotamia there were practically no steamers and no commerce on the great rivers Euphrates and Tigris prior to the invasion of this territory by the British in 1914. It is true that a firm of Englishmen ran steamers between Bagdad and Basra, but they did so under every possible disadvantage, owing to the state of the country and its lack of proper governance.

In the Cameroons also, at this period, a spirited little campaign was carried out in

fire from enemy ships, *Elisabeth*, *Nachtigall*, *Soden*, and *Mungo*. The expedition had also to keep a very sharp eye on the swiftly running stream, down which the foe kept sending contact mines. The obstruction was forced, and the *Challenger* passed through the gap, followed by the *Dwarf*, which ship almost immediately afterwards sank the German *Nachtigall*. This "side-show" of the Great War gave much scope for the gallantry and resource of our younger officers, both R.N. and R.N.R. Mine-sweeping, engaging enemy troops on the banks of the river, going on ahead to draw the fire of concealed enemies, mounting field-



THE ADVANCE TO AMARA ON RIVER STEAMERS BROUGHT FROM BURMA.

conjunction with our French Allies. The ships engaged were the *Cumberland*, Captain Fuller; *Challenger*, Captain Beaty Pownall; *Dwarf*, Commander Strong; *Ivy*, Commander Hughes; *Remus*, Lieutenant-Commander Henderson; *Porpoise*, Lieutenant Martin; two French cruisers, and a flotilla of small craft from the Niger. The ships forced their way up river, from which all buoys, beacons, and marks had been removed, and got within fifteen miles of the port of Dualla, the capital; and it was discovered that half-way between the point where the ships anchored and Dualla the channel had been blocked by the enemy by the sinking of no less than nine steamers. A channel was forced by the blowing up of one of these steamers, and this feat was performed under

guns on trucks and pushing them through dense bush, landing to rescue comrades lost in the bush, and such-like kindred occupations, kept all hands fully employed. Here again is an expedition full of the most varied and wonderful experiences, the details of which were entirely lost to view in that clash of arms by land and sea which embraced every continent and every ocean. Those, however, in whose entirely competent hands it was placed deserve the thanks of their country no less than those in the more vital centres of the war. Hard work, hard living, and hard fighting were their portion, and they carried it to a successful issue with a verve, a spirit, and a gallantry that were worthy of the country and the service to which they belonged.

CHAPTER VII

German bombardment of Hartlepool, Whitby, and Scarborough—Aeroplanes, light cruisers, destroyers, and submarines at Cuxhaven—Loss of the *Formidable*, torpedoed in the Channel—Rescue of seventy men by the *Providence*, Brixham smack—Escape of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* in the Mediterranean.

WE now come to consider "an act of war" entirely senseless in its savagery, namely, the bombardment by German warships of Hartlepool, Whitby, and Scarborough. To fire from the sea on coast-towns entirely unprotected was worthy of Germans, and Germans alone. From this method of warfare we can draw one deduction with certitude, which is, that had England not stood by France in the world war, one method of compelling her submission would have been the bombardment of all towns that could be reached by gunfire from the sea. That remarkable German publicist, Count Reventlow, stated just before the raid: "We must see clearly that in order to fight with success we must fight ruthlessly in the proper meaning of the word." On December 16 this principle was put into practice by the Imperial German Navy.

The enemy is entirely within his rights in attacking, and destroying if he can, any place that has guns mounted. Hartlepool at the time of the raid boasted of a small fort armed with guns totally inadequate to engage any ship with armour on her sides. Nevertheless there was a fort, and there were guns; and had the attack been confined to this place we should have had no cause of complaint. Scarborough, as is known to all the world, and perhaps more particularly to the Germans (who, thanks to the freedom allowed them before the war, had carried out a staff ride in the neighbourhood), is a watering-place filled with hotels, lodging-houses, boarding-houses, and possessed of concert-rooms, theatres, and such-like places that go to make up the attractions of a summer resort. Whitby is a sleepy little place which, before the raid, was principally noted for its beautiful old Abbey.

At 11.35 A.M. on December 16 the follow-

ing announcement was issued by the War Office for publication: "At 7.30 A.M. to-day three enemy ships were sighted off Hartlepool, and at 8.15 A.M. they commenced the bombardment. The ships appeared to be two battle cruisers and one armoured cruiser. The land batteries replied, and are reported to have hit and damaged the enemy. At 8.50 the firing ceased, and the enemy steamed away. None of our guns were touched. One shell fell in the Royal Engineers' lines and several of the lines of the 18th (Service) Battalion of the Durham Light Infantry. The casualties among the troops amounted to 7 killed and 14 wounded. Some damage was done to the town, and the gasworks were set on fire. During the bombardment, especially in West Hartlepool, the people crowded into the streets, and approximately 22 were killed and 50 wounded. At the same time a battle cruiser and an armoured cruiser appeared off Scarborough and fired about fifty shots, which caused considerable damage, and 13 casualties are reported. At Whitby two battle cruisers fired some shots, doing damage to buildings, and the following casualties are reported, 2 killed and 2 wounded. At all these places there was an entire absence of panic, and the demeanour of the people was everything that could be desired."

Twenty-nine persons were killed and 64 wounded in Hartlepool alone; and the miracle was that the whole town was not laid in ashes and hundreds killed. It was evident that the attacking squadron was thinking first of all of securing its retreat, and its shooting was beneath contempt. The land battery was manned, and although a shell killed five men, it continued to fire at the enemy until the affair was over. At Whitby it was reported that the gunnery of

the assailants was contemptible, and the inhabitants gathered on the West Cliff and watched the bombardment, which lasted about a quarter of an hour, during which time it was estimated that 200 shells were fired. At the time of the raid the weather was foggy and misty, and as the enemy ships approached the shore they came out of the mist close to a flotilla of English destroyers. These small craft could do nothing against the big battle cruisers, and the *Doon* and the *Hardy* suffered somewhat severely. On board the *Doon* 2 men were killed and 10 wounded, and 3 were killed and 15 wounded on board the *Hardy*. That these destroyers were not sunk is another proof of how bad was the shooting of the enemy.

Naturally a good deal of feeling was raised by this assault on our coast, and a singularly inept communiqué from the Admiralty did not help to mend matters. People could not understand that what was said by the Admiralty was nothing more than ordinary common sense when it was stated by the department "that the bombardments might cause some loss of life among the civil population and some damage to private property, which was much to be regretted, but they must not in any circumstances be allowed to modify the general naval policy that was being pursued."

It was essentially a case in which silence would have been golden, especially when the announcement could be twisted in the following way, as it was by a prominent member of Parliament :

(1) Open towns on the East Coast must expect to be bombarded, and we cannot help it.

(2) Those who are killed must be killed, and their relatives who mourn must mourn. We are sorry, but it cannot be prevented.

(3) Though we are supposed to command the North Sea, we cannot scatter our big ships about to prevent bombardments, which, though deplorable, are devoid of military significance.

Members of Parliament, at all times

persons of very doubtful utility, become positively mischievous when they give vent to such unadulterated nonsense as this. As the *Times* remarked in a leader, it would appear that there were people in the country who thought that our warships were drawn up like a line of sentinels around our coasts. To those who have an understanding of the sea and its happenings, not drawn from the study of books, but from actual sea experience, it has been a marvel too great for words how raids have been prevented during the continuance of a long and bitter war against a brave and unscrupulous enemy.

That the warships that attacked our north-east coast towns escaped the penalty of their crime was due to their undeserved luck, fog hiding them from view as they scuttled back to the shelter of their fortified harbours.

Christmas of 1914 was marked by an air raid. On Friday, December 25, German warships lying in Schillig Roads off Cuxhaven were attacked by seven naval seaplanes piloted by the following officers: Flight-Commanders Oliver, Hewlett, Ross, and Milner; Flight-Lieutenants Miley and Edmonds; Flight-Sub-Lieutenant Blackburn. The attack was delivered at daylight, starting from a point in the vicinity of Heligoland. The seaplanes were escorted by a light cruiser and destroyer force, together with submarines. As soon as these ships were seen by the Germans from Heligoland, two Zeppelins, three or four hostile seaplanes, and several submarines attacked them. It was necessary for the British ships to remain in the neighbourhood in order to pick up the returning airmen, and a novel combat ensued between the most modern cruisers on the one hand, and the enemy's aircraft and submarines on the other. By swift manoeuvring the enemy's submarines were avoided, and the two Zeppelins were easily put to flight by the guns of the *Undaunted* and *Arcthusa*. The enemy seaplanes succeeded in dropping their bombs near to our ships, though without hitting any. The British ships remained for three hours off

the enemy coast without being molested by any surface vessels, and safely re-embarked three out of the seven airmen with their machines. Three other pilots, who returned later, were picked up according to arrangement by British submarines that were standing by, their machines being sunk. Six out of the seven pilots returned safely; only Flight-Commander Hewlett was missing. But this daring and skilful officer was subsequently rescued by a Dutch trawler.

As was usual in such cases the Germans reported that no damage had been done, and asserted that all the hits had been on their side. Thus the *Hamburger Zeitung* stated: "Cuxhaven was not a sleepy Scarborough. Everybody was on duty. The enemy having sent airmen in advance, we prepared a worthy reception. The difference was that our airmen and Zeppelins directed bombs which hit, and the English dropped missiles which fell beside the objects aimed at. The gasometer at Cuxhaven is still undamaged, but it is a question whether the British gun-boats are still navigable, the German bombs being much better aimed. After the first attack a heavy Elbe cloud fell over the seas, so that we did not even advance towards the proper action of the piece."

On our side it was claimed that a Parseval shed and airship were destroyed, and a number of Zeppelin sheds and their contents damaged. It is difficult to understand why no German surface warships took a hand in this operation. Schillig Roads are just at the entrance of the Jade and Weser Rivers, and but a short distance from both Wilhelms-haven and Brunsbüttel. That no sally was made from any of these fortified positions to cut off the audacious English raiders does not speak well for the enterprise of the enemy Fleet. Flight-Commander Hewlett, whose engine "ran hot," and who was forced to descend into the sea, was picked up by the Dutch trawler *Maria van Hattem*, and subsequently returned to England.

On January 1, 1915, the *Formidable*, a battleship of 15,000 tons, was sunk in the Channel with heavy loss of life. The report from the


Admiralty giving the first news of the disaster ran as follows: "The battleship *Formidable* was sunk this morning in the Channel, whether by mine or submarine is not yet certain. Seventy-one survivors have been picked up by a British light cruiser, and it is possible that others may have been rescued by other vessels." A trawler arrived in port subsequently, and landed about sixty-eight men and two officers of the *Formidable*, who had been picked up early in the day in the Channel. These survivors were in addition to those picked up by a light cruiser, and referred to in the Admiralty statement.

There seems no reason to doubt that the *Formidable* was struck by a torpedo, and shortly afterwards by a second torpedo. Vice-Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly then left the *Topaze* light cruiser to save life and steamed away with the rest of the squadron. There was a strong wind at the time and the sea was rising. This rendered the getting out of the boats from the sinking ship a matter of the greatest difficulty, and many were swamped and smashed alongside. It was bitterly cold, with squalls of snow alternating with rain.

In the evidence given at the inquest held at Lyme Regis, Mr. A. E. Cooper, Master-at-Arms of the *Formidable*, who landed with some others in the ship's pinnace, in which were 57 men, stated: "The boat was absolutely full of water when we started . . . we landed on the beach at about 11 o'clock, so that we had been from half-past two in the morning till eleven at night in the water. When we landed six men were dead in the boat and three expired when they got on shore. There was no physical injury to any one." A seaman of the light cruiser *Topaze* gave the following description of the last moments of the *Formidable* to the *Daily Telegraph*: "All the remainder of the Fleet scattered, but we stood by her until she went. We kept sweeping round in circles so as to make ourselves an awkward target for submarines. The first time round we managed to get a line to a cutter and got 35 hands out of her. The coxswain of the boat was a real good Britisher. He remained in his boat

calling to his crew to stand by him. He wanted to go back again for another boat-load. He refused to come out until an officer went down and literally hauled him out, and he nearly cried because they wouldn't let him go back.

right close to the *Formidable*, and endeavoured to go alongside her, but were unable to do so on account of the sea. We laid off helpless to save them, and at two minutes past six the poor old *Formidable* went down to Davy. The voice of the skipper could



A MINE-SWEEPER IN THE CHANNEL.

“What struck me most was the coolness of the captain of the *Formidable*. He stood there among the men, cheering them and giving orders quite coolly. He was a white man. The men had fallen in on the quarter-deck, smoking, and quite orderly. The third and last time we steamed round we went

still be heard cheering up the men on deck. Then we saw her settle down by the bows, heard the skipper yell out, ‘Good-bye, lads, every man for himself and may God help you all.’ His cool and calm voice seemed to reach miles. He was answered with a cheer from the men, and then—I am not ashamed

to say that tears were in my eyes and in many others' too—the ship took the final plunge. The lads on her deck went down singing, 'Should auld acquaintance be forgot.' It was so grand, and oh, so pitiful."

It would seem as if there could be no more moving story of the sea than this. Captain Loxley on his bridge heartening his men till the end came; that splendid crew showing with what majesty—to paraphrase Napier—the British seaman can die. Truly,

They sleep as well beneath that purple tide
As others under turf.

And the memory of that wild night shall endure, limned for us by a comrade who, on the deck of a sister vessel, wept for the death agony of those whom he could not save. Surely an epic tale, that of the coxswain of the cutter, who could not be prevailed upon to leave his frail craft in that shouting gale and monstrous sea, because of the peril of those whom he loved better than his own life. Room also must be found for the saving of 2 officers and 68 men by the Brixham trawler *Providence*. High in the roll of honour should stand the name of William Pillar, the master of the smack; of W. Carter, mate; of Jack Clark, second hand, and Dan, the boy. As a feat of seamanship and magnificent daring nothing could have been finer. What honour is too great for those fishermen who saved for England seventy lives of such a company as that which manned the *Formidable*?

The *Western Daily Mercury*, of Plymouth, gives the following account of the rescue by the trawler:

"After being in their open cutter for nearly twelve hours 2 officers and 68 men of H.M.S. *Formidable* were rescued by the Brixham fishing smack *Providence*, owned and skippered by William Pillar, some 15 miles from Berry Head. They were bearing west-north-west. The *Providence* was running before a gale to Brixham for shelter, and when off the Start had to heave to owing to the force of the wind. She had just previously been struck by heavy seas, and

when on the starboard tack Jack Clark, the second hand, noticed an open boat under the lee of the smack. He shouted to his captain and his mate, the latter named W. Carter, to jump up, saying, 'Here's a sight under our lee!' They were amazed to see a small open boat driving through the mountainous seas with one oar hoisted as a staff from which was flying a sailor's scarf. The little cutter was hidden from view for minutes together in the seething foam. Captain Pillar swung the *Providence* clear. The crew, with almost superhuman efforts, took another reef in the mainsail and set the storm jib, for until that had been done it would have been disastrous to have attempted a rescue.

"Meanwhile the cutter drifted towards them, although at times they lost sight of her in the heavy sea. Clark climbed the rigging, and presently discovered the cutter braving the storm just to leeward of his boat. The captain decided to gybe—a perilous manœuvre in such weather, since the mast was liable to give away. Four times did the gallant smacksmen seek to get a rope to the cutter. Each effort was more difficult than the last, but in the end they obtained a good berth on the port tack. A small warp was thrown and caught by the sailors. This they made fast round the stem of the capstan, and with great skill the cutter was hauled to a berth at the stern. The warp was passed round to the lee side and the cutter brought up to the lee quarter. Then the naval men began to jump on board; but even now there was a danger of losing men, as the seas were rising some thirty feet high at times. The rescues from the cutter to the smack took thirty minutes to accomplish. A lad of eighteen having suffered from exposure required immediate treatment on board to save his life. The officer in charge of the cutter, Torpedo-Gunner Hurrigan, was the last to leave, and he found himself clutching the mizzen rigging to get aboard the *Providence*.

"This accomplished, the cutter's rope was then cut. She was full of water, having a hole under her hull. This had been stuffed with a pair of pants, of which one of her sea-

men had divested himself for the purpose. One of the men had his fingers jammed between the cutter and the fishing smack. Those of the rescued men who were wearing no trousers were accommodated in the engine-room, and the others in the cabin and the fish-hold. All had been rescued by one o'clock, and a course was then shaped for Brixham. The needs of the men were attended to on board the *Providence*. All the food she carried was fairly divided, and all the cigarettes and tobacco possessed by her crew were shared amongst the benumbed sailors. They were also regaled with hot coffee. Near Brixham the *Providence* fell in with the *Dencade*, which took her in tow, and she was berthed at the pier. Residents of Brixham brought blankets, clothing, and boots to the survivors, for a great number of them were without coats or footwear. They were soon housed in comfortable quarters. Their plight was simply indescribable. For hours they had been battling against the storm, hoping against hope until the brown sails of the *Providence* hove in sight. During the height of the storm they were almost continuously engulfed by great waves. The officer in charge of the cutter commended the gallant seamanship of the Brixham fishermen, and characterised it as being beyond all praise.

" 'It blew as hard this morning as it had ever blown,' remarked one of the weather-beaten fishermen, to which a bare-footed bluejacket, with a safety belt around his neck, replied: 'Here we are again; undress uniform; swimming costume!' The *Providence's* trawl net was lying about the deck with fish still in its folds, but the four men who manned her were proud that they were the means of snatching seventy of the *Formidable's* men from a watery grave."

It is gratifying indeed to record that honour and reward did come to the gallant smacksmen. Received by the King at Buckingham Palace, His Majesty addressed the skipper and his men in the following words: "I congratulate you heartily upon your gallant and heroic conduct. It is a

great feat to have saved seventy-one lives. I realise how difficult your task must have been, because I know myself how arduous it is to gybe a vessel in a heavy gale." And thus not only did king speak to subject, but he spoke also as sailor to sailor, which must have much enhanced the pleasure of the recipients of the medal for gallantry. The Shipwrecked Mariners' Society also awarded their gold medal and £5 to the skipper, and their silver medal and £3 to the crew. Captain Pillar also received £250 from the Admiralty, William Carter and John Clark £100 each, and Daniel Taylor, apprentice, £50.

It would be impossible in this chronicle of the sea war to do more than indicate the activities of the mine-sweeping section of the Royal Navy. For stolid endurance of conditions of indescribable hardship no lieges of His Majesty did more to facilitate the commerce of Great Britain being carried on than did the fishermen and others into whose hands this business was confided. A memorandum from the Admiral commanding the East Coast mine-sweepers was issued at the end of 1914, in which that officer speaks as follows: "From the 19th to the 31st of December sweeping operations were conducted by the East Coast Mine-sweepers with the object of clearing the minefield which had been laid by the enemy off Scarborough. At the beginning there was no indication of the position of the mines, although, owing to losses of passing merchant ships, it was known that a minefield had been laid. In order to ascertain how the mines lay it was necessary to work at all times of tide, with a consequent large increase in the element of danger."

To give some idea of this service, and what it means, let us quote from the recommendations of the Admiral of certain officers employed:

"Captain Lionel G. Preston, R.N., H.M.S. *Skipjack*, on December 11 proceeded at once into the middle of the area where the mines had exploded to give assistance to the damaged trawlers. He anchored between

the trawlers and the mines, which had been brought to the surface, and proceeded to sink them.

"Lieutenant Godfrey Craik Parsons, R.N., H.M.S. *Pekin*, displayed great skill and devotion to duty in continuing to command his group of trawlers after being mined in Trawler No. 58 on December 19. On this day his group exploded eight mines, and brought to the surface six more, Trawler No. 99 being blown up and Nos. 58 and 465 damaged, all in the space of about ten minutes.

"Lieutenant H. Boothby, R.N.R., H.M.S. *Pekin*.—When Trawler No. 99 (*Orianda*), in which he was serving, was blown up by a mine on December 19, Lieutenant Boothby successfully got all his crew (except one, who was killed) into safety. Lieutenant Boothby was again blown up on January 16, 1915, in Trawler No. 450.

"Skipper Ernest V. Snowline, R.N.T.R.—He kept to his station in heavy weather, standing by the s.s. *Gallier* after she had been damaged by a mine.

"Skipper T. Tringall, R.N.T.R., Trawler *Solon*, on his own responsibility went to the assistance of the steamer *Gallier*, which had just been mined on the night of December 25. It was low water at the time, and dark, and the *Gallier* was showing no lights, so had to be searched for in the minefield."

The cases cited are only a few out of a long list. Those who are intimately acquainted with the North Sea know what it means merely to keep the sea in heavy weather, in the daunting darkness of the long winter nights when all is black as Erebus save the gleaming foam which crowns the vicious wall-sided seas of this storm-tormented area. The bitter cold, the fact that those in small craft like trawlers are perpetually wet through, saps the vitality of men to the lowest ebb. And yet in such conditions as these did our heroes of the mine-sweeping service ply their awful trade of seeking for mines. Oftentimes they found them with the stem of their vessel, and then with a crash and a roar of spouting waters

one more of them had ceased to be. But, if this happened, there was one thing upon which they could most confidently count, that yet another of their sister vessels would dare all to save those who haply had not been killed by the explosion. There are on record cases in which men who had been blown up three times returned in a fourth vessel to hunt once again for the peril lurking beneath their keel.

In the very first month of the war the German battle cruiser *Goeben* and the light cruiser *Breslau* escaped from the vigilance of the British Mediterranean Fleet and gained the shelter of a Turkish port. There was at the time considerable speculation how this could have come about, and there was a tendency on the part of irresponsible critics to blame Admiral Sir Berkeley Milne for the occurrence. On August 30, however, an Admiralty communiqué was given to the Press, which stated: "The conduct and disposition of Admiral Sir Berkeley Milne in regard to the German vessels *Goeben* and *Breslau* have been the subject of careful examination by the Board of Admiralty, with the result that their Lordships have approved the measures taken by him in all respects."

Three weeks later the Secretary of the Admiralty announced that: "Rear-Admiral E. C. T. Troubridge has been recalled to England from the Mediterranean in order that an enquiry may be held into the circumstances leading to the escape of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* from Messina Straits. The Court of Enquiry will consist of Admiral Sir Hedworth Meux and Admiral Sir George Callaghan."

Subsequent to this enquiry, Captain Troubridge was tried by court-martial and honourably acquitted. In the meanwhile the *Goeben* and *Breslau* had become incorporated in the Turkish Fleet. Although it was satisfactory to learn that neither of the admirals on the Mediterranean Station was to blame in any way for the escape of two new and powerful vessels belonging to the enemy, no reason was ever given by the

Board of Admiralty as to why no one was responsible. It preferred—and perhaps wisely preferred—to leave the public to form its own conclusions. This the public did in a manner not complimentary to My Lords. How important was this escape is instanced by the fact that on November 18 the two German vessels were in action with the Russian Black Sea Fleet, when the Russian battleship division opened fire and severely damaged the *Goeben*, which, after an

passing over the *Indomitable*. What the exact damage done was not known; but it would appear as if this attack were merely a display to ascertain the range of the enemy guns. But however this may have been, it gave the Turks and their German masters their cue. They guessed instantly what this preliminary meant, and set to work to prepare for what was coming with characteristic Teuton thoroughness. Not only did they build up again their damaged



THE GOEBEN.

affair lasting fourteen minutes, turned tail and disappeared, which she was easily able to do owing to her superior speed and the prevailing mistiness of the weather. The *Breslau*, which was also present, remained out of action on the horizon.

At daybreak on November 3, 1914, a combined British and French Fleet bombarded the Dardanelles at long range. Fire was opened by the battleships and battle cruisers at about six miles, and each ship fired some twenty rounds. The forts replied, but nearly all their shells fell short, one only

batteries, but they scientifically barred ingress to the Black Sea by a series of mine-fields. When the real bombardment came later on, no one then dreamt that we and our French Allies were in for one of the most disheartening defeats of the war. Blunder succeeded upon blunder, co-ordination of naval and military force was far to seek, with the result that in the end we had to abandon our terribly costly and bloody enterprise with our object unaccomplished. Although, however, we were here defeated and had eventually to withdraw, we never-

theless proved of immense assistance to our Russian Allies. For months while the desperate struggle in the peninsula of Gallipoli swayed backwards and forwards, while our gallant fellows fought through all the changes of season of that terrible climate, we kept locked up an army that must have been counted by the hundred thousand, and thereby lightened the burden of the Grand Duke Nicholas and his armies. And the Turk, to his honour be it said, fought a clean fight, until our own British regiments and those wonderful fellows, whom we now know

as Anzacs, swore that it was worth while to come half round the world to fight with men who, unlike the German, knew how to fight like gentlemen. One thing is certain, when we look back on the tragedy of Gallipoli, that on whomsoever the blame may rest, none falls on the sailors and the soldiers who strove there so valiantly to make good. Man-of-warsman and merchant Jack, English, Scottish, Irish, Australians, New Zealanders, all were there; all striving for the dear honour of the land they loved so well.

CHAPTER VIII

Beatty's battle cruiser action in the North Sea—British naval raid on Alexandretta—What the Mushir of Damascus said—A snapshot from the Suez Canal.

ON January 24, 1915, the following notice was issued by the Secretary of the Admiralty: "Early this morning a British patrolling squadron of battle cruisers and light cruisers, under Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, with a destroyer flotilla under Commodore Tyrwhitt, sighted four German battle cruisers, several light cruisers, and a number of destroyers steering westward, and apparently making for the British coast. The enemy made for home at high speed. They were at once pursued, and about 9.30 A.M. action was joined between the battle cruisers *Lion*, *Tiger*, *Princess Royal*, *New Zealand*, and *Indomitable* on the one hand, and *Derfflinger*, *Seydlitz*, *Moltke*, and *Blücher* on the other. A well-contested running fight ensued. Shortly after one o'clock the *Blücher*, which had previously fallen out of the line, capsized and sank. Admiral Beatty reports that two other German battle cruisers were seriously damaged. They were, however, able to continue their flight, and reached an area where dangers from German submarines and mines prevented further pursuit. No British ships have been lost, and our casualties in personnel as at present reported are slight, the *Lion*, which led the line, having only eleven wounded and no killed. One hundred

and twenty-three survivors have been rescued from the *Blücher's* crew of 885, and it is possible that others have been saved by some of the destroyers. No reports of any destroyer or light cruiser fighting have yet been received at the Admiralty, though some has apparently taken place. Their Lordships have expressed their satisfaction to Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty."

The principal details of the vessels in the squadrons mentioned by the Admiralty are as follows:

| Ship. | Date. | Tonnage. | Speed. | Main Armament. |
|---------------------------|-------|----------|--------|-------------------------|
| <i>Lion</i> . . . | 1912 | 26,350 | 28.5 | Guns. Eight 13.5-in. |
| <i>Tiger</i> . . . | 1914 | 28,000 | 28 | " " |
| <i>Princess Royal</i> . . | 1912 | 28,500 | 28.5 | " " |
| <i>New Zealand</i> . . | 1912 | 26,350 | 25 | Eight 12-in. |
| <i>Indomitable</i> . . | 1908 | 26,000 | 26 | " " |
| <i>German Squadron</i> | | | | |
| <i>Derfflinger</i> . . | 1914 | 28,000 | 27 | " " |
| <i>Seydlitz</i> . . | 1913 | 24,640 | 29.2 | Ten 11-in. |
| <i>Moltke</i> . . | 1911 | 22,640 | 28.4 | " " |
| <i>Blücher</i> . . | 1910 | 15,500 | 25.5 | Twelve 8.2-in. |

This list shows that the German squadron was outmatched at every point, in numbers, speed, tonnage, and gun power, and that they should have immediately sought refuge in flight was only natural in the circumstances, except for the fact that in days before the war the superiority of German

ships, and, more particularly the superiority of German officers and men, had been so loudly vaunted by the pan-German party and the Flottenverein.

Perhaps the most famous naval despatch ever penned was that of the eighteenth-century captain in the Mediterranean, which ran: "Have taken or destroyed all enemy ships that were on this coast, names as per margin."

We are to-day far from such elementary simplicity as this. All the same the despatches of our own Admirals of the present day are well worth studying, though to a people thrall to the pen of the picturesque writer of the daily press they may seem lacking in rhetorical flourish and intimate detail.

If we take the despatch of Sir David Beatty concerning this battle, dated H.M.S. *Princess Royal*, February 2, 1915, we find the story of the affair set out for us in short, dry, pregnant sentences, while at the same time we can read into them so much that is left out. After setting out the names of the battle cruiser squadron (already given), the despatch proceeds: "The light cruisers *Southampton*, flying the broad pennant of Commodore W. E. Goodenough, M.V.O., *Nottingham*, Captain C. B. Miller, *Birmingham*, Captain A. A. M. Duff, and *Lowestoft*, Captain T. W. B. Kennedy, were disposed on my port beam. Commodore (T.) Reginald Y. Tyrwhitt, C.B., in *Arethusa*, *Aurora* (Captain W. S. Nicholson), *Undaunted*, (Captain F. G. St. John, M.V.O.), and the destroyer flotillas were ahead. About 7.25 A.M. the flash of guns was observed S.S.E. Shortly afterwards a report reached me from *Aurora* that she was engaged with enemy ships. I immediately altered course to S.S.E., increased to 22 knots, and ordered the light cruisers and flotillas to chase S.S.E., to get in touch and report movements of enemy."

The next paragraph is one of great interest, revealing as it does the entirely intimate co-ordination between the Admiral and his subordinate commanders. "The order was

acted upon with great promptitude," says the despatch; "indeed, my wishes had already been forestalled by the respective senior officers, and reports almost immediately followed from *Southampton*, *Arethusa*, and *Aurora*, as to the composition of the enemy, which consisted of three battle cruisers and the *Blücher*, six light cruisers, and a number of destroyers, steering N W. The enemy had altered course to S.E. From now onwards the light cruisers maintained touch with the enemy and kept me fully informed of their movements." A modern sea battle is fought at an almost incredible speed, and at this period the battle cruisers worked up to full power of their engines, and were soon travelling at a rate of 28.5 knots. There are wizards in these days who have accomplished the impossible; for the naval constructors—assisted by the chief wizard of all, the Hon. Charles Parsons, inventor of the Parsons turbine—have wedded power to speed in a manner that would be frankly unbelievable if it were not an accomplished fact. We look, in the realm of nature, to the elephant for strength, to the greyhound for speed; we do not expect to find a combination of such opposites. And yet we have it in the battle cruiser of the second decade of our twentieth century. We notice, as the despatch proceeds with its terse chronicle of facts, that: "Great credit is due to the Engineer Staffs of *New Zealand* and *Indomitable*. These ships greatly exceeded their normal speed." The men of the shovel and slice were proving the real metal that was in them on this day, and one is glad to notice that they were the first to receive the commendation of their Admiral.

At 7.30 A.M. the enemy was in sight from the flagship, on the port bow, steaming at great speed, steering about S.E. distant fourteen miles. The despatch continues: "At 8.52 A.M., as we had closed to 20,000 yards (*i.e.* ten miles) of the rear ship, the battle cruisers manœuvred to keep on a line of bearing so that the guns would bear, and *Lion* fired a single shot which fell short. The enemy at this time were in single line

ahead, with light cruisers ahead and a large number of destroyers on their starboard beam."


The enemy being in line ahead—meaning that the ships were following one another in a continuous line—the pursuing squadron had to haul out, on to a line of bearing, as it is called, in order to get their guns to bear, which it is obvious that they would not do if the British Admiral had kept his ships merely astern of the chase. Single shots were fired at intervals to test the range, and at 9.9 A.M. *Lion* made her first hit on *Blücher*, which was No. 4 in the enemy line. The *Blücher*, as will be seen by reference to the list of ships, was the oldest, the slowest, and the most lightly armed of the German ships. She was a heavier type of those armoured cruisers of von Spee that were lost in the battle of the Falkland Islands, which were of 4000 tons less displacement and carried eight 8.2 guns. It might have been thought, by persons who are not Germans, that she should have been placed at the head of the line and defended by her stronger and faster colleagues; but such is not the custom, apparently, of the German Navy. A British Admiral would have held himself disgraced to allow of the *Blücher* being destroyed in the manner she was. At 9.20 A.M. the *Tiger* opened fire on the rear ship, and the *Lion* shifted to No. 3 in the line, at 18,000 yards, this ship being hit by several salvos. It will be noticed that the *Tiger* was travelling at the rate of 28.5 knots, and the range was nine miles. *Princess Royal*, on coming into range, opened on *Blücher*, the range of the leading ship being 17,500 yards at 9.35 A.M. *New Zealand* was now within range of the unfortunate *Blücher*, which had dropped somewhat astern, and opened fire on her.

Princess Royal now shifted on to the third ship in the line, inflicting considerable damage on her. The enemy returned the fire of the British ships at 9.14 A.M. "Our flotilla cruisers and destroyers," continues the Admiral, "had gradually dropped from a position broad on our beam to our port quarter, so as not to foul our range with their

smoke; but the enemy destroyers threatening attack, the *Meteor* and M division passed ahead of us, Captain the Hon. H. Meade, D.S.O., handling the division with conspicuous ability."

About 9.45 A.M. the situation was as follows: "*Blücher*, the fourth in their line, already showed signs of having suffered severely from gunfire; their leading ship and No. 3 were also on fire. *Lion* was engaging No. 1, *Princess Royal* No. 3, *New Zealand* No. 4, while the *Tiger*, who was second in our line, fired first at their No. 1, and when interfered with by smoke, at their No. 4. The enemy destroyers emitted vast quantities of smoke to screen their battle cruisers, and under cover of this the latter now appeared to have altered course to the northward to increase their distance from our line. The battle cruisers therefore were ordered to form a line of bearing N.N.W., and proceed at their utmost speed."

Shortly after this the enemy destroyers, which showed a disposition to attack, were driven off by the fire from the *Lion* and *Tiger*. At 10.48 the *Blücher* dropped out of the line, evidently in a disabled condition, and *Indomitable* was ordered to chase enemy to N.W. At 10.54 submarines were reported on the starboard bow, and the Admiral states that he personally observed a periscope and turned to port. At 11.3 an injury to the *Lion*, a projectile having damaged the feed tank, caused her to slow up, and the Admiral, calling the destroyer *Attack* alongside his flagship, transferred his flag to the *Princess Royal*. He comments thus on the occurrence: "The good seamanship of Lieutenant-Commander Cyril Callaghan, H.M.S. *Attack*, in placing his vessel alongside the *Lion* and subsequently the *Princess Royal*, enabled the transfer to be made in the shortest possible time. At 2 P.M. I closed the *Lion* and received a report that the starboard engine was giving trouble owing to priming, and at 3.38 P.M. I ordered the *Indomitable* to take her in tow, which was accomplished by 5 P.M. The greatest credit is due to the captains of the *Indomit-*



THE LAST MOMENTS OF THE "BLÜCHER."

(Photo, Central News.)

able and *Lion* for the seamanlike way in which the *Lion* was taken in tow in difficult circumstances."

On our side the only ships hit were the *Lion*, *Tiger*, and *Meteor*, which does not say much for the shooting of the enemy. A most interesting account of this battle was written by one of the crew of the destroyer *Meteor*, which craft administered the *coup de grâce* to the *Blücher*. This little ship was right in the thick of it between the battle cruisers, and escaped destruction, it may be said, by a miracle. Her part in the sinking of the

circling round, but even then she was not dead, for at precisely 12.5 P.M. she sent the last round she ever fired into us, killing four men and wounding another. But we took a sweet revenge. Two minutes later we discharged our torpedo. It hit her nearly amidships; there was a tremendous violent shock, she heeled completely over on her side, and sank in eight and a half minutes, hundreds of men clambering over her side and standing on it, just as if it was the upper deck, waiting for the final plunge."

After she sank, the *Arethusa* and destroyers



THE *METEOR* FINISHING THE *BLÜCHER*.

Blücher is thus described: "Just about this time the *Blücher* was in a terrible state, one funnel gone, the other two like scrap iron and tottering, both fore and main topmasts shot away, her fore-turret carried clean over the side, and only part of her mainmast and fore-tripod mast left standing, and even these in a shaky condition. She was indeed a pitiable sight, and she dropped out of the line helpless, unable to steam, and left to her fate by her sister ships. The battering she had undergone was something incredible, and she was in her death agonies, so we began to close her, and found she was settling down, though still on an even keel. Now was our chance. We approached her

rushed up to save life, and while thus engaged bombs were dropped upon them by a Zeppelin and a Taube aeroplane. One hundred and twenty-three men of the *Blücher* were rescued in spite of the attentions of their comrades in the air.

Two things stand out prominently in this action,—the first, of course, being the amazingly bad shooting of the enemy. On our side only three ships were hit at all in an action that lasted for several hours. The second point is, that with the exception of the torpedo fired by the *Meteor* at short range into the disabled *Blücher*, none of these under-water weapons seem to have done any damage at all, notwithstanding the fact that

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a very large number of torpedo craft were present on both sides. The gun had the predominance all the time, and as it was in the past, so it appears to be in the present.

Very naturally during the war all eyes have been fixed upon the tremendous happenings by land and sea that have taken place within a few miles of the homes of the people of the United Kingdom. It has been said, and with truth, that there is far more excitement over a man who falls down and breaks his leg in the street in which you live than there is over the news that a million Chinamen have been drowned by the overflowing of the banks of the Yellow River. You are not interested in Chinamen, and the odds are against your knowing where the Yellow River is situated; in consequence you take the news calmly. In the same way the deeds of our Navy that have happened at your front or your back door—so to speak—have excited as much interest in the sea affair as it seems possible to arouse in the breasts of the land folk; but when these deeds have been transferred to different spheres far from the homeland, they have, as a rule, been relegated to out-of-the-way corners of the newspapers, and glanced at by the public with but scant interest. There have been many hundreds of things done, some indeed of first-class importance, of which nothing has been heard.

It can hardly be said that the British naval raid on Alexandretta on January 24–25 comes within this category, but it presents features seldom encountered in warlike operations, to wit that it borders narrowly on the farcical. On January 28 the following communiqué was issued at Cairo: "On January 24–25 small parties landed at Alexandretta Bay, north and south of the town, and cut six telegraph wires. No serious resistance was offered, and there were no casualties."

The *Times* correspondent on the spot makes the following comments: "The attitude of the officials (Turkish) in such circumstances is best illustrated by an incident which recently occurred at Saida,

when British sailors were landed there to destroy the telegraph wires. The Commandant of the local troops retired to his private room in his house, saying he was temporarily indisposed, and did not reappear on the scene until the sailors were again on board their ship and she was disappearing over the horizon. The people at Saida were not a little amused when the Mushir of Damascus, in a communiqué to the press, described the incident as follows: 'A hostile warship attempted to land sailors at Saida, but our troops, who went bravely into action, subjected them to a heavy fire and compelled the warship to retire.'" Commenting on this, the German war news issued from Berlin stated: "Turkish headquarters reports the vain attempt of the British cruiser *Doris* to land troops at Alexandretta."

From this it is evident that should the Mushir of Damascus fail to please his military superiors, he has, at any rate, a bright future before him as a special correspondent. Bubble reputation at the cannon's mouth has, it would appear, but little attraction for this potentate, but as a purveyor of warlike information to the Berlin headquarters he must have had few superiors during the struggle of the nations.

Almost on the same date, that is to say, January 26, the following extract from a letter of a seaman to his family shows how another unit of the British fleet was employed. He says: "We left Port Said on January 26th for Kantara, where some of the enemy were gathered. Our soldiers were retiring, the Turks advancing. We got in position in the Canal and let drive, starting with our small guns and soon ranging our heavies. You should have heard us cheer when we fired our first angry shell, but I don't think the Turks liked it very much, for they retired behind the sand-dunes, leaving about three hundred dead, which our shrapnel and lyddite caught. The same night a party got right down to the Canal bank with gun-cotton, but we spotted them and they dropped cotton and nipped. The

next day, my birthday, nothing much took place, but on the 28th we got a call to Ismailia, a few miles up the Canal, which the Turks were trying to bombard, but their shells fell short into Lake Timsah. We put a few of our pills into them and they retired. Then we went farther up to Toussoum, where the enemy had reached the banks and launched pontoons to get across. This was a real go ; there were snipers all along the banks, but we carefully kept under cover,

attack, but instead our airmen tell us that the enemy is in full retreat. None of the enemy is within twenty miles of the Canal. Several Turks surrendered, and we sent a party out into the desert and brought back many wounded Turks. Now we are looking forward to go to the Dardanelles and bombard the forts there. Meanwhile we remain here and keep a good look-out for the return of the enemy."

There is one feature in this war which helps



WRITING EXPERIENCES.

except one man, who unfortunately got hit and soon died. It is, of course, the first time I have been under fire ; it was funny and exciting. Fancy a battleship being fired on by rifles ; it almost seems absurd, although if they had known where to aim many of us would have been put out. I had my eye along my gun all the time, saw a few Turks behind an upturned boat, and I put a common shell into them. They did not snipe any more. After plenty of firing the Turks drew off, and we had one man killed. Since, we have returned to Ismailia to await a fresh

considerably to the understanding thereof. It is that the fighting man of the twentieth century is no longer the dumb animal that he has been in the past. Nowadays our soldiers and sailors are educated, in many cases very highly educated men, and they are able to set down the impressions that they form of the conflicts in which they are engaged. These snapshots of battle from the combatants help greatly to the understanding of the whole ; for whether war be waged by land or by sea, the numbers fighting and the vast areas covered make it more

impossible than it has ever been before for the despatch of Admiral or General to do more than to sketch in outline the tremendous happenings of which they, as officers commanding, are the guiding spirits. The gift of narrative is by no means very common, but from among the masses of officers and men now employed there have arisen persons of all ranks, from the highest to the lowest, who, in putting on record their experiences, have conferred a real benefit on those of their countrymen and countrywomen who, for one cause or another, have not had the

privilege they have enjoyed of fighting for the land that gave them birth. Their reminiscences, it is true, are often couched in homely and colloquial language; but this by no means detracts from "the dignity of history." What we want to know, one and all of us, is how went the battle at such and such a period, and our thanks are due as much to the man who tells us this in the vigorous and unmistakable style of the lower deck or the barrack-room, as to his more cultured superior whose fate it is to pen despatches to be read by the great ones of the earth.

CHAPTER IX

Forecast of the Scarborough raid—Distances steamed by our ships in the North Sea—The destruction of the *Königsberg*—The *Karlsruhe*—The sinking of the *Dresden*—*Prinz Eitel Friedrich* interned at Newport News; her career—The *Kronprinz Wilhelm* interned at Hampton Roads, U.S.A.

A SOMEWHAT remarkable forecast of probable German action was made by a naval officer before the Scarborough raid. He wrote: "I think the last action off the Falkland Islands was pretty satisfactory, and it is somewhat of a comfort to know that practically all their ships are accounted for now. All the same, I expect one effect it will have will be to make them dash over and bombard some places on the East Coast and then run back again. So do not be at all surprised if this does take place, and do not take it as a sign that we are getting careless." The writer then added those words, which have since been so widely quoted: "A captured German naval officer (a decent fellow) remarked to one of our people the other day, just before he left for his prison quarters, 'Well, old man, it will always be the same. You will always be fools, and we shall never be gentlemen.'"

Yet another officer writing from the Grand Fleet says: "I suppose you want to know a little of how we are getting on and what we are doing. Of course I can't give you any details, but it is the same old thing, watching and waiting. We know we shall get our chance eventually, then we hope to be in the

limelight a little. The point that is so aggravating to us is that to the unthinking person we are doing nothing. Herr Ballin, the manager of the Hamburg-Amerika Line, says that we are lurking in our harbours. That may be so, but how does that statement coincide with this one of mine. From the first week in August to the middle of November *my ship has steamed no less than 17,000 miles, and that in the North Sea*, and of course we have not been alone. The Grand Fleet have been with us, and although they have not covered so many miles, yet they have been at sea just as long as my ship, but owing to our high speed and the duties we have to perform, scouting, reconnoitring, etc., we have naturally travelled many miles. Herr Ballin need not worry; if they want us, well, they know where to find us. Of course the Germans can say the same to us, that we know where to find them. Oh yes, we know exactly—Kiel, Wilhelmshaven, Cuxhaven, and Heligoland. People who don't understand will say, 'Why don't you go there and attack them?' Not much! We have our own plans, and they are certainly not to take our splendid Fleet into their mine-infested areas and under their guns. Every

mile of their coast bristles with heavy guns."

It is necessary to forbear, from considerations of space, to quote further from this most interesting letter. But it is one on which it is well that readers should ponder. Seventeen thousand miles in 100 days, and that in the North Sea, means much indeed, when we consider the restricted area in which this cruiser was manœuvring. The ships are out of sight, more often than not they are out of mind, but night and day, week in and month out, till the period reached to years, their vigil has been one of toil undreamt of, of hardship undergone, of waiting and suspense, enough to wear the nerves of these silent and misunderstood watchers to fiddle-strings. When St. Vincent kept his endless watch off Brest, when Nelson was nearly two years without setting his foot outside his ship in the Mediterranean, while he waited for the Toulon fleet to come out, these great Admirals suffered much from monotony and bad weather. But they fought with a foe which could be seen, let him but appear, and they could grapple with him. It has been far otherwise with our mariners of the twentieth century. To guard everlastingly against the lurking mine and the deadly torpedo has been their portion; and not for them has been the hurricane rush of the boarders sweeping over the nettings of an enemy ship.


There are two ways of presenting the occurrences of the sea war to readers: one to group the more important happenings and leave the lesser to subsequent chapters; the other to follow, as far as possible, all events in their chronological sequence. Here the latter manner has been adopted, and for this reason: everything that happens at sea is of first-class importance to the inhabitants of islands such as ours; the maintenance of open trade-routes being only one degree less important than the winning of battles. Enemy cruisers and armed merchantmen have to be hunted down and destroyed, in order that our supplies be not held up, and that prices shall not rise in our

home markets. These enemy ships in the out-seas proved to be evasive and elusive, they were commanded by men of guile, shifty and full of cunning. By no means the least of the tasks of our Navy has been to hunt down these pests, in order that business at home should be enabled to proceed as far as possible "as usual."

It will be remembered that the *Pegasus*, lying at anchor in Zanzibar harbour, was attacked and sunk by the German cruiser *Königsberg* on September 19, 1914. A concentration of fast cruisers was ordered by the Admiralty to search in East African waters. A letter from a naval lieutenant serving in those seas throws some light on the trouble taken to locate this peril to British merchantmen. First, the cruiser to which the writer of the letter belonged went to Aden, then she proceeded to Bombay to pick up a convoy—there are comments on the habits of those convoyed quite in keeping with those made by our sea-going forefathers in "eighteen hundred and wartime"—and then the convoy was dropped, and four British cruisers in company—no doubt in high spirits at getting rid of this *posse* of traders—steamed off at high speed for Mombasa in British East Africa. North they went to the Comoro Islands, then south to Zanzibar, where, unofficially, they heard that the *Königsberg* was hiding up the Rufigi River—where she eventually proved to be. But nothing definite was known, and so the German East African coast was searched from end to end, except inside Mafia Islands, and then the ship was headed for the Comoros once more. Half-way there, however, she was turned back with the news that the object of their search was hiding among some small islands in Portuguese territory to the southward of Mozambique. "Every one was convinced she was there," says the writer, "and we were all on the top line for a scrap." But she was not where they expected to find her, and the only consolation was that the cruiser captured a German tug, which was towed into Mombasa. At last they met with the *Chatham*, and

were delighted to find that the *Königsberg* had been located at last, and in the Rufigi River, as their first unofficial information had told them. The German cruiser having been found, the next thing to do was to compass her destruction; but this the *Chatham* was unable to effect. The *Königsberg* had contrived to get six miles up the river, and the *Chatham* was of too heavy a draught to attempt to follow. Also the German cruiser had so effectually screened herself that she could not be got at by

board had then to steam out in two attendant launches, in which they were again heavily fired on as they passed the island, and both coxswains were killed. On July 5, at 4.15 A.M., the two monitors, *Severn* and *Mersey*, started, and reached the Rufigi at 5.20 A.M. These ships had been sent out from England for this special job, owing to the lightness of their draught; both had previously rendered excellent service on the Belgian coast. Two aeroplanes had also been sent from England to do the spotting and to help the monitors



THE END OF THE KÖNIGSBERG.

shell-fire from the mouth of the Rufigi. Precautions were at once taken that the *Königsberg*, having got into the Rufigi River, should never get out again; and with this end in view a collier named the *Newbridge*, that had just brought out a cargo of coal to Zanzibar, was requisitioned, and together with two smaller vessels, the *Somali* and the *Duplex*, was sunk in the fairway out of the river. Some of the crew of the *Königsberg* had entrenched themselves on a small island at the entrance to the river, and upon the *Newbridge* passing, opened fire upon her with field-guns and Maxims. The *Newbridge* was sunk in a selected position, and those on

in their difficult task. These went up between 5 and 6 A.M., and proceeded to drop bombs on the *Königsberg*, with a view of preventing her correct aiming as the monitors were getting into position. The *Weymouth*, which was flying the flag of Vice-Admiral Sir H. King-Hall, proceeded over the bar and anchored at the entrance to the river. Fire was opened from the monitors at 6.30 A.M., to which the *Königsberg* replied, making most excellent shooting and dropping her salvos right alongside the English vessels. About 2.40 P.M. she ceased firing altogether, and the following description of what she looked like is from a letter of an officer in

one of the monitors: "We raised our topmast and had a look at the *Königsberg*. She was a fine sight. One mast was leaning over, the other was broken at the maintop, and smoke was pouring out of the mast as out of a chimney. The funnels were gone, and she was a mass of smoke and flame from end to end."

The monitors came out of the river unharmed and triumphant, to the accompaniment of the cheers of their comrades, led by the Admiral himself from the bridge of the *Weymouth*.

The extraordinary case of the *Königsberg* has been dwelt upon at some length for a definite reason. It illustrates how long is the arm, how tireless is the patience of British sea-power; how when once there is an object to be gained no trouble is spared to attain the end that is in view. It was on September 19 that the *Pegasus* was attacked by the *Königsberg*; it was on October 30 that the German cruiser was discovered in the Rufigi River; it was not until July 5 that she was finally destroyed. Meanwhile, monitors, tugs, and aeroplanes had been sent out all the way from England to compass the end of this menace to the safety of our trade routes. Many of the lieges of His Majesty have spent most of their time in denouncing the incompetence of the various departments responsible for the waging of the Great War; it is seldom, if ever, that a good word has been said in their favour. But if "the mills of God grind slowly," they have certainly, in a naval sense, "ground exceeding small" those whom they have had to meet upon the sea; and the destruction of the *Königsberg* was due to the clear understanding of the authorities at home working in consonance with those remarkably competent persons serving under the flag of Vice-Admiral Sir Herbert King-Hall—which proves that even a department can be right sometimes!

Although the name of the raiding cruiser *Karlsruhe* never attracted the same notice as did that of the *Emden*, her exploits were extraordinary, her escapes marvellous, and


her end somewhat doubtful. Captain Köhler, her commander, seems to have been a seaman of resource and imagination, and the officers of the s.s. *Pruth* captured by him reported that he had three liners acting for him in the capacity of scouts as well as his colliers. He spread these vessels over a line 150 miles long, and when he was informed by wireless of the presence of a merchantman, his superior speed enabled him to dash out and capture her, or, if a cruiser were sighted, to avoid her. He is said to have captured and destroyed seventeen steamers in forty-seven days. At the end of 1914 much wreckage bearing the name *Karlsruhe* was washed up on the shores of St. Lucia and Grenada Islands in the West Indies.

An official announcement from the Admiralty on March 18, 1915, stated: "There is every reason to believe that the *Karlsruhe* was sunk in the neighbourhood of the West Indies at the beginning of November 1914, and that those of her crew who were rescued reached Germany in the s.s. *Rio Grande*, which had been acting in concert with the *Karlsruhe* early in December. Chief Officer Campbell of the *Baranfels*, which came into Montreal early in November, and who spent three months aboard one of the *Karlsruhe's* consorts, stated that he was on board the s.s. *Strathroy* when she was captured off the Brazilian coast. The *Karlsruhe* always kept two boats in attendance as colliers, and he remembered having seen seven British steamers at the *Karlsruhe's* beck and call at the same time. The crew of the *Strathroy* were not allowed on board the raider, but one of them, a Chinaman, was taken as a steward. This Chinaman told Mr. Campbell that one of her captures, the *Condor*, was laden with blasting-powder. One day Captain Köhler sent every one aft, while he remained forward, where the blasting-powder taken from the *Condor* was stored. An explosion took place, and the officers and crew had just time to get into the boats and row away to one of the colliers in attendance when the raider sank. The Chinaman said

that the German officers were of opinion that Köhler had blown up the ship himself, as "he was sick of the whole game."

On March 14 the raiding cruiser *Dresden* was caught and destroyed off the island of Juan Fernandez by His Majesty's ships *Kent* and *Glasgow* and the auxiliary cruiser *Orama*. The *Dresden* was a sister ship of the *Emden* and was completed in 1909. In August she sank the British steamer *Holmwood* off the Argentine coast. She was next

hiding on the Chilean coast, where the British cruisers had been hot on her trail. The island of Juan Fernandez—Robinson Crusoe's Island—is 500 miles from Coronel, where the battle took place, and 420 miles from the Chilean coast. It was used by von Spee as a base in defiance of Chilean neutrality. When discovered by the British force an action ensued which only lasted five minutes. She was much damaged and set on fire, then her magazine exploded



KENT AND GLASGOW DESTROYING THE DRESDEN OFF JUAN FERNANDEZ.

heard of in the action off Coronel, when in company with von Spee on the occasion of the sinking of the *Good Hope* and the *Monmouth* on November 1. She was also present at the battle of the Falkland Islands on December 8, when she escaped the fate that overtook the *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, *Leipzig*, and *Nurnberg*, escaping by reason of her superior speed and a change in the weather which hid her from view. The next news of her was that she had proceeded to Punta Arenas, a southern Chilean port, where she filled her bunkers from a German vessel. From that time onwards she was in

and she sank. The crew were saved, and fifteen badly wounded Germans were subsequently landed at Valparaiso. There were no British casualties and no damage to the ships.

On April 9, 1915, the German raider *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* was interned by the Government of the United States at Newport News, Virginia. For seven months this ship, which was originally employed in the Far Eastern service of the Norddeutscher Lloyd, had escaped capture. She is a vessel of 8800 tons, with a speed of 15 knots. She arrived at Tientsin on July 29, and was not reported

again till November 6, when she left the port of Valparaiso. It was then known that she had received guns from one of the German cruisers. The first capture made by this vessel was that of the s.s. *Charcas*, 17 miles south of Valparaiso, early in December. Then she was in company with von Spee's squadron, from the destruction of which force she and the *Dresden* escaped. At the end of the year she sank the British ship *Kildalton* and the French ship *Jean*, and landed the captains and crews on Easter Island in the Pacific some time in January. In addition to the ships already mentioned, she sank the Russian sailing ship *Isabel Browne*, French sailing ship *Pierre Loti*, American sailing ship *William P. Frye*, French sailing ship *Jacobsen*, British sailing ships *Invercoe* and *Mary Ada Short*, and British steamer *Willerby*. The ships sunk had a total tonnage of 24,365. Every imaginable trick was used by this ship to disguise her identity. She used the flags of any nation impartially. She painted one side of the ship black and the other side white, and to this stratagem owed her escape from a British cruiser, which chased her until she disappeared in a patch of fog. She immediately turned about, and when the cruiser captain saw a white ship coming towards him he asked had she seen a black ship, to which the raider made answer that she had seen her 18 miles west. Much anger was manifested in the United States at the sinking of the *William P. Frye*; the President wrote many strong notes to Germany, and Germany answered in the usual ambiguous fashion. In the end, as usual, nothing came of it beyond the usual sound and fury signifying nothing in the newspapers of the U.S.A. The captain of the *Willerby*, the British steamer that was sunk, made a gallant attempt to ram his opponent, which was armed with 8-inch guns, but unfortunately missed him by about three feet. This typically British mariner, Captain Wedgewood, said: "I did not know that all those women and children and civilians were on board. I only knew she was German and trying to capture us. My ship was gone, I knew, and

I thought I might just as well send the German down along with me." The captain of the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* swore that he would put to sea, no matter how many warships were waiting for him outside, and on the day on which he was bound to leave the smoke was pouring out of his funnel, and Newport News gathered to watch the daring raider put to sea once more. But at the last moment his nerve failed him and he consented to be interned in the port in which he had sought shelter.

On April 12, sea-scarred, battered, and leaking, with several bow plates stove, the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* arrived in Hampton Roads, U.S.A. Her plates were deeply rusted, she had a perceptible list, and 60 of her crew were down with beri-beri, due to a prolonged diet of rice washed down by water inadequately distilled. She had only 21 tons of coal left. She had captured the British steamers *Correntina* and *Indian Prince*, the French barque *Union*, the *Hemisphere*, *Potaro*, *Highland Brae*, *Wilfred*, all British steamers, and the Norwegian sailing ship *Sonantha*. The *Chase Hill*, the French liner *Guadeloupe*, the *Tamar*, and the *Coleby* also fell victims to this raider. The British prisoners confined in her complained bitterly of the treatment they received, stating that their captors, even when they had an abundance of fresh meat on board fed their prisoners on rice, bully beef, and sour bread. Every evening the prisoners were forced into a black hole without lights, and an iron door was shut on them. "As soon as I set foot on British soil," exclaimed Captain William Creighton of the sunken ship *Coleby*, amid approving cheers from Captain F. H. Hamar and other officers, "I go to the nearest recruiting station and enlist in the King's Army. For weeks I have been forced to live in the bottom of a dirty pirate ship, wondering day and night when I would be killed like a rat in a trap, and my one hope now is that I may live to put a bit of lead through a German."

Before the declaration of war the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* left New York with a huge cargo of coal, which was undoubtedly intended for

the rebunkering of German cruisers in the South Atlantic. It will be seen with what care the "Marineamt" in Berlin had prepared for the war that all Germany knew to be coming. Also it is undoubtedly the fact that she was—contrary to International Law—converted into a commerce destroyer on the high seas. The naval correspondent of the *Times* deals thus with the subject :

"The status of the German auxiliary cruiser remains unsettled. Their crews have not been treated as pirates, but of the six ships known to have been converted in this way four have been sunk, and two, including the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, have escaped into a neutral port. The former ships were the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*, which was caught by the *Highflyer* off the Oro River on the West Coast of Africa and destroyed ; the *Cap Trafalgar*, which was engaged and sunk by the *Carmania* on September 14 off the Island of Trinidad in the South Atlantic ; the *Markomannia*, which was destroyed by the *Yarmouth* off Sumatra on October 15 ; and the *Navarra*, which was engaged by the *Orama* on the River Plate on November 11 and sunk. Two other vessels were captured, these being the *Spreewald*, which was taken by the *Berwick*, operating in the North Atlantic, on September 12 ; and the *Bethania*, which was captured in the same week and brought into Kingston, Jamaica. The latter was reported to have thrown her armament overboard before the British cruiser took her as a prize. There were other vessels reported at various times to have been converted into auxiliary cruisers, but so far none of these has been known to make any captures, nor are any of them believed at the present time to be roving the seas."

It is a far cry from the Oro River to the Island of Trinidad in the South Atlantic. The distance from Sumatra to the River Plate is by no means inconsiderable. The North and South Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans all present spaces of considerable width. The wonder is, not that these ships should have had so long a lease of life in which to prey on

our commerce, but rather that they should all have been come up with, sunk, or hunted into neutral ports in so short an interval of time. No one but the sailor knows how vast, how illimitable is the sea. No map, no chart gives any idea of the lengths and the breadths that there are to traverse ; what a million to one chance it is that the seaman shall find the ship of which he is in chase. And he who is chased is quite as well aware of this fact as is his pursuer. There can be no sort of doubt that the commerce-raiding on the ships of our realm had been planned and thought out by the German Admiralty Staff to the last decimal point of the combined intelligence they possessed. Neutrals—so called—had been pressed into the service, and store ships, colliers, ammunition carriers had all been drilled and instructed before the red light of war "flamed in the forehead of the morning sky." Success these commerce-destroyers were bound to have, but Nemesis, which in this case took the shape of lean grey shapes moving swiftly as the shadows of the clouds over the bosom of the ocean, and who wore at the peak what Campbell has so rightly called "the meteor flag of England," were hot on the track of those whose real status was that of pirates. From Liverpool to New York, on again from Vancouver to Cochin-China, from Archangel to the Horn, from Bass Strait to the North Cape, the mariners of England kept watch and ward for the honour of their King and the life of their country. As we read this record of the German raiders we see how in the uttermost outposts of the Empire, on every far-distant shore, the ships of Britain's Navy rested neither by day nor by night. Let the Teuton, if he care so to do, deride the sportsman's spirit which animates our officers and our men ; they have found, in every corner of the seven seas, no matter whether the sailor of our race serves in big ship or small, that here is something with which he has to reckon. For on August 4, 1914, the hunt was up, and the chase will never cease until the last quarry has been pulled down.

CHAPTER X

OPERATIONS IN DISTANT SEAS—THE BOMBARDMENT OF THE DARDANELLES

LIKE a kaleidoscope the sea war shifts from one area of the ocean to another, and we have now to consider what was happening in the Mediterranean and beyond that sea on the southern side of the Suez Canal. The following communication was issued by the Secretary of the Admiralty :

" A combined British and French squadron bombarded the Dardanelles forts at long range at daybreak on November 3, 1914. The forts replied, but no ships were hit and the Allies suffered no loss, only one projectile falling alongside. The material damage to the forts cannot be estimated, but a large explosion, accompanied by dense volumes of black smoke, occurred at Helles Fort." In the same communication the further intelligence was set out, that—" On the arrival at Akaba (the north-eastern horn of the Red Sea, the north-western being the Gulf of Suez) of H.M.S. *Minerva* (a twenty-year-old light cruiser, 5000 tons, mounting eleven 6-inch guns), Captain P. H. Warleigh found the place in occupation of soldiers, one of whom had the appearance of a German officer, and armed natives. The *Minerva* then shelled the fort and the troops. The town was evacuated, and a landing party proceeded to destroy the fort, the barracks, the post office, and the stores. There was some loss to the enemy, but no British casualties."

The operations thus described took place just after the entrance of Turkey into the war on the side of the Central European Powers. Of the importance of the Dardanelles there is no occasion to speak ; but Akaba was in a very minor degree also a potential menace, as it was thought that from here mines might be sent down to impede the free access to and egress from the Gulf of Suez of our transports and merchantmen. Yet another service was performed in the same week by the Navy, when the *Odin* (sloop, 1070 tons, six 4-inch guns) (Commander C. R.

Wason), the armed launch *Sirdar*, and a boat from the *Ocean* (Captain A. Hayes-Sadler) covered with their guns the landing of troops from India under the command of Brigadier-General Dalmain, who occupied Fao, a small town occupying an important strategical position at the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab. This river, formed by the confluence of the Euphrates and Tigris, runs into the sea at the head of the Persian Gulf. Almost on the same day again a *coup* was carried out by Indian troops against the Turkish fort on the Sheikh Said Peninsula, to the east of the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb. The troops landed under cover of fire from H.M.S. *Duke of Edinburgh* (armoured cruiser, 13,550 tons, six 9.2 and ten 6-inch guns) (Captain Henry Blackett), which shelled the fort and put the heavy guns out of action. The reduction of the forts caused no trouble. During November the German battle cruiser *Goeben*, and *Breslau*, light cruiser, which vessels had escaped from the British Mediterranean Fleet, became incorporated in the Turkish Navy.

We may note in passing that on November 19, 1914, Petrograd reported that—" The Black Sea Fleet has had an encounter with the *Goeben* and inflicted severe punishment on the cruiser, after which the enemy escaped. The Russian flagship was only slightly injured, but lost four officers and 29 men." Subsequent to this an official communiqué was issued by the Turks to the effect that—" The Russian Fleet was put to flight and pursued by the *Goeben*." Petrograd, commenting on this, remarks : " The absurdity of this assertion is evident, because the speed of the *Goeben* is so much greater than that of the Russian ships that if she had really pursued them she could have immediately caught up with them and sunk them." It appears that the *Goeben* stood up to the Russians for exactly fourteen minutes, at the expiration of which period she made off and

was soon hidden in the fog which prevailed in patches on the day of the engagement.

During the whole of the sea war it was not so much a question of what the Navy was doing, but rather what it was not doing! Owing to the exertions of our great sea service in times of peace the Germans were enabled to trade without let or hindrance in all the seas and in all the harbours of the world. Accordingly, when war came there was no quarter of the globe in which these pests were not to be found, and they had to be watched and shepherded to their own destruction in the most unlikely quarters. As evidence of this let us quote a letter written by a naval officer in the Far East in December 1914. He says:

"At last I am permanently appointed as No. 1 of a destroyer. We travel about 1000 miles a week, most of it in practically unknown seas, full of uncharted coral reefs, rocks, and islands, whose existence even is unknown. And by way of making things still more difficult we keep meeting floating islands. I always thought these things were merely yarns out of boys' adventure books. However, I have seen five, the largest about the size of a football field. They are covered with trees and palms, some of them with ripe bananas on them. They get torn away from the swampy parts of the mainland by the typhoons which are very frequent at this time of year (this letter must have been written not later than September, which is the end of the typhoon season). We are always absolutely ready. We are at sea six days and nights and then get forty-eight hours' rest in harbour, the first twelve of which are always spent in coaling ship. Our harbour is a quaint little spot. About fifty white people live here, it has a very nice club and about a dozen English ladies, all married. They are the chief attraction, and you have no idea how refreshing women's society is after the life one lives at sea in a destroyer in war.

"The enemy we have not seen yet, but we have captured a lot of his coal in German colliers. It is rather exciting boarding these


steamers, as they frequently show fight, and are most of them desperate runners of contraband, and they hide their cargoes in all sorts of unlooked-for places. So-and-so is prize officer in one of them now and the first day he was in her he laid his revolver down for a moment, then, on looking up, he found he was covered by his own revolver by one of the German officers. He and his two Sikh guards, however, got it back before the German could fire. Our enemy here consists of two or three powerful German cruisers corresponding to our Town class, an old protected cruiser, an Austrian armoured cruiser, two or three large fast armed North-German Lloyd liners, a large gunboat, destroyers, and torpedo boats—but I may tell you nothing of them. The gunner and I are in watch and watch, and it is most strenuous in this awful heat and the glare of the sun; it makes one's eyes awfully tired, this continual watching for what never seems to come. In my watches off we have been reorganising the fighting efficiency of the ship; everything is absolutely on the top line. Each man knows exactly what to do and where to go in an emergency. The spirit and keenness of all my men 'to get at 'em' is more than one could even hope for. We have everything against us so far. There are millions of islands out here, and it's like looking for needles in a haystack; but still we shall find the enemy soon; our clues get closer every day."

Let us hope that this gallant officer and his men who were so anxious to "get at 'em" had their chance in due time. Searching through uncharted islands in a destroyer in the typhoon season of Far Eastern seas would boil down the enthusiasm of any fighting men less keen than these. Great heat in a destroyer causes the interior of this thinly plated craft to resemble a baker's oven in temperature, the only change from which is the risk of sunstroke on her decks. Poor food, and water a good deal more than tepid, would be their fare, and on this they kept "absolutely on the top line." Standing watch and watch at sea (which means four

hours on the bridge and four hours off) leaves a man but scant time for meals and sleep; all the same, this first lieutenant utilised his scanty leisure to attain to that "top line" of which he speaks. And perhaps with a typhoon thrown in, for in the typhoon season you are never sure when one of these terrible storms may not be on top of you; and a typhoon in a destroyer is, as is known to those who have been through this experience—and survived it,—one of those things of

least of these was the feat of the submarine B11.

On December 14 the Secretary of the Admiralty made the following announcement: "Yesterday submarine B11 (Lieutenant-Commander Norman D. Holbrook, R.N.) entered the Dardanelles, and in spite of the difficult currents dived under five rows of mines and torpedoed the Turkish battleship *Messudiyeh*, which was guarding the mine-field. Although pursued by gunfire and



THE LOSS OF THE *MESSUDIYEH*.

which men speak with bated breath for the remainder of their natural lives.

Leaving this destroyer to pick her way through her uncharted islands, and to wrestle with recalcitrant German colliers, we must now return to the Near East, where at this time the tragedy of the Dardanelles was slowly unfolding itself, until it ended in one of the biggest defeats in English history. Defeat though it proved in the end, it was productive, nevertheless, of some of the most marvellous feats of heroism with which the war was brightened, and by no means the

torpedo boats, the B11 returned safely, after being submerged on one occasion for nine hours. When last seen the *Messudiyeh* was sinking by the stern. It will be remembered that a German submarine under the command of Captain-Lieutenant Weddigen sank the three cruisers in the North Sea. But valuable as was that feat to the German Navy, it cannot be compared for skill and daring to the sinking of the Turkish battleship by B11."

When we are considering this performance, almost, if not quite unparalleled in this

wonderful war, we have to remember that it was undertaken in one of the oldest types of submarines. *B11* was a vessel (if a submarine can be dignified with such a title) of 280 tons on the surface and 313 submerged, which dated back to 1905, and was therefore nine years of age when she dared all to pass the Dardanelles and its dangers. There is something curiously ironic in the fact that the ship which was sunk by her was actually placed where she was "to guard the mine-field." The intelligence produced a feeling akin to dismay in Constantinople.

On December 23 the following announcement appeared in the press: "His Majesty the King has been graciously pleased to approve the grant of the Victoria Cross to Lieutenant Norman Douglas Holbrook, R.N., for most conspicuous bravery on December 13, when in command of submarine *B11* he entered the Dardanelles, and notwithstanding the very difficult current, dived his vessel under five rows of mines and torpedoed the Turkish battleship *Messüdiyeh* which was guarding the mine-field. Lieutenant Holbrook succeeded in bringing *B11* safely back although assailed by gunfire and torpedo boats, having been submerged on one occasion for nine hours. The King has been graciously pleased to give orders for the appointment to the Distinguished Service Order of Lieutenant Sydney Thornton Winn, R.N., second in command of submarine *B11*."

On February 19, 1915, the Secretary of the Admiralty made the following announcement: "Yesterday at 8 A.M. a British fleet of battleships and cruisers accompanied by flotillas and aided by a strong French squadron, the whole under the command of Vice-Admiral Sackville H. Carden, began an attack on the forts at the entrance to the Dardanelles. The forts at Cape Helles and Kum Kale were bombarded with deliberate long-range fire. Considerable effect was produced on two of the forts. Two others were frequently hit, but, being open earth-works, it was difficult to estimate the damage. The forts, being outranged, were not able to

reply to the fire. At 2.45 P.M. a portion of the battleship force was ordered to close, and engaged the forts at closer range with secondary armament. The forts on both sides of the entrance then opened fire, and were engaged at moderate range by *Vengeance*, *Cornwallis*, *Triumph*, *Suffren*, *Gaulois*, *Bouvet*, supported by *Inflexible* and *Agamemnon*. At long range the forts on the European side were apparently silenced. One fort on the Asiatic side was still firing when operations were suspended owing to failing light. No ships of the Allied Fleets were hit. The action has been renewed this morning after aerial reconnaissance. His Majesty's aeroplane ship *Ark Royal* is in attendance with a number of seaplanes and aeroplanes of the Naval wing."

The ships engaged in this bombardment were *Inflexible*, eight 12-inch and sixteen 4-inch guns; *Cornwallis*, four 12-inch and twelve 6-inch; *Agamemnon*, four 12-inch and ten 9.2-inch; *Triumph*, four 10-inch and fourteen 7.5-inch. French ships: *Suffren*, four 12-inch and ten 6.4-inch; *Gaulois*, four 12-inch and ten 5.5-inch; and *Bouvet*, four 12-inch, two 10.8-inch, and eight 5.5-inch guns. The 12-inch guns throw a projectile of 850 pounds weight; the 9.2, one of 380 pounds; the 7.5, one of 200 pounds; the 6-inch, one of 100 pounds. What is termed "secondary armament" is guns of 7.5-inch calibre and downwards.

It will be remembered that a preliminary bombardment of the Dardanelles forts took place on November 3, when a combined force of French and British battleships and battle cruisers opened fire on the forts at a range of six miles, each vessel firing about twenty shots. The French paper *Liberté* published the following announcement concerning the damage done on that occasion: "It was not till a month later that we learned how much damage our shells had done. To the credit of our Allies, one fort completely ruined, three 17-inch guns blown to pieces, and ten officers and from three to four hundred men buried by the explosion of the powder magazine. On the Asiatic shore the Koum

Kalessi battery, which had been the mark of two French battleships, was likewise absolutely knocked to bits. It had taken twenty-four hours to put out the fires caused by our shells, which had spread from the fort to the adjacent village. Five German officers had been killed, and twenty carts, each containing ten or twelve dead bodies, had been used to take away the dead."

On February 24 unfavourable weather, with low visibility and a strong south-westerly gale, interrupted the operations at the Dardanelles. The outer forts were seriously damaged by the bombardment of the 19th. The weather having moderated, the bombardment of the outer forts of the Dardanelles was resumed at 8 A.M. this morning, February 25. After a period of long-range fire a squadron of battleships attacked at close range. All the forts at the entrance of the Straits were successfully reduced by this attack.

The entrance to the Dardanelles was guarded by four principal forts; these are Cape Helles with two 9.2-inch guns, Fort Sedd-el-Bahr with six 10.2-inch, Fort Orkhanieh with two 9.2, and Fort Kum Kalessi Tabia with four 10.2 and two 5.9-inch guns. When the attack was resumed the weather had improved, although the wind still blew strongly from the south-west. The new battleship *Queen Elizabeth*, with her armament of eight 15-inch and twelve 6-inch guns, supported by *Agamemnon*, *Irresistible*, and *Gaulois*, bombarded the forts at long range. Fort Helles replied, and one shell at 11,000 yards hit *Agamemnon*, killing three men and wounding five. *Irresistible* and *Gaulois* made excellent practice at Orkhanieh and Kum Kale, while the *Queen Elizabeth* concentrated on Helles, putting both its guns out of action by about 11.30 A.M. *Vengeance* and *Cornwallis* then ran in under cover of long-range fire and engaged Helles at close range. The reduction of Helles was completed, while Orkhanieh and Kum Kale opened a slow and inaccurate fire. *Suffren* and *Charlemagne* next delivered an attack on Orkhanieh and Kum Kale, advancing to

within 2000 yards of them, and it was seen that they were in no condition to offer effective resistance. *Vengeance*, *Triumph*, and *Albion* were then ordered to complete the reduction of the forts. All four were reduced by 5.15 P.M. Sweeping operations, covered by a division of battleships and destroyers, were immediately begun. The enemy set fire to the village at the entrance as darkness fell. Following upon this action the Straits were swept up to four miles from the entrance. *Albion* and *Majestic*, supported by *Vengeance*, proceeded to the limit of the swept area and began an attack on Fort Dardanus mounting four 5.9-inch guns, and some new batteries that had recently been erected on the Asiatic shore. The fire from these batteries was ineffective. After the enemy had been shelled from inside the Straits he retired from the forts at the entrance, and during the afternoon demolishing parties were landed at Kum Kale and Sedd-el-Bahr from *Vengeance* and *Irresistible*.

One of the features of this bombardment was the employment for the first time of the new battleship *Queen Elizabeth*. As she was at this time the last word in battleship construction, the following details from the *Naval Annual* are of interest: Displacement, 27,500 tons; length, 600 feet; beam, 90 feet 6 inches; draught, 28 feet 3 inches; horse-power, 60,000; machinery, Parsons turbine; armour belt, 13-inch; main armament, eight 15-inch guns; secondary armament, twelve 6-inch; torpedo tubes, four, discharging 21-inch torpedo; designed speed, 25 knots; fuel, oil only.

The following is a list taken from the *Times* of the total force utilised in the bombardment of the Dardanelles at this period, giving guns mounted in ships and weight of broadside.

The ships in the table are arranged in order of date, which is an important factor so far as pre-Dreadnoughts are concerned. Although eight of the British battleships mount four 12-inch guns in their heavy armament, and all these guns fire a projectile of the same weight, the weapons are not all of the same size and power. Thus the *Majestic* of 1895

is equipped with a 12-inch gun of 35 calibres, with a muzzle energy of 33,900 foot-tons. The next four battleships of the Canopus type carry a 12-inch gun of the same type, but the *Irresistible*, completed in 1902, is armed with a weapon of 40 calibres, as is the *Cornwallis*, completed in 1904. The 12-inch guns of the *Agamemnon* and *Inflexible* are of 45 calibres, with a muzzle energy of 47,800 foot-tons as compared with the 39,200 foot-tons of the 40-calibre weapon. The 10-inch guns of the *Swiftsure* and *Triumph* are of 45 calibres. The same discrepancy will be observed in the 6-inch gun. The *Majestic* has a 40-calibre weapon, the *Irresistible* one of 45, and our latest battleships, where they are mounted, have one of 50-calibre length.


| Name. | Guns. | Weight of Broadside. | |
|------------------------|---|----------------------|---------------------|
| | | Heavy Guns. | Secondary Armament. |
| <i>Queen Elizabeth</i> | Eight 15-in., twelve 6-in. | 15,600 | 600 |
| <i>Inflexible</i> | Eight 12-in., sixteen 4-in. | 6,800 | 37½ |
| <i>Agamemnon</i> | Four 12-in., ten 9.2-in. | 5,300 | .. |
| <i>Swiftsure</i> | Four 10-in., fourteen 7.5-in. | 3,312 | .. |
| <i>Triumph</i> | .. | .. | .. |
| <i>Cornwallis</i> | Four 12-in., twelve 6-in. | 3,400 | 600 |
| <i>Irresistible</i> | " " " | " | " |
| <i>Vengeance</i> | " " " | " | " |
| <i>Albion</i> | " " " | " | " |
| <i>Ocean</i> | " " " | " | " |
| <i>Canopus</i> | " " " | " | " |
| <i>Majestic</i> | " " " | " | " |
| <i>French Ships</i> | | | |
| <i>Suffren</i> | Four 12 in., ten 6-in. | 3,880 | 495 |
| <i>Gaulois</i> | Four 12-in., ten 5.5-in. | 3,880 | 330 |
| <i>Charlemagne</i> | .. | .. | .. |
| <i>Bouvet</i> | Four " 12-in. " two " 10.8-in., eight 5.5-in. | 2,416 | 264 |

All these ships of the line of battle, it will be observed, are what is known as pre-Dreadnought, with the exception of the *Queen Elizabeth*, which term signifies that they came before the name ship of the all-big-gun type which was completed and dates from 1906. Length in calibres is the handiest way to reckon a gun. Thus a 45-calibre 12-inch is 45 feet in length.

On Monday, March 8, Vice-Admiral Carden, commanding the Allied Fleets, made to the Admiralty the following report: "No action was possible on the 3rd and following till 2 P.M., when, although the weather was still unfavourable, *Irresistible*, *Albion*, *Prince George*, and *Triumph* resumed the attack on Fort Dardanus and the concealed guns in

the neighbourhood. These were less active than before, and were dealt with by the ships with more certainty. A useful seaplane reconnaissance located several encampments and two permanent batteries. On March 4 the weather became fine, and the sweeping and bombarding operations within the Straits continued steadily. Meanwhile demolition parties, covered by detachments of the Marine Brigade of the Royal Naval Division, were landed at Kum Kale and Sedd-el-Bahr to continue the clearance of the ground at the entrance to the Straits. The party at Sedd-el-Bahr discovered and destroyed four Nordenfeldts. Some skirmishing ensued on both banks, and the enemy were found to be holding the villages in force. On this day also, farther down the coast, *Sapphire* silenced a battery of field guns north of Dikeli in the Gulf of Adramyti, and the defences of Besika were shelled by *Prince George*. The following casualties were sustained on the 4th: 19 killed, 3 missing, 25 wounded. On March 5 the attack was begun by indirect fire from *Queen Elizabeth* upon the defences at the Narrows. This attack was supported in dealing with howitzers by *Inflexible* and *Prince George*. Fire was confined to Forts Rumilieh, two 11-inch guns; Medjidieh Tabia, four 9.4 inch; Hamidieh 2, five 3.4; Tabia and Namazieh, mounting altogether two 14-inch, one 11-inch, one 10.2-inch, eleven 9.4-inch, three 8.2-inch, and three 5.9 inch. *Queen Elizabeth* fired 29 rounds with satisfactory results. The magazine in Fort Tabia, which is an important fort armed with the best and heaviest guns, blew up. The other forts were damaged. The fire of *Inflexible* and *Prince George* was observed from inside the Dardanelles by *Irresistible*, *Canopus*, *Cornwallis*, and *Albion*. Although these vessels were much fired at by concealed guns they were not hit. *Sapphire* again fired on troops in the neighbourhood of the Gulf of Adramyti and destroyed a military station at Tuz Burnu."

On March 5 also the Commander-in-Chief East Indies, Vice-Admiral Sir Richard



AT THE DARDANELLES—THE “IRRESISTIBLE” AND THE “OCEAN” SHELLING THE FORTS ON THE ASIATIC SIDE.

(Taken from the deck of a British warship. By permission of The Illustrated London News.)

Peirse, arrived with a squadron of battleships and cruisers off Smyrna. A methodical bombardment of Fort Yeni Kale was carried out during the afternoon for two hours in favourable conditions of weather. Thirty-two hits were secured, inflicting considerable damage on the fort, and there were two heavy explosions, apparently of magazines. *Euryalus*, which flew the flag of the Vice-Admiral, shot with remarkable accuracy from her after 9.2-inch guns. Fire was not returned. The bombardment at closer range was then begun, the weather conditions being good. The reduction of the Smyrna defences was a necessary incident in the main operations.

Vice-Admiral Carden reported that on March 6 *Queen Elizabeth*, supported by *Agamemnon* and *Ocean*, began to attack Forts Hamidieh 1 Tabia and Hamidieh 3, by indirect fire across the Gallipoli Peninsula, firing at 21,000 yards. *Queen Elizabeth* was replied to with howitzers and field guns, and three shells from field guns struck her without doing any damage. Meanwhile inside the Straits, *Vengeance*, *Albion*, *Majestic*, *Prince George*, and the French battleship *Suffren* fired on Suandere and Mount Dardanus batteries, and were fired on by a number of concealed guns. Fort Rumilieh Medjidieh Tabia, which had been attacked on the previous day, opened fire, and was engaged and struck by 12-inch shells. The majority of the ships inside were struck by shells, but there was no serious damage and no casualties.

On March 7, the weather continuing fine, four French battleships, *Gaulois*, *Charlemagne*, *Bouvet*, and *Suffren*, entered the Straits to cover the direct bombardment of the Narrows by *Agamemnon* and *Lord Nelson*. The French ships engaged Mount Dardanus battery and various concealed guns, silencing the former. *Agamemnon* and *Lord Nelson* then advanced and engaged the forts at the Narrows at 14,000 to 12,000 yards by direct fire. Forts Rumilieh Medjidieh Tabia and Hamidieh 1 Tabia replied. Both were silenced after heavy bombardment.

Explosions occurred in both forts. *Gaulois*, *Agamemnon*, and *Lord Nelson* were struck three times each; damage not serious. *Lord Nelson* had three men slightly wounded. While these operations were in progress the *Dublin* continued to watch the Bulair Isthmus. She was fired at by 4-inch guns and struck three or four times. Owing to the importance of locating concealed guns the seaplanes had to fly very low on occasions. On the 4th instant a seaplane—pilot, Flight-Lieutenant Garnett; observer, Lieutenant-Commander Williamson—became unstable and nose-dived into the sea, both officers being injured. Flight-Lieutenant Douglas, reconnoitring at close quarters in another seaplane, was wounded but managed to return safely. On the 5th, seaplane No. 172, pilot, Flight-Lieutenant Bromet with Lieutenant Brown, was hit no fewer than twenty-eight times; and seaplane No. 7, pilot, Flight-Lieutenant Kershaw with Petty-Officer Merchant, eight times, in locating concealed positions. The *Ark Royal* is equipped with every appliance necessary for the repair and maintenance of the numerous aircraft she carries.

Those who are not acquainted with the Mediterranean are apt to picture it as a sea in which the sun shines, the air is sweet and balmy, and where the myrtle, the fig, the olive, and orange stretch down from verdant hillsides to meet the azure of the ocean. That this state of things frequently obtains in the tideless sea is true enough. At the same time, in winter, particularly at the eastern end of the sea, weather conditions are frequently as unpleasant as the mind of man could well imagine. So well known was this to the mariners of a bygone age that they never put to sea at all in the winter season. The lumbering round ships of the Venetians, the Genoese, and those who hailed from the Western ports like Barcelona, lay up in ordinary when the autumn gales began to render existence difficult and dangerous for those who went down to the sea in ships. Similarly the long ships, the craft that were propelled by oars, made of winter a close

season. And this for an excellent reason. The long ship, which was the vessel in which the Moslem pirates (men such as Uruj Barbarossa, his infinitely greater brother, Kheyr-ed-din Barbarossa, Dragut Reis, and Ali Basha) cruised, found that it was not worth their while to wrestle with stormy—and what was worse from their point of

Ages, when, "the army then went into winter quarters." He, poor wretch, sits in a muddy ditch throughout that dark and dismal season. Likewise his brother Jack, who must stick it—to use his own vernacular—at sea, no matter what the weather may be. He has, it is true, certain advantages. Like the snail he carries his house with him



ON WATCH ON A DESTROYER.

view—empty seas. Those splendid heroes, the Knights of Malta, sworn foes of the Crescent, also kept their fighting ships stowed away in what is now known as Dockyard Creek, in that island, where they remained till the breath of spring was on land and sea, and when trader and pirate slipped forth from the harbours on business bent. Modern warfare, however, takes no heed of times or seasons. Not for the twentieth-century soldier is there that eminently sensible custom of the Middle

wherever he goes, and is seldom within measurable distance of starvation. But let none of the land folk run away with the idea that his life is one of more or less luxurious ease. In his case, since the introduction of the submarine and the automobile torpedo, his days, and particularly his nights, are spent—supposing him to be serving in home waters or the Mediterranean—in the perpetual strain of look-out for these devilish contrivances. Also the British seaman has had to keep the seas during the whole

duration of the war. Those of us who have had friends and relations employed in the sea service know the strain to which they have been subjected, both the men of the big ships and the small alike. We have to think of the toughness of fibre that has gone to keep our shores free from the taint of the enemy foot; and particularly has this rack and strain come upon the officers and men of our small craft. Sometimes they have

found time to set down for the benefit of their friends what their particular form of existence is like, and some of their reminiscences have found their way into the press. The letter here reproduced was communicated to the *Times*, and is eloquent of the discomforts, dangers, and difficulties experienced by our destroyers during the arduous times of the Dardanelles bombardment.

CHAPTER XI

Experience of a destroyer in the Mediterranean—The attack on the Narrows in the Dardanelles—Loss of the *Irresistible*, *Ocean*, and French battleship *Bouvet*—The deadly work of the floating mine.

A DESTROYER officer, serving in the Eastern Mediterranean, gives the following description of what life is like in one of these craft: "I must tell you what life in a destroyer is like in war. Here we have no land base of any kind, so never get ashore. Now and then we anchor for a day or a night rest, under the lee of an island which we are blockading, and every night when on patrol, and even so, when at anchor for our so-called rests, we are in sight of the enemy batteries and searchlights. We have to keep a very good look-out for drifting mines. The Turks, like the Germans, push them out into the sea whenever they can. Three have been picked up at our anchorage. We have men armed with rifles to watch for them all night; at present no one has been actually caught laying them."

Lack of excitement is not a matter with which the destroyer people were troubled during the bombardment of the Dardanelles; the decidedly negative form of this emotion being provided by the fact that even when they were—what was called—"resting," at any moment they were liable to death in a remarkably unpleasant form from the drifting mine. Then there was weather. Attend to the description of a by no means infrequent spring evening in these latitudes: "Now it is blowing a south-westerly gale, with sleet squalls every hour—you can't see an

inch," which is reminiscent of a destroyer cruise across the Wash in February when the very torpedo tubes became as flies in amber from the ice; the anchors had to be dug out with a pickaxe and boiling water, while the commander was partially thawed by a prescription made up and presented to him on the bridge by a kindly Scot, who happened to be his chief engineer. But we must return to the genial Mediterranean. "Away on the black horizon you keep seeing the gleam of the enemy searchlights, which light up the thickness of the wind with driving spray and sleet." This as pyrotechnic display is undeniably beautiful, cutting the darkness as it does with the prismatic colours of the rainbow, but it does not appeal to our destroyer officer, who proceeds: "We are steaming dead slow, head to wind and sea, sometimes going into it at about 10 knots in order to keep in the same patrol billet. Each time the ship plunges she chucks the top of a wave right over her bridge"—where the narrator of these events must have been standing—"forecastle, and foremost 12-pounder gun. Each time she gets a few degrees off her course. She gives a great roll, and a solid black wave (we call them 'seas') washes right over her after gun platforms and torpedo tube. At each gun and tube is a man on watch, trying to see through the blackness and spray, holding

on for all he's worth each time a sea breaks over her. At each gun and tube is a huddled heap of oilskin, or sometimes two or three, according to the position of gun or tube. This is an officer or seaman asleep, or trying to sleep, at his station, ready to be full awake and at his station the second I yell out 'Night Action.' "

This is the routine the man has. He goes

you, is thirteen hours on end in one continual howling gale, as often as not with seas breaking over him, and sleet storms at intervals. Even going below "for a rest" does not bring much silken sloth with it, as the monstrous wallowing motion of one of these long slender craft renders sleep almost an impossibility. In order to keep themselves alive during the long hours of darkness,



A STAGGERING OIL-SKINNED FORM.

on watch at 6 P.M. till 8 P.M. when he has half an hour for supper. Sometimes the galley fire has been washed out by the breaking seas, and as there is no supper bar, this means cold meat and ship's biscuit. At 8.30 P.M. he goes back to his gun and endeavours to sleep there till midnight, when he does a four hours' watch. At 4 A.M. he again tries to sleep till 7 A.M., when it is daylight, and he goes below for a rest. Well this, mark

our officer tells us, "I have the ship's cook and the wardroom steward told off to make cocoa all night for the men on deck"—hot, thick, oily ship's cocoa—and once every hour a staggering oil-skinned form is seen on the reeling decks, hanging on with one hand and balancing a bucket of cocoa with the other (the ship's cook is a fat man, and it is a hard job), and as often as not half gets spilt. When the galley is washed out by the sea

then there is no cocoa, and one feels like death about 4 A.M. to 6 A.M. When daylight appears you see sodden-looking, pale-faced men, begrimed with "stokers"—the thing that gets in the eye when one looks out of an express train window—staggering forward to get dry, eat, and then sleep on a stuffy, battened-down, overcrowded mess deck, where they have to jam themselves in on the deck to keep from rolling about.

So far we have been told of the fate of the men at the gun positions and torpedo tubes; we now come to the people on the bridge.

"On the bridge are the two searchlight men (watch and watch—meaning four hours on and four off) and the two signalmen. When it is their 'stand-by' they sleep on the deck of the bridge. There also you find the captain, who stops up there the whole night, except for ten minutes or so now and again, when he goes down to look at the chart, or get some cocoa in the chart-house under the bridge."

Hard as the men work in a destroyer, the officers work still harder, and the captain hardest of all. And yet the destroyer men like it, and it is seldom that you find those among them who wish to change back into a big ship. Even in times of peace their lot is one of hardship, for they would not be what they have proved themselves to be during the war if their training had not been of the most intensive description. In harbour the torpedo men do not eat the bread of idleness; at sea their life becomes a purgatory directly the sea begins to rise; what it is in war-time we are learning from an expert in this form of danger and discomfort.

"Glued to the wheel," he continues, "is the helmsman (there are two of them, who split the night), who for six and a half of these thirteen weary hours keeps the little lubber's point glued to whichever point of the compass the captain may direct; for the other six and a half hours he is asleep on the deck at the foot of the bridge. The captain and officer of the watch are on the bridge peering out

over the 'dodgers' (canvas screens), and seem always to have a pair of glasses glued to the opening of their Balaclava helmets, or else trying to wipe the lenses clean with a black and sodden handkerchief. Every now and then all on the bridge duck instinctively, following the motions of whoever is looking out right ahead; this is when we get an extra big green one over. When daylight comes, we patrol and have look-outs by day as well. From 8.45 till noon the men are hard at work repairing the damage done by the seas to the upper deck gear and cleaning up the guns and torpedoes. Then every day at 5 P.M. the whole of the fighting mechanisms of the ship are tested and got ready for the night. We get in for about eight hours' rest, as a rule, once after twenty-four hours' patrol, but one out of every three rests is spent coaling. Sometimes we get a whole night at anchor and sheltered from the cold black seas, looking out for mines or the enemy, whom we expect any second of our lives here. It is the suspense and the watching and waiting that tell! Still, in spite of this and the truly awful weather and great hardships, we are a truly happy family, full of beans to get at 'em, and I wouldn't be anywhere else for worlds."

During the first fortnight in March there was preparation for the serious attack that was in contemplation. The mine-sweepers performed wonderful work inside the Straits, and the light cruiser *Amethyst* had 23 killed and 37 wounded in a dash up the Straits. A general attack by the British and French Fleets was delivered on March 18 upon the fortresses at the Narrows of the Dardanelles. What damage was done by the bombardment of the forts by *Queen Elizabeth*, *Inflexible*, *Agamemnon*, *Lord Nelson*, *Triumph*, *Prince George*, assisted by the French ships *Suffren*, *Gaulois*, *Charlemagne*, and *Bouvet*, is not known. The bombardment began at 10.45 A.M., and by 1.25 P.M. all the forts had ceased firing. As the French squadron was passing out the *Bouvet* struck a mine and sank in 36 fathoms off

Aren Kioi village. They had been relieved —i.e. the French ships—by *Vengeance*, *Irresistible*, *Albion*, *Ocean*, *Swiftsure*, and *Majestic*, which engaged the enemy at 2.36 P.M. At 4.9 *Irresistible* quitted the line listing heavily. At 5.50 she sank, having also struck a drifting mine.

There was at this comparatively early stage of the great defeat no question of the seriousness with which the operations against the Dardanelles were undertaken by England and France. "If naval resources," said Mr. Ward Price, "are worth anything, this fleet ought indeed to be capable of its mission, for to pass through the lines of the sixty odd vessels of all classes that are here is like sailing through the pages of the Navy List. They literally block out the horizon between Tenedos and the mainland: battleships, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, water-plane ships, repair ships, hospital ships, mine-sweepers, colliers, and even then they are not all here. In and out among them scurry pinnaces and steam cutters. The gaunt grey masts are constantly breaking out in fluttering strings of gay signal flags, and heliographs flash and semaphores wave from ship to ship. There have been wars enough fought on these blood-stained seas, but never one that gathered a hundredth part of such powers of destruction as float within sight of where I write. In the middle of the whole fleet, long and black, rising two above two at each end of the ship, you see the great 15-inch guns of the *Queen Elizabeth*, the mightiest cannon afloat in all the world."

The bombardment of March 18 was a terribly costly affair for the Allies. The *Irresistible* was a battleship of 15,000 tons, armed with four 12-inch and twelve 6-inch, sixteen 12-pounders, and six 3-pounder guns. Her complement was 780 officers and men. The *Ocean* was a battleship of the Canopus class, of 12,950 tons. She carried four 12-inch, twelve 6-inch, and eighteen smaller guns. Her complement was 750 officers and men. The French battleship *Bouvet* was an old vessel, dating from 1896. She was 12,205 tons, armed with four 12-inch, two 10.8-inch,

eight 5.5-inch, eight 4-inch, and thirty smaller guns. Her complement was 630 officers and men. In addition to these losses the French battleship *Gaulois* struck a mine with her bows, but the damage done was fortunately only slight. The battle cruiser *Inflexible* was struck by a shell on the bow, and a shell exploding on her deck killed some forty men and wounded others.

A seaman of the *Ocean* gave the following description of the *Ocean's* last fight. He says: "About fifteen minutes after getting into action on March 18th I witnessed from the fore central position a sight I would not care to see very often—the sinking of the French battleship *Bouvet*. I noticed a terrific explosion just off our starboard bow, and on training the range-finder on it to have a better view, I saw it was the *Bouvet*. She quickly listed to starboard, and was bottom up in less than a minute. The last of her disappeared in just over two minutes. I saw the survivors, just over twenty, crawling on her bottom, and when that went they were in the water. Our picket boats at once proceeded to pick them up, being under a heavy fire from the Turks all the time.

"About 3.45 P.M. we noticed that the *Irresistible*, which was on our port hand—second ship of the line,—had a heavy list to starboard, having apparently hit a mine; she signalled to us that her engines were disabled. Destroyers were ordered to stand by her to take her crew off if necessary, and we prepared to take her in tow. The Turks soon saw that she was in trouble, and howitzer batteries on either shore poured a heavy fire into her, killing many of her ship's company. We, meanwhile, maintained a heavy fire on these same batteries with our 6-inch guns, at the same time engaging the Kilid Bahr Forts with our 12-inch guns.

"Shortly after this the battleships were ordered 'to open range from the forts,' but we still stood by *Irresistible*, until she informed us that she was no longer in a condition to be towed. We then turned to port to withdraw, the remainder of the *Irresistible's*

people having been taken off by destroyers. Just as we were turning we got either a mine or a torpedo, which fairly lifted our stern out of the water, destroyed our steering-gear, burst the main steam-pipe to the starboard engine, and dismounted the after guns. The ship being no longer under control, went round in a circle with the port engine going ahead, and assumed a heavy list to starboard. It was then found that she was in a sinking condition. Destroyers were ordered to close, the main steam valves were opened up, and every one was ordered up from below. As soon as the Turks saw we were in trouble they concentrated a hot fire on us, but I am pleased to say caused no loss of life, though they did succeed in hitting the ship several times and made things very unpleasant. The destroyers took all our ship's company off, and one of them caught a shell while so doing which killed three men.

"I cannot speak too highly of the splendid way in which our destroyers carried out the work of rescue under a very heavy fire. Altogether we were four and a half hours in action and the ship was hit some forty or fifty times. A piece of shell about three inches long struck the range-finder which I was using, making a hole right through it, but did not put it out of action. I was one of eight men who were not under armour during the whole business, and consider myself real lucky to be alive. But though it was pretty hot in the ship, I feel sure it was a thousand times worse in the forts, which were under a perfect hail of 12-inch and 15-inch shells. Terrific explosions could be seen frequently taking place in them. As darkness came on, the forts at Chanak and Kilid Bahr were all ablaze, and could be seen for twenty miles or more at sea. I would have liked to have brought the old ship out, but anyhow we left our trademark on those forts before we went under. The *Ocean* sank in 34 fathoms of water shortly after we left her. We had several previous engagements to this one, but this was the biggest and last."

Our Navy is frequently described as "the

silent Navy," and rightly so described, as it goes about its avocations with a commendable absence of talk. At the same time, when it comes to fight its battles over again, it is extraordinary the power of description that it develops. We are concerned, of course, in war-time with the net results that accrue to our Nation and Empire by the actions that take place by land and by sea. At the same time we are filled with a very human curiosity to ascertain how went the battle with those of our valiant fellow-countrymen who have been engaged in the mighty conflict. And here is an able seaman who takes us into his confidence in a manner which enables us to see for ourselves how the struggle waxed and waned on this disastrous day in the Dardanelles. There in his "fore central position," entirely outside of all protective armour, he was in a position to watch the unfolding of the drama that was being played around him. To see two great capital ships sink before his eyes, then to find that his own vessel is wounded to the death, to be taken off by a destroyer only to see her also engulfed, is most certainly a tremendous experience. And yet somehow the narrator seems quite prepared to take it as all in the day's work, to have time to admire the splendid seamanship of his comrades in the destroyers, and to carry away with him the certainty that he has "left his trademark" on the forts of the enemy. He "would have liked to have brought the old ship out," but, as it was not to be, he consoles himself with admirable philosophy and the reflection that she did not sink in vain.

We who read such a narrative as this regard it, naturally enough, from the point of view of the country alone. It is far otherwise with those who have suffered the loss of their ship. A sailor carries with him to sea his poor private belongings; the ship is his home, and when she goes, if haply his life be saved, it is all that he carries away with him, except the flannel and the pair of trousers in which he is probably arrayed. His clothes, his boots, his "ditty box"—

his prized possession in which he keeps home photographs, his letters from his wife or from "her,"—all are gone, and he has to make a fresh start at a heavy pecuniary sacrifice; for Form XYZ—or whatever it may be—although it may provide him with new boots and trousers, will not take into account either all his material losses, or any of those of a sentimental description.


An officer in the *Prince George* battleship gives an interesting account of what happened as viewed by him from the foretop of that ship: "As we drew ahead we fired about twelve rounds of 12-inch at Mount Dardanus, and then engaged the two forts on the European side, which were very difficult to see, owing to their being over the rise of a hill. We then came under heavy howitzer fire. A shell struck the fore-shelter deck, sending up black smoke to us in the foretop, and splinters fairly rattled round the top. Another entered the side of the ship, making a hole of about three square feet, and wrecking a seamen's mess inside, and shell after shell went over us, exploding in the water just by the side. The forebridge had all its woodwork carried away, and shrapnel bursting overhead wounded two men in the crow's nest above us and riddled the cowls with bullets. Our wireless aerial was also carried away. About this time I saw the *Inflexible's* foretop struck by shrapnel; every one was killed there except two who were not touched. About 2 P.M. we entered the Straits, at 10.30 we were ordered to retire as the relieving ships were coming up, and to do this we had to turn round and cross the Straits to the other side to pass through the main line of ships. I thought when we were in the middle of the Dardanelles that we would come under a heavy fire from Chanak, but we did not do so; evidently they must have been a good deal knocked about.

"The *Bouvet* and other French ships were also being relieved, and we were exactly abreast of the *Bouvet*—proceeding out of the Dardanelles, although we had not yet passed through the main line of four ships—when I saw what I thought were two shells strike

her on the starboard side, the side next to us. Great volumes of black and yellow smoke poured out of the holes in her side, and she commenced listing rapidly to starboard; but I think she must have struck a mine as well, for she turned turtle and sank in about two or three minutes. We sent our picket-boat and cutter away and rescued forty out of fifty men saved; and the *Prince George* herself steamed rapidly out of the Dardanelles. Of the second part of the action, resulting in the loss of the *Ocean* and *Irresistible*, I can tell you no more than the papers can, as we were outside the Dardanelles then. The Turkish report states that the *Prince George* was put *hors de combat*; that is of course not true, as we suffered no material damage whatever to affect the fighting efficiency of the ship, and had only three men wounded, and we have not had a single man killed yet. We are truly a lucky ship."

It was about this time, towards the latter end of March, that Marshal von der Goltz Pasha gave a lecture to his fellow-countrymen in Constantinople, in the course of which he declared that city to be absolutely impregnable; but this view of the matter was far from being believed among the Allied nations. Immense damage had been done to the forts, Turks and Germans had suffered the most tremendous losses, ships and ammunition were replaced, and there was confidence that our advance could not be stayed. It will be remembered that at this time, while the French and English were battering the forts of the Dardanelles, the Russian Black Sea Fleet was engaging the forts on the Bosphorus from positions some distance out at sea. A good deal was hoped from these operations, but all the time the Germans were employed in constructing new forts farther inland, and mounting in them heavier ordnance than had been mounted in the original Turkish defences.

Few things during the whole course of the war demonstrate the determination of the Germans to bid for what Bernhardt rightly called "world domination" than the repulse




THE BRITISH AND FRENCH FLEETS ADVANCING TO THE ATTACK OF THE DARDANELLES.
(Topical Photo.)

to the Allies in the Dardanelles. Without entering into the vexed question of the ineptitude and blundering with which this vitally important campaign was initiated and carried on on our side, we still stand amazed at the preparations which the Germans were able to make, the manner in which, with the magnificent fighting material at their disposal among the Turks, they were able to hold off the Allied offensive. The money that must have been spent was limitless and admirably applied, the manner of fortification entirely practical, the disposition of artillery and troops masterly, to withstand the gigantic forces against which the German and the Turk had to struggle ; and this was a campaign for which the Teuton must have

by their brethren in the destroyers ; but against the drifting mine they were powerless. As there may be some natural curiosity as to what form is taken by the drifting mine, the following extract from the *Naval Annual* of 1914 is of interest. The mine can be dropped from ships in the open sea, and was so dropped by the raiders who attacked Yarmouth and Scarborough. It will be remembered that in the Yarmouth raid a British vessel was actually lost by striking one of these contrivances. The *Annual* says :

“ It is not an automobile torpedo, but merely a freely floating mine, which can be set to oscillate between any depths below the surface that may be desired : on becoming water-borne it assumes an approximately



DESTROYER AT NIGHT.

been prepared with the same meticulous care and forethought as those on the Western and Eastern fronts, which formed his main battle area. There was only one thing lacking as far as it is possible to see, and that was the absence of well-trained gunners in the forts which dominated the sea highway to Constantinople. Had the forts, armed as they were, been manned by good shots, the tale of our losses in ships and men had been far heavier than it actually was. In the case just cited, the attack on the Straits on March 18, we lost three ships. But these losses were not due to gunfire ; in each case the ship lost was hit by the deadly mine floating downstream on the swift current which runs through the Straits. Prodigies of valour were performed by our gallant seamen of the mine-sweepers—manned by fishermen—and

vertical position, and having a certain negative buoyancy, it sinks until automatically a propeller is brought into use and drives it upward again. As prearranged, the action of the propeller ceases and commences at any depth selected for use. There is a time arrangement embodied by which the duration of its floating can be regulated ; after such time the mine is flooded and sinks, or, if desired, can rise to the surface. It can also be so arranged that when first discharged it sinks to the bottom, and after a prearranged time rises and commences to oscillate.”

There was great jubilation in Germany over the repulse of the Allied attack ; the *Lokalanzeiger* stated that Admiral Carden attributed the misadventure of March 18 to the too optimistic report from the *Amethyst* which was sent in the day before for recon-

naissance, and to the unexpectedly large number of mines scattered at the last moment. A correspondent of the *Berliner Tageblatt* wrote: "German officers are in command of the forts and of the Turkish soldiers. Here we find the same discipline, the same spirit of comradeship, as if officers and men were of one and the same nationality; nowhere is the soldier spirit higher than you will find it here. Siege guns of the largest size lie always ready for action, while in the deeply hewn ammunition chambers, secure from the fire of the enemy, lie charges and projectiles sufficient to maintain a siege." In what was regarded as premature comment at the time, Admiral Kirchhoff delivered himself thus: "Already we see the Western Powers in grief and bitterness withdrawing from the Dardanelles, where they have bitten granite. Their lying reports of the great successes achieved, which they have sent out into all the world, produce a contrary effect. It will soon be recognised everywhere that they have reached the end of their strength, and that it is going badly with them in the south as well as in the north, in Egypt, and in Mesopotamia."

On March 16 Vice-Admiral Sackville Hamilton Carden was incapacitated by illness from continuing in the Mediterranean command, and was succeeded by Rear-Admiral John Michael de Robeck with the

acting rank of Vice-Admiral. His Majesty's ships *Queen* and *Implacable* were sent out from England to replace the *Irresistible* and *Ocean*, thus bringing the British Fleet in these waters up to its original strength. Considering the magnitude of the operations undertaken the casualties on the British side were inconsiderable; we had, however, to mourn the loss of nearly the entire gallant company of the French battleship *Bouvet*, as it would appear that an internal explosion, presumably that of her main magazines, supervened upon the explosion of the mine by which she was struck.

It must not be imagined that all the success lay with the Turks on this day of the bombardment of the Narrows. At Chanak and at Kalid Bahr magazines were exploded and many minor batteries were silenced, and the damage inflicted must have been terribly severe. What played into the hands of the Hun, and of his ally the Turk, was the swift current running down the Straits, and the absolute fleet of the deadly Leon mines set afloat and all allowed to drift down with the tide. Ships were powerless to lie long distances off the forts in the Narrows and pound them into dust; into the danger zone it was absolutely necessary that they should go; and not all the efforts of the mine-sweepers were able to save them from the peril that none could see.

CHAPTER XII

SUBMARINE BLOCKADE—SPEECH OF THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY

WE now come to a phase of the sea war which differentiates it from any conflicts on the water by which it has been preceded. This is what was known in Germany as "The Submarine Blockade of England." Before the war broke out Grand-Admiral von Tirpitz and the German higher command generally had but a poor opinion of the submarine as a weapon of offence; and when hostilities actually occurred there were not more than thirty of the "Unterseebots" on the list of

the Imperial German Navy. The Teuton, being of a thrifty turn of mind, preferred that England, France, and America should conduct those preliminary experiments in the new arm which were certain to be costly, both in money and in life. Accordingly he held his hand. But with the war came also the striking fact that an inferior Navy was of little use. The merchant vessels of the Fatherland were captured, sunk, or driven into neutral ports, there to be interned; and

gradually but surely such men-of-war as were outside what has come to be known as "the wet triangle" were brought to action and destroyed. There then came the proof—if indeed it were still wanted—that Germany at war was even more unscrupulous than Germany at peace. The second largest Navy in the world had marched *pari passu* with the second largest Mercantile Marine; both had, as it were, ceased to exist—the Mercantile Marine absolutely, the Navy relatively, as this latter could not sail the seas save with the chance, or rather the certainty, of destruction sooner or later. It requires no very deep or recondite knowledge of international law to be aware that the sinking of enemy merchantmen at sight and the drowning of their crews is altogether *hors concours*, a thing of which even Captain Kidd, Teach, Blackbeard, L'Ollonais, or any others of the piratical hierarchy, never dreamt.

The German, however, is the modern exponent of "thorough"; and even as on the field of battle on shore he distinguished himself by the use of poison gas, even as in South Africa he poisoned the wells, and even also as he has employed liquid fire and every other damnable device that his chemists could invent, so also he was not above stooping to wholesale murder on the high seas. There appeared in the Press of our own country on February 5 the following notice:

"The Admiralty in Berlin announces the strictest blockade of England and warns neutral shipping against navigating the waters surrounding Great Britain, because on account of the English announcement (no such statement was ever made) that England will misuse neutral flags for its own shipping purposes, neutral ships will run risks. The blockade comes into force on February 18."

In order to cross the t's and dot the i's of this official pronouncement the *Reichsanzeiger* published the following announcement:

"1. The waters around Great Britain and Ireland, including the entire English Channel, are hereby declared a military area. From February 18 every hostile merchant ship in

these waters will be destroyed, even if it is not always possible to avoid thereby dangers which threaten the crews and passengers.

"2. Neutral ships will also incur danger in the military area because, in view of the misuse of neutral flags ordered by the British Government on January 31 (it will be noticed that this infamous lie is persisted in) and the accidents of naval warfare, it cannot always be avoided that attacks may involve neutral ships.

"3. Traffic northwards around the Shetland Islands in the east part of the North Sea and a strip of at least thirty miles in breadth along the coast of Holland is not endangered.

"(Signed) VON POHL,

"Chief of the Admiralty Staff."

On February 8 the following statement was issued by our Foreign Office: "The use of the neutral flag is, with certain limitations, well established in practice as a *ruse de guerre*. The only effect in the case of a merchantman of wearing a flag other than the national flag is to compel the enemy to follow the ordinary obligations of naval warfare, and to satisfy himself as to the nationality of the vessel and of the character of her cargo by examination before capturing her and taking her into a Prize Court for adjudication. The British Government has always considered the use of British colours by a foreign vessel legitimate for the purpose of escaping capture. Such a practice not only involves no breach of international law, but is specifically recognised by the law of this country."

In the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, it is enacted (Sec. 69 (1)) as follows: "If a person uses the British flag and assumes the British national character on board a ship owned in whole or in part by any persons not qualified to own a British ship, for the purpose of making the ship appear to be a British ship, the ship shall be subject to forfeiture under the Act, unless the assumption has been made for the purpose of escaping capture by an enemy or by a foreign ship of war in the exercise of some belligerent right."

And in the instructions to British Consuls, 1914, it is stated, a ship is liable to capture if British character is improperly assumed, *except for the purpose of escaping capture*. As we have in practice not objected to foreign merchant vessels making use of the British merchant flag as a ruse for the purpose of evading capture at sea at the hands of a belligerent, so we should maintain that in the converse case a British merchant vessel committed no breach of international law in assuming neutral colours for a similar purpose, if she thought fit to do so.

By the rules of international war, the customs of war, and the dictates of humanity, it is obligatory upon a belligerent to ascertain the character of a merchant vessel and of her cargo before capture. Germany has no right to disregard this obligation. To destroy ship, non-combatant crew, and cargo as Germany has announced her intention of doing is nothing less than an act of piracy on the high seas.

As far back as December 24, 1914, the *Times* quoted extracts from an interview given by Grand-Admiral von Tirpitz to the Berlin representative of the United Press of America in which he outlined the plans of Germany for the destruction of British trade. He declared that Germany could play against England and her Allies the same game as England is playing against Germany, by torpedoing every English and Allied ship that nears the British coasts, and thus cut off the greater part of British food supplies. "But," continues the *Times*, "as a matter of fact a beginning had already been made with such a policy, for on November 22 in the Havre roadstead, about four miles from the coast, the British steamer *Malachite*, of the Cunard Line, bound from Liverpool for Havre, was sunk by a German submarine. The captain of the submarine told the crew he intended to sink their ship, saying, 'I give you ten minutes to take to your boats.' The crew obeyed, and saw their vessel destroyed by ten shells from the submarine, which afterwards dived and disappeared. Three days later the steamer *Primo* was sunk off Cape

d'Antifer as the result of an attack by a German submarine, the crew landing at Fécamp. Earlier in the war, on October 20, the Leith steamer *Giltra* was sunk off the Norwegian coast by the German submarine U17, nine miles south of Skudenas."

Putting on one side the murderous cowardice of the scheme of the submarine blockade, the idea from the point of view of the German was not a bad one. They calculated, first, on frightening the British land folk; second, in establishing such a reign of terror at sea that the British mariner would refuse to leave the harbours of the United Kingdom; and each calculation was a mistake of the most ridiculous description. The Teuton knew nothing of the dour doggedness of the inhabitants of these islands when affronted by a foreign foe, still less did he understand the reckless uncalculating courage of the British Mercantile Officer and the British Mercantile Seaman. Von Tirpitz and his gang of pirates, in setting forth on this adventure, did so no doubt with light hearts. The thing was so easy. Even a very indifferent shot with a twelve-bore can, if he creeps along the hedge and rests his gun on a gate, generally account for a fat and lethargic rabbit at a range of fifteen yards or so; and so was it to be with the submarine and the merchant vessel. The victim could offer no resistance; the range was clear, the weapon was absolutely deadly, and, to crown all, when murder and destruction had been wrought, the depths of the sea would hide the submarine by which the deed had been wrought.

The scheme was received with shouts of ghoulish joy in Germany. The newspapers vied with one another in commending this blow that was to destroy "the most hated enemy"; thus putting an end for ever to that chimera which still dazzled some of our own people, of a kindly people led astray from the paths of virtue by a dominant military caste. The long and pompous manifesto that was issued by the German Government was as dull as it was illogical; there is no room to quote it textually here,

nor, were it so quoted, is it likely that it would find many readers! but we may note that in it is stated "England has declared the entire North Sea to be an area of war"—as if our legislators or our seamen considered the North Sea to be a sort of preserve for the waging of hostilities, and that in some mysterious way it differed from all other stretches of the ocean. Perhaps the most amazing thing about this State document is its extraordinary insolence; an insolence also that converted words into

entering and leaving our harbours. Changes of route of course there were, but even our coastwise traffic continued, and this in so contemptuous a manner that times of sailing even were not altered. As for the ships "that bring the wheat and cattle lest the street-bred people die," what praise can we give that is strong enough to those valiant mariners who, faring forth from London River, the Mersey, the Bristol Channel, the Firth of Forth, the Clyde, and all the lesser ports and harbours with which our coasts



STEAMER HELD UP BY A GERMAN SUBMARINE.

deeds, as neutrals were torpedoed with a fine impartiality, giving great occasion for lengthy juridical manifestos to be issued—especially from the United States—by neutral Powers who objected to seeing their property and the lives of their fellow-countrymen sacrificed in this fashion.

There was no question whatsoever that the menace was a serious one, and that it resulted in great loss and suffering to our seamen and the owners of our ships. There is one thing, however, that we may record with pride of the deepest, that it made no difference at all to the stream of ships

are ringed, kept on, month in month out, regardless of the danger that they faced in the mine-strewn and submarine-haunted waters. We who "lived ashore in ease" reaped the benefit of their unselfish courage, as mercantile Jack, no less than his brother sailor in our men-of-war, showed the world that there was nothing he would not dare.

Towards the end of January, before the decree issued from Berlin had become operative, the German submarines were already at their deadly work. On February 1 it was reported that four British steamers, the *Ben Cruachan* of North Shields, the *Linda*

Blanche of Bangor, the *Kilcoan* of Bristol, and another vessel, name unknown, had been sunk. On January 30 the Japanese steamer *Tokomaru* was sunk seven miles west-north-west of Cape d'Antifer, and on the same day the steamer *Icaria* was also torpedoed in the same locality, but fortunately was not too much damaged to prevent her being towed into Havre by French torpedo boats. On this occasion the following note was issued by the French Minister of Marine: "Till to-day, out of some kind of respect for themselves, the Germans have, as a rule, only sunk Allied merchant shipping which they surprised, after having taken off the crews or allowed them to save themselves. Practically the only exception to this rule with which they have to reproach themselves was the criminal attempt on the French steamer *Amiral Ganteaume*, when she was carrying Belgian women and children. Struck by a German torpedo, she fortunately reached the coast with the assistance of friendly vessels, which saved the majority of the passengers. To-day the German Navy has decided systematically to violate international law. Its officers have been ordered to have no further respect for anything, and to place themselves outside humanity. Thus on January 30 a German submarine torpedoed without previous warning four British merchant ships, two near Havre and two in the Irish Sea. The entire world will be horrified at such proceedings, which are unworthy of a civilised nation."

On February 16 an important statement regarding the Navy was made by Mr. Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty. Speaking of the manning of the Fleet, he said: "We were able to man every ship in the Navy fit to send to sea. We were able to man a number of old ships that we did not intend to send to sea, but which, after being repaired and refitted, were found to have the possibility of usefulness in them. We were able, in addition, to man the powerful new vessels building for foreign nations, for which no provision had been made. We were able to man an enormous number—several score

of armed merchantmen—which have been taken up and have played an important part in our arrangements for the control of traffic and trade."

The speech of the First Lord was packed with interesting matter, and through it all there ran a note of pride and confidence in our sea service. Dealing with the Admiralty Transport, he reminded the House that since the beginning of the war, which had then been in progress just over six months, this Department had moved over a million men by sea, some from the uttermost ends of the earth, and this without let or hindrance, without the loss of a man or damage to a ship. After touching on the victory off the Falkland Islands and the action off the Dogger Bank, the speaker went on to pay a well-deserved compliment to the engine-room staff of His Majesty's ships in general. In this connection he said: "There is another remarkable feature of this action to which I should like to draw the attention of the House. I mean the steaming of our ships. All the vessels engaged in this action (he was dealing with the Dogger Bank at the moment) exceeded all their previous records without exception. I wonder if the House and the public appreciates what this means? Here is a squadron of the Fleet which does not live in harbour, but is far away from its dockyards, and which during six months of the war has been constantly at sea. All of a sudden the greatest trial is demanded of their engines, and they excel all previous peace-time records. Can you conceive a more remarkable proof of the excellence of British machinery, of the glorious industry of the engine-room branch, or of the admirable system of repairs and refits by which the Grand Fleet is maintained from month to month, and can, if need be, be maintained from year to year in a state of ceaseless vigilance without exhaustion? Take the case of the *Kent* at the Falklands. The *Kent* is an old vessel. She was launched thirteen years ago, and has been running ever since. The *Kent* was designed for 23½ knots. The *Kent* had to catch a ship

which went considerably over $24\frac{1}{2}$ knots. They put a pressure and a strain on the engines much greater than is allowed in time of peace, and they drove the *Kent* 25 knots and caught the *Nurnberg* and sank her."

This is a fine testimony, but never was one better deserved. Very naturally the public thinks of sea battles in terms of guns, torpedoes, and the man behind these weapons. But down in the flaming heart of the ship are heroes as staunch as they; men whose pride it is that no demand shall be made upon them that they are not in a position to meet. Whether it has been in the vast stokehold of a battleship, or the cramped engine-room of a cargo tramp manœuvring to escape the murderous intention of a submarine, the men who drive the ship have never failed to respond to the call. Also when you drive your engines a knot and a half or two knots more than the speed for which they are designed, an element of danger enters into your action from the engines themselves, apart from that which is run from the attentions of the foe. As it is in the Royal Navy, so it is in the mercantile marine, and in his speech Mr. Churchill instanced "the spirit of the gallant captain of the *Laertes*, whose well-merited honour has been made public this morning."

A somewhat typical case of the bravery and resource of merchant seamen was this case of the *Laertes*. The master reported that "about 4.30 yesterday afternoon," when his ship was between the Maas Lightship and Schouwen Bank, she was fired on by the German submarine U2. Shots struck the ship's funnel and compass and boats on the upper deck. Afterwards the submarine tried to fire a torpedo, but the *Laertes* escaped by clever manœuvring and putting on full speed. It appears that the steamer, before being challenged by the submarine, was steering without colours. When asked to stop, the captain, it is stated, showed the Dutch flag, in order to safeguard the lives of the crew, who are neutral subjects, most of them being Norwegians and

Chinese. He then went full speed ahead for a distance of sixteen miles, and finally reached Ymuiden in safety. The announcement shortly afterwards was made in the press that "Captain William Henry Propert of the s.s. *Laertes*, having been granted a temporary commission as lieutenant in the Royal Naval Reserve as from February 10, 1915, the King has been graciously pleased to award him the Distinguished Service Cross for his gallant and spirited conduct in the command of his unarmed ship when exposed to attack by gunfire and torpedo of a German submarine on the 10th instant. The Admiralty has conveyed to Captain Propert and the officers and men under his command an expression of high appreciation of their conduct, and has bestowed on each officer a gold watch. A complimentary grant of £3 has also been made to each member of the crew. This exceptional recognition is intended to mark the example set by this merchant vessel."

On February 22 it was reported that the British ship *Cambank* had been torpedoed off Anglesey, the French ship *Dinorah* torpedoed off Folkestone, the British ship *Downshire* torpedoed off the Isle of Man, while the Norwegian vessel *Belridge* and the American vessel *Evelyn* had been mined in the North Sea and off the Frisian Island of Borkum respectively. These firstfruits of "the submarine blockade" were hailed with frenzied joy in Germany, while at the same time the press of the Fatherland teemed with articles bitterly reviling the neutral nations for their attitude regarding this entirely new method of warfare. International law as it existed did not suit them at all; by it neutral nations were enabled to supply such contraband of war as arms and munitions to belligerent Powers—if they could. It was perfectly competent for Germany and Austria to capture and destroy the vessels from America carrying this cargo—also if they could. But as they could not, they chose to regard themselves as deeply aggrieved parties, forgetting conveniently that they had supplied the United States of

America with warlike stores when that Power was at war with Spain, and the Boers when they were at war with England. But for the Fatherland the ancient adage that "what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander" apparently did not apply, and for it was substituted, "Do not do as I did, but do as I tell you." The *Cologne Gazette* wrote: "Neutral nations safely outside the field of hostilities hope later to fish in troubled waters. If they think to enrich themselves with European blood-money by selling cannon and shells, that is their privilege and we cannot stop them. They have yet to reckon, however, with the fact that this kind of neutrality will never be forgotten by us." The *Berliner Tageblatt* declared that "Germany is determined to prevent the sending of supplies to England. Neutral Powers will have to make the best of it."

With regard to the first week of the "submarine blockade," on February 25 the Secretary of the Admiralty authorised the publication of the following figures :

| Week. | Arrivals. | Sailings. |
|-------------------|-----------|-----------|
| Dec. 31 to Jan. 6 | 605 | 575 |
| Jan. 7 " Jan. 13 | 632 | 723 |
| Jan. 14 " Jan. 20 | 821 | 763 |
| Jan. 21 " Jan. 27 | 823 | 680 |
| Jan. 28 " Feb. 3 | 677 | 743 |
| Feb. 4 " Feb. 10 | 754 | 664 |
| Feb. 11 " Feb. 17 | 752 | 686 |
| Feb. 18 " Feb. 24 | 708 | 673 |

British vessels sunk by German submarines since February 18 :

| Date. | Ship. | Tons. | Position. |
|---------|-----------------|-------|-----------------|
| Feb. 20 | Cambank | 3112 | Off Anglesey |
| Feb. 20 | Downshire | 337 | Off Cal of Man |
| Feb. 23 | Branksome Chine | 2026 | Off Hastings |
| Feb. 24 | Oakby | 1976 | Off Beachy Head |
| Feb. 24 | Western Coast | 1105 | Off Beachy Head |
| Feb. 24 | Harpalion | 5867 | Off Beachy Head |

It would be quite impossible to give an account of each separate ship sunk or damaged by German submarines in the course of their iniquitous career, but only the more important of their successes can be indicated. On March 14 it was reported that the auxiliary cruiser *Bayano* had been torpedoed, and that nearly two hundred lives had been lost. Only twenty-six officers and

men were saved by the patrol vessel *Tara* and the collier *Balmerino*. The survivors stated that the morning was calm but very dark, and they had no warning of danger until there was a sudden and terrific explosion which rent the vessel almost from stem to stern. The lashings of the boats were immediately cut, but before the boats could be launched the *Bayano* foundered in less than four minutes from the time of the explosion. Captain Carr, the captain of the ship, went down with her, standing on the bridge, and all the survivors spoke in the terms of warmest admiration for his conduct.

Before proceeding further, it is necessary to elucidate briefly the German position with regard to submarine attack. That Empire claimed the right to declare the seas around Great Britain and Ireland as a "war area," and officially notified that "all enemy ships found in this area will be destroyed, and that neutral vessels will be exposed to danger."

In a Declaration made by His Majesty's Government, March 1, 1915, it is stated that : "This is in effect a claim to torpedo at sight, without regard for the safety of the crew or passengers, *any merchant vessel under any flag*. As it is not in the power of the German Admiralty to maintain any surface craft in these waters, this attack can only be delivered by submarine agency. The law and custom of nations in regard to attacks on commerce have always presumed that the first duty of the captor of a merchant vessel is to bring her before a prize court, where it may be tried, where the regularity of the capture may be challenged, and where neutrals may recover their cargoes. The sinking of prizes is in itself a questionable act, to be resorted to only in extraordinary circumstances and after provision has been made for the safety of the crew and passengers (if there are passengers on board). The responsibility for discriminating between neutral and enemy vessels, and between neutral and enemy cargo, obviously rests with the attacking ship, whose duty it is to verify the status and character of the vessel




A CRUISER RAMMING A SUBMARINE.

and cargo, and to preserve all papers before sinking or even capturing her. So also is the humane duty of providing for the safety of the crews of merchant vessels, whether neutral or enemy, an obligation upon every belligerent. It is upon this basis that all previous discussions of the law for regulating warfare at sea have proceeded.

"A German submarine, however, fulfils none of these obligations. She enjoys no local command of the waters in which she operates. She does not take her captures within the jurisdiction of a Prize Court.

ing commodities of all kinds (including food for the civil population) from reaching or leaving the British Isles or Northern France. Her opponents are, therefore, driven to frame retaliatory measures in order in their turn to prevent commodities of any kind from reaching or leaving Germany.

"These measures will, however, be enforced by the British and French Governments without risk to neutral ships or neutral non-combatants, and in the strict observance of the laws of humanity. The British and French Governments will there-



CRUISERS PATROLLING THE CHANNEL.

She carries no prize crew which she can put on board a prize. She uses no effective means of discriminating between a neutral and an enemy vessel. She does not receive on board for safety the crew of the vessel she sinks. Her methods of warfare are therefore entirely outside the scope of any of the international instruments regulating operations against commerce in time of war. The German declaration substitutes indiscriminate destruction for regulated capture. Germany is adopting these methods against peaceful traders and non-combatant crews, with the avowed intention of prevent-

fore hold themselves free to detain and take into port ships carrying goods of presumed enemy destination, ownership, or origin. It is not intended to confiscate such vessels or cargoes unless they would otherwise be liable to condemnation."

We have to recollect at what period of the war the manifesto of the enemy Government was issued. Although checked and held at the outset of the struggle by the troops of the Allies in France, Belgium, and the Russian frontier, there was still an overweening confidence in the success of German aims, both among the German General Staff

and among the subjects of William II. and of Francis Joseph. A check had come, it is true, but with the whole manhood of the two Empires upon which to draw, with the Turk to harry England in Egypt, Arabia, and Asia Minor, victory, complete and overwhelming, still dazzled the eyes that were holden. Would not the troops of the Fatherland hack a way through to Calais?—and with Calais in the hands of the Kaiser the rest was simple. Incredible and monstrous were the fables with which an inland people, who knew nothing of the sea, were fed. They were told that once Calais was gained, a platform six miles long would be built out from thence into the North Sea; that the short intervening space of fifteen miles would be patrolled by German submarines in such numbers that no enemy vessel could live in that area for more than a few hours before her terrible end had been accomplished.

For years had the Pan-German party and the Flottenverein, by means of lectures, of diagrams, of pictures, of school treats to the principal naval ports, instructed their fellow-countrymen in the faith of the supremacy of German sea-power. It was true that England—the most hated foe—had the superiority in ships, but then German guns, from the mighty firm of Krupp, were superior in every point of range, trajectory, and endurance. Was it not the fact, it was asked with passionate insistence, that in all the wide realm of ocean there was none to compare with the heroes of the German torpedo service? Indiscipline, it was confidently asserted, was rife in the British Navy, the men were of the lowest class, the officers mere triflers, players of golf and of football. Could any comparison exist between these people and the noble sons of the Fatherland, brave, patient, painstaking, awaiting only the day—*der Tag*—toasted in every ward-room of the German Navy? When loosed upon the foe they would prove to the world in what manner the German seaman ruled the sea, in the same manner as the German soldier ruled the land. And

then there came the great awakening. Their warships were swept from every sea, their commerce-destroyers destroyed, their colonies reft from them, while grass grew in the streets of Hamburg and Bremen, where such of the mighty argosies of the Hamburg-Amerika and the Nord-Deutscher Lloyd as were not interned in foreign ports rusted at their moorings. If we attempt to draw a parallel with our own country concerning such a state of affairs, we have to imagine London River, the Mersey, the Clyde, Cardiff, the Tyne, Sunderland, Southampton, and hundreds of other subsidiary but still flourishing ports dead as the snows of yester year. In any game at which the German has ever played his motto has been, "Win, tie, or wrangle."

Then when the greatest of all games came to be played, the natural savagery of this people was displayed in all its naked ugliness. What cared the Wilhelmstrasse for

Inky blots and rotten parchment bonds?


Had not the German Chancellor at the very inception of the struggle denounced a solemn Treaty as a mere scrap of paper? And so it came about that, in defiance of all laws, the "submarine blockade" was instituted and red murder stalked abroad upon the high seas, not merely unashamed, but proclaimed to a wondering world as an act justified by God and man, and calling for the sympathy of all right-minded persons.

Following the manifesto establishing this state of affairs came an Order in Council from our own King, dated March 15, which set forth among other things that "such attempts on the part of the enemy give to His Majesty an unquestionable right of retaliation." What that right of retaliation was was set forth in a column and a half of the *Times* detailing the steps that it was necessary to take.

It was not until March 28, 1915, that we were quite aware how far the Germans were prepared to go in the matter of sea murder. At 6.25 P.M. on that date the British s.s. *Falaba*, of 4806 tons, was torpedoed to the

south of St. George's Channel and sank in ten minutes. The ship carried a crew of about 90 persons, and there were on board some 160 passengers. About 140 survivors were picked up, eight of whom, including the captain, died after being rescued. It is feared that many were killed by the explosion of the torpedo. This was the first brief message received, and it was not for some days, by which time all the facts could be gathered, that an authorised statement was issued by Messrs. Elder Dempster, the owners of the ship. This set forth that no less than 111 persons lost their lives; that

was blown into atoms, and all the passengers and crew thrown into the water. There was some doubt in the minds of the survivors as to the number of minutes' grace allowed to them by the submarine commander, but all agreed that it was well within ten minutes, and further, that he could not fail to have seen that the decks were crowded with passengers, and that the majority of the boats were nowhere near the water when the torpedo was fired. After the ship had sunk the submarine stopped and answered the cries and appeals for help from drowning men and women with laughter and jeers.



SIGHTING A GUN ON A PATROL BOAT.

the *Falaba* was totally unarmed; that it was untrue to state, as had been stated by the Germans, that time was given for the passengers to escape. What had happened was that a submarine flying the German ensign had appeared about 200 yards on the starboard beam of the *Falaba* and made three signals to that ship to stop. As the submarine had some six knots greater speed than the steamer, escape was out of the question; so the ship was stopped and prepared to lower her boats. While the boats were still at the davits the submarine fired a torpedo at the *Falaba* at short range, and the explosion occurred just as the first boat touched the water. She

This charge of inhumanity by no means rests on the testimony of one or two; it is supported by all those who were present and who saw. Most fortunately some help was at hand, as the *Eileen Emma*, a trawler, was within 200 yards of the *Falaba* when she foundered, and she picked up over one hundred persons alive and recovered six dead bodies. Captain Davis, the captain of the *Falaba*, was alive when rescued, but succumbed almost immediately to shock. A drifter joined in the work of rescue, the lifeboat with fourteen persons on board was taken in tow by a third, and the survivors were landed at Milford Haven. One of the passengers expressed it as his deliberate opinion

that had they been given another ten minutes, all on board might have been saved. As it was, if it had not been for the trawler, scarcely any of them had been saved. It is somewhat surprising to have to record that the trawler was not sunk by gun-fire!

CHAPTER XIII

Submarine blockade—Raiding cruisers—Amount of losses through their activities—Sinking of neutrals by U boats—Evolution of the German submarine—Loss of the *Léon Gambetta*—Sir James Domville's fight in a trawler with two German torpedo boats—Appointment of Sir Henry Jackson as First Sea Lord—Destruction of *Princess Irene* by explosion in Sheerness Harbour—The Dardanelles bombardment and landing of troops on April 25-26—The *River Clyde*: Commander Unwin, midshipmen, and seamen gain the V.C.

ON April 7 the Secretary of the Admiralty issued a memorandum showing the number of British merchant and fishing vessels lost by hostile action since the outbreak of the war. During the week ended April 7 there were 1234 arrivals and sailings of oversea steamers (of over 300 tons net) of all nationalities to and from United Kingdom ports. During this week five British merchant vessels were sunk or captured by submarines, their gross tonnage being 7904 tons, and five British fishing vessels of 914 tons were either sunk or captured by German vessels of all classes.

Since the declaration of "the submarine blockade" on February 18, 37 British merchant vessels and 6 British fishing vessels have either been sunk by enemy cruisers, mines, or by submarines, the total gross tonnage of the former 100,987, and of the fishing vessels 1203 tons. The total number of sailings and arrivals to and from United Kingdom ports of vessels over 300 tons during this period has been 10,194. Of the total number of 37 vessels sunk, 33 have been sunk by submarines.

In all the history of maritime warfare the systematic sinking of fishing vessels has never been practised before; but nothing that floated was safe from the cruelty of these German assassins. Thus on April 10 it was reported that the Belgian relief-ship *Harpalyce* had been torpedoed and seventeen innocent men done to death. This vessel left Rotterdam at 3 A.M. on April 10 bound for Norfolk, Virginia, in ballast. In addition

to a huge white flag which she flew bearing the inscription "Commission for Belgian Relief," and which was said to be visible at eight miles' distance, she had the same words painted on both her sides in immense white letters. She had a crew of 44. Nine miles north-east of the North Hinder Lightship she was torpedoed without warning by a submarine, and almost the entire side of the vessel was blown away. She sank in some four or five minutes. A ship named the *Elizabeth* came to the rescue and saved many lives. The crew of the *Elizabeth* behaved with the greatest humanity and kindness to their unfortunate brother-seamen and brought them into Rotterdam. But this sneaking and blackguardly warfare—if cold-blooded murder can be dignified with such a name—threw out into high relief the dauntless spirit of the English sailor.

Captain H. Gibson of the tug *Homer* was towing the French barque *General de Sonis*, when he was challenged by a submarine and ordered to abandon the ship. What Captain Gibson did was something quite unexpected on the part of the German, as he slipped his towing hawser and swung the tug round on her heel, making straight for his antagonist under a hail of bullets. The windows and woodwork of the wheel-house were smashed, but the captain escaped injury. The *Homer* only missed the stern of the enemy by 3 feet, then turned and made for the Owers Light ship. She was pursued by the submarine which fired a torpedo which passed close by the side of the tug. Captain Gibson brought

his ship triumphantly into Bembridge Roads with seven bullet holes in her, and her tow, the *General de Sonis*, was picked up by the Dover tug *Lady Crundall* and anchored in the Downs.

About the same date the British s.s. *Serula* was attacked on a voyage from Manchester to Amsterdam by German sea-planes which attempted to drop bombs on her; by skilful manœuvring of the steamer these were avoided, although several dropped close alongside into the sea. Captain John Richard Green of the s.s. *Vosges* was granted a commission as Lieutenant in the Royal Naval Reserve, and the King was pleased to award him the Distinguished Service Cross in recognition of his gallant and resolute conduct when the vessel was attacked by a German submarine on March 27. The Admiralty also expressed their high appreciation of the gallant behaviour of the officers and crew during the attack, and presented the officers with gold watches and each member of the crew with £3. The widow of the late Chief Engineer Harry Davies was presented with the gold watch that would have been presented to him. From 10.15 A.M. till 11.45 A.M. the *Vosges* was chased by the submarine, which kept up a continuous fire on her. The funnel was riddled, the bridge-house smashed, the engine-room badly holed. The chief engineer was killed near the stokehold while encouraging the firemen and volunteers to further exertions; the second mate was hit in the arm while on the bridge; one fireman was hit in the wrist, and the mess-room boy in the leg; the mate was slightly wounded in the hand, and splinters also grazed the hand of the captain. The *Vosges* made off towards Milford, intending to put in and report there, but water was gaining rapidly on the pumps, and at about 12.30 P.M. H.M.S. — was sighted. The *Vosges* was now sinking, and after all hands had been transferred to the —, she sank at 2 P.M. The survivors were taken into Newquay by the —.

Towards the end of April, as already

stated, the armed German merchant vessel *Kronprinz Wilhelm* was interned at Newport News. The total number of British ships sunk by her was 13, and their value, together with their cargoes, was estimated at £1,165,000. The following figures concerning the raiders were given by the *Times*. First place is taken by the *Emden*, which sank 17 vessels representing £2,211,000. Next comes the *Karlsruhe*, responsible for the sinking of 17 steamers representing £1,662,000. She worked off the coast of Argentina and Brazil, and caused, apart from actual loss, a certain amount of uneasiness in the South American trade. The *Emden*, as is known, was responsible for temporary cessation of trade between Calcutta and Europe. The *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, interned in U.S.A., took fourth place with 11 vessels representing £885,000. It was the *Eitel Friedrich* that sank the American sailing ship *William P. Frye*, owned in the United States. Fifth place as regards values was taken by the *Königsberg*, which only sank one steamer. That was the Ellerman liner *City of Winchester*, representing a value, with her cargo of Indian tea, of about £275,000. The *Dresden* came sixth with 3 steamers and 2 sailing ships sunk, value about £275,000. Seventh and last came the *Leipzig*, which sank 3 steamers, value £235,000. The total catch of these seven cruisers was 67 vessels sunk, representing £6,691,000.


Commenting on this, a writer in the *Times* says: "At first sight a total of £6,691,000 may seem a fairly large sum. In reality it is, in proportion to the total value of ships and cargoes afloat since the outbreak of war, a trifling sum. During the first eight months of the war the total value of imports into the ports of the United Kingdom was nearly £471,000,000, and that of exports £265,000,000. The total value of imports and exports of merchandise through the ports of the United Kingdom was thus nearly £736,000,000. . . Figures such as the above show the work of the German cruisers in its real proportion. Individually there

have been cases of hardship to both merchants and shipowners, but as a whole the result has been extraordinarily favourable to us. It has been infinitely more favourable than shipowners and underwriters anticipated during the early days of the war."

We must not lose sight of the fact in considering our losses by sea, both on account of raiding cruisers and by the operations of German submarines, that all, almost without exception, were totally contrary to the accepted international law on this subject. And we must also not forget that in her desperate anxiety to starve England by

March 13. Also in March two Dutch steamers, the *Batavier V.* and the *Zaanstroom*, were seized on the 18th and carried into Zeebrugge. The *Zevenbergen* was attacked by an aircraft which discharged bombs at her, and the *Mecklenberg* was fired upon by an armed trawler. The Dutch steamer *Medea* was destroyed off Beachy Head by a submarine, as were also the Norwegian barque *Nor* and the Portuguese sailing ship *Douro*.

The growth in size, sea-going efficiency, speed, and radius of action of the German submarine was commented upon at a meet-



AN EARLY GERMAN SUBMARINE (1905).

preventing her oversea commerce, Germany did not hesitate to sink neutral ships at sight. In the month which we have been considering the Dutch steamer *Katwyck* was torpedoed off the North Hinder Lightship without warning; also the four Ymuiden trawlers, *Nicolaas*, *Een*, *Twee*, and *Rynland*, were seized by German warships and taken into Cuxhaven; also the Greek steamer *Ellis-pontos* was sunk off the North Hinder. The case of the Norwegian steamer *Belridge* which was attacked off Folkestone has already been mentioned. Another Norwegian, the *Regin*, was sunk at anchor. A Swede named the *Hanna* was sunk off Flamborough Head with a loss of six lives on

ing of the French Society of Civil Engineers held on March 26, 1915, by M. Laubeuf, who is one of the highest authorities on the submarine living, and his remarks were reproduced in the English journal, *Engineering*. The first German submarine was launched—as U1—at the Germania Yard on August 30, 1905. The displacement on the surface of this craft is 185 tons and 240 tons when submerged; her length is 128 feet 3 inches; beam, 11 feet 10 inches; draught, 9 feet 2 inches; oil fuel surface engines, 400 h.p.; electric under-water engines, 240 h.p.; maximum speed on surface 11 knots, submerged 8 knots; radius of action on surface, 1200 miles at 9 knots, submerged 50 miles

at 9 knots; armament, one torpedo tube, three 17.7-inch torpedoes. U2 to U8 were slightly larger—237-300 tons—armed with two tubes and four 17.7-inch torpedoes. U9 to U12 were slightly larger again; while U13 to U20 jumped to 450-550 tons, with two or three tubes and four or six torpedoes. U21 to U32 increased to 650-800 tons, with a radius of action of 1500 miles at 12 knots and a speed of, surface 16, and submerged 10 knots. This class carry eight 19.6-inch torpedoes and two 3.5-inch guns. U33 to U38 are slightly larger and have a speed of 17 knots on the surface developing 2500 h.p. as against 1800 h.p. of U31-32. U33 to U38 were built and ready in 1913, Germany therefore starting the war with 38 of these boats. Her programme was to form by 1917 a flotilla of 72 boats. That number must have been very greatly exceeded during the course of the war, as perpetual replacement of submarine units had to take place owing to the activities of the British Navy in their destruction, as well as the toll taken by enemy merchant ships, and those lost by the inexperience of their crews, and from other causes. As the war progressed and the under-water craft improved in design they were fitted for mine-laying.

On April 28 the following communiqué was issued in Paris by the French Minister of Marine: "The armoured cruiser *Léon Gambetta*, while cruising at the entrance to the Otranto Straits, was torpedoed on the night of April 26-27 and sank in ten minutes. All the officers perished at their posts. One hundred and thirty-six of the crew, eleven of whom were petty officers, were saved by ships sent to the rescue by the Italian authorities."

This ship, an obsolescent type of armoured cruiser, was torpedoed some twenty miles from the Italian coast, and was, at the time, only proceeding at a rate of 7 knots. At 1 A.M. she was struck by a torpedo forward, and this was immediately followed by another, which hit her abreast the engine-room. She was headed for the shore, but she could no longer steam, and foundered

in ten minutes. The ship herself, a cruiser of 12,416 tons, was thirteen years old, with an armament of four 7.6-inch and sixteen 6.4-inch guns, and her loss was not so much to be mourned as that of Rear-Admiral Sénés, all his officers, and about five-sixths of her crew. She was the second large ship—the other being our own *Formidable*—torpedoed on a moonlight night while proceeding at a very low rate of speed.

On May 1 the Secretary of the Admiralty made the following announcement: "H.M. ships *Barbados* (Lieutenant Sir James Domville, Bart., R.N.), *Columbia* (Lieutenant-Commander Walter H. Hawthorn, R.N.R.), *Miura* (Sub-Lieutenant Kersley, R.N.R.), and *Chersit* (Sub-Lieutenant Stapleford, R.N.R.) were attacked on May 1 by two German torpedo boats. The engagement lasted about a quarter of an hour, when the enemy broke off the action. The direction of the retreat was shortly afterwards communicated to British destroyers, which followed and destroyed the torpedo boats. The *Columbia*, however, was sunk with the loss of 16 officers and men, only 1 man—a deck hand—being saved. Her commanding officer, Lieutenant-Commander Walter H. Hawthorn, R.N.R., had displayed gallantry and good seamanship on many occasions. Lieutenant Sir James Domville, *Barbados*, remained at the wheel after the skipper was wounded, personally worked the helm, and generally handled his ship in a seamanlike manner under heavy fire, to avoid being torpedoed. He also took effective measures to call the attention of H.M.S. *Leonidas*, in order to convey to her the information which led to the subsequent destruction of the enemy vessels. Petty-Officer 1st Class Arthur H. Hallett, *Barbados*, distinguished himself by the rapid and effective fire of his gun."

This was a singularly gallant affair on the part of Sir James Domville and Petty-Officer Hallett. Domville at the wheel had the wheel-house absolutely riddled with shot, none of which mercifully took effect upon him. Hallett, who was serving the 3-pounder

—the *Barbados*, be it observed, being a steam trawler with an outside speed of 7 knots—put a shot into the engine-room of one of the German boats as she circled round the *Barbados* at 30 knots. There was still another German 30-knotter with which to reckon, and Domville determined that one at least should not escape him. He swung his ridiculous fighting ship round on her heel, pointed her for the broadside of the disabled German, and at the terrific speed of 7 knots did he steam straight for her. Had he hit her, both vessels would in all probability have gone to the bottom together. As it was, the uninjured torpedo boat slid alongside her consort, took her in tow, leaving *Barbados* no chance to follow and wreak vengeance on those who had sunk *Columbia*. The torpedo boats, however, were chased and come up with by the destroyers *Laforey*, *Leonidas*, *Lawford*, and *Lark*, who sank them both without any casualties to themselves. Two German officers and 44 men were rescued from the sea and made prisoners of war.

It is well here to mark a contrast between British and German sailors, told in the dry, unemotional language of the Government Press Bureau.

"*London, Monday.*—After the destroyer action on Saturday afternoon strenuous efforts were made to rescue the German sailors, Lieutenant Hartnoll going into the water himself to save a German. In consequence 2 officers and 44 men out of a total of 59 were picked up. The German prisoners stated that they had sunk a British trawler before being sighted by the *Laforey*, and that they picked up a 'two-striped officer,' i.e. a lieutenant, and 2 men. When asked what had become of them, they stated that their prisoners were below at the time and the time was short. It must therefore be concluded that the officer and two men have perished. There could be no other conclusion at which to arrive; and the plain English of it was that these German fiends had deliberately left these enemies of theirs secured down below and purposely allowed

them to sink with their ship, from which they were rescued at the peril of life by their English captors."

On May 28 the following most important announcement appeared in the papers: "The King has approved of the appointment of Admiral Sir Henry Jackson, K.C.V.O., F.R.S., to be First Sea Lord of the Admiralty in the place of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone. Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur K. Wilson, O.M., G.C.V.O., V.C., will remain associated with the Board of Admiralty in an advisory capacity."

Admiral Sir Henry Jackson is known throughout all the service as its foremost scientific officer. He has been responsible for the introduction of wireless telegraphy into the Navy, and its application to the needs of the fighting seaman. He was, while Controller of the Navy, responsible, in company with three other captains (which was the rank he then held) for the construction and introduction into the service of the *Dreadnought*—our first all-big-gun battleship—and the *Invincible*—our first battle cruiser, his coadjutors on this occasion being Captains Jellicoe, Madden, and Bacon. The naval correspondent of the *Times* in writing of him says:

"In the year 1896, in which he was promoted captain, he met Mr. Marconi, and from this date until appointed naval attaché in Paris early in 1897, the two inventors were in close touch, mutually assisting one another in developing their ideas and schemes. Sir Henry Jackson remained responsible for the progress of wireless telegraphy in the Navy until 1906, on October 18 of which year he became a Rear-Admiral. During these years his appointments had been such as to facilitate the experiments and research work which he pursued. Sir Henry has been chief of the war staff at the Admiralty and Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean in succession to Sir Berkeley Milne."

On May 27 there occurred a terrible and mysterious explosion in Sheerness harbour, whereby the *Princess Irene* was totally

destroyed. This ship, which had been taken over by the Admiralty, was one of the newest of the Canadian Pacific Company's passenger liners. She was a twin-screw vessel of 6000 tons built by Denny of Dumbarton, was fitted for oil fuel and driven by four steam turbines. She carried a crew of some 300 men, all of whom save one lost their lives, in addition to some 70 or 80 workmen from Sheerness Dockyard, who were on board at the time. An officer who was on board a ship quite close to the *Princess Irene* gave a very clear description of what happened. He said he was on the Sheerness side of the vessel, and, as the wind was blowing strongly in the opposite direction, he was able to see the great explosion without being involved in it. He said that the noise of the explosion at close quarters was the most extraordinary experience of his life. The *Princess Irene* seemed to be hurled into the air a mile high in ten thousand fragments, and he could distinctly make out the forms of men amidst the flying wreckage and the great cloud of smoke. The end of the vessel was appallingly sudden and complete. "She did not go down" (said the officer), "she simply went up and distributed her remains over an area of a score of miles. When I came back a little later in my vessel, and sailed near the spot where the explosion had occurred, there was nothing, except a portion of a mast, to mark the place where the *Princess Irene* had been berthed. I found the Medway, however, spotted with spars and pieces of wreckage and furniture, little bits of human bodies, and other evidences of the completeness of the calamity. The skipper of a passing vessel told me he had two men on board injured and unconscious." Other witnesses of the catastrophe likened it to that of a volcanic explosion. No light was ever thrown on the cause of this appalling accident. Fortunately no other vessels were involved, though two barges that were alongside at the time were destroyed.

During April and May there was much activity at the Dardanelles. The following is a diary of what occurred :

April 5.—French contingent reviewed by Sir Ian Hamilton.

April 8.—Enos bombarded.

April 15.—Russians bombard Black Sea coal depots.

April 17.—E15 stranded and lost off Kephez Point. Turkish destroyer run ashore at Chios after attacking *Manitou*.

April 18.—E15 blown up by picket boats of the Fleet.

April 25.—Landing of the armies on both shores ; combined attack by sea and land.

April 26.—Sedd-el-Bahr taken.

April 27.—Two miles' advance from the point of the peninsula.

April 28.—Astride the peninsula ; Australians at Sari Bar.

April 29.—E14 sinks transport in Sea of Marmora ; Russians bombard Bosphorus Forts.

April 30.—Submarine AE2 sunk in attempt to enter Sea of Marmora.

May 3.—E14 sinks Turkish gunboat in Sea of Marmora.

May 6.—Allies reinforced ; great three days' battle at Krithia begun.

May 7.—Achi Baba heights attacked.

May 8.—Battle ends, slight gain of ground.

May 13.—E14 drives steamer ashore near Rodosto.

May 18.—E14 returns from Sea of Marmora.

May 19.—Allied advance in Southern Peninsula. Australians inflict 7000 casualties on Turks.

May 21.—Death of General Bridges announced.

May 22.—Attack on Indian contingent repulsed.

May 23.—Truce granted to Turks for burial of dead.

May 25.—H.M.S. *Triumph* torpedoed.


May 27.—H.M.S. *Majestic* torpedoed. E11 reported in Sea of Marmora, and to have attacked Turkish ships off Constantinople Arsenal.

May 28.—Turkish night attacks repulsed in the Peninsula.

The chronicles of the sea war are bound to

include such amphibious expeditions as that to the Dardanelles and the Gallipoli Peninsula. That it may be written down as the greatest military failure and rebuff ever experienced by our country, there can be none to deny. Failure to obtain the objective in war is always humiliating; but in this case no stigma can ever rest on the sailors and soldiers, from whatever corner of the Empire they may have hailed, in this titanic but abortive attempt. Neither can it be said that this diversion of strength from the main theatre of war was altogether

Tempting as it is to stray from the track of naval records pure and simple and to set beside them those of that splendid land force who dared so much and died so hard, yet this temptation must be avoided as outside the scope and limit of this book. The deeds of sailor and of soldier in this campaign were interdependent, the one formed the complement of the other, they were great in attack, greater in sheer doggedness of holding on, greatest, perhaps, in the final act when delusive hope had been swallowed up in disappointment. What they endured they



BOMBARDING THE DARDANELLES.

without effect on the fortunes of the Allies. Once Turkey came down on the side of the Germanic Powers it was quite certain that every man, horse, and gun belonging to the Mahommedan nation would be forced to pull their pound, and the strength of that pull was a good deal more than doubled, when to the magnificent courage and fighting value of the Turkish soldier was added the scientific knowledge of the modern German officer. But although we miscalculated and blundered, on a scale great even for England, we kept in play the finest army that the Turks could put into the field, thereby easing the burden of our Russian Allies and also causing dissipation of effort to our principal antagonist.

alone know; but we, who can only make the dimmest of guesses, can assure them that to no men who here went forward in the cause of country and empire do we feel a greater gratitude, a more abiding admiration. As far as the Navy was concerned the despatch of Vice-Admiral de Robeck tells us clearly and succinctly what happened on April 25 and 26, "during which period the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force was landed and firmly established in the Gallipoli Peninsula."

The landing at Gaba Tepe was carried out under the orders of Rear-Admiral C. F. Thursby, who approached the land having with his flag:

Battleships.
Queen
London
Prince of Wales
Triumph
Majestic

Cruiser.
Bacchante

Destroyers.
Beagle
Bulldog
Foxhound
Scourge
Colne
Uak
Chelmer
Ribble

Seaplane Carrier.
Ark Royal

Balloon Ship.
Manica

Trawlers.
15

To *Queen*, *Prince of Wales*, and *London* was delegated the duty of actually landing the troops, to *Triumph*, *Majestic*, and *Bacchante* the duty of covering the landing by gun-fire. The Admiral reports that the beach was very narrow and continuously under shell-fire, therefore the actual landing and the evacuation of the wounded had to be carried on at the same time. Much praise is here given to the extraordinary dash and gallantry of the 3rd Australian infantry brigade, under Colonel Sinclair Morgan, also to the personnel of the Navy here employed. On the 26th our position north of Gaba Tepe was secure. The landing at the southern end of the Peninsula was carried out under the orders of Rear-Admiral R. E. Wemyss, his squadron consisting of the following ships :

Battleships.
Swiftsure
Implacable
Cornwallis
Albion
Vengeance

Lord Nelson
Prince George

Cruiser.
Euryalus

Fleet Sweepers.
6

Trawlers.
14

Landings in this area were to be attempted at five different places ; the conditions at each varied considerably. At " Y " beach the Scottish Borderers landed from *Amethyst*, *Sapphire*, and transports *Southland* and *Braemar Castle*. They were landed at 5 A.M. under cover of fire from *Goliath*. The troops gained the top of the high cliff surmounting this beach without being opposed. Next came the Plymouth battalion of the Royal Marines. These troops met with severe opposition on the top of the cliffs, where fire from covering ships was of little assistance, and had to be re-embarked in *Talbot*, *Goliath*, *Dublin*, *Sapphire*, and *Amethyst*. At " X " beach the 2nd battalion Royal Fusiliers were landed from *Implacable*. The nature of the beach was very favourable for the covering fire from ships, but, continues the despatch, the manner in which this landing was carried out might well serve as a model. The story

of the landing on " W " beach is one that does the greatest credit both to the 1st battalion Lancashire Fusiliers, who stormed with the bayonet an almost impossible position, and the beach personnel of the Royal Navy, who continued to land troops and stores as imperturbably as if they were not being decimated by the fire of the enemy. The landing on " V " beach is best told in the words of the despatch itself ; it runs as follows :

LANDING AT " V " BEACH

" This beach, it was anticipated, would be the most difficult to capture ; it possessed all the advantages for defence which ' W ' beach had, and in addition the flanks were strongly guarded by the old castle and village of Sedd-el-Bahr on the east and perpendicular cliffs on the west ; the whole foreshore was covered with barbed-wire entanglements which extended in places under the sea. The position formed a natural amphitheatre with the beach as stage.

" The first landing here, as at all other places, was made in boats, but the experiment was tried of landing the remainder of the covering force by means of a collier, the *River Clyde*. This steamer had been specially prepared for the occasion under the directions of Commander Edward Unwin ; large ports had been cut in her sides and gangways built whereby the troops could reach the lighters which were to form a bridge on to the beach.

" ' V ' beach was subjected to a heavy bombardment similarly to ' W ' beach, with the same result, i.e. when the first trip attempted to land they were met with a murderous fire from rifle, pom-pom, and machine-gun, which was not opened till the boats had cast off from the steamboats.

" A landing on the flanks here was impossible, and practically all the first trip were either killed or wounded, a few managing to find some slight shelter under a bank on the beach ; in several boats all were either killed or wounded ; one boat entirely disappeared, and in another there were only two survivors.

Immediately after the boats had reached the beach the *River Clyde* was run ashore under a heavy fire rather towards the eastern end of the beach, where she could form a convenient breakwater during future landing of stores, etc.

"As the *River Clyde* grounded, the lighters which were to form the bridge to the shore were run out ahead of the collier, but unfortunately they failed to reach their proper stations and a gap was left between two lighters over which it was impossible for men to cross; some attempted to land by jumping from the lighter which was in position into the sea and wading ashore; this method proved too costly, the lighter being soon heaped with dead, and the disembarkation was ordered to cease.

"The troops in the *River Clyde* were protected from rifle and machine-gun fire and were in comparative safety.

"Commander Unwin, seeing how things were going, left the *River Clyde* and, standing up to his waist in water under a very heavy fire, got the lighters into position; he was assisted in this work by Midshipman G. L. Drewry, R.N.R., of H.M.S. *Hussar*; Midshipman W. St. A. Malleson, R.N., of H.M.S. *Cornwallis*; Able Seaman W. C. Williams, O.N. 186774 (R.F.R. B.3766), and Seaman R.N.R. George McKenzie Samson, O.N. 2408A, both of H.M.S. *Hussar*.

"The bridge to the shore, though now passable, could not be used by the troops, any one appearing on it being instantly shot down, and the men in *River Clyde* remained in her till nightfall.

"At 9.50 A.M. *Albion* sent in launch and pinnace manned by volunteer crews to assist in completing bridge, which did not quite reach beach; these boats, however, could not be got into position until dark owing to heavy fire.

"It had already been decided not to continue to disembark on 'V' beach, and all other troops intended for this beach were diverted to 'W.'

"The position remained unchanged on 'V' beach throughout the day, men-of-war and

the Maxims mounted in *River Clyde* doing their utmost to keep down the fire directed on the men under partial shelter on the beach.

"During this period many heroic deeds were performed in rescuing wounded men in the water.

"During the night of the 25th-26th the troops in *River Clyde* were able to disembark under cover of darkness and obtain some shelter on the beach and in the village of Sedd-el-Bahr, for possession of which now commenced a most stubborn fight.

"The fight continued, supported ably by gun-fire from H.M.S. *Albion*, until 1.24 P.M., when our troops had gained a position from which they assaulted hill 141, which dominated the situation. *Albion* then ceased fire, and the hill, with old fort on top, was most gallantly stormed by the troops, led by Lieutenant-Colonel C. H. H. Doughty-Wylie, General Staff, who fell as the position was won. The taking of this hill effectively cleared the enemy from the neighbourhood of the 'V' beach, which could now be used for the disembarkation of the allied armies. The capture of this beach called for a display of the utmost gallantry and perseverance from the officers and men of both services—that they successfully accomplished their task bordered on the miraculous."

The following officers and men were awarded the Victoria Cross by His Majesty the King:

"Commander EDWARD UNWIN, R.N.—While in *River Clyde*, observing that the lighters which were to form the bridge to the shore had broken adrift, Commander Unwin left the ship and under a murderous fire attempted to get the lighters into position. He worked on until, suffering from the effects of cold and immersion, he was obliged to return to the ship, where he was wrapped up in blankets. Having in some degree recovered, he returned to his work against the doctor's order and completed it. He was later again attended by the doctor for three abrasions caused by bullets, after which he once more left the ship, this time in a lifeboat, to save some wounded men who were lying in shallow water near the beach. He continued

at this heroic labour under continuous fire, until forced to stop through pure physical exhaustion.

"Midshipman GEORGE L. DREWRY, R.N.R., assisted Commander Unwin at the work of securing the lighters under heavy rifle and Maxim fire. He was wounded in the head, but continued his work and twice subsequently attempted to swim from lighter to lighter with a line.

"Midshipman WILFRED ST. A. MALLESON, R.N., also assisted Commander Unwin, and after Midshipman Drewry had failed from exhaustion to get a line from lighter to lighter, he swam with it himself and succeeded. The line subsequently broke, and he afterwards made two further but unsuccessful attempts at his self-imposed task.

"Able Seaman WILLIAM CHARLES WILLIAMS, O.N. 186774 (R.F.R. B.3766), held on to a line

in the water for over an hour under heavy fire, until killed.

"Seaman R.N.R. GEORGE MCKENZIE SAMSON, O.N. 2408A, worked on a lighter all day under fire, attending wounded and getting out lines; he was eventually dangerously wounded by Maxim fire.

"Lieutenant JOHN A. V. MORSE, R.N., assisted to secure the lighters at the bows of the *River Clyde* under a heavy fire, and was very active throughout the 25th and 26th at 'V' beach.

"Surgeon P. B. KELLY, R.N., attached to R.N.A.S., was wounded in the foot on the morning of the 25th in *River Clyde*. He remained in *River Clyde* until morning of 27th, during which time he attended 750 wounded men, although in great pain and unable to walk during the last twenty-four hours."

CHAPTER XIV

Dardanelles (*continued*)—King's message—Woodgate of the *Koorah*—How the battleships towed the boats into action—The landing on the beaches—The bombardment of April 27—Loss of the *Goliath*—E14: Commander Boyle's V.C.—Loss of the *Triumph*—Loss of the *Majestic*—E11: Lieutenant-Commander Nasmyth's V.C.—Germany's crowning deed of shame, the sinking of the *Lusitania*.

THE following message from His Majesty the King was sent to Vice-Admiral de Robeck and General Sir Ian Hamilton: "It is with intense satisfaction that I have heard of the success which in face of determined resistance has attended the combined naval and military operations in the Dardanelles. Please convey to all ranks, including those of our Allies, my hearty congratulations on this splendid achievement."

Following on the landing in the Gallipoli Peninsula the War Office and the Admiralty issued the following announcement: "After a day's hard fighting in difficult country the troops landed on the Gallipoli Peninsula are thoroughly making good their footing with the effective help of the Navy. The French have taken 500 prisoners."

The following telegram was officially published in Cairo: "The Allied forces under Sir Ian Hamilton have effected a landing on

both sides of the Dardanelles under excellent conditions; many prisoners taken and our forces are continuing their advance."

It was reported at the time that the casualties to the army had been necessarily heavy; the casualties to the fleet, however, were not numerous, and appear to have been confined to the destroyers and to the boats' crews engaged in landing operations, in which the merchant captains, officers, and crews of the transports took part. The British merchant seaman—as has been usual in the course of all our wars—proved here that where there was fighting to be done he was determined to have his share; and it is well that we should also notice the part that was taken by the mine-sweepers. These craft were perpetually under fire, and how they escaped being sunk to a ship is a mystery to those engaged in them and to those who observed their work. One trawler

was struck by a shell which went through the bunkers and the fish-room, cutting the main stanchion and out through the bow. On the night of the great attack on the Dardanelles, Captain Woodgate of the *Koorah* heard an explosion, and knew that one of his fellow mine-sweepers had been blown up. Under a heavy fire he turned his ship, and rescued the men of the lost trawler. The fire was exceedingly severe, but he succeeded in his gallant enterprise, although one of his boats was smashed to atoms by a shell. At the bombardment of Smyrna the trawler *G. M.* (skipper, Harry James) of Milford Haven, the *Beatrice* and *Achilles* of Grimsby went into action with the Fleet, and were very much surprised to find themselves afloat at the end of the day.

As an operation of war the landing on the Gallipoli beaches was one of the most difficult ever undertaken in warfare. It required meticulous organisation and absolute co-operation between the different ships, timed to a fraction, if it were to have even a semblance of success.

To give some idea of the difficulties encountered and the manner in which they were overcome, the following passage from the report of one who was present by permission of the Government, representing several British newspapers, is here reproduced: "This battleship belongs to the division which will consist of the Australians who are to land near Gaba Tepe. . . . We passed down through the long line of slowly moving transports amidst tremendous cheering, and were played out of the Bay by the French warships. No sight could have been finer than this spectacle of long lines of warships and transports, each making for a special rendezvous without any delay or confusion. At four o'clock this afternoon the ship's company and the troops were assembled on the quarter-deck to hear the Captain read out Admiral de Robeck's proclamation to the combined forces. This was followed by a last service before battle, in which the Chaplain uttered a prayer for victory and called for the Divine blessing on

the expedition, while the whole of the ship's company and the troops on board stood with uncovered and bowed heads. We are steaming through this momentous night slowly towards the coast, and are due at our rendezvous at 3 A.M. to-morrow—Sunday—a day that has so often brought victory to the British flag. Slowly through the night of April 24 our squadron, which was to land the covering force of the Australian contingent just north of Gaba Tepe, steamed towards its destination. The troops on board were the guests of the crews, and our generous sailors entertained them royally. At dusk all lights were extinguished, and very shortly afterwards the troops retired for a last rest before their ordeal at dawn. It was a beautiful night lit up by a very bright half-moon, and the sea was absolutely calm.

"A visit to the mess-decks showed those Australians—the majority of whom were about to go into action for the first time under the most trying circumstances which require that 'four o'clock in the morning courage'—to be cheerful, quiet, and confident. There was no sign of nerves, of undue excitement, such as one might very reasonably have expected. At 1.20 A.M. the signal was given from the flagship to lower the boats, which had been left swinging from the davits throughout the night. Our steam pinnaces were also lowered to take them in tow. The troops took up their assigned places on the quarter-deck, and the last rays of the waning moon lit up a scene which will ever be memorable in our history. On the quarter-deck, backed by the great 12-inch guns, this splendid body of Colonial troops were drawn up in serried ranks, fully equipped, and received their last instructions from their officers, who six months ago, like their men, were leading a peaceful civilian life in Australia and New Zealand, five thousand miles away. Now at the call of the Empire they were about to disembark on a strange unknown shore in a strange land, and attack an enemy of a different race.

"By the side of the soldiers were the

beach parties of our splendid bluejackets and marines, arrayed in their old white uniforms dyed khaki colour, and carrying the old rifle and the old equipment. These men were to take charge of the boats, steer them ashore, and row them to the beach, when they were finally cast off by the towing pinnaces. Each boat was in charge of a young midshipman, many of whom had come straight from Dartmouth after a couple of terms, and now found themselves called upon to play a most difficult and dangerous role like men. Of the splendid conduct and courage of these youths I shall have much to say later, but it was a strange contrast to see these youthful figures, clad in every kind of garment which could be scraped together for shore work, and carrying revolvers which appeared almost as big as themselves, standing side by side in the dim light with these giants from Australia. Commanders, lieutenants, and special beach officers had charge of the whole of the towing parties, and went ashore with the troops.

"At 2.5 A.M. the signal was given for the troops to embark in the boats which were lying alongside, and this was carried out with great rapidity in absolute silence, and without a hitch or accident of any kind. Each one of the three ships which had embarked troops transferred them to boats towed by a steam pinnace, and in this manner the men of the covering force were conveyed to the shore. More of the Australian Brigade were carried in destroyers which were to go close inshore and land them from boats as soon as those towed by the pinnaces had reached the beach.

"At 3 A.M. it was quite dark, and all was ready for a start. The tows were cast off by the battleships, and the ladders taken in, and the decks cleared for action, the crews going to general quarters (*i.e.* their stations for battle). Then we steamed slowly towards the shore, each of the battleships being closely followed by her tows, which looked exactly like huge snakes gliding relentlessly after their prey I do not

suppose the suppressed excitement of this last half-hour will ever be forgotten by those who were present. No one could tell at the last minute what would happen; would the enemy be surprised, or would he be ready on the alert to pour a terrible fire on the boats as they approached the beach? The operation had been timed to allow the pinnaces and boats to reach the beach just before daybreak, so that the Turks, if they had been forewarned, would not be able to see to fire before the Australians had obtained a firm footing and, it was hoped, good cover on the foreshore. Exactly at 4.10 A.M. the three battleships in line abreast (thus | | |), four cables (*i.e.* 800 yards) apart, arrived about 2500 yards from the shore, which was just discernible in the gloom.

"The engines were stopped, guns were manned, and the powerful searchlights made ready for use if required. The tows, which, up to this time, had followed astern, were ordered to advance to the shore. The battleships took up positions somewhat farther out on either flank, for to them was assigned the duty of supporting the attack with their guns as soon as light allowed. Very slowly the twelve snakes of boats steamed past the battleships, the gunwales almost flush with the water, so crowded were they with khaki figures. Then each lot edged in towards one another so as to reach the beach 4 cables apart. So anxious were we on board the battleships that it seemed as if the loads were too heavy for the pinnaces, or that some mysterious power was holding them back, and that they would never reach the shore before daybreak, and thus lose the chance of a surprise. The distance between the battleships and the boats did not seem to diminish, but only for the reason that we steamed very slowly in after them until the water gradually shallowed. . . .

"At 4.53 A.M. there suddenly came a very sharp burst of rifle-fire from the beach, and we knew our men were at last at grips with the enemy . . . all praise is due to the splendid conduct of the officers, midship-

men, and men who formed the beach parties, and whose duty it was to pass backwards and forwards under this terrible fusillade, which it was impossible to check in the early part of the day. The work of disembarking went on mechanically under this fire at almost point-blank range. You saw crowded boats cast off from the pinnaces, tugs, and destroyers, and laboriously pulled ashore by six or eight seamen. The moment it reached the beach the troops jumped out and doubled for cover to the foot of the bluffs over some forty yards of beach, but

volcanoes, the common shell throwing up great chunks of ground and masses of black smoke, whilst the shrapnel formed a white canopy above. Sections of ground were covered by each ship all round our front of trenches, and, the ranges being known, the shooting was excellent. Nevertheless, a great deal of the fire was of necessity indirect, and the ground affords such splendid cover that the Turks continued their advance in a most gallant manner, whilst their artillery not only plastered our positions on shore with shrapnel, but actually tried



LANDING ON THE BEACHES AT GALLIPOLI—LIKE GREAT SNAKES GLIDING TO THEIR PREY.

the gallant crews of the boats had then to pull them out under a dropping fire from a hundred points where the enemy marksmen lay hidden amidst the sand and shrubs.

"On April 27, when the Turkish infantry moved forward to the attack, they were met with every kind of shell which our warships carry, from 15-inch shrapnel from the *Queen Elizabeth*, each one of which contains twenty thousand bullets, to 12-inch, 6-inch, and 12-pounders. The noise, smoke, and concussion produced was unlike anything you can even imagine until you have seen it. The hills in front looked as if they had suddenly been transformed into smoking

to drive the ships off the coast by firing at them, whilst their desperate snipers, in place of a better target, tried to pick off officers and men on decks and bridges. We picked up many bullets on the deck afterwards. Some warship started to fire over the peninsula, but the *Triumph* dropped two 10-inch shells within a few yards of her, whereupon she retired up the Straits to a safer position."

The rest of this brilliant and most informing despatch is concerned with the movements of the troops on shore, with which here we have nothing to do. What the toll must have been of the Turkish dead and wounded we shall never know, the more

especially as, owing to the spotting work of the hydroplane as the struggle proceeded, our gunners became more and more expert in indirect fire. The Turks also took a hand in this form of bombardment, and frequently flung shell from guns of heavy calibre from their side of the peninsula. This shooting, however, was wild and ineffective, as it is obvious that a ship can never be hit by indirect fire, unless she is at anchor or remains stationary in the same spot. But the Turks, trusting, it is to be presumed, that Allah might aid them, were not daunted by their ill-success and continued to fire on the chance of bagging a stray transport. One ship in particular, which mounted heavy guns, was persistent in her attentions, and, as she generally began her practice in the earliest hours of the morning, and also as her shells in bursting were of a particularly noisy description, she earned from the sailors the name of the "Christians, arise."

In the House of Commons on May 13 the First Lord of the Admiralty, rising in his place, said that he regretted to have to inform the House that he had just heard from the Admiral at the Dardanelles that the battleship *Goliath* was torpedoed last night in a torpedo attack by destroyers when she was protecting the French flag just inside the Straits. "There are 20 officers and 160 men saved," added Mr. Churchill, "which I fear means that over 500 lives have been lost. The Admiral has also informed me that Submarine E14, which, with so much daring, entered the Sea of Marmora some time ago, has reported that she has sunk two Turkish gunboats and another large Turkish transport."

In the *London Gazette* appeared the following notice: "The King has approved of the grant of the Victoria Cross to Lieutenant-Commander Edward Courtney Boyle, R.N., for the following conspicuous act of bravery. For most conspicuous bravery in command of Submarine E14, when he dived his vessel under the enemy minefields and entered the Sea of Marmora on April 27. In spite of great navigational difficulties

from strong currents, of the continual neighbourhood of hostile patrols, and of the hourly danger of attack from the enemy, he continued to operate in the narrow waters of the Straits, and succeeded in sinking two Turkish gunboats and one large military transport. The King has further approved of the Distinguished Service Cross to Lieutenant Edward Geldard Stanley, R.N., and Acting-Lieutenant Reginald Wilfred Lawrence, R.N.R. Approval has also been given for the award of the Distinguished Service Medal to each member of the crew of E14."

The official announcement from the Admiralty, supplementing the brief statement made in the House of Commons by the First Lord, runs as follows: "A more detailed report has now been received of the recent operations of Submarine E14. On her passage to the Sea of Marmora she sank a Turkish gunboat of the Berk-i-Satvet class. In the Sea of Marmora she sank a transport on April 29, a gunboat on May 3, a very large transport full of troops on May 10, and on May 13 compelled a small steamer to run herself aground. The return journey was made on May 18. The Admiral at the Dardanelles states that it is impossible to do full justice to this great achievement, and that His Majesty the King's appreciation and reward for these services have, throughout the Allied Fleets, given universal satisfaction."

By the end of May the enemy had several submarines operating in the Eastern Mediterranean, and these craft were handled with great skill and determination by the officers in command. A great Fleet had been assembled at the Dardanelles by this time, and with it were numerous destroyers, the most deadly and dangerous foe of the submarine; and we have seen in a previous chapter with what assiduity all the waters around Mudros and the entrance to the Straits were watched. In spite of all their vigilance, however, the Secretary of the Admiralty had to report as follows on May 27: "The Secretary of the Admiralty

announces that while operating yesterday in support of the Australian and New Zealand Forces on the shore of the Gallipoli Peninsula His Majesty's ship *Triumph* (Captain Maurice Fitzmaurice, R.N.) was torpedoed by a submarine and sank shortly afterwards. The majority of the officers and men are reported as saved, including the captain and commander. The submarine was chased by the destroyers and patrolling small craft until dark." A telegram from Constantinople the following day stated that "there was a terrible explosion which turned the *Triumph* over on her side within a minute. Seven minutes later the ship turned turtle and was floating keel uppermost. After this she sank rapidly." This disaster was quickly followed by another, as on May 27 the Secretary of the Admiralty reported: "An enemy submarine torpedoed and sank H.M.S. *Majestic* (Captain H. F. G. Talbot) this morning while supporting the Army on the Gallipoli Peninsula. Nearly all the officers and men were saved."

The *Majestic* was the fifth capital ship lost at the Dardanelles, the others being *Triumph*, *Irresistible*, *Ocean*, and *Goliath*, while the *Bulwark* had been blown up at Sheerness and the *Formidable* sunk in the Channel. The French battleship *Bouvet* had also been sunk, and the *Gaulois*, damaged by gun-fire, had been beached.

Mr. Ashmead Bartlett, who was on board the *Majestic* when she was struck by the torpedo, wrote a most graphic account of the disaster. He records how the ship listed over, eventually capsized, and then sank, and that a sailor who was on the bottom of the ship ran her full length and perched himself on her ram, which remained sticking out of the water as her stern had fetched up and rested on a shoal. This man was eventually rescued by a boat without even having wetted himself. Captain Talbot, who remained on the bridge until he was actually thrown into the water, was picked up by a launch, then seeing two of his men in danger of drowning went overboard again and saved them both. A great deed of

which we should have known nothing in all probability if it had not been witnessed by Mr. Bartlett. Is there any man who uses the sea, or for the matter of that who does not, whose blood is not stirred when he reads such a story as this?

Writers of fiction in all ages have toiled laboriously after the truth. They will be put to a harder test than ever when we consider the exploits of our submarines in this war. We now come to another exploit of one of these craft. "The King has been graciously pleased to approve the grant of the Victoria Cross," runs the *Gazette* of May 27, "to Lieutenant-Commander Martin Eric Nasmyth, R.N., for conspicuous bravery specified below. For most conspicuous bravery in command of one of His Majesty's submarines while operating in the Sea of Marmora. In the face of great danger he succeeded in destroying one large Turkish gunboat, two transports, one ammunition ship, and three storeships, in addition to driving one storeship ashore. When he had safely passed the most difficult part of his homeward journey, he returned again to torpedo a Turkish transport. The King has further been graciously pleased to approve of the award of the Distinguished Service Cross to the officers of the same submarine: Lieutenant Guy D'Oyley-Hughes, R.N., and Acting-Lieutenant Robert Brown, R.N.R. Approval has also been given for the award of the Distinguished Service Medal to each member of the crew."


An Admiralty account of May 27 gave the submarine as *ERR*, and described one of the ships sunk as containing a great deal of ammunition, comprising charges for heavy howitzers, several gun-mountings, and a 6-inch gun. Submarine *ERR* entered Constantinople (170 miles from the Dardanelles entrance), where her appearance caused a great panic, and discharged a torpedo at a transport alongside the arsenal. One of the storeships with a heavy cargo was torpedoed alongside the pier at Rodosto on the Thracian coast, 98 miles from the Dardanelles entrance. In Constantinople itself people rushed about

shouting "The Russians are coming," and troops already on board transports were so—naturally—anxious to land, that they had to be prevented by their officers with drawn swords. Eventually, however, orders were given to disembark the troops.

No deed perpetrated by the Germans has stirred the depths of feeling in our country and Empire to the same extent as that which was rightly described at the time as "Germany's crowning deed of shame." On May 7, 1915, the famous Cunard liner *Lusitania*, carrying over 2000 persons, was torpedoed by a submarine off the south

weather was beautifully fine. A wireless message from the vessel was received at Queenstown at 2.15 P.M. asking for assistance, and immediately Rear-Admiral Sir Charles Coke despatched all the available tugs and steam trawlers to the scene. It was calculated that it would take most of them about two hours to reach the spot where the vessel was reported to have gone down.

On Saturday—the following day—at 12.55 A.M., the following message was received from the Admiral, Queenstown, by the Secretary of the Admiralty: "Survivors from *Lusitania* are being landed. Those wounded are



THE SINKING OF THE *LUSITANIA*.

coast of Ireland. She sank in about twenty minutes, and the death-roll of men, women, and children mounted to the appalling figure of 1200. The first news was received by the Cunard Company's headquarters at Liverpool in the following message from the Old Head of Kinsale: "*Lusitania* sunk by submarine at 2.33 P.M., eight miles south by west." The Company thereupon issued a brief statement as above, adding that there was no word of the passengers and crew. At 6.30 P.M. the officials of the Cunard Company in London announced that they had received information that sixteen of the ship's boats were engaged in the work of rescue, and that twenty boats from the adjacent coast were also on the scene. The

being sent to the naval and military hospitals. No names have yet been received. There are many hospital cases. Several have died. Also some have been landed at Kinsale. The number has not yet been received."

A warning was issued from the German Embassy in New York that the vessel was to be torpedoed, in the following words:

Notice.—Travellers intending to embark on an Atlantic voyage are reminded that a state of war exists between Germany and her Allies and Great Britain and her Allies, that the zone of war includes the waters adjacent to the British Isles, that in accordance with the formal notice given by the Imperial German Government, vessels flying the flag of Great Britain or any of her Allies are liable to destruction in those waters, and that travellers sailing in the war zone on ships of Great Britain and her Allies do so at their own risk.

IMPERIAL GERMAN EMBASSY, WASHINGTON,
April 22, 1915.


The Embassy officials, at the time, explained that they were acting in accordance with instructions from Berlin. Mr. Alfred Vanderbilt received a telegram which stated: "Have it on definite authority that the *Lusitania* is to be torpedoed. You had better cancel passage immediately." The action of the German Embassy caused some resentment in Washington, and was generally interpreted as a threat directed at the *Lusitania*. Indeed a German in America expressed himself confident that "we shall have her." "We did it to ease our conscience, lest harm should come to persons misinformed," was the explanation of the notice given by the German Embassy. The *Lusitania's* passengers, however, for the most part treated the threat derisively, confident in the belief that the Cunarder's great speed would make her safe from attack, and the vessel left New York on Saturday with a record number of passengers on board for the time of year, not a single booking having been cancelled.

The *Lusitania*, and her sister ship the *Mauretania*, were built in 1906-7 as an answer to the German liners which had then captured the records for speed across the Atlantic. The *Lusitania* was 762.2 feet long, 87.8 feet beam, and 56.6 feet deep; her tonnage was 33,000 and speed 27 knots. From noon Thursday March 12, 1914 to noon Friday the 13th she covered 618 knots, giving an average of 26.7 knots. This beat the previous record that up till then had been held by the *Mauretania*. Many American citizens were drowned in the *Lusitania*, but beyond an interminable correspondence no vengeance was ever taken by the United States for this wholesale massacre of these ill-fated people. Feeling in the United States undoubtedly ran very high on this subject, and the newspapers were full of sound and fury. That it signified nothing, however, the Germans were well aware; they had murdered Americans on the high seas before, and had expressed their profound contrition, with their tongues in their cheeks. A typical argument was cabled from Berlin to New York


by the notorious German-American correspondent, Karl von Wiegand: "We estimate," he said, "that approximately 100,000 soldiers have been killed by American shells and another 200,000 wounded, many of them maimed for life. Place that against 114 American lives lost, to our sorrow, in the *Lusitania* through a German torpedo directed against an enemy ship carrying millions of cartridges intended to find targets in the bodies of the defenders of the Fatherland, and you will understand the sentiment of the Army on the *Lusitania* case, and why that sentiment is against any compromise in the submarine war that would make ships carrying death for thousands of our men exempt from attacks by our submarines."

This statement contains one deliberate lie and a false inference. The lie, which was so sedulously propagated throughout Germany, was to the effect that the *Lusitania* was an armed vessel carrying munitions of war, the inference being that submarines only attacked ships that were laden with munitions of war. A curious story was published in the French paper *La Guerre Sociale* concerning the sinking of the *Lusitania*. The writer was said to be a German Socialist, and the letter from which it was taken would appear to have been communicated by an American propagandist to a journal representing American and Italian newspapers. It runs:

"The order to sink the *Lusitania* arrived on May 2 at Heligoland, where the German naval base is situated, and aroused the indignation of all the officers. More than one was beside himself. The order was, nevertheless, carried out by the U21, which left under the command of Lieutenant Hersing. The writer of the letter was on board his ship when Hersing returned from his expedition, and was able to take note of the contempt which all the officers manifested towards him. Without daring to lift his head he muttered, 'It went against me to act as I did act, but I could not do otherwise.' He was crying. He then told how



THE "EYES" OF THE SUBMARINE—THE PERISCOPE.
(Drawn by H. W. Koelkoek.)



THE PATH OF A SUBMARINE'S TORPEDO.
(Photo by Graphic Photo Union.)

none of his men knew the object of the voyage, and how several times he was on the point of letting them into the secret, in the hope of seeing the crew mutiny. Arrived at the spot where it was intended to surprise the *Lusitania*, the submarine had a long wait. At one moment the idea of making off entered the commander's head, but he found that another submarine had stopped a short distance away. The *Lusitania* meanwhile was approaching; she could not escape her doom. 'I saw people gathered on deck,' continued Hersing. 'The ship was crammed with human beings. I caused the submarine to plunge and the torpedo was discharged. I don't know whether it was this torpedo or the one discharged by the other submarine that struck the liner, but the latter's hull was ripped open. I tried to avoid witnessing the ghastly sight which followed, and made away from the torpedoed liner at full speed. Then I came to the surface. The sea was crowded with

struggling wretches. Even at that distance I could hear the shouts of the shipwrecked. I had become a man of stone, incapable of moving or giving an order.' "

If Germans were like the inhabitants of civilised countries this story would bear upon its face the stamp of truth. The reluctance to accept the order; the chivalrous indignation of the officers at being expected to perform such a butcherly deed, the communings with his conscience by Hersing, his half desire to tell his crew in the hope that they might mutiny and take the decision out of his hands—all these things are more than understandable in the case of civilised mankind. But with Germans and cannibals—no. Such people massacre for the love of bloodshed for its own sake, and it is greatly to be feared that Mons. Gustave Hervé, of *La Guerre Sociale*, has been taken in, and that all this is but the figment of the brain of "the American propagandist"

CHAPTER XV

Summing up in the *Lusitania* case—Attacks by submarines—Murder of fishermen—Loss of the *Manitou*—Loss by grounding of *E15*—Cutting-out expedition to destroy her—Reported additions to the German Fleet—German transport torpedoed—List of ships employed in Dardanelles—Many ships sunk by submarines—The position of America with regard to the submarine.

So important were the decisions arrived at by the Court which sat to inquire into the loss of the *Lusitania* that it is well here to reproduce the salient features of the finding of the Court. They ran:

That the loss of the ship and lives—by this time established at no less than 1198—was caused by torpedoes from a German submarine. That the act was done not merely with the intention of sinking the ship, but of the destruction of the lives of the people on board. That the German statements that the *Lusitania* was equipped with masked guns, that she was supplied with trained gunners, with special ammunition, that she was transporting Canadian troops and thereby violating the laws of the

United States were untrue and nothing but baseless inventions. "The German statements," said Lord Mersey, on behalf of the Court, "serve only to condemn the persons who make use of them. The steamer carried no masked guns, nor trained gunners, nor special ammunition, nor was she transporting troops or violating any laws of the United States. The whole blame for the cruel destruction of life in this catastrophe," said Lord Mersey, "must rest solely with those who plotted and with those who committed the crime. Captain Turner was fully advised as to the means which in the view of the Admiralty were best calculated to avert the perils he was likely to encounter, and in considering the question whether he is to

blame for the catastrophe in which his voyage ended I have to bear this circumstance in mind. It is certain that in some respects Captain Turner did not follow the advice given to him. It may be—though I seriously doubt it—that had he done so his ship would have reached Liverpool in safety. But the question remains, was his conduct the conduct of a negligent or of an incompetent man? On this question I have sought the guidance of my assessors, who have rendered me invaluable assistance, and the conclusion at which I have arrived is that blame ought not to be imputed to the Captain. The advice given to him, although meant for his most serious and careful consideration, was not intended to deprive him of the right to exercise his skilled judgment in the difficult questions that might arise from time to time in the navigation of his ship. His omission to follow the advice in all respects cannot fairly be attributed either to negligence or incompetence. He exercised his judgment for the best. It was the judgment of a skilled and experienced man, and although others might have acted differently and perhaps more successfully, he ought not in my opinion to be blamed. It was a murderous attack," concluded his Lordship, "because made with a deliberate and wholly unjustifiable intention of killing the people on board. German authorities on the laws of war at sea themselves establish beyond all doubt that, though in some cases the destruction of an enemy trader may be permissible, there is always an obligation first to secure the safety of the lives of those on board. The guilt of the persons concerned in the present case is confirmed by the vain excuses which have been put forward on their behalf by the German Government as before mentioned."

The sinking of the *Lusitania* was received with the utmost rapture throughout Germany. Any lingering doubts concerning the fact that the people of this empire were not behind their leaders in any atrocity that they choose to order and to commit could from this moment be banished. In

case, however, that there might still be some persons who retained a glimmering of decency and humanity in the masses of the people, resort was had to barefaced lying, not only by the endless articles that were written to gloat over the fact of the sinking of the ship, but also pictorial representations of her end, in which she was represented with guns mounted thickly all around her sides. As, for some inscrutable reason, which the inhabitants of our country cannot in the least understand, the German people are given to believing what their Government tells them, the lieges of the Kaiser settled down to the comfortable belief that if women and children were slain in their hundreds on board the *Lusitania*, as they undoubtedly were, then it was entirely the fault of these foolish people for travelling on board an armed liner which was carrying troops.

The *New York Tribune* caused an enquiry to be made to Sir Alfred Booth, chairman of the Cunard Company, in order to set this part of the question at rest in America. Sir Alfred made the following reply:

"*Lusitania* was not armed in any way. She was built in agreement with the British Government, under which she could be requisitioned for service as an armed cruiser. As a matter of fact she was never so used at any period of her career, and no guns of any description were ever put on board the ship. Any statement to the contrary, therefore, is entirely false, and is typical of the German method of covering up the wilful murdering of non-combatants and women and children."

The month of May was marked, in addition to the *Lusitania* crime, by attacks on fishing-boats by German submarines. On May 4 it was reported one or more U boats had appeared among the Grimsby fishing-fleet in the North Sea and done considerable damage. To the crew of one of the sunken vessels the captain of U14 boasted that he had destroyed £150,000 worth of fishing-vessels in under a week. Nine trawlers were sunk on this occasion—the *Hero*, *Iolanthe*, *Northward Ho*, *Rugby*, and *Bob White* of Hull, and the *Hector*, *Progress*,

Coquet, and *Uxbridge* of Grimsby. All the crews were saved and landed at Hull, Grimsby, or Hartlepool. They were sent away in their own boats with compasses and a supply of bread. There is something specially mean and repulsive in this cowardly warfare against fishermen, who in war-time have hitherto been permitted to pursue their useful and harmless calling in peace. The crews of the boats just mentioned, however, got off lightly, as in many cases the U boats took pleasure in using fishing-vessels as targets and murdering their crews. This

and a deck hand, named P. Rogers, went below to get some lifebelts. We waited in the boat in order to take them off, but the captain of the submarine waved us away, and as shells were still being fired at us, we had no alternative but to row away. Hanson and Rogers jumped overboard and were swimming towards us. I went round intending to pick them up, but the submarine again turned us away and refused to allow us to rescue the men. Men from the submarine boarded the *St. Lawrence* and placed bombs upon her deck, and with these the



A SHIPWRECKED CREW LANDING.

was what happened to the trawler *St. Lawrence*. The skipper said: "We were fishing about 11.30 A.M. when a number of shells were fired at us. We could not see the submarine. The shells kept flying, and half an hour later we saw a German submarine about two miles away approaching us. The firing continued, but still the trawler was not hit. I had given orders for full speed, but the submarine gradually got nearer, keeping up the firing. I estimate that about fifty shells were fired at us. A splinter struck me on the head, inflicting a scalp wound. It was evident the submarine was bent on sinking us. We got into the boat. The third hand, W. Hanson,

vessel was sunk. The two men were still swimming some distance away, and I made another effort to reach them, but both of them went down." Such is the tale of Skipper J. Hinds, a story so monstrous in its inhumanity as to be almost incredible, had there not been so many similar occurrences at sea once Germany started on her so-called "blockade."

The captain of this submarine apparently considered the bombardment of helpless and unarmed fishermen—who by no manner of means could hit back—to be a form of sport, and, as he did not succeed in sinking her by gun-fire he had the still greater gratification of shooting at the boat, and in this

manner preventing the rescue of the two helpless men in the water. It really requires an effort of the imagination to realise that the man who did this was an officer in the German Navy, presumably one in the position of a gentleman in his own country.

It was not, as every one knows, by any means an isolated case, and we can instance the Aberdeen trawler *Envoy*, which was shelled by a submarine off the East Coast under almost precisely similar circumstances, either on the same day or the day after. Captain Smalley of the *Envoy* said that the submarine was about a mile off when she began to shell his vessel, twenty-five shots being fired in rapid succession. The small boat was launched, and in it the men pulled away, but the submarine then transferred her attentions to the boat and fired at that. She wished to do murder. An hour after leaving the *Envoy* the boat was picked up by the Milford Haven trawler *Fuchsia*, and taken into Aberdeen.

An unfortunate affair happened in the Mediterranean in the third week in April. The transport *Manitou*, carrying British troops in the Aegean, was attacked by a Turkish destroyer, which fired three torpedoes at her. Most fortunately the Turks could not even hit an unarmed vessel which could offer no resistance. The Turk was flying Russian colours, and signalled the *Manitou* to stop. The transport obeyed, whereupon her assailant hauled down the Russian, hoisted the Turkish flag, and discharged a torpedo. The *Manitou* put on full speed in order to escape, but, as there seemed a slender chance of evading her antagonist, all the boats were hastily lowered and crammed with men. A second torpedo was fired, then a third, but these also missed, and by this time the Turkish destroyer became concerned for her own safety as the British cruiser *Minerva* appeared in sight, and the Turk made off, hotly pursued. Most unfortunately one of the boats of the *Manitou* capsized in the water, and another while being lowered, owing to the breaking of a davit. Twenty-four men were drowned ;

but the troopship escaped without any injury whatever. Another misfortune during the same week was the grounding of submarine E15 on Kephez Point in the Dardanelles, her crew being taken prisoners by the Turks. Immediately upon grounding, and after the removal of the crew, who were in no position to offer any effective resistance, the Turks started to try and salve the vessel. She was new, and would have formed a most valuable prize had they been able to float her again. Battleships accordingly bombarded her with long-range fire, but owing to her position were unable to score a hit.

Certain it is that there is no new thing under the sun. No imagination was so vivid as to foreshadow that in the sea war of the twentieth century there would occur a cutting-out expedition ; a thing of which the modern sailor had read in the pages of Mahan and of Marryat, but which he regarded as dead nowadays as "the white wings," hemp cables, or rigging turned in "cutter-stay fashion." Yet it happened, as so many other things have happened, which recall to us the brave days of the sailing line-of-battle ship, the frigate, and the barefoot, bare-sark seaman who handled the cutlass, the tomahawk, and the pistol, what time he cut the *Hermione* out from under a hundred-gun West-India Spanish fortress. On the night of April 18 the picket-boats of the *Triumph* and *Majestic*, both manned by volunteer crews, stood in and attacked the submarine that it was necessary to destroy. There is one thing at which the imagination stops short, and that is how the crews for this enterprise were chosen, when it is fairly certain that a whole battleship's crew (in the case of each unit from which the picket boats came), volunteered to a man—and more particularly to a boy. The expedition was commanded by Lieut.-Commander Eric Robertson, R.N., who was assisted by Lieutenant Arthur Brook-Webb, R.N.R., and Midshipman John Woolley.

The picket-boat of the *Majestic* was com-

manded by Lieutenant Claude Godwin, R.N. As the boats got within range they were subjected to a very heavy fire from Fort No. 8, which they had to pass at a range of a few hundred yards, and also as they came in closer to the shore from innumerable small guns. With the illuminated sea boiling with foam from the fire to which they were subjected, the picket-boats went straight for their objective; the picket-boat of the *Majestic* was holed and sunk, but a torpedo had been fired which had got home on ill-starred E15, rendering her useless for all time. Then the *Triumph's* boat turned and picked up their comrades and steamed out of action, the only casualty being one man, who died of his wounds. Vice-Admiral de Robeck spoke in the highest terms of all who were concerned in this gallant enterprise, and Lieutenant-Commander Eric Robertson was promoted Commander by the Admiralty, and a report was called for on the individual services of other officers and men with a view to their recognition.

It has, while the war has been in progress, been quite impossible to ascertain what the enemy was doing in the matter of new warship tonnage. When the war broke out all seamen were on the *qui vive* for reckless and extensive attacks by destroyers. These attacks, however, did not materialise, and sooth to say the German destroyer, when met with, did not by any means come up to the standard that we had been led to expect. On the other hand, the submarine which the German had formerly contemned, became the God of his idolatry. This class of craft was cheaply and swiftly built, and was extremely efficacious in sinking unarmed merchantmen. In this inglorious and piratical ship the proud German Navy specialised, thinking, as others have thought before to their own undoing, that by a *guerre de course* England, "the most hated enemy," would be brought to her knees. If the Germans are masters of anything surely they should be masters of war; and yet we find them following in the stony path of merchant-ship destruction, forgetting the precept of him

who, more than any foreigner, put them in the way of thinking of an invincible fleet. It was Mahan who said: "It is no good snapping at the heels, you must strike straight at the heart"; and a greater than Mahan, who gave it as a principle that "only numbers can annihilate." Germany could not annihilate the British Fleet, although if any one had listened to pre-war conversations among the sons of the Fatherland, and had read the pan-German newspapers, even that seemed to be a matter for the consideration of the very near future. But however this may have been, they unquestionably did think that with submarines they could hold up the mercantile marine and starve England until her people would cry out for peace. In the beginning of May 1915 it was reported from America that Germany, in addition to having completed a Dreadnought of 25,000 and a battle cruiser of 26,500 tons, with an armament of 18-inch guns, had also turned out twenty-four submarines from each of the following yards: Germania (Krupp), Vulcan, Howaldt, Blohm & Voss, and Schichau. These 120 submarines were each 1200 tons (on the surface it is to be presumed), with a surface speed of 20 knots, a submerged speed of 16, a steaming radius of 3000 miles, and armed with four torpedo tubes and two heavy quick-firing guns. In addition to these the Cockerill works near Liège were reported to have turned out twelve small submarines from 200 to 250 tons, in sections that could be moved by rail. It was also claimed that at some—unspecified—place, a further twelve submarines of 300 tons had been built. Our Navy and our Admiralty have not thought fit to inform the public, during the course of the war, how many enemy submarines have been sunk; neither have they divulged the means that have been adopted for their capture and destruction. No estimate even approximately correct can therefore be made of the numbers that have been dealt with from time to time. Undoubtedly efficacious as our means of disposing of the submarine have been, it is extremely doubtful that as

many as 144 submarines, large and small, had been built and commissioned by the enemy in May or June 1915. If this were actually the case, then the toll taken by our methods of destruction must have been terrible indeed.

On June 3 the Vice-Admiral at the Dardanelles reported that "one of the British submarines at present operating in the Sea of Marinora torpedoed a large German transport in Panderma Bay yesterday morning." Panderma is on the coast of Asiatic Turkey in the Sea of Marmora, and the Bay is the eastern water of the peninsula of Kara Dag. It was a place for the embarkation of troops and for the loading of supplies from Asia Minor. On June 4 the allied fleets took part in the assault on the position of Achi Baba. For an hour the fire of every available gun was poured upon the Turkish trenches. Battleships and a large destroyer on the right battered his position, while a French warship in the entrance to the Dardanelles dropped heavy projectiles on the left; while French 75's and British 18-pounders kept up a perfect rain of shells on the parapets of the enemy trenches.

The list now given shows the ships employed at the Dardanelles in the summer of 1915; but it is exclusive of the submarine depot ship *Adamant* and the aeroplane carrier *Ark Royal*, and the mine-sweepers. We notice that among the ships given in the list is the British monitor *Humber*, which was bought from Brazil when war was declared, and which before coming out to the Mediterranean had been usefully employed in the bombardment of the Belgian coast. With the exception of the *Queen Elizabeth*, a brand-new battleship type at this time, and the *Inflexible* battle cruiser, one of the first type of these vessels, the heavy ships are all of the pre-Dreadnought era; the *Lord Nelson* with her sister ship *Agamemnon* being the immediate precursors of that epoch-making vessel. The French heavy ships are mostly of an even more antiquated pattern than our own.


| Name. | Guns. | Weight of Broadside. | |
|-------------------------------|---|----------------------|-----------------|
| | | Heavy Guns. | Secondary Guns. |
| <i>British Battleships</i> | | | |
| Queen Elizabeth | Eight 15-in., twelve 6-in. | 15,600 | 600 |
| Inflexible . . . | Eight 12-in., sixteen 4-in. | 6,800 | 372 |
| Lord Nelson | Four 12-in., ten 9.2-in. | 5,300 | .. |
| Agamemnon | " " | " " | " " |
| Swiftsure | Four 10-in., fourteen 7.5-in. | 3,312 | .. |
| Triumph . . . | " " | " " | " " |
| Cornwallis | Four 12-in., twelve 6-in. | 3,400 | 600 |
| Queen | " " | " " | " " |
| Implacable | " " | " " | " " |
| London . . . | " " | " " | " " |
| Irresistible * | " " | " " | " " |
| Goliath * | " " | " " | " " |
| Ocean * | " " | " " | " " |
| Vengeance . . | " " | " " | " " |
| Albion . . . | " " | " " | " " |
| Canopus . . . | " " | " " | " " |
| Prince George | " " | " " | " " |
| Majestic * | " " | " " | " " |
| <i>British Cruisers, etc.</i> | | | |
| Euryalus . . . | Two 9.2-in., twelve 6-in. | .. | 1,360 |
| Dublin . . . | Eight 6-in. | .. | 500 |
| Minerva . . . | Eleven 6-in. | .. | 600 |
| Doris . . . | " " | .. | " " |
| Talbot . . . | " " | .. | " " |
| Phaeton . . . | Two 6-in., eight 4-in. | .. | 355 |
| Amethyst . . | Twelve 4-in. | .. | 217 |
| Sapphire . . . | " " | .. | " " |
| Hussar . . . | Two 4.7-in., four 6-pdr. | .. | 102 |
| <i>British Monitor</i> | | | |
| Humber . . . | Two 6-in., two 4.7-in. | .. | 290 |
| <i>British Destroyers</i> | | | |
| Scorpion . . . | One 4-in., three 12-pdr. | .. | .. |
| Wolverine . . | " " | .. | .. |
| Pincher . . . | " " | .. | .. |
| Renard . . . | " " | .. | .. |
| Chelmer . . . | Four 12-pdr. | .. | .. |
| <i>French Battleships</i> | | | |
| Suffren . . . | Four 12-in., ten 6.4-in. | 3,880 | 495 |
| Gaulois . . . | Four 12-in., ten 5.5-in. | " " | 330 |
| Charlemagne . | " " | " " | " " |
| St. Louis . . | " " | " " | " " |
| Bouvet * . . | Two 12-in., two 10.8-in., eight 5.5-in. | 2,060 | 308 |
| Henri IV. . . | Two 10.8-in., seven 5.5-in. | 1,124 | 264 |
| Jaureguiberry | Two 12-in., two 10.8-in., eight 5.5-in. | 2,416 | " " |
| <i>French Cruisers</i> | | | |
| Kleber . . . | Eight 6.5-in., four 3.9-in. | .. | 754 |
| Jeanne d'Arc . | Two 7.6-in., fourteen 5.5-in. | .. | 763 |
| D'Entrecasteaux | Two 9.4-in., twelve 5.5-in. | .. | 1,146 |
| <i>Russian Cruiser</i> | | | |
| Askold . . . | Twelve 6-in. | .. | 623 |

* Signifies ships lost by mine or torpedo.

During the month of June the German submarines continued their career of sinking without warning all ships to which they could attain without danger to themselves. On June 4 the fine Liverpool steamer *Inkum*, 4747 tons, was sunk 43 miles south-west of the Lizard. No submarine was seen, and the first indication that anything was wrong was an explosion. The ship sank, but slowly, and the crew proceeded to get out the boats, being in some doubt as to whether they had not struck a mine. Some of the men returned to the ship, but almost im-

mediately afterwards a second torpedo struck her, and she foundered. As the second explosion occurred the periscope of a submarine was observed. Fortunately for themselves the crew were picked up and brought into Falmouth by the Norwegian steamer *Wendla*. On the same day the three-masted Danish schooner *Salvador*, bound from Copenhagen to the Bristol Channel with timber, was stopped by a German submarine. The crew were ordered into their boats, and their vessel was then set on fire, while two shots were fired at her, blowing away her stern. The crew were picked up by the Grimsby trawler *Fermo*

marine that they mistook for a schooner, as she had rigged up her periscope and some sort of a spar with a sail arrangement. Other sinkings at this time were the Leith steamer *Dunnet Head*, torpedoed off the Skerries; the Cairn liner *Iona*, sunk about 25 miles south of Fair Isle, her crew landing at Kirkwall; the *Edna May*, Peterhead drifter, the *Kathleen*, another Peterhead drifter, and the French steamer *Penfield* of Brest, bound from Nantes to Cardiff, torpedoed in the Channel. At the week-end, June 7, the pirate craft had destroyed 24 vessels, 21 of these being British. And yet it was all futile from the larger aspect of the



LATEST TYPE OF GERMAN SUBMARINE.

and landed at Lerwick, after having been adrift in their boats for twelve hours in a heavy rain. The Swedish steamer *Lapland* was sunk 55 miles off Peterhead. She was a vessel of 3500 tons proceeding from Norvik to Middlesborough with iron ore. The crew managed to reach Peterhead in their own boats. The Norwegian steamer *Cubano* of Tonsberg was torpedoed and sunk by a submarine off Gallion Head, Lewis. The crew were saved.

On June 6 the Lowestoft trawler *Little Boy* landed the crews of the Lowestoft trawlers *Horace* and *Economy*. On the same day four Aberdeen fishing-vessels, *Evening Star*, *Cortes*, *Ebenezer*, and *Strathbraan*, were sunk, and their crews landed in northern ports. They were sunk by a sub-

problem. Grand-Admiral von Tirpitz, as far back as December, had said: "England wishes to starve us; we might play the same game and encircle England, torpedoing every British ship belonging to the Allies that approached any British or Scottish port, and thereby cut off the greater part of England's food supply."

It is hard to imagine that the man who made this pronouncement was a seaman, and yet this was Germany's foremost naval exponent of her activities by sea. For the three months immediately preceding the period of which we speak, the number of vessels arriving and leaving the ports of the United Kingdom varied between 1234 and 1604, the largest number sunk in any one week was eight, and the average per week

four. Even Count Reventlow, the prime advocate of murder in all its forms, regretfully confessed that it was no use for Germany to pin all her hopes on the submarine; all that could be hoped from them, he quite sensibly remarked, was that they could harass the commerce of the enemy; it was quite certain that they could never exercise control. But the game, as played by Tirpitz and the "Marineamt" at this period, was not altogether a material one; it had also a strong psychological side. By the time the submarine blockade was instituted, there is small doubt that many—very many—of the subscribers to the Flottenverein in the days before the war were beginning to grumble that they had not had a run for their money. They had been led to believe that all sorts of things, magnificent if somewhat vague, would happen once the youngest of great navies got into its stride when war came. War did come, and in the best part of a year nothing had happened to give the lieges of the Kaiser an idea that the new arm was both efficient and terrible. But the idea of submarine warfare caught on to the imagination of an inland people. With the German in commerce, sport, or war, it is "win, tie, or wrangle," and so sea murder displayed itself in fascinating colours to the great mass of the inhabitants of "Mittel Europa."

As the wolves in winter circle
Round the leaguer on the heath,

so did Germany in imagination picture England humbled to her knees, her ships all sunk, her people all starving, her rulers aghast, in the face of this new and appalling danger which had been conjured from the depths by Tirpitz and his merry men. To them it seemed as if success was assured, as they read in their papers week by week of the splendid deeds of the men who torpedoed unarmed merchantmen. Leading articles lauded them to the skies. The whole pack of the Government press was flung upon the breast-high scent, and they yapped and yowled in unison in praise of this great new device that in the end was to win for them

what they grandiloquently called "the freedom of the seas." Nor was the written word sufficient. Even as the degraded liar who limned the *Lusitania* with guns fore and aft of her decks, so came others of the tribe to depict Tirpitz and his fleet of submarines confining the pusillanimous British mariner to his harbours, because of the awful and certain death that awaited him were he to venture to put the nose of his ship out to the open sea. It was the dream of a people who knew nothing of the sea, less of the sailors of England. But for a time it served its purpose well enough. Our people were being murdered at sea—this formed a cause for rejoicing, for the drinking of healths, for jubilation, and for swagger. As time went on the edge of all this became considerably blunted. The British Navy took the submarines seriously, and German families in ever-increasing numbers began to scan the waters of the North Sea with poignant anxiety on account of those who had, in more senses than one, "gone down to the sea" in the U boats that had been destined to bring about the downfall of Great Britain.

Lord of all was the capital ship before the advent of the submarine, lord of all she is likely to remain as long as men shall use the sea with guns, torpedoes, and explosives as the weapons with which to fight. It is said that lookers-on see most of the game, and while Europe has been fighting the United States of America has been spectator of the struggle. It is interesting to notice what she has done. To begin with, she has evidently no illusions as to the perpetual future peace of the world; she does not imagine that this is "the war that will end war." She is gorged with the wealth that her people have acquired by the production of war material and the sale thereof to such belligerent Powers as could take it across the seas. But when it is all over, what then? Well, America knows no more than does anybody else, but she has learned a lot while the war has been in progress. For one thing, that Germany has dealt out the



EFFECT OF A TORPEDO: A LARGE CARGO STEAMER BROUGHT SAFELY INTO DOCK.
(Photo by F. C. Coleman, Newcastle.)

same measure—which is measureless—of contempt to her as she has to the other neutral Powers. And the more responsible and intelligent citizens of the great Republic have known this to be the case, and the knowledge has not been pleasant. Amongst other things that have been borne in on their minds is the fact that no nation can “speak with her enemy in the gate” when she stands weak and virtually unarmed in the comity of the Powers. She has rediscovered the fact that as force ruled the world of old, so it does to-day, and so it will, world without end, amen.

The result has been that Congress has passed the most gigantic appropriations for the increase of her Navy. And is it the submarine upon which she is depending? Not

at all. In their proper places stand the above-water vessels that are to carry “Old Glory” in the future; for the American seamen have marked and inwardly digested the fact that, in their own vernacular, the submarine cuts no ice; they have discovered also that being too proud to fight may be merely a synonym for not being prepared to fight. And so the newest, and in many ways the most acute, of modern nations is prepared in the future to face the world in her new character of the strong man armed. She has known the bitterness of impotence among the armed men, so she reconstructs her Navy, and, in accord for once with Count Reventlow, she does not pin her faith on the submarine as the weapon of the conquering people.

CHAPTER XVI

The *Dreadnought* and its effect on the Kiel Canal—The Russian Fleet in the Baltic—E13: half her crew murdered—List of Russian Baltic Fleet.

No single act of the Emperor William and his Government was so significant of preparation for war as was the construction of the Kiel Canal. Every one is aware of—even if they have not read—the preamble to the German Navy Act, in which it was set forth that it was the determination of Germany to possess a Fleet of such magnitude that even the mightiest of sea Powers would hesitate before venturing on a war with that Empire. The politicians in our own country persuaded themselves that this was not a direct threat to Great Britain, and preferred to take the assurances of the German Emperor that his Fleet was built merely with an idea of safeguarding his rapidly-growing mercantile marine. That the Kiel Canal was a great strategical conception, that in time of war it would prove an invaluable asset to the mid-European Empire, with its singularly constricted and reef-choked sea coast, no one was concerned to deny. Rightly proud as she was of her achievement, Germany found herself in the year 1906, just after the Canal had

been completed for the passage of the largest men-of-war then afloat, confronted with a problem which might well have given pause to any nation not bent, as the Teuton was bent, on securing the hegemony, not only of Europe, but of the world. In 1906 their preparations, though not complete, were well in train, when there was launched in England the ship which has given her name to the all-big-gun ships of all the world.

The *Dreadnought*, with her tonnage of 17,900, her speed (and this not a paper one but one actually accomplished on trial) of 21 knots, her ten 12-inch guns, and her adequate armour protection, made of all the battleships at that time afloat the merest hacks. In one way (as has already been remarked in Chapter I.) this worked against the country in which she was built, as the battleships of Britain were *déclassés* just as much as were those of other nations. At the time this produced a somewhat lively controversy as to the wisdom or otherwise of, so to speak, allowing other Powers to

start fair in a new competition of sea armament. England, however, had got the start and kept it, and there was some doubt at the time as to whether others would care to incur the enormous expense of constructing ships so costly. The *Dreadnought* had cost £1,790,000.

In the 1903 edition of that admirable publication, the late Mr. Jane's *Fighting Ships*, there was an article entitled "An Ideal British Battleship," in which the late eminent Italian constructor, General (then Colonel) Cuniberti, foreshadowed the coming of the *Dreadnought* in nearly every detail. At the same time he explained that he used the qualifying word "British" because in his opinion that country was the only one that could possibly afford to pay the price. Now the advent of the *Dreadnought*, to use sailor idiom, brought up Germany with a round turn. In the first place, here were all her battleships left standing—the 13,000-ton Pommerns were then her most formidable ships; and it was obvious that the *Dreadnought* had little to fear from the entire class of Pommerns in the German Navy.

Now all this was bad enough, but there was much worse to follow. The Kiel Canal, which had dipped so deeply into the Teutonic purse, had, by the arrival of the *Dreadnought*, become practically useless. This waterway had been constructed for battleships of the pre-Dreadnought era; and now if Germany were to continue the struggle of competition in sea armaments, not only must she build ships of the Dreadnought class, but she must reconstruct the Kiel Canal from end to end. For an appreciable period Germany "hung in the wind." Should she, or should she not, take up the challenge, as she considered this new battleship to be? But obsessed with the idea already mentioned in a previous chapter, that of Bernhardt in his sentence "world dominance or nothing," the step was taken. Or, to speak more accurately, the two steps, the one to build battleships of the new type, the other to adapt the Kiel Canal to the new vessels. This undertaking was of a most formidable description, for it was


not merely a question of the depth of the waterway. So much longer and so much broader in the beam were the new vessels, that the Canal had to be considerably widened, not only to take the ships then building, but also those which were foreshadowed for the future.

Where the idea of world dominance was to the fore no money was to be spared. The ships were built, the Canal widened. There is one curious reflection that may perhaps be permitted here. We have heard so much since the war began of the ubiquity of the German spy; we know from certain prosecutions that took place in pre-war days that spying was continuous; what strikes the observer is, how futile were most of the efforts of these paid sleuth-hounds of the Teuton. Apparently the *Dreadnought* was just as much a surprise to Germany as she was to the rest of the world. It is true that she was built in record time, yet that nothing leaked out concerning her is instanced by the fact that the ships built in Germany as an answer to her were, to say the least of it, comparative failures, drawing a foot more water than the draught for which they were designed. Another instance might also be quoted. When the 13.5-inch gun was in course of construction, to be mounted in our battleships in place of the 12-inch, it was officially quoted as "12-inch mark A," and it was not till a battleship armed with these weapons was actually in commission that the German spy discovered that—in the language of the street—he had been spoofed.

The Kiel Canal has proved a haven of rest for the battleships and cruisers of the Kaiser's Navy; at the same time it has not proved itself to be of quite the utility for which it was designed. Probably no one who engaged on that great engineering work ever anticipated that one day Germany was to be at war at one and the same time with Great Britain and Russia. There has consequently ensued for Germany a period, which covers the whole duration of the war, of acute anxiety for the safety of her Fleet. The much-adver-

tised "High Sea Fleet" has been dubbed derisively the "High Canal Fleet," and with every justice. Only once have they been ill-advised enough to come into contact with the Fleet of Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, the result of which meeting will be dealt with later on, but their reluctance to fight fleet

It is no lack of gallantry on the part of the officers and men of the German Navy that has kept that fine force inactive in the Canal, and under the guns of Heligoland, Cuxhaven, and Brunsbüttel. Situated as they are, with the greatest Fleet in the world holding the North Sea, with the potential menace of



A RUSSIAN BATTLESHIP.

actions can very readily be understood. Russia, although her Fleet is by no means on the same footing as that of Germany, has still a force in the Baltic that can by no means be neglected. If the German Fleet could be definitely smashed, it would then become possible for our Russian Ally to land troops on the Baltic shore within a hundred miles of Berlin.

a strong if comparatively small Fleet in the Baltic itself, they can adopt only Fabian tactics, much, it may be remarked, to the annoyance of the British seamen, who have always wished ardently to meet the German and to finish him for good and all. The policy of "dilly dilly duck, come out and be killed" does not appeal to the Teuton, and this is understood by the sailormen to

whom he is opposed ; and, if he could only refrain from

Frantic boast and foolish word,

he would be commiserated with in the unfortunate situation in which he is placed. Sympathy, however, is somewhat far to seek for those who never cease to tell their countrymen that they seek perpetually and unavailingly for "the cowardly British Fleet" that refuses to leave its fortified harbours and come out and satisfy their burning lust for battle.

During the summer and autumn of 1915 there were several collisions between the Russian and German Fleets. On June 3 Petrograd reports : "Our look-out stations on our coast and our submarines doing scouting duty revealed enemy activity near our coast, especially at the entrance to the Gulf of Riga. At the same time enemy torpedo boats preceding large vessels approached the entrance to the Gulf, but they retired when they saw our forces approaching. Shortly afterwards the enemy sent out hydroplanes, which attacked our ships. The attacks of the hydroplanes were fruitless, all their projectiles missing our ships, and our artillery drove them away. On June 6 the enemy repeated an attempt to approach our shores, but, attacked by our submarines, fell back. At the same time our transport *Yenisei* was attacked and sunk by an enemy submarine in the Baltic Sea. Thirty-two men were saved. On June 6 reports from our coastguards and scouting submarines state that mines had been laid successfully on the route of the enemy, and by means of these and of submarine attacks three of the enemy vessels had been sunk or damaged."

Perhaps one of the most thrilling tales of the submarines during the war was that of which official details were issued from Petrograd ; and it may here be remarked that no nation has equalled the Russian in the sobriety and accuracy of its reports, whether the occurrences which are noted be happenings by land or by sea. This adven-

ture happened on or about June 24. The Russian submarine picked up the smoke of enemy vessels at 9 P.M. (it must be remembered that this is the season of "white nights" in the Baltic, when there is little, if any, darkness), and at once headed for them. When she had approached to a suitable distance the submarine dived, and by means of her periscope was soon able to see that the enemy vessels comprised a squadron of ten ships of the line and torpedo boats. To prevent the enemy seeing the periscope, the commander of the submarine decided to steer to the port side of the squadron, where he would be between the enemy and the light. At the same time, knowing that German torpedo boats trail special explosive contrivances for the destruction of submarines, the commander decided to make a frontal attack on the squadron, and steered a corresponding course. Keeping her periscope above water, the submarine approached the torpedo boat leading the right column about ten o'clock, and passed on its port side at a distance of between forty-five and sixty yards, still keeping her periscope six inches above water. The torpedo boat either did not perceive the submarine, or perceived her too late, for it stood on its course. Wishing to operate outside the line of torpedo boats, the submarine drew to the left, under the prow of the second torpedo boat, and in order to avoid a collision sank to a depth of fifty feet. At this depth the crew of the submarine distinctly heard the noise made by the screws of the warships. At a depth of thirty-five feet the submarine raised her periscope. At this moment she sighted on her starboard beam the ram of the leading warship, which was cutting across the course she was steering at a distance of not more than sixty yards. The commander gave the order to dive and to fire a torpedo. The torpedo was fired and was immediately followed by a collision. A terrible crash was heard. The whole submarine trembled, the electric bulbs burst, crockery and all kinds of articles flew about ; something above cracked and gave way. The sub-

marine took a list of 25 degrees to starboard, so that the sailors were unable to keep their feet; they hung on to anything that they could grasp or find. Fortunately no one lost his head, and all orders were carried out with speed and accuracy. By keeping going at full speed, and thanks to the fact that the hull of the vessel struck the centre of the submarine, which was beneath an enemy battleship, she was able to regain her balance. Having filled his water-tanks and made preparations to dive, the commander succeeded in getting free and sinking the boat. When she was seventy-five feet below the surface there was a loud explosion. The noise was so great that the commander imagined that the shell of the submarine, having been damaged by the collision, could not stand the pressure of water and was collapsing. He therefore rose to sixty feet, but the sound of the approaching screw of a large vessel compelled him to dive again to a depth of eighty feet. Repeated attempts to rise were in vain, because each time she rose to fifty feet they heard the screws of the battleships and torpedo boats of the enemy squadron, which had broken line and were cruising backwards and forwards over the spot where she lay submerged. Water was coming from the stuff-box, and it was found that the periscope had been damaged by the collision. Although only a little water had entered the submarine, she was losing her buoyancy, and the commander ordered the supplementary tank to be blown out from time to time. This would enable the enemy to spot the submarine with ease. Towards midnight, taking advantage of what darkness there was, and choosing the blackest period of the night, she rose carefully to the surface and made for the shore, having been under water from 7.29 P.M. until 11.30 without a break. This long compulsory sojourn under water and the damage to her periscope prevented the commander from ascertaining the success of her attack, and to make certain whether the explosion which he had heard was the result of the torpedo that he had fired at the

enemy vessels. We are not told the name of this submarine commander, who seems to have acted with equal daring, discretion, and competence on this remarkable occasion. One can rejoice, however, that he and his plucky crew escaped from the large number of enemy vessels that he had not hesitated to attack.

On July 3 it was reported from Petrograd that the Russian cruisers *Rurik*, *Makarov*, *Bayan*, *Bogatyr*, and *Oleg* encountered off the island of Gothland, and between that and the Courland coast, an enemy squadron consisting of a light cruiser of the Augsburg class, a mine-layer of the Albatross class, and three destroyers. The sea was shrouded in fog so dense that in the action that ensued the opposing ships were at times swallowed up in the darkness, and hence the gun-layers found accurate fire impossible. The Russian squadron manoeuvred with the object of intercepting the enemy's retreat, and the leading ships were attacked by the German destroyers with gun-fire and torpedoes. None of the enemy torpedoes found a mark and the destroyers hauled off, disconcerted by the salvos fired from the Russian cruisers.

Half an hour after the beginning of the action, the *Augsburg*, finding the Russian fire too hot, abandoned her slower consort and made off with all speed to the south, the fog, which had by this time become even denser, favouring her escape. Again the German destroyers came on, and again they were driven off by concentrated fire from the cruisers. To save the *Albatross*, which was already showing signs of distress, they poured forth thick volumes of black smoke from their funnels, thus interposing a screen between the Russians and their consort. About nine o'clock the foremast of the *Albatross* went by the board, and clouds of steam rose from the mine-layer, now certainly doomed. At the same time she began to list slightly to starboard. Describing several circles and hauling down her flag, the *Albatross* made for the coast. As she was damaged and was rapidly entering neutral waters, the


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Russians ceased fire, and shortly afterwards the *Albatross* was seen to run ashore on the coast of Gothland, behind the Oestergarn Lighthouse.

The Russian squadron then continued its course northwards, but about ten o'clock the smoke of several rapidly approaching ships was sighted to starboard. As the distance between the squadrons lessened, the enemy were seen to consist of an armoured cruiser of the Roon class, a light cruiser of the Augsburg class, and four destroyers. The Russians immediately joined battle, and half an hour later the enemy began to retreat southwards. They were accompanied by submarines, which then unsuccessfully attacked the Russians. The *Rurik*, which brought up the rear of the squadron,

As a result of this action the Russians sustained trifling damage, while their casualties amounted to only fourteen wounded men, no one being killed. Shortly after the engagement the cruiser squadron was joined by a battle squadron, and on approaching the Russian coast they were met by a flotilla of destroyers, which protected them against attacks by enemy submarines, whose presence had been detected by patrol boats.

On August 23 the Naval General Staff at Petrograd issued a communiqué: "On August 16 the German Fleet renewed with heavy forces its attacks on our position in the entrance of the Gulf of Riga. During that day and on the following day our vessels repulsed the attacks of the enemy,



TO SAVE THE *ALBATROSS*, THE GERMAN DESTROYERS Poured FORTH A THICK VOLUME OF BLACK SMOKE.

was ordered to attack, and in a quarter of an hour she was engaged with two cruisers of the Roon and Bremen classes respectively, the latter having apparently just come up. The *Augsberg*, which had been damaged in the previous action, did not take part in the engagement, but kept at a respectful distance. Working their guns brilliantly, the men of the *Rurik* soon had the satisfaction of seeing the effect of their salvos, for the *Roon's* fire weakened as her four 8-inch guns were silenced one after another, till only one replied, while flames bursting from her decks showed that fire had broken out on board. Obviously dreading further damage or complete destruction, the German cruisers withdrew from the contest, and disappeared rapidly in the fog, pursued by the *Rurik*. Towards the close of the action the *Rurik* was again attacked by a submarine, but beat off her assailant.

whose secret preparations for an entry into the Gulf had been singularly favoured by misty weather. Taking advantage of a thick fog, considerable enemy forces penetrated into the Gulf of Riga. Our vessels fell back while continuing to resist the enemy without losing touch with him. On August 19 and 20 the enemy carried out reconnaissances in various directions. At the same time the engagement with our vessels continued. As a result the enemy suffered appreciable losses among his torpedo craft. We on our side lost the gunboat *Sivutich*, which perished gloriously in an unequal action with an enemy cruiser which was escorting the torpedo craft. The cruiser closed with her to a distance of about 400 metres. The *Sivutich*, wrapped in flame and on fire fore and aft, continued to answer shot for shot until she went down, having previously sunk an enemy torpedo

boat. On August 21, the enemy, in view of the losses he had sustained, and considering the barrenness of his efforts, apparently evacuated the Gulf. From August 16 to August 21 two cruisers and not less than eight torpedo vessels belonging to the enemy were either put out of action or sunk. At the same time, our gallant Allies torpedoed in the Baltic one of the most powerful Dreadnoughts of the German Fleet. (This was the battle cruiser *Moltke*.) The *Sivutich*, which so distinguished herself in the Gulf of Riga, was a vessel of 960 tons and 12 knots. She carried a crew of 148, and was commanded by Commander Tcherkasoff, who distinguished himself at Port Arthur. . . . The naval successes at Riga have come as a great relief after the strain of the past week. The scenes of joy yesterday evening lasted until late into the night, and included an enthusiastic demonstration outside the British Embassy. To a correspondent of the *Novoe Vremya*, who at this time gained permission to visit the Baltic Fleet, Admiral Kanin explained that the object he had before him in the late operations was to make the Baltic Fleet a continuation of the extreme flank of the Army. Great difficulty was experienced in the operations in the Gulf owing to fog, which enabled the Germans to sweep up the Russian mines and thus open a passage. Two torpedo boats got through, and it was just at this moment that one of the most effective actions took place. On the *Novik* there were four 4-inch guns, and on the torpedo boats three each—six against four. The *Novik* was the first to open fire, with such accuracy that one of the torpedo boats was at once disabled, while the *Novik* on her part sustained no damage whatever. The torpedo boat tried to retreat, but blundered into an area that had not been trawled, and instantly blew up. The other followed and escaped in the fog, and we don't know what became of her. . . . The Admiral admitted that they had been helped extraordinarily by British submarines, and bore eloquent testimony to the splendid coolness of their officers, as also to the official lying of the Germans."

On August 19 the British submarine E13, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander Layton, on its way to the Baltic grounded on the Danish island of Saltholm in the Sound. All efforts to refloat E13 failed. At 5 A.M. a Danish torpedo boat appeared upon the scene and communicated to E13 that she would be allowed twenty-four hours to try and get off. At the same time a German destroyer arrived and remained close to the submarine until two more Danish torpedo boats came up, when she withdrew. At 9 A.M., while three Danish torpedo boats were anchored close to the submarine, two German destroyers approached from the south. When about half a mile away one of these destroyers hoisted a commercial code flag signal, but before the commanding officer of E13 had time to read it the German destroyer fired a torpedo at her from a distance of about 300 yards, which exploded on hitting the bottom close to her. At the same moment the German destroyer fired with all her guns, and Lieutenant-Commander Layton, seeing that the submarine was on fire fore and aft, and unable to defend herself, owing to her being aground, gave orders to the crew to abandon her. While the men were in the water they were fired on with shrapnel and machine-gun. One of the Danish torpedo boats immediately lowered her boats and steamed between the submarine and the German destroyers, who therefore had to cease fire and withdraw. Fifteen officers and men were killed and wounded in this cowardly and dastardly attack on a helpless vessel aground on the Danish shore. Great indignation was manifested in Denmark at this infringement of their sovereign rights, and the brutal murder of British seamen within Danish territory. Had it not been for the prompt and courageous action of the captain of the Danish torpedo boat, the probability is that the whole crew of E13 would have been murdered. It was, at all events, no fault of the brutal ruffians in the German destroyers that this was not the case.

As this chapter is principally concerned with the activities of the Russian Fleet, a

list is given here of the forces of that Empire in the Baltic at this date. From the description of the battles here given it will be seen that much had been learned by the experiences of the Russian-Japanese War. The late Admiral Essen had taken the Baltic Fleet in hand, had kept it cruising for months on end in the locality it was called upon to defend, and had also so overlooked all its material requisites that when war was declared it was able to put to sea within

four hours of receiving its orders. It was surely the irony of fate that the gallant Essen did not live to command in war the Fleet for which he had done so much in peace.

It will be seen from this table that Russia possesses four very powerful all-big-gun or Dreadnought ships mounting twelve 12-inch guns, and four older battleships mounting four 12-inch guns each—a total of sixty-four 12-inch.

RUSSIA'S FLEET IN THE BALTIC, 1915

| Name. | Tonnage. | Completed. | Armament. | Name. | Tonnage. | Completed. | Armament. |
|--------------------------|----------|------------|--|---|----------|------------|---|
| <i>Battleships</i> | | | | <i>Armoured Cruisers—continued.</i> | | | |
| A. Pervosvanni . | 17,400 | 1911 | Four 12-in., fourteen 8-in., twenty 4.7-in., five torpedo tubes | Admiral Makaroff . | 7,900 | 1908 | Two 8-in., eight 6-in., twenty small guns, two torpedo tubes |
| Imperator Pavel . | " | 1911 | Four 12-in., twelve 8-in., twelve 4.7-in., five torpedo tubes | Bayan . . . | " | " | " |
| Slava . . . | 13,500 | 1905 | Four 12 in., twelve 6-in., twenty-five small guns, four torpedo tubes | Gromoboi . . . | 13,200 | 1900 | Four 8-in., twenty-two 6-in., twenty 12-pdrs., twenty-four small guns, four torpedo tubes |
| Cesarewitch . . | 12,912 | 1903 | Four 12-in., twelve 6-in., twenty 12-pdrs., thirty-nine small guns, three torpedo tubes | Rosla . . . | 12,130 | 1898 | Four 8-in., twenty-two 6-in., twelve 12-pdrs., thirty-six small guns, six torpedo tubes |
| Gangut . . . | 23,000 | 1914 | Twelve 12-in., sixteen 4.7-in., four 3-pdrs., eight machine guns, four to five torpedo tubes | <i>Protected Cruisers</i> | | | |
| Petrovavlosk . | " | " | " " " | Askold . . . | 5,905 | 1903 | Twelve 6-in., twenty-six small guns, six torpedo tubes |
| Sevastopol . . | " | " | " " " | Diana . . . | 6,700 | 1902 | Eight 6-in., thirty small guns, four torpedo tubes |
| Poltava . . . | " | " | " " " | Aurora . . . | 6,645 | 1904 | Twelve 6-in., twenty-six small guns, two torpedo tubes |
| <i>Armoured Cruisers</i> | | | | Oleg . . . | " | 1905 | " " " |
| Rurik . . . | 15,000 | 1905 | Four 10-in., eight 8-in., twenty 4.7-in., two torpedo tubes | Destroyers 1895-1913, 109. Torpedo Boats, 29. Submarines, 21. | | | |

CHAPTER XVII

Count Reventlow and Mr. Balfour—Progress of sea murder by submarines—The story of the *Anglo-Californian*—Opinions of Captain Persius—The Turkish battleship *Kheyr-ed-Din Barbarossa* torpedoed and sunk—Sinking of the transport *Royal Edward* and loss of 1000 lives—The Australians on board the torpedoed *Southland*—Loss of the armed auxiliary *India*—Twenty ships sunk in two days—Letter from the First Lord.


ON July 31, 1915, there were published simultaneously in the British press a letter from Mr. Balfour, First Lord of the Admiralty, and one from Count Ernst Zu Reventlow. The communication from the German naval expert, one of the principal propagandists of the Berlin "Marineamt," was first printed in the *New York World*, and that from our own First Lord was written in answer to it at the request of the editor of the American paper.

Count Reventlow begins his lengthy letter by a reference to the *Dreadnought*, and the way in which this revolutionised all previous German preparations; and he states that "the German Fleet was far from being ready in the summer of 1914." The writer then proceeds to detail at length the disabilities of a naval force so circumscribed in its coast as is that of his country. When, however, he boasts that "through the systematic strategic employment of mines

and submarines, the German naval leaders have in a short time succeeded in making a continuous stay in the North Sea impossible for the British main Fleet," and when he goes on to declare that "only occasionally since last fall (*sic*) have detachments of the main English Fleet made short rapid sorties into the North Sea, only to return immediately to the Irish Sea or to the waters west of the coast of Scotland," we know from the best possible authority, that of Sir John Jellicoe, he is stating the thing that is not.

After the usual wail concerning the brutal

be expected from a German. It is possible that there may have been persons in the U.S.A. who believed this—outside of the hyphenates—but if there were, they must have been persons of a remarkably low order of intelligence. Count Reventlow indulges in further boastings, and repeats the downright lie that the *Tiger* was sunk in the action in the North Sea. As American journalists have been entertained on board the *Tiger* since the battle, he would have been better advised had he left this out. He states that the German Fleet "has



DESTROYER SINKING A GERMAN SUBMARINE.

treatment of neutrals by Great Britain, the Count indulges in the remarkable statement that "it is plainly the standpoint of the British Admiralty to avoid serious encounters with the Germans, except under especially favourable circumstances. It fears that it would otherwise have too few ships left, and would be weaker than the United States after the war." This leaves the reader breathless, as does also the statement, a little farther on, that neither Great Britain nor Germany commands the North Sea! That the Count should state that, concerning German cruisers, "ship for ship they are superior to the English," is only what is to

repeatedly shown that it possesses full freedom of action in the North Sea," and instances with pride the baby-killing expeditions to the English coast; and he ends up by stating that "the German Fleet and the German people await with confidence the events of the coming twelve months." Perhaps when Count Reventlow wrote his letter he did not anticipate that it would be answered by Mr. Balfour. Of all controversialists this statesman is the most delightfully courteous, and the most terribly deadly. After brushing aside the statement that "England desired to attack Germany," he says that Count Reventlow's object appears

to be to praise the German Fleet, "and it is certainly no purpose of mine to belittle the courage or the skill of the sailors composing it." "I doubt not," he continues, with that polished irony that we have learned to expect from him, "that they have done all that was possible both in the honourable warfare to which doubtless they were inclined, and the dishonourable warfare required of them by their superiors." When Mr. Balfour writes a letter it is always hard to refrain from quoting the whole of it; observe the following sentence. "He tells us that we—the British—have failed to induce the German Fleet to come out and fight us—and certainly we have. So far the German Fleet has thought it wise to avoid engaging a superior force, and I am the last person to blame them. But surely this is hardly to be counted as a triumph of either tactics or strategy. It is a military exploit which, however judicious, would be well within the competence of the least efficient fleet and the most incapable commander." Here it will be seen that Mr. Balfour really "handles the worm as if he loved him"; but a little later on he is not quite so suave. "He (*i.e.* Count Reventlow) tells us, for example, that in the skirmish of August 28, when some German cruisers were destroyed, the English squadron suffered heavy damage. This is quite untrue. He tells us again that in the skirmish of January 18 last, when the *Blücher* was sunk, the British lost a new battle cruiser—the *Tiger*. This is also untrue. In that engagement we did not lose a single cockle-boat. I do not know that these mis-statements are of any great moment; but for the benefit of those who think otherwise let me say that in no sea fight, except that off the coast of Chile, has any ship of the English Fleet been either sunk or seriously damaged." Speaking of the baby-killing raids Mr. Balfour says: "Personally I think it better to invent stories like the sinking of the *Tiger* than to boast of such a feat of arms as this."

Later on the First Lord defines the func-

tions of a fleet, which he declares to be seven.

"It may drive the enemy's commerce off the sea.

"It may protect its own commerce.

"It may render the enemy fleet impotent.

"It may make the transfer of enemy troops across the sea impossible, whether for attack or defence.

"It may transport its own troops where it will.

"It may secure their supplies, and (in fitting circumstances) it may assist their operations."


The letter then proceeds to sum up. "All these functions have so far been successfully performed by the British Navy. No German merchant ship is to be found on the ocean. Allied commerce is more secure from attack, legitimate and illegitimate, than it was after Trafalgar. The German High Sea Fleet has not as yet ventured beyond the security of its protected waters. No invasion has been attempted of these islands. British troops, in numbers unparalleled in history, have moved to and fro across the seas, and have been effectively supported on shore. The greatest of military Powers has seen its Colonies wrested from it one by one, and has not been able to land a man or a gun in their defence. Of a Fleet which has done this we may not only say it has done much, but that no Fleet has ever done more. And we citizens of the British Empire can only hope that the second year of war will show no falling off in its success, as it will assuredly show no relaxation of its efforts."

Thus faithfully did our First Lord deal with the impudent pretensions of the henchman of Grand-Admiral von Tirpitz. There is no occasion to add one word to this masterly summing-up of the position as it then was.

On July 1, 1915, it was reported that the fine Leyland liner *Armenian* had been torpedoed and sunk off the Bishop Rock by a German submarine. The liner sighted the submarine at seven o'clock in the evening, and the captain manœuvred his vessel at full

speed for twenty minutes in an endeavour to escape. The submarine, one of the largest and fastest of her kind, overhauled the *Armenian* and opened fire. The decks of the steamer were swept, several men being killed. She was then stopped and the boats lowered. One boat capsized, but the submarine, which passed quite close to men struggling in the water, made no attempt to save life. Twenty-nine of the crew were either killed by shell-fire or

the flags of Germany's enemies." The Government of the U.S.A. was "seriously concerned," and "prepared to collect comprehensive details before taking action." What details it would be possible for them to collect, or what details were necessary, it is hard to understand. A ship had been sunk, contrary to all sea law; on board that ship were certain American citizens who were done to death: what more could any Government desire?



LOOKING OUT FOR SUBMARINES.

drowned, most of them being citizens of the United States. As soon as the crew left the *Armenian* the submarine fired two torpedoes and sank her; she was a vessel of 8825 tons. There was the usual outcry in the United States of America, and the papers talked in a most bellicose fashion, the *Tribune* stating that "the case of the *Armenian* has again emphasised the necessity of obtaining from Germany a direct and conclusive assurance respecting the rights of Americans who may be passing through the war zone on merchant vessels flying

On July 2 news came that H.M.S. *Lightning* had been damaged off the East Coast, either by mine or torpedo explosion, and that fourteen of the crew were missing. The *Lightning* was a destroyer of 275 tons, and was launched at Palmer's yard in 1895.

On July 3 it was reported that the oil-tank steamer *Caucasian*, 4656 tons, the *Inglemoor* of London, 4331 tons, the *Welbury* of West Hartlepool, 3591 tons, and the *L. C. Tower*, schooner, had all been sunk by submarines. The crews escaped in their boats, and some of the men of the *Caucasian* and *Inglemoor*—


which ships were sunk close to one another—had a curious experience. The *Inglemoor* was towing a lighter, and this craft was not sunk by the submarine. The seamen got on board the lighter, and in her set sail for the Cornish coast. This they reached, being escorted by a boat which they met and which belonged to Penzance.

Perhaps one of the finest stories of the heroism of our mercantile marine during the war is that of the *Anglo-Californian*, 7333 tons. On July 5 this ship was closing the Irish coast in the vicinity of Queenstown when she was attacked by a submarine at eight o'clock in the morning. The U boat came up rapidly and immediately started to shell the steamer, aiming in the first instance at her wireless apparatus to prevent her sending out calls for help. Captain Parslow, on the bridge of his ship, manœuvred her so as to present the smallest target to the foe, and ran in circles and zigzagged, baffling the submarine time after time. For four hours did this splendid English sailor keep up his tactics, and during all this time shells were sweeping his decks. One of these struck the captain, but terribly injured as he was, with an arm and a leg blown off and wounds in the head, he continued to give orders till he died. No man could have done more than he during that terrible four hours of a murderous fire to which he could not reply. But with her captain lying dead on the deck of the *Anglo-Californian*, the sea murderers had not done with that ship yet. Alongside of Captain Parslow when he fell, and knocked down by the wind of the shell that slew his father, was the son of that hero, a youth of nineteen, and second mate of the ship. He took the wheel practically from his father's dead hand, and lying flat on the deck steered the ship. At once came another shell that smote a spoke from the wheel, but young Parslow never flinched. By this time the submarine had expended her gun ammunition and was firing machine-gun bullets by the beltful in the endeavour to kill the ship's crew. But her wireless had been heard, help was coming, destroyers came racing over the

horizon extended like hounds in full cry over a burning scent. A shell whizzed out across the sea and struck close alongside the submarine. She filled her tanks, dipped below the surface, and was gone, and young Parslow, erect now on that bloodstained deck, where lay his dead father and nine other of his shipmates still in death, steered his ship triumphantly into Queenstown.

The gallantry of this young man was recognised by the bestowal upon him by the Admiralty of a commission in the Royal Naval Reserve, and never was reward more brilliantly won. There was none of the joy of battle for Captain Parslow, his son, his officers, and men; but the old English spirit of dogged defiance of the worst that these cowardly murderers could accomplish was as fine as anything even the British mercantile marine can show in this war. Even at the very zenith of the so-called "submarine blockade," when scarcely a day passed without its tale of ships sunk and damaged, there were persons, even in Germany, who were doubting if by these means England could be brought to her knees. Captain Persius, one of the foremost of naval writers in Germany, thus expressed himself:

"If the submarines succeeded in putting out of action many warships, then the English Fleet would be liable to attack, and a German landing of troops would be possible, if England had not, at the same time, its own submarines. That this is so, and that the English submarine weapon possesses the capacity for winning, is not to be doubted. Practically there are many obstacles in the way of the command of the sea by submarines themselves. But these obstacles can be overcome. With the greatest confidence we can expect that the still more industrious activity of our submarines will find expression in the continually growing number of war and trading ships sunk. Without doubt the English ship-building industry is, and will be, able to replace every loss in fighting units in a very short time. No error is made when it is asserted that the strength of British sea-



A DESTROYER NARROWLY ESCAPES BEING STRUCK BY A TORPEDO.
(Drawn by Norman Wilkinson.)

power is very much higher than it was a year ago. Therefore expectations in respect to a trade war for the present should not be screwed up too high. It will require some time before it enters upon its full effect, but every success of our submarines is one more step on the way to the unfolding of a favourable position."

The seaman who reads these lines sees the real hopelessness that they express. The war on merchantmen, the sinking of the *Lusitania* and other great passenger vessels, with the holocaust of innocent victims that such action connotes, had pleased the German people more than almost any other event in the war. Greedily devoured were the bombastic articles put forth from the "Marineamt" in the Teutonic press; much admiration was shown for the pictures of John Bull cowering in his island surrounded by the "tin fish" of the invincible Navy of the Kaiser. But by the middle of July it was thought well to modify the national transports somewhat, and the article of Captain Persius in the *Berliner Tageblatt* must have come like a dash of cold water on the red-hot enthusiasm of the populace. As for the writer himself, he must have rejoiced for once to have the muzzle taken off and to be able to say what he really thought, instead of a senseless repetition of banging the von Tirpitz big drum. His communication is full of "ifs" and "buts," letting the land folk down as easily as he knew how, observing at the same time that expectations in respect of a trade war for the present should not be screwed up too high. As far as it is possible to read between the lines of the declaration of the submarine blockade, the true inwardness of the matter, from the enemy point of view, must have been something like this: "We know," the "Marineamt" might have argued, "that on the sea we have not the proverbial dog's chance against England. At the same time here is our Navy, the second in the world in the matter of strength, the first in the world for the supreme competence of our officers and the gallantry of

our men (being Germans, they would naturally have argued thus), we have taught our countrymen to expect great things of us, and, so far, we must confess, quite privately, that we have not come up to their expectations (or our own boasts, they might have added). Such being the case, we will institute a new *guerre de course* with submarines. We know that to sink an unarmed and unsuspecting vessel is fairly easy, and as to international law, that is only made for fools. If we can only sink enough merchant ships, we shall regain that confidence of the public which we have undoubtedly lost. It will please our own people, and no doubt will cause the British merchant seaman to strike and to refuse to go to sea and to face such perils."

Thus they might have argued. All the same, they knew, as is instanced by the words of Captain Persius in the *Berliner Tageblatt*, that no mere submarine campaign was going to finish the sea war. No doubt they inflicted great loss on many innocent persons, and caused terrible grief and dismay in the families of those whom they thus ruthlessly destroyed. Did they really benefit from their action? Was it from their own standpoint a wise move? As far as it is possible to judge, the thing recoiled on their own head. Goaded into action on this score, England tightened the blockade of the German coast, and began reprisals by sinking such German merchantmen as still dared to cross the Baltic Sea. Psychologically the Huns were wrong, as the German almost invariably is when he attempts to deal with the mentality of any one who has not had the crowning misfortune to have been born a German. The attitude of our own merchant officers and captains is, and has been, altogether admirable. Apparently they look upon the submarine much in the same manner as they do upon other dangers to navigation—a thing to be faced and avoided if possible: if not, "Well, why the devil don't the Admiralty give us *all* guns!" is the cry. Without a gun they feel dissatisfied; with a gun they simply burn with ardour

to use their weapon, and have been known to loose off their piece in a manner highly irregular—that is to say, before the submarine had time to sink them.

What Captain Persius said in effect was : “ We will go on with our submarine campaign, with it alone we cannot win the war.” No doubt in the fine flush of enthusiasm then pervading Germany, so shortly after the *Lusitania* crime, he was looked upon as something of a spoil-sport. Protests, of course, were coming from America. “ Well,” said the Germans, “ let them come ; what do they matter ? ” What indeed ! For almost in the same papers that reported Germany had apologised to America for the sinking of the *Nebraskan*, an American ship, came the news that the liner *Orduna*, of 15,500 tons, had been attacked by torpedoes and shell-fire, and that she had twenty-one American passengers on board. This occurrence took place 37 miles south of Queenstown, and fortunately, owing to her considerable speed (she was steaming 16 knots at the time), she managed to escape. The torpedo missed her by ten feet, and none of the shells struck her, dropping into the water alongside. There was the usual talk in the American newspapers, and then eleven days later, on July 27, news was received of the sinking of the New York steamer *Leelanaw*. In this case there was not even the pretence of a mistake having been made. The captain of the American steamer said that he saw a submarine sink a steamer when 65 miles north-west of Kirkwall. The submarine then chased the *Leelanaw* and fired at her ; the helm was put over and the ship headed for the submarine. Then the captain was ordered to bring his papers on board the submarine ; this he did, receiving orders to abandon ship. He and his crew got into the boats, and the ship was then sunk by a torpedo. There was then more correspondence between Germany and America.

On July 27 it was stated in the House of Commons by Dr. Macnamara that up to July 27 approximately 1550 people had been killed as the result of attack by German

submarines on British merchant ships, and 22 as a result of their attack on neutral ships, but the nationality of those who lost their lives was not definitely known to the Admiralty.

On August 9 the Turkish battleship *Kheyr-ed-Din Barbarossa* was sunk by a British submarine. The Turks made the best of the matter, reporting that “ the loss of the *Barbarossa*, however regrettable in itself, does not affect us excessively beyond the fact that it places the strength of our ships as compared with the enemy in the ratio of one to ten.” At the same time as the *Barbarossa* was sunk, our submarine destroyed a Turkish gunboat and a large Turkish transport. The *Kheyr-ed-Din Barbarossa* was an old German battleship that had been disinterestedly sold by the Kaiser’s Government to their dear friends the Turks when she had become obsolete and no further use as a fighting unit. She was built in 1891, and sold in 1910 to the Turks, a thoroughly rascally transaction. She was armed with six 11-inch guns of an obsolete pattern, and possessed a speed, when she was launched, of 17 knots.

On August 14 the British transport *Royal Edward* was sunk in the Ægean Sea by an enemy submarine. She belonged to the Canadian Northern Steamships (Limited), and was a triple-screw steel steamer of 11,117 tons. She had on board just over 1600 persons, and of these 600 were saved. This was the first loss of a transport in connection with the operations in the Mediterranean. The troops on board consisted principally of reinforcements for the 29th Division and details of the Army Medical Corps.

On September 2 the transport *Southland*, from Alexandria, was torpedoed in the Ægean Sea, but reached Mudros under her own steam at 10 P.M. the same day. As a measure of precaution the troops on board were transferred to another transport.

The case of the *Southland* was remarkable for the wonderful discipline maintained on board after the ship had been struck by the torpedo. She was steaming in moderate

weather, when at 9.43 A.M. some of those on deck saw the track of a torpedo making straight for the ship. Before they had time to raise the alarm the warhead struck home on her plates just abaft the foremast on the port side. The men fell in steadily as if on parade; there was no confusion, no shouting; the soldiers stood in their ordered ranks awaiting the command to move. Then, in accordance with the boat drill that they had been taught, they moved to their respective boats, which had been got ready for them by the crew. Meanwhile the S.O.S. signal had been flung abroad by the wireless, and fortunately picked up by the hospital ship *Neuralia*, which came up full speed to the rescue. The men in the boats were taken on board of her, more were taken off by the boats of the *Neuralia*. When it was seen that the *Southland* kept afloat, volunteers were called for, and with the pumps going, and stoked by officers and men of the contingent, the *Southland* managed to reach Mudros under her own steam. Three men were killed by the explosion, and a further nineteen were lost from the capsizing of a raft; the remainder reached Mudros in safety. The Australian soldier, tried as highly as had ever been soldier in the world, who had "made good" on the dreadful beaches of Gallipoli, on the plains of Flanders, the rolling hills of France, and the staring Suez desert, showed that when disaster came at sea he could keep as cool a head as the most veteran seaman. Even as the men of the *Birkenhead* at the Cape in 1853 stood firm and left an undying memory behind them, so also did these young heroes from far Australia demonstrate that by sea as well as by land there was no peril that they were not prepared to confront in the sacred cause that had brought them thousands of miles from their homes in the sunny south.

On August 13 the armed auxiliary cruiser *India*, whilst employed on patrol duties in the North Sea, was torpedoed and sunk by a German submarine; 142 of the crew were saved. Considerable indignation was expressed in Norway because the torpedoing

of the *India* had taken place in the West Fiord, which from time immemorial had been regarded as Norwegian territorial water.

On August 17 a German submarine fired several shots into Parton, Harrington, and Whitehaven, three small towns in Cumberland, between 4.30 and 5.20 A.M.; but very little damage was done. A few shells hit the railway embankment north of Parton, but the train service was only slightly delayed. Fires were caused at Whitehaven and at Harrington, which were soon extinguished. Curious to relate, although populated districts were selected to fire at, there was no damage to life or limb.


On August 19 the officials of the White Star Line received a telegram that their steamer *Arabic*, 15,801 tons, had been sunk without warning by a German submarine. She had sailed from Liverpool to New York on the previous afternoon. There were on board at the time: cabin passengers, 132; third-class passengers, 49; crew, 243—total, 424; reported saved, 375; unaccounted for, 49. Eleven boat-loads were picked up by one of H.M. cruisers, the remainder found their way into Queenstown. During this month the submarines were unusually busy. In addition to the ships already mentioned, there were sunk on August 12 the Norwegian steamer *Geiranger*, the Russian barque *Baltzer*, the British steamers *Rosalie* and *Oakwood*, Norwegian barque *Morna*, sailing trawlers *Young Admiral* and *George Crabbe*, steam trawler *Utopia*, trawling smacks *Illustrious*, *Palm*, *Trehear*, and *Welcome*, French ship *François*. And on August 27 were added to this list *Baron Erskine*, 5585 tons, of Ardrossan; *Restormel*, 2118 tons, of Cardiff; *Ben Vrackie*, 3908 tons, of Glasgow; *New York City*, 2970 tons, of Bristol; *Gladiator*, 3359 tons, of Liverpool; *Sverresborg*, 1150 tons, of Bergen; *Pena Castillo*, 1718 tons, of Santander; *Samara*, 3172 tons, of Glasgow; and *Bittern*, 1797 tons, of Cork.

Yet another passenger liner was torpedoed without warning about 130 miles from Queenstown. This was the Allan Line steamer *Hesperian*, bound from Liverpool

to Quebec and Montreal, with upwards of 600 passengers and crew on board. Fortunately the vessel did not sink. The attack was made under cover of darkness, which naturally made the transference of people to the boats much more difficult. Splendid service was rendered on this occasion by Major Barree and the officers of the 14th Battery of Canadians, who helped in lowering boats, closing bulkheads, etc. ; while Captain Main of the *Hesperian* maintained the utmost coolness throughout. All the passengers were landed safely, though twenty

so intimately connected that neither can be understood apart from the other.

" It was in 1900 that Germany first proclaimed the policy of building a fleet against Britain, and from the point of view of her own ambitions the policy was a perfectly sound one. She aimed at world domination, and against world domination the British Fleet, from the time of Queen Elizabeth to the present day, has always been found the surest and most effectual protection. The Germans have reason to be aware of the fact, for without the British Fleet Frederick the



GERMAN SUBMARINE SHELLING THE COAST.

of them were suffering from injuries more or less severe. One woman was dead when taken out of the water. It is well to end the melancholy record of murder contained in this chapter with a letter from the official head of the British Navy.

The First Lord of the Admiralty has addressed the following letter to a correspondent :

" ADMIRALTY, S.W.,
" 5th September 1915.

" GERMAN FLEETS, GERMAN SUBMARINES,
AND AMERICA

" DEAR SIR—Much has been written about Germany's military methods and aims on land ; not so much about her methods and aims at sea. Yet in truth the two are

Great must have succumbed to his enemies, and without the British Fleet Prussia would scarcely have shaken off the Napoleonic tyranny.

" Whatever may be thought about the ' freedom of the seas ' in any of its various meanings, the freedom of the land is due in no small measure to British ships and British sailors.

" It takes, however, time as well as money to create a grand fleet, and German statesmen were too wise to suppose that they could at once call into existence a navy able to contend on equal terms with the Power which, as they saw clearly enough, was the most formidable obstacle to their aggressive projects. But they did not on that account

doubt the immediate advantages which their maritime policy conferred upon them. They calculated that a powerful fleet, even though it were numerically inferior to that of Britain, would nevertheless render the latter impotent, since no British Government would dare to risk a conflict which, however successful, might leave them in the end with naval forces inferior to those of some third Power. This is the policy clearly, though cautiously, expressed in the famous preamble to the Navy Bill.

"It is unnecessary to add that the German Navy League entertained much more ambitious designs to those designs. So far, however, neither the designs of the German Government nor those of the German Navy League have met with any measure of success. The British fighting fleet has become relatively stronger than it was thirteen months ago, and there is no reason to suppose that during the future course of the war this process is likely to be arrested.

"It is indeed plain that after six months of hostilities Admiral Tirpitz and the Government which he serves arrived at the same conclusion. They saw that the old policy had broken down and that a new policy must be devised. Submarines, they thought, might succeed where Dreadnoughts and cruisers had failed

"The change, no doubt, was adopted with extreme reluctance and many searchings of heart. The admission of failure is in itself unpleasant, and though we cannot regard the Government responsible for the Belgian atrocities as either scrupulous or human, even the most reckless of Governments do not desire to perpetrate unnecessary crimes. As to what the German Navy must have felt about the new policy we can only conjecture.

"But German sailors are gallant men, and gallant men do not like being put on a coward's job. They know well enough that in the old days, which we are pleased to regard as less humane than our own, there was not a privateersman but would have thought himself disgraced had he sent to the bottom unresisting merchant ships with all

hands on board, and it can have been no very agreeable reflection, even to the German Navy League, that the first notable performance of the German Fleet should resemble piracy rather than privateering.

"We may therefore safely assume that nothing but the hopes of a decisive success would have induced the German Ministers to inflict this new stain upon the honour of their country. Yet a decisive success has not been attained, and does not seem to be in sight.

"I claim no gifts of prophecy; I make no boast about the future; but of the past I can speak with assurance, and it may interest you to know that while the losses inflicted upon German submarines have been formidable, British mercantile tonnage is at this moment greater than when the war began.

"It is true that by this method of warfare many inoffensive persons, women and children as well as men, neutrals as well as belligerents, have been robbed and killed, but it is not only the innocent who have suffered. The criminals also have paid heavy toll. Some have been rescued and are prisoners of war, but from the very nature of submarines it must often happen that they drag their crews with them to destruction, and those who send them forth on their unhonoured mission wait for their return in vain.

"Herein lies the explanation of the amazing change which has come over the diplomatic attitude of Germany towards the United States. Men ask themselves why the sinking of the *Lusitania*, with the loss of over eleven hundred men, women, and children, was welcomed throughout Germany with a shout of triumph, while the sinking of the *Arabic* was accepted in melancholy silence.

"Is it because, in the intervening months, the United States have become stronger or Germany weaker? Is it because the attitude of the President has varied? Is it because the arguments of the Secretary of State have become more persuasive? Is it because German opinion has at last revolted against lawless cruelty?

"No! The reason is to be found elsewhere. It is to be found in the fact that the authors of the submarine policy have had time to measure its effects, and that deeds

which were merely crimes in May in September are seen to be blunders.—Yours faithfully,

"ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR."

CHAPTER XVIII

OPERATIONS ON THE BELGIAN COAST

ACTUAL and intimate co-operation on the same spot between naval and military forces has never been very common in war. In this mighty struggle of the nations, however, Great Britain has shown how closely interwoven the efforts of the soldier and the sailor may be. Principally this has been shown at the Dardanelles, but in the primary theatre of war also the guns of the warships of England have assisted the efforts of their military brethren on the shore; and the roar of the naval 12-inch gun has been heard at the same time as the bark of the 18-pounder field-piece. Perhaps one of the greatest of all the successes of the Germans—and they have had very many successes—was their capture of Antwerp in the second week of October 1914. From thence they moved down to the coast, and, on October 16, captured and occupied Ostend, Westende, and Nieuport Bains, stopping short at the French frontier. Some day, when in the future all things now in debate can be made absolutely clear, it will be seen whether the Germans gained much by their move down to the water? It is true that they possessed themselves of the port of Zeebrugge, which they utilised as a depot for submarines, mine-layers, and air-craft. From hence they have been able to carry on the war in the southern area of the North Sea, but Zeebrugge is far from being an ideal port for the purpose for which it has been used by the enemy. It has no outlying defences such as bristle all around the German naval harbours on the Elbe, the Weser, and the entrances to the Kiel Canal. It faces the open sea, and can in consequence be attacked from that element.


This from the enemy point of view is its great disadvantage, a disadvantage which our own people availed themselves of with promptitude. No doubt the Germans thought of pushing along the coast, and we know that at one period of the war Calais occupied the attention of the Kaiser and his staff to the exclusion of all other objectives, and we remember gratefully the delightful cartoon of our old friend Mr. Punch of the Kaiser and his staff singing in unison, "Has anybody here seen—Calais." They did *not* see Calais, owing to the valour of the incomparable troops of our original Expeditionary Force, but there was a time when they might have had it almost for the asking. And then the Navy took a hand in the game. This bombardment of the coast which took place under the command of the late Rear-Admiral Hood, to begin with, commenced on October 17, 1914, when his flotilla attacked with a view to prevent the movement of large bodies of German troops along the coast roads from Ostend to Nieuport Bains, to support the left flank of the Belgian Army, and to prevent any movement by sea of the enemy troops. On the same day, it will be remembered, four German destroyers were caught and sunk off the Dutch coast. On October 18, machine-guns from the monitor *Severn* were landed to assist in the defence of Nieuport, and a most gallant young officer, Lieutenant E. S. Wise, was killed on this occasion.

Meanwhile the "flotilla" of Admiral Hood was growing, and it was demonstrated what utility still resided in what, before the war, were considered to be obsolete battleships. The *Venerable* and other pre-Dread-

nought capital ships, which undoubtedly were no longer fit to lie in the line of battle with their more modern sisters, were found to be of a quite special utility for the new amphibious warfare in which shrapnel from the largest guns found an unexpected value. The bombardment of the coast of which we now speak lasted from October 18 to November 9, when the arrival of large

all the doings of those in responsible positions.

Yet if we consider for a moment, as dispassionately as is in our nature, the doings of the British Admiralty, we shall be constrained—perhaps—to admit, that not we ourselves would have done much better. In the first instance that much abused body had to provide for the safety of His Majesty's



A MONITOR OFF THE BELGIAN COAST.

military reinforcements, and the inundation of the country surrounding Nieuport Bains, rendered the presence of the ships unnecessary for the time being. There was, however, no slackening in preparation for future events. Criticism no doubt is the breath of life to the inhabitants of our islands. When all is going well no outcry is raised, but at any moment the public and the press are prepared to fall savagely upon any department that, in their opinion, falls short of that perfection which should characterise

Dominions, which include some sixth part of the habitable globe. This meant in the first instance the upkeep of the Grand Fleet—all that magnificent collection of ships of the latest date and of the most proved efficiency under the command of Admiral Sir John Jellicoe. This in itself is a business of no inconsiderable magnitude. To keep this immense fleet supplied with provisions, ammunition, stores of every description, and last and most important of all, with men, to arrange for docking, repairs, reliefs, coal,

oil, and all its innumerable wants is quite enough to keep numbers of people in the department extremely busy. Next perhaps in importance to this is the care of the outer seas. The Admiralty had to provide ships and men to pervade the seven seas, to hunt down and destroy all enemy cruisers and armed merchantmen that preyed upon our commerce. And we have seen in a previous chapter how even one able captain in a swift cruiser, not overburdened with scruples, or thrall to international law, could "flutter the dovescots in Corioli." Arrangements also had to be made in the outer seas to safeguard our coal stations and other *points d'appui*; also for a naval campaign in the Cameroons, and the placing of troops on the Shatt-el-Arab and the Tigris, and to assist in the campaign up those swift and shallow rivers. Even the placing of officers and men with appropriate small craft on the great lakes of Central Africa, the provision of a naval detachment to assist the Serbians, and of launches to lend a hand in the campaign on the Danube, are tiresome minor matters to which attention has to be devoted. There was then the submarine blockade—so called—and when the veil is finally lifted, and we are told what was done with regard to this, the Navy—and perhaps, who knows—even the Admiralty—may stand higher in our estimation than they did before. And ever and always, never ceasing, never resting, practically night and day, has been the work that has been in progress during the whole war, of the provision of new ships, from the overwhelming super-Dreadnoughts to the last word in submarines and monitors. Also in the hands of the Admiralty has been that gigantic transport service, without which the efforts of England in the war would have been nugatory. The sailor carries the soldier on his back, and not only in the person of Jack's very good friend and comrade, Tommy Atkins, but everything that the aforesaid Tommy eats, drinks, and uses. Practically one-half of the mighty mercantile marine of Great Britain has been engaged in this service; for not only have we had to supply

ourselves, but we have also had to attend to the wants of our Allies.

From time to time we read in the papers with a languid wonderment that Russia, France, and Serbia have ordered boots by the tens of millions. Take this one item alone. We try and imagine what space a million pairs of boots would occupy in boxes put out in a field; we do not follow out the idea to its logical corollary and conceive how many ships it will take to convey those boots to their destination. Likewise munitions of war. Not only for our own needs have munition workers "scorned delights and lived laborious days"; for from English ports have gone forth anything from 14-inch guns to friction tubes, from torpedoes to machine-gun ammunition, from armoured cars to copper plating, while ships have left this country so stuffed with explosives, that had they been "touched off" imagination cannot compass what would have happened, and all these things have, in Jack's language, "gone foreign." And of all these things mentioned, and a thousand and one others besides, have the Admiralty held the responsibility. There should be in the face of facts like these some truce to the preposterous nonsense that is talked about our incompetence in organisation. Great is Germany and great is her power of organisation, but, put to the test of an expansion undreamed of in all the ages, Great Britain has accomplished the impossible, as if it were the easiest thing in the world to make bricks without straw.

When the kaleidoscope shifted so that it became necessary to provide for the bombardment of the Belgian coast, our officials did not merely sit down and scratch their heads, wondering what they should do. Not at all; they collected one of the ablest and youngest of our Admirals—and it is astonishing how young and how able our Admirals are in this war—they also assembled a weird assortment of craft ranging from pre-Dreadnought battleships of the oldest types to armed fishing-vessels, and sent them over to the Belgian coast to take a hand in the game of

annoying the too enterprising enemy, who had forgotten how near to the sea he had approached.

He was not, however, to be allowed to forget this unpleasant fact. On November 23 all points of military significance in the neighbourhood of Zeebrugge were bombarded by two British battleships, and on December 1 there were further attacks on Zeebrugge by sea and air, and so successful were these efforts that the Germans admitted that British warships had opposed

merchantman. On January 23 there was an attack by two aeroplanes, piloted by Squadron-Commander Davies and Flight-Lieutenant Perise, on submarines alongside the mole at Zeebrugge, and on February 12 there was an attack by thirty-four naval aeroplanes on submarine bases and establishments in the Bruges-Ostend-Zeebrugge district. This was followed on February 16 by an attack on the same region by no less than forty-eight machines, and on March 6 by another in which six aeroplanes took part.



NAVAL AEROPLANES ATTACK ZEEBRUGGE.

the advance in the Nieuport region. To proceed chronologically. On December 16 the monitor squadron resumed the bombardment off Westende, and it may here be remarked that these craft were singularly useful in this work, as their exceedingly light draught enabled them to work close inshore where they were safe from submarine attack, the submarine requiring a certain depth of water in which to work effectually and get off her torpedoes; for it must be remembered that a warship, "being a mischievous animal that defends itself when attacked," cannot be shelled by the gallant German submarine in the manner adopted to the unarmed

On March 24 five naval machines from the Dunkirk squadron attacked submarines under construction at Hoboken, Antwerp, and on April 1 there were further air raids on Hoboken and Zeebrugge. On April 2 three new German submarines were towed through the canals from Antwerp to Zeebrugge; on April 3 the German mine-layers who were attempting to extend the mine-field off Zeebrugge were fired upon by British warships and driven into port, and on the same day the coast bombardment of Middlekerke was resumed.

On May 7 an unfortunate incident occurred. The destroyer *Maori* whilst operating

off the Belgian coast was sunk by a mine, and her crew were taken prisoners into Zeebrugge.

We come now to the despatch of Vice-Admiral Bacon commanding the Dover patrol, who had taken over these duties from Rear-Admiral Hood. The Vice-Admiral begins by stating that "great care has been taken to confine the fire of the guns to objectives of military and naval importance, so as to inflict the minimum of loss and distress on the civil population, the larger number of whom are our Allies. In order to carry this principle into effect it has at times been necessary to modify and even postpone projected attacks. The results therefore have been effective rather than sensational."

This despatch is worthy of attention for the manner in which it brings into prominence ships and men whose deeds have run the risk of being overlooked in the midst of the tremendous drama in which they were playing so useful and worthy a part. We note in the next sentence the unfamiliar names of unfamiliar ships, wishing, perhaps, that such poverty of imagination had not been used in this nomenclature, for surely it is the business of the Admiralty to perpetuate the names of famous seamen rather than those of famous soldiers. But wooden-headedness in this respect has always been one of the characteristics of My Lords. The despatch proceeds: "On the evening of August 22 I sailed with H.M. ships *Sir John Moore* (Commander S. R. Miller, R.N.), *Lord Clive* (Commander N. H. Carter, R.N.), *Prince Rupert* (Commander H. O. Reinold, R.N.), and seventy-six other vessels and auxiliaries, and on the following morning attacked the harbour and defences of Zeebrugge. The results were markedly successful; all the objectives selected were damaged or destroyed. It was satisfactory that extreme accuracy was obtained with the gunfire at the long ranges necessary for the best attack of such defences. This accuracy fully justifies the novel methods used, and the careful training and attention to details

to which the vessels are subjected. A similar organisation was employed in subsequent attacks."

It will be seen that, as far as it was humanly possible, nothing was left to chance. The position as it existed and as it changed from day to day—as of course it did change, with the movement of German troops and guns—had been studied by the keenest eyes and the most agile brains in the naval force that was to be employed. Admiral Bacon does not tell us what these instructions given to his fleet were, but he tells us at all events that they were "novel," and we can leave it at that. We could wish for more detail in the despatch, but naval documents of this character are proverbially scanty, for the man of action is seldom the individual of many words. It continues: "On September 6 I attacked Ostend with five monitors, including *General Craufurd* (Commander E. Altham, R.N.) and M 25 (Lieutenant-Commander B. H. Ramsay, R.N.), and damage was done to submarine workshops and harbour works. The enemy returned our fire with guns of heavy calibre, probably larger than our own, and with considerable accuracy. Again the shooting on the part of our vessels was remarkably good, and the assistance rendered by the auxiliary craft most valuable. On the same day Westende was subjected to attack by H.M. ships *Redoubtable* (Captain W. B. Molteno, R.N.), *Bustard* (Lieutenant O. K. H. Maguire, R.N.), and *Excellent* (Commander G. L. Suarin, R.N.), under the direction of Captain V. B. Molteno, and with results that reflected credit on all concerned. On September 19, with several of the vessels, including H.M.S. *Marshal Ney* (Captain H. J. Tweedie, R.N.), I carried out an attack on certain defences in the neighbourhood of Middelkerke, Raversyde, and Westende, which resulted in silencing and damaging the batteries. Valuable co-operation was received from the French batteries in the vicinity of Nieuport. On the evening of September 24 I despatched H.M.S. *Prince Eugene* (Captain E. Wigram, R.N.) and one other monitor and the re-

quisite auxiliary craft to bombard the following morning the coast of Knocke, Heyst, Zeebrugge, and Blankenberghe (east of Ostend), while with the other vessels, including H.M.S. *Lord Clive* (Commander G. R. B. Blount, R.N.), on the same day I carried out an attack on the fortified positions west of that place. Again during these attacks considerable damage was done. On the evening of October 2 I sailed with four monitors and again attacked with satisfactory results the batteries at Zeebrugge on the morning of the 3rd. The whole coast during our passage was showing signs of considerable alarm and unrest as a result of the previous operations. Our advanced vessels were attacked by submarines, but without result. On October 6, 12, 13, and 18, and November 16, 19, other batteries or positions of military value have been attacked by the vessels under my command. Up to the present, therefore, concerted operations of considerable magnitude have been carried out on six occasions, and on eight other days attacks on a smaller scale on fortified positions have taken place. The accuracy of the enemy fire has been good. The damage inflicted on the enemy is known to include the sinking of one torpedo boat, two submarines, and one large dredger, the total destruction of three military factories, and damage to a fourth, extensive damage to the locks at Zeebrugge, and the destruction of thirteen guns of considerable calibre, in addition to the destruction of two ammunition depots and several military storehouses, observation stations, and signalling posts, damage to wharves, moles, and other secondary places. Further, a considerable number of casualties are known to have been suffered by the enemy. I regret that three vessels were lost during the operations: H.M. armed yacht *Sanda*, sunk by gun-fire; H.M. drifter *Great Heart*, sunk by mine; H.M. mine-sweeper *Brighton Queen*, sunk by mine. Our total casualties numbered 34 killed and 24 wounded, which, considering the dangers to which the vessels were exposed by gun-fire, aircraft, submarines, and

mines on an enemy coast, may be looked upon as comparatively small in proportion to the number of officers and men taking part in the operations. It is with regret that, among others, I have to report the death of Lieutenant-Commander H. T. Gartside-Tipping, R.N., of the armed yacht *Sanda*, who was the oldest naval officer afloat. In spite of his advanced age he rejoined, and with undemonstrative patriotism served at sea as a Lieutenant-Commander. I cannot speak too highly of the manner in which the officers and men under my command have carried out the duties allotted to them. The work has been varied, and to a great extent novel, but in all particulars it has been entered into with a zeal and enthusiasm which could not have been surpassed. The gunnery results have exceeded my expectations.

"Their Lordships will appreciate the difficulties attendant on the cruising in company by day and night under war conditions of a fleet of eighty vessels, comprising several widely different classes, manned partly by trained naval ratings, but more largely by officers of the Naval Reserve, whose Fleet training has necessarily been scant, and by men whose work in life has hitherto been that of deep-sea fishermen."


It requires perhaps a man trained in the Navy itself to appreciate this approbation of the Admiral for his officers and men in the work that they had to do. The management of a fleet of eighty vessels would have (in any event and if they had all been manned and officered from the Royal Navy itself) been a task calling for exceptional ability in the Admiral who commanded. This side of the question is left out by Admiral Bacon. But also it is something in the way of a modern miracle that among the component units of this heterogeneous assemblage of ships ranging from battleships to drifters, their officers should have developed that ability in handling them which must have been the absolute keynote of the success that they achieved. There is no word here

of losses, collisions, or groundings, save for those vessels that were destroyed by the fire of the enemy. Naval Reserve officers, skippers of trawlers and drifters, all seem to have behaved, not only with the cool gallantry with which in any and every case we should have credited them, but also with a seamanlike skill in totally unaccustomed situations, for which no praise can be too high. The enemy hugged himself with the delusion that we had no reserves of trained seamen upon which to draw. The answer to this was writ plain for them to read in their damaged fortifications, their overturned guns, their sunken submarines, and their destroyed and damaged military works amidst the sand dunes of the Belgian coast. The despatch concludes: "The protection of such a moving fleet by the destroyers in waters which are the natural home of the enemy submarines has been admirable, and justifies the training and organisation of the personnel of the flotilla. But more remarkable still, in my opinion, is the aptitude shown by the officers and crews of the drifters and trawlers, who in difficult waters, under conditions totally strange to them, have maintained their allotted stations without a single accident. Moreover, these men under fire have exhibited a coolness well worthy of the personnel of a service inured by discipline. The results show how deeply sea adaptability is ingrained in the seafaring race of these islands." The despatch then closes with the recommendations to the notice of their Lordships of those officers and men who have done exceptionally well.

As before remarked, we could have wished for more—for the exact composition of the fleet, the manner in which it was disposed at sea, the armament of the different units of which it was composed, and other matters which would have rendered us more *au fait* with the operations that were undertaken by Admiral Bacon's command. As it is, he tells us just enough and no more that is from the official point of view. There has been much complaint during the whole

duration of the war of persons giving information to the enemy by loose and unguarded talk. Here again the sea service is to be congratulated, as no information has been vouchsafed to the public that could serve the purpose of the foe in any way whatsoever. Of course we have grumbled, because we wanted to know so much that has been withheld. All the same, while we complained every man and woman of sense knew that the sea service was setting an example that every one else would do well to follow.

There is something else to be said also—how much do we owe to it, how little do the general public acknowledge the debt. On the land frontiers all is movement, stir, and excitement, as day by day tales of heroism are unfolded in the press. All this time the Navy, out of sight, is out of mind, save among those whose dear ones tread their daily round of duty on the decks of our warships. Even those who dwell upon our coasts see them but rarely, and even when they come, they come like ghosts and like ghosts depart. Even should you row in a boat under the stern of one of His Majesty's ships you will not see her name painted on her stern, and unless you are one knowledgeable in such matters you will depart as wise as when you came. For when they come they are merely there on some business connected with their profession: a damaged gun to shift, to go into dry dock to scrub and clean the bottom, or to repair some engine-room defect. Swiftly they come, and even more swiftly do they depart; they disappear over the rim of the horizon, more likely than not steering a course that will entirely deceive any watchers on the shore. They return, these scouts and sentinels of the sea, to the place from whence they came, to take up once more that duty which has kept our land inviolate, which has prevented the fair fields and the teeming cities of England, Wales, Scotland, and Ireland from becoming the smoking bloodstained golgothas that the insensate wickedness of a devil-ridden foe has made of the fields and



LIEUTENANT GUY D'OYLY HUGHES STARTING OFF WITH HIS RAFT.
(Photo, Central News.)

cities of France, of Belgium, of Poland, and of Serbia. For them is the silence of that inviolate sea which they hold in trust, not only for England but for mankind. The German mouths and foams and talks ridiculously of "the freedom of the seas." Too long, too long indeed, has that freedom been granted to him who has misused and fouled every country in the world to which he has been allowed access. Toll by the thousand has been taken of our best and bravest wherever the winds blow and the sea stretches blue from horizon to horizon, and the end is not yet. True it is that there is a good

time coming, though it lags upon the road, and no man can say when the sun of peace may rise once more upon a suffering and blood-drenched world. True also it is that when that day shall dawn, the Nation and the Empire will not forget. In the clash of arms which surrounds us on every side now, sometimes we may be tempted to forget to what it is we owe the security of our land. And this is not as it should be, for of all that combination which holds the Hun in check, "the far-distant storm-beaten ships" are the centre and the hinge around which the victory which is coming must revolve.

CHAPTER XIX

Lieutenant Guy D'Oyley-Hughes damages Ismid railway, swimming from submarine—Granted D.S.O.—Turkish destroyer *Yar Hissar* sunk by British submarine—Loss of Ezo and destroyer *Louis*—Armed boarding steamer *Tara* sunk—German gunboat captured on Lake Tanganyika by British motor-boats—*Natal* destroyed by explosion—P. & O. s.s. *Persia* sunk off Crete—Unarmed ships sunk without warning by German submarines—Evacuation of Gallipoli—Loss of *King Edward VII.*—Exploits of the raider *Möwe*—Splendid fight of the *Clan MacTavish*.

IT is not too much to say that every one has been obsessed by the feats of the German submarines during the continuance of the war. Nor is this at all a matter to cause our wonder. Germany, cut off from the sea, in the sense that no craft which navigates the surface can escape from the ceaseless watch maintained by the British Navy, has had recourse to what has been grandiloquently called "the submarine blockade"; and we have observed how Grand-Admiral von Tirpitz himself stated that he would torpedo every ship approaching the shores of England or Scotland. We are not concerned to deny that this means of warfare has caused us great loss and damage, but the purblind submarine has not caused—and never can cause—the starvation of our country. As has been stated before, there are few things easier than to sink a helpless merchant ship from an under-water vessel, but even the frenzied appeals of persons like Count Reventlow and Captain Persius "to urge the war with the utmost ruthlessness" have not resulted in a greater access of

frightfulness. This not from want of goodwill on the part of the nation and the submarines of which it disposes, but on account of the measures taken to counteract this plague by our own fighting seamen.

There are then our own submarines to consider, and, when the war is over and the full tale can be told, we shall stand aghast at what those young men by whom they are manned have accomplished. It is true that they did not wage an indiscriminate war upon merchant vessels, but confined their attentions to the destruction of the armed forces of the foe. This method of description of their activities is used purposely, because our submarines have flown at any game whether ashore or afloat, as is instanced by this account of what Lieutenant D'Oyley-Hughes attempted in the Sea of Marmora, and which is embodied in an official report:

"Lieutenant D'Oyley-Hughes, R.N., having volunteered to make an attempt on the railway, proceeded slowly towards the shore, dropped into the water, and pushed

the raft carrying the charge, his accoutrements, and clothes, to a spot some 60 yards on the port bow of the boat. His weapons consisted of an automatic service revolver and a sharpened bayonet. He also carried an electric torch and a whistle. The cliffs proved unscalable at the first point of landing. He therefore relaunched the raft and swam along the coast until a less precipitous spot was reached. Here, after a stiff climb, he reached the top, and half an hour later, after a considerable advance, reached the railway line. He then proceeded very slowly with the charge towards the viaduct. Having advanced some 500 or 600 yards voices were heard ahead, and shortly afterwards three men were observed sitting by the side of the line talking quite loudly.

"After watching them for some time he decided to leave the charge, which was very cumbersome and heavy, and go forward, making a wide detour inland, to inspect the viaduct. This detour was successfully carried out, the only incident being an unfortunate fall into a small farmyard, disturbing the poultry but not rousing the household. From a distance of about 300 yards the viaduct could easily be seen, as there was a fire burning at the end of it. A stationary engine could be heard on, or just beyond, the viaduct, and men were moving about incessantly. He decided that it was impossible to destroy the viaduct, so he returned to the demolition charge and looked for a convenient spot to blow up the line. He found a low brickwork support over a small hollow, and placed it underneath. Unfortunately it was not more than 150 yards from the three men sitting by the line, but there was no other spot where so much damage could be done. He muffled the fuse pistol as tightly as possible with a piece of rag, but the noise was very loud on such a still night, and the men heard it and instantly stood up. They then came running down the line, so a hasty retreat was made. After running a short distance he turned and fired two shots to try and check the pursuit, but these proved ineffectual ;

soon two or three shots were fired from behind.

"In view of the fact that speed was necessary, Lieutenant D'Oyley-Hughes decided that to return down the cliffs at the place of ascent was impossible, so he followed the railway line to the eastward for about a mile until he came close to the shore. He then plunged into the water about three-quarters of a mile to the eastward of the small bay in which the boat was lying. The charge exploded as he entered the water, fragments falling into the sea near the boat, although the distance between the boat and the charge was between a quarter and half a mile. After swimming for four or five hundred yards straight out to sea, he blew a long blast on his whistle, but the boat being in a small bay, behind the cliffs, it was not heard. Day was breaking very rapidly, so after swimming back to the shore and resting for a short time on the rocks, he commenced swimming towards the bay in which the boat was lying. At this point he discarded his pistol, bayonet, and electric torch, their weight making his progress very slow. It was not until he had rounded the last point that the whistle was heard, and at the same time he heard shouts from the cliff overheard, and rifle fire was opened on the boat. As the boat came astern out of the bay the early morning mists made her appear to him to be three small rowing boats, the bow, the gun, and the conning tower being the objects actually seen. He swam ashore and tried to hide under the cliffs, but on climbing a few feet out of the water he realised his mistake, and shouted again before entering the water. We picked him up in an extremely exhausted condition about 40 yards from the rocks, after he had swum the best part of a mile in his clothes."


The story, so far, is complete, but there is much more that we should like to know, no detail could be too small in such a breathless adventure as this. Baldly official as the tale is, as here presented, yet is there man or woman who does not follow every yard of the way of this young hero's progress by

sea and land with absorbing interest? It is true that he did not do all that he set out to accomplish, but that is by the way; what we should really like to know is why those three men of the Turkish guard should have been sitting on the railway line and talking in the very middle of the night, instead of being fast asleep according to the immemorial custom of the East? It is, however, a great pleasure to record the following:

"In Friday night's *London Gazette* it was announced that the King had been pleased

in Asia Minor, 53 miles south-east of Constantinople. It is connected by rail with Scutari, which is on the eastern shore of the Bosphorus, and which is the Asiatic suburb of Constantinople. Lieutenant D'Oyley-Hughes was certainly badly out of luck to find a Turkish railway guard actually awake in the middle of the night.

Later on in the year another submarine thus described some of her activities: "On December 2 she fired into and damaged a train on the Ismid railway. On



THE BOW, THE GUN, AND THE CONNING TOWER LOOKING LIKE THREE SMALL BOATS IN THE MORNING MIST.

to approve of the appointment of Lieut. Guy D'Oyley-Hughes, D.S.C., R.N., to be a Companion of the Distinguished Service Order, for his services on August 21, 1915, when he voluntarily swam to the shore alone from a submarine and blew up a low brick-work support to the Ismid railway line, in spite of the presence of an armed guard within 150 yards of him. After a running fight of about a mile he dived into the sea, and was finally pulled on board the submarine utterly exhausted, having had to swim nearly a mile in his clothes."


It may be mentioned that Ismid is a town

December 3 she torpedoed and sank the Turkish destroyer *Yar-Hissar* outside the Gulf of Ismid. She picked up two officers and forty men of the destroyer's crew and placed them on board a sailing-vessel. On December 4 she sank a supply steamer of 3000 tons off Panderma by gunfire, and also destroyed four sailing-vessels that were carrying supplies.

As a set-off against this the Turks were able to report in the middle of November that submarine E20, which was on detached service in the Sea of Marmora, had been sunk, and that three of her officers and

twenty men of her crew had been taken prisoners. Almost the same day the destroyer *Louis* ran ashore in the Gulf of Saros and became a total wreck; the officers and crew were saved. In November, also, the armed boarding steamer *Tara* was attacked by two enemy submarines and sunk; thirty-four of the crew were reported missing at the time, the survivors of which party, who were made prisoners by the Senussi Arabs in the Tripolitan desert, were rescued in the

the capture of a German gunboat on Lake Tanganyika on Boxing Day by two British motor-boats. The gunboat was sighted at 8 A.M., whereupon the motor-boats immediately rushed at full speed to the attack. Fire was opened at 2500 yards. The Germans failed to hit. The second British shot carried away the gunboat's wireless apparatus, and the third hit her on the water-line. The gunboat then turned and fled, but the motor-boats were much the



SHE PICKED UP TWO OFFICERS AND CREW AND PLACED THEM ON BOARD A SAILING-VESSEL.

most dashing manner by the Duke of Westminster with a squadron of armoured motor-cars, after suffering the most terrible privations. The losses of the *Louis* and of *E20* were serious, each vessel being one of the newest representatives of the class to which she belonged.

Not only in battleship and cruiser, in mine-sweeper, destroyer, and submarine, was the Navy busy at this time, for from Lake Tanganyika came the following story over the wires:

"A thrilling story reached Cape Town of

faster. The fifth shot killed the captain (who had belonged to the *Königsberg*). The gunboat surrendered twenty minutes after the action commenced. It was not seriously damaged. The engines and boilers were untouched, and repairs were effected within a week. The gunboat is five times the tonnage of the motor-boats. The capture was due to the splendid dash and gunnery of the British, who fired 15 shots while going at full speed in a choppy sea, and hit the gunboat twelve times. The commanding officer had a tremendous reception on landing.

The Belgian officers tried to kiss him, while thousands of natives did a war-dance, and rubbed their heads with sand."

For telegraphic compression the above would be hard to beat. Let us hope that the Belgian officers did not succeed in kissing the commanding officer, and that enthusiastic natives did not rub his head with sand as well as their own; though the latter operation would have been preferable to the former!

The end of the year was marked by a disaster of a terrible description. H.M.S. *Natal* was blown up by an internal explosion while lying at anchor, and only some 400 of her crew survived. The cause of the explosion was a mystery, the ship at the time lying in a northern port of the United Kingdom. She was an armoured cruiser of 13,550 tons, with a complement of about 700. She was sister ship to the *Warrior* (since lost in the Jutland battle), *Achilles*, *Cochrane*, and *Black Prince*, and dated from 1905.

On the same day as the disaster happened to the *Natal*, December 30, the P. & O. steamer *Persia* was torpedoed without warning in the Mediterranean, and out of some 500 souls on board only 158 survived. She was struck at 1.30 P.M., and immediately heeled over so much that persons were thrown into the water. The ship sank in five minutes 40 miles off the island of Crete. There was absolutely no panic on board, all the passengers behaving splendidly. The loss of life was caused by the ship sinking so instantaneously, and in consequence there being but little opportunity to lower the boats. No submarine was seen, but the track of a torpedo was observed by Second Officer Wood, four points on the port bow, one second before the impact. The torpedo struck the ship abaft No. 3 hatch, opposite the boiler room, and the Second Engineer was of opinion that the forward port boiler blew up, accelerating the sinking of the ship. It must have been a proud moment for the captain of the German submarine when he saw this great ship go down with her helpless freight of passengers, women, and babies.

In the year 1915 the following list of unarmed British ships were sunk without warning by enemy submarines:

Jan. 30, *Tokomaru*; Feb. 15, *Dulwich*; Feb. 20, *Cambank*; Feb. 23, *Branksome Chine*; Feb. 23, *Oakby*; Feb. 24, *Western Coast*, *Rio Parana*, *Harpalion*; March 7, *Bengrove*; March 9, *Blackwood*, *Princess Victoria*; March 11, *Florazan*; March 13, *Invergyle*; March 18, *Glenartney*; March 21, *Cairntorr*; March 22, *Concord*; April 1, *Seven Seas*; April 4, *City of Bremen*; April 10, *Harpalyce*; April 15, *Plarmigan*; April 18, *Vanilla*; May 1, *Eddale*; May 3, *Minterne*; May 6, *Centurion*; May 7, *Lusitania*; May 18, *Drumchree*; May 19, *Dumfries*; June 1, *Sadieh*; June 4, *Inkum*; June 8, *Strathcarron*; June 12, *Leuctra*; June 15, *Strathmairn*; June 28, *Dumfriesshire*; July 28, *Mangara*; Aug. 1, *Fulgens*; Aug. 10, *Rosalie*; Aug. 16, *Serbino*; Aug. 19, *Arabic*; Sept. 12, *Ashmore*; Nov. 19, *Hallamshire*; Dec. 30, *Persia*.

The following neutral vessels were torpedoed without warning by enemy submarines:

Feb. 19, *Belridge* (Norwegian); March 13, *Hannah* (Swedish); April 3, *Douro* (Portuguese); April 14, *Folke* (Swedish); April 15, *Katwik* (Dutch); April 17, *Ellisfontos* (Greek); May 2, *Gulflight* (American); May 7, *Ellen* (Swedish); May 25, *Nebraskan* (American); May 26, *Betty* (Norwegian); June 9, *Svein Jarl* (Norwegian); July 14, *Rym* (Norwegian); Aug. 18, *Magda* (Norwegian); Aug. 27, *Uranus* (Swedish).

In addition to these ships there are several cases in which there is no reasonable doubt that the vessel was sunk by torpedo fired without warning from a submarine, but in the absence of actual proof, due to lack of survivors or from other causes, these cases are omitted. We now come to innocent lives sacrificed of passengers and crews lost from passenger vessels:

Oct. 26, 1914, *Ganteaume*, French lives lost, 40; Mar. 28, 1915, *Falaba*, British, 111; May 7, *Lusitania*, 1198, *Armenian*, 30; Aug. 19, *Arabic*, 30; Sept. 4, *Hesperian*, 32;

Nov. 7, *Ancona*, Italian, 208 ; Dec. 24, *Ville de Ciotat*, French, 80 ; *Persia*, 342. We thus arrive at a total of 2071 persons murdered at sea in this fashion, and not counting those done to death when trying to escape.

On January 6, 1916, information was received from the Dutch Ministry of Marine that one of His Majesty's submarines had sunk off the Texel, her entire crew of 33 persons having been rescued. The Dutch cruiser *Nord Brabant* saw signals of distress coming from the submarine and sent two boats to her assistance. The boat had lost its reckoning off the North Hinder and had sprung a leak near the Haaks Bank, 20 miles west of Texel, and had grounded there. The crew were taken to Helder and there interned. Other submarines that have been lost belonging to our Navy are : E3 sunk on October 18, 1914, in the North Sea. D3 struck a mine and sank on November 3, 1914, on the occasion of the German naval raid on Yarmouth. E15 grounded on Kephez Point in the Dardanelles on April 17, 1915. Was destroyed by two picket boats of the *Triumph* in order to prevent her from falling into the hands of the Turks—a most wonderfully gallant operation carried out with complete success and the loss of one boat. E13 grounded on August 19, 1915, on the Danish island of Saltholm, where fifteen of her crew were murdered by German destroyers opening fire on her when helpless and ashore in neutral waters, the remainder of the crew being rescued by a Danish torpedo boat. E7 lost in the Dardanelles, September 1915. E20 lost in the Dardanelles, November 1915. Also two boats of the Royal Australian Navy—AE1, lost September 1914 ; AE2, sunk on April 30, 1915, while endeavouring to enter the Sea of Marmora.

On January 9 the Government issued the following notice to the press : " General Sir Charles Monro reports that the complete evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninsula has now been successfully carried out. All guns and howitzers were got away with the exception of 17 worn-out guns, which were blown up by us before leaving. Our casualties

amounted to one of the British rank and file wounded ; there were no casualties among the French troops. Sir C. Monro states that the successful accomplishment of this difficult task is due to Generals Birdwood and Davies, and to the invaluable assistance rendered in an operation of the highest difficulty by Admiral de Robeck and the Royal Navy."

Thus came to an end perhaps the greatest defeat that British arms have ever experienced. Much was made by the press at the time of the evacuation of the extraordinary skill with which this operation was carried out. It was no doubt a notable feat, but the recollection of this is but small comfort when the plain fact of having to retreat in the face of the enemy is what it meant. For months, with an almost superhuman courage, sailors and soldiers had contended in impossible conditions with the climate, the enemy, and the terrain, and whosoever should bear the blame for this gigantic muddle, no reflection can ever be cast upon those fighting men who died in their thousands trying to repair the blunders of some one, they knew not whom.

On January 10 it was announced that H.M.S. *King Edward VII.* had struck a mine and foundered. Owing to the heavy sea running at the time she had to be abandoned, and sank shortly afterwards. The only consolation to be derived from the disaster was that all her company were taken off, only two men being injured. The King Edward VII. class were the last class but one of the pre-Dreadnoughts—actually the last being the *Agamemnon* and *Lord Nelson*. The King Edwards—a class of eight homogeneous ships—were the last word in battleship construction of their day, 1902-3-4, and carried an armament of four 12-inch, four 9.2-inch, and ten 6-inch, besides smaller guns. The keel plate of the *King Edward VII.* was laid by the monarch after whom she was named, and was launched by our present queen, then Princess of Wales.

On February 1 a great sensation was caused in America by the arrival of the British steamer *Appam* at Norfolk, Virginia,

in charge of a German prize crew. She was one of the largest and newest steamers of the fleet of Elder, Dempster & Co. of Liverpool. She left Dakar, west coast of Africa, and was more than a fortnight overdue, no one knowing what had become of her, and her owners fearing that, like so many other vessels, she had been torpedoed without warning. It eventually became known that she had been captured by a German raider called the *Möwe*. This was a ship of some 4000 tons, originally employed in the fruit trade, which had been converted into a really formidable raider. When she came up with the *Appam*, Sir Charles Merewether, the former governor of Sierra Leone, who was a passenger on board, stated: "Forward and aft her railings, which had looked quite solid until that instant, simply disappeared as if by magic. We learned later that whole sections of these solid-looking railings were actually composed of accordion-like strips of steel, which dropped into a slot at the pressure of a button located on the bridge. At the same time the square structures we had mistaken for deck-houses also collapsed and exposed batteries of guns. I counted these guns and saw two mounted forward, four mounted aft, and one 3-pounder on the poop deck. These guns ranged between 4-inch and 6-inch according to my judgment." The whole story of the *Möwe* is too long to tell here, but there is no reason to doubt the substantial accuracy of the following announcement made by the German Naval General Staff, March 4, 1916:

"S.M.S. *Möwe*, Commander-Captain the Burgrave von und zu Dohna-Schlodien, after a successful cruise lasting several months, arrived to-day at a certain home port with 4 British officers, 29 British marines and sailors, and 166 men, the crews of enemy steamers, among them 103 Indians, as prisoners, and one million marks (£50,000) in gold bars. The vessel brought up the following enemy steamers, the majority of which were sunk, and some of which were sent as prizes to neutral ports: the British steamers *Corbridge*, 3687 tons; *Author*, 3496


tons; *Trader*, 3608; *Ariadne*, 3935; *Dromonby*, 3627; *Farringford*, 3146; *Clan MacTavish*, 5816; *Appam*, 7781; *Westburn*, 3300; *Horace*, 3335; *Flamenco*, 4629; *Saxon Prince*, 3471; the sailing vessel *Edinburgh*, 1473; the French steamer *Maroni*, 3109; the Belgian steamer *Luxembourg*, 4322. At several points of the enemy coast the *Möwe* also laid out mines, to which, among others, the battleship *King Edward VII.* fell a victim."

It was without question a notable bag, and the German officer with the polysyllabic name no doubt proved himself to be a daring and resourceful sailor. But all the honours of the career of the *Möwe* fall not to her, a hawk in a chicken yard, but to the British steamer *Clan MacTavish*, which vessel with one 6-pounder gun fought to a finish an opponent mounting six 7-inch and one 4.7 guns, with two torpedo tubes in addition. This story which was related to the press by Mr. Michael MacIntyre, second officer, shows the stuff of which our merchant sailors are made.

"I went on the bridge to relieve the chief and the fourth officers for tea; it was just beginning to get dark. The day was glorious, with only a slight breeze and swell, and we were sailing without lights. A vessel ahead was burning her foremast headlight. We were overhauling her rapidly, and just before six o'clock she was quite close, about six points on the port bow. She started to call us on the Morse signal, and I answered. She then asked, 'What ship?' I reported to the captain and he told me to make no answer. She again asked the question, and we then enquired her name. She answered, '*Author* from Liverpool,' and we then gave our name. By this time she was abaft our beam, and she immediately signalled, 'Stop at once, I am a German cruiser.' The captain instantly ordered the engineers to give us all the steam they could, and at the same time I bluffed and signalled to them that we were stopped. The German then signalled for us to stop as he was sending a boat aboard. When he saw our signal he at once stopped

his own engines, with the result that he was left astern. But as soon as he found that we were not stopped he started again full speed ahead, and fired across our bows. Our own gunners then got busy at the captain's orders and fired back. Then the fun began. The next shell struck us on the fo'c'sle head,

go singing by our ears. The German was only 200 yards away but nearly all their shells missed, only four actually striking us. The next to hit us struck the top of the engine-room, killing 17 men and wounding 5, all Lascars. Another hit us below the water-line in No. 5 hold, badly damaging us.



THE END OF THE CLAN MACTAVISH.

smashing up the windlass and the lookout man, a Lascar. The third went through the second officer's room and the steward's room; it seemed to be shrapnel, and splinters were hurled all over the deck, the port dinghy on the bridge being smashed in. All this time our own two gunners were firing as hard as they could, and we could only see that they were hitting. A number of shells seemed to

It was obviously useless to carry on the fight, and the captain ordered cease fire and stopped the ship. I signalled the German in Morse to this effect, but owing to the smoke some time passed before they could see our signal, and they continued to fire. Even as we signalled our gun went off, owing to the order cease fire being delayed in transmission. And that of course caused more

trouble. The whole thing was over in less than fifteen minutes. They signalled to ask if we had any wounded on board. Being on the bridge I did not know our full casualties, and replied that we had only one. They signalled that they would send a boat, and we began to get out our own lifeboats. It was not until we were taken on board the raider that we ascertained the extent of their casualties. Although our shells were so small—the gun was only a 6-pounder—it seems we had done a good deal of damage, and their bluejackets told us we had killed four of their crew and wounded two. When the German commander came aboard he asked for the captain, and on Captain Oliver coming forward he demanded to know why the *Clan MacTavish* had fired on them? 'I wanted to get away, of course,' replied the captain, 'and I fired to protect my ship. My Government put a gun on

board and I used it. It wasn't put there for ornament!'"

And so the good ship *Clan MacTavish* and her gallant company and captain pass down into history; and more than that fact must they value the testimony of those other fighting sailors of our Grand Fleet, for the Commander-in-Chief of that great sea force, the greatest that even England has seen in all her chequered annals, telegraphed to Captain Oliver: "The magnificent fight shown by the *Clan MacTavish* fills us in the Grand Fleet with admiration." It is not possible for those valiant mariners of the merchant ship to have received a higher compliment—one which, let it be said, is endorsed by every man, woman; and child of British blood.

The loss of ships and cargoes destroyed by the *Möwe* has been estimated at no less a sum than £1,450,000.

CHAPTER XX

The *Alcantara* and the *Greif*—Supply of men to the Navy: First Lord's speech—Loss of *Coquette* and T.B. 11—Portugal comes in—Losses of merchant shipping—Raid on Lowestoft and Yarmouth—Scouting by Zeppelins—Capture of Casement—The *Wandle*—Loss of H.M.S. *Russell*—Rear-Admiral Sir Dudley de Chair on the blockade.

ON February 29 there was an engagement in the North Sea between the British armed merchant cruiser *Alcantara* and a German raider, the *Greif*. The *Alcantara*, on patrol duty, signalled a large merchant vessel having the Norwegian colours painted on her side to heave to while she sent a boat on board. As soon as the boat was lowered the crew of the *Greif* dropped their false bulwarks and fired at the *Alcantara*. But the men were at their quarters and replied immediately, and there ensued an interesting duel in which all the good shooting was on the side of the British ship. The gunnery of the German vessel was atrocious, but, more by good luck than good management, the *Greif* contrived to put a shell into the rudder of the *Alcantara*, destroying her manœuvring power. As she floated powerless the Ger-

mans discharged a torpedo which struck her amidships. The *Greif* then turned and made off, but by this time another British ship, the *Andes*, came on the scene and gave chase. This newcomer, a converted liner, made excellent practice, her shells sweeping the decks of the German raider. Then over the horizon, apparently from nowhere, there came a British light cruiser, and her arrival was heralded by a shell which hit the German, exploding amidships. By now the race of the *Greif* was run and she foundered, and it is related that as the cruiser raced up like an express train she made the apologetic signal, "Sorry, your bird"—a handsome acknowledgment that her presence was quite unnecessary. It was related at the time that one of the German prisoners (of whom there were 5 officers and 115 men), on being

asked how it was that the shooting of their ship was so poor, replied, "We knew well when we left Wilhelmshaven we were going to our doom. How would you feel if you knew that, single-handed, you were out to fight the whole might of the British Fleet?"

On the House of Commons going into committee on the Navy Estimates an important speech was delivered by the First Lord of the Admiralty. Referring to the question of the manning of the Fleet, Mr. Balfour said: "If I remember rightly the Navy Estimates of 1914 were for 140,000 men without reserves. I suppose now, excluding the Naval Division, we have about 300,000 men. We have taken power to raise the total number to 350,000, including the Naval Division, but, broadly speaking, at this moment there are about 300,000 men engaged in strictly naval work. . . . I find that the Navy has increased by well over a million tons since the war broke out."

The First Lord in the course of his remarks paid a fine tribute to the men serving "not under the White Ensign, the captains and crews of transports, the captains and crews of ordinary merchant and cargo vessels. . . . I am not aware that any of them trouble their heads about peril until they meet it, and when they meet it they also know how to deal with it. To them also I would, on behalf of the Admiralty, and if I may venture to do so, on behalf of this House also (cheers), tender my hearty thanks. The country is not ignorant of their services, it is not ungrateful to them. On them we depend not less than on our armed forces for maintaining the necessary economic basis upon which all war must ultimately be waged."

On March 11 the torpedo boat destroyer *Coquette* and torpedo boat No. 11 struck mines off the East Coast and sank. The *Coquette* lost 1 officer and 21 men; torpedo boat No. 11, 3 officers and 20 men. Following on these disasters came the news that H.M. mercantile fleet auxiliary *Fauvette* had struck a mine in the same locality and had sunk with the loss of 2 officers and 12 men.

On March 11 the German Government declared war upon Portugal consequent on the seizing by the Portuguese of German ships lying in Portuguese waters; presenting at the same time a long list of grievances against Portugal, and declaring that "the whole procedure of the Portuguese Government therefore presents a serious violation of existing laws and treaties. The Portuguese Government by this procedure openly showed that it regards itself as the vassal of Britain, which subordinates all other considerations to British interests and wishes." The Portuguese Government upheld their right to seize the ships, "in order to meet the domestic needs of the country," thereby accepting Germany's challenge.

On March 16 the splendid new Dutch liner *Tubantia* was torpedoed, and sank some hours later. The Germans, with characteristic impudence, tried to prove to the Dutch that this was the work of a British submarine, but this lame story did not gain any credence in Holland. Even had it done so the sinking of the *Palembang*, another large Dutch liner, on March 20 would have undeceived any one who had attached any importance to the fable concerning the *Tubantia*. Holland protested as usual, and as usual was put off with fables and evasions from Germany. Ever since the submarine blockade began the toll of neutral merchant vessels destroyed has risen. Germany never works without a definite aim in view, and, since she discovered that she could torpedo the ships of the United States with no more trouble than was necessary to answer endless "notes," she has shown but scant mercy to the smaller sea-going nations. Some day Germany hopes for the war to cease, and when that good day comes the fewer steamers there are afloat to compete with German bottoms, so much the better for the Fatherland. On no other hypothesis can the torpedoing of the Dutch liners be reconciled to ordinary common-sense. The following extract from a letter of that distinguished officer, Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge, to the *Times* is full of illumination on this subject.

"SIR—The losses caused by the enemy to the merchant shipping of our own country, of our Allies, and of neutral nations from the beginning of the war down to March 23, 1916, are as follows :

STEAMERS

| | No. | Tonnage. | Number of Steamers and Total Steam Tonnage of the Country. | |
|----------------|-----|-------------|--|------------|
| | | | No. | Tonnage. |
| British . . . | 379 | 1,320,171 * | 10,218 | 20,830,918 |
| French . . . | 41 | 199,865 * | 1,616 | 1,909,609 |
| Belgian . . . | 10 | 29,861 | .. | .. |
| Russian . . . | 27 | 42,226 * | 744 | 851,951 |
| Italian . . . | 21 | 70,231 * | 655 | 1,513,631 |
| Japanese . . . | 3 | 19,267 | 1,155 | 1,826,068 |

* The tonnage of three British steamers, of two French, of six Russian, and of one Italian is not reported, and each of these vessels has been assigned the average tonnage of the steamers of which the size has been precisely stated.

SAILING-VESSELS

| | No. | Tonnage. | Number of Sailing-Vessels and Total Sailing Tonnage of the Country. | |
|---------------|-----|----------|---|----------|
| | | | No. | Tonnage. |
| British . . . | 31 | 19,119 * | 1,135 | 443,150 |
| French . . . | 12 | 18,323 | 523 | 376,119 |
| Russian . . . | 8 | 7,463 | 512 | 202,511 |
| Italian . . . | 6 | 3,373 * | 522 | 222,914 |

* The tonnage of three British vessels and one Italian is not reported, and each of these vessels has been assigned the average tonnage of the sailing-vessels of which the size has been precisely stated.

"In addition to the above the losses of trawlers reported have been : British, 237 ; French, 7 ; Belgian, 2.

"The Teutonic Powers have caused to neutral countries the following losses :

STEAMERS

| | No. | Tonnage. |
|--|-----|----------|
| Norway | 59 | 95,732 |
| Denmark | 18 | 32,734 |
| Sweden | 33 | 42,086 |
| Holland | 22 | 73,786 |
| United States | 6 | 16,013 |
| Greece | 11 | 22,383 |
| Spain | 4 | 8,606 |
| Persia | 1 | 758 |
| Portugal (whilst still neutral). | 1 | 623 |

SAILING-VESSELS

| | No. | Tonnage. |
|-------------------------|-----|----------|
| Norway | 22 | 19,780 * |
| Denmark | 10 | 1,566 * |
| Sweden | 7 | 2,028 * |
| Holland | 2 | 226 * |
| Rumania | 1 | 285 |
| United States | 1 | 176 |

* The tonnage of two Norwegian sailing-vessels, of five Danish, and of one Dutch has not been reported, and each of these vessels has been assigned the average tonnage of the sailing-vessels of which the size has been precisely stated.

"The losses of neutrals in trawlers have been : Denmark, 1 ; Holland, 7.

"The loss inflicted by the enemy on the steam shipping of the British Empire down to the 23rd of the month of March, that is to say, in nearly 19 months of war, amounts to less than 4 per cent of the number of vessels and a little more than 6 per cent of the tonnage. The French loss in steamers amounts to a little over 4 per cent of the number of French vessels of the kind and to rather more than 7 per cent of the tonnage. The Russian steamers lost amount to rather less than 3½ per cent of the number and to rather less than 5 per cent of the tonnage. The Italian steamer losses are nearly 3½ per cent of the number and rather more than 4½ per cent of the steam tonnage. The very much smaller figures of the sailing-vessels need not be subjected to closer analysis."

Now there is no doubt that the figures given by Sir Cyprian Bridge disclose an extremely grave condition of affairs ; they also display the extraordinary cynicism and impudence of all the German talk of "the freedom of the seas ! " Let us see what this means translated into cold fact. Germany is at war. She is unable to use the sea herself because she imprudently "took on" the mistress of the seas as one of her opponents. Consequently she delivers an *ex cathedra* judgment. She says to all the world, "It is my order that none of you trade with England" ; and having done this proceeds with an exaggerated brutality to sink the ships of neutral nations. According to the figures in the letter quoted, no less than 165 steamers and 43 sailing-vessels with an aggregate tonnage of 309,782 tons had been destroyed up to March 23, 1916 ; and this has continued ever since, and is continuing as these lines are being written. Meanwhile the mercantile marine of Germany laid up in her own harbours, or interned in ports all over the world, is awaiting that good day when they can reap the benefit of this policy. If Germany were going to win the war this manifestation of murder and robbery, this exhibition of Kultur in excelsis, might serve her turn very well. As, however, she is destined to lose, a time will come

when those whose lives and property have been destroyed will have a say in the matter, and if they do not then exact ton for ton from the aggressor, they will only have themselves to blame for their superlative foolishness.

On April 24 there occurred a combined sea and air raid on Lowestoft and Yarmouth. It began at 4.10 A.M. and was conducted by the German battle-cruiser squadron, accompanied by light cruisers and destroyers. The extraordinary thing connected with the attack was that, in spite of the heavy guns used, the damage was relatively small. At Lowestoft a convalescent home, a swimming-bath, the pier, and 40 dwelling-houses were damaged; some 200 dwelling-houses were slightly damaged. Two men, one woman, and one child were killed; three persons were seriously wounded, and nine slightly wounded. Fire was opened on Great Yarmouth at the same time. There the damage was one large building slightly damaged by fire, and another building slightly damaged by shell-fire. The usual bombastic proclamation was issued from Berlin, stating that "a section of our High Sea Fleet bombarded with good success fortifications and important military buildings at Great Yarmouth and Lowestoft, etc."; the Admiralty report shows that the whole affair only lasted twenty minutes, when the gallant bathing-machine bombardiers made for their own coasts at top speed. One thing was, however, demonstrated beyond the shadow of a doubt, which was that the immunity with which this raid was carried out was due to the scouting of Zeppelins. The fast cruiser squadron knew before it started that it was to have a clear run, that there was every chance of bombarding the "fortified positions" of the watering-places of Lowestoft and Yarmouth, and then returning to spread the glorious account of its heroic doings. In fact, to read the dithyrambic descriptions of this exploit published in the German press, the reader might imagine that Portsmouth had been captured; whereas Mr. Balfour, in a letter sent to the


Mayors of these towns, mentions that the total number killed in all these baby-killing raids amounted to 141 non-combatants.

It is of course no consolation whatever to the relatives of those slain in these bombardments of open and undefended towns to read in the newspapers that "no object of military value has been attained"; all the same, it is impossible—even for the British Navy—to draw a cordon on the sea so tightly that in no circumstances can enemy ships slip through. And this brings to our notice the question of the value of the Zeppelin from the military point of view. Damage of course they can do, and have done with considerable results since they started raiding our country. It is hardly conceivable, however, that at any time, present or future, the gas-bag is destined to shatter the resistance of an enemy. Where, however, the lighter-than-air craft has proved its supreme utility is in scouting at sea. The Zeppelin, unlike the aeroplane, can hover, and given atmospheric conditions favourable to the work it is called upon to perform, can prove of incalculable service in the narrow seas which separate England and Scotland from Germany; this being proved by the success—such as it was—of the April raid on our East Coast towns. There has been one surprising feature in all these raids, which has been the amazingly bad shooting that has been made by the enemy ships. In the case of Lowestoft, 12-inch shells were showered on the town, and if it were conceivable—which it is not—that a British squadron of the same size had been bombarding an open and undefended town as big as Lowestoft, there would not have been one stone left upon another. Of over one hundred shells fired, no more than six fell in or near the town, and the only damage of any account was the burning of one block of fishing premises. At the south end of the town various buildings, including the Corporation Electricity Station, were peppered with steel fragments. A barrel factory also suffered severe damage.

On Easter Monday a severe bombardment

of the Belgian coast took place, and Zeebrugge, Heyst, Duinbergen, and Knocke suffered greatly. Especially was this the case at Zeebrugge, where, it was reported from Amsterdam, the harbour locks were damaged and some ships sunk. On April 25 it was announced that "During the period between P.M. April 20 and P.M. April 21, an attempt to land arms and ammunition in Ireland was made by a vessel under the guise of a neutral merchant ship, but in reality a German auxiliary, in conjunction with a German submarine. The auxiliary

officials of the company, and a presentation of £250 was made to the master and crew by Field-Marshal Sir Evelyn Wood on behalf of the company. All Captain — could find to say was that the thanks were due to the company for putting the gun on board, and that he was glad to have been able to make a good use of it. And so we observe the very valiant company of a collier making history, probably the last thing that they ever expected to do, and, having done it, regarding it as all in the day's work!



ZEPPELIN SCOUTING FOR THE GERMAN FLEET.

sank, and a number of prisoners were made, amongst whom was Sir Roger Casement."

On May 2 the collier *Wandle*, putting to sea from the Tyne, was attacked by a submarine. Captain — of the *Wandle*, who had a gun aboard his ship, put up so fine a fight that he beat off his antagonist, having one man wounded, and himself knocked down by the concussion of a shell on his bridge. He put back into the Tyne, landed his wounded man, and then proceeded on his voyage. His passage up the Thames to Wandsworth gasworks, to which the ship belonged, was quite a triumphal progress. The captain was met by the Mayor of Wandsworth, the directors and

The loss of the battleship *Russell* in the Mediterranean happened on April 28. She struck a mine and foundered. Her Admiral, Rear-Admiral S. R. Fremantle, her Captain, Captain William Bowden Smith, 24 officers, and 676 men were saved, and 124 officers and men were lost. She was a battleship of 14,000 tons, launched at Jarrow in 1901, and was armed, after the fashion of that date, with four 12-inch and twelve 6-inch guns and four torpedo tubes.


On May 2 the armed yacht *Aegusa* and the mine-sweeper *Nasturtium* both struck mines in the Mediterranean and foundered. The captains and officers of both ships were saved, but six were missing from

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the crew of the *Aegusa* and seven from the *Nasturtium*.

On May 3 a Copenhagen paper published the following: "On October 17 last, a German mine-sweeping squadron, consisting of eight ships, under the leadership of the auxiliary cruiser *Kaiser*, left Kiel to examine a mine-field in the Sound. The squadron anchored, taking up positions alongside the *Kaiser*, and at about 7.30 P.M., when the crews were having their evening meal, a British submarine suddenly attacked. There were several terrific explosions, and three of the ships immediately went to the bottom, while a fourth was badly damaged. The remainder weighed anchor and hurried off

of war, that blockade squadrons were at first necessarily small. This grew, until "we now have a complicated network of cruisers scattered over the North Sea areas, a network through which it is impossible for any steamer, sailing ship, or trawler, flying either a neutral or enemy flag, to pass without coming under our direct observation." Here, it may be observed, is food for thought for those who wonder "what the Navy is doing all the time." It is next explained what a modern blockade means. "Our North Sea blockade consists of the strategic placing of units of patrolling squadrons all out of sight of each other but within easy steaming distance." Cruisers are twenty miles apart,



DESTROYERS HOLDING UP A MERCHANTMAN.

to Kiel, where they arrived at 4.30 on the following morning. The squadron remained there till December 1, when new ships were substituted for those that had been lost."


On May 3 there was published in the press an interview with Rear-Admiral Sir Dudley de Chair on the subject of the British blockade. Perhaps in the perpetually strained excitement induced by the war, this highly important document did not receive from the readers of newspapers the notice that it most decidedly deserved. The Admiral began by stating to his interlocutor (the London correspondent of the *Brooklyn Eagle*—we wonder naturally why an American paper was chosen as the recipient of these confidences) that the blockade was begun from the very date of the declaration

so that in ordinary weather no ship can pass without being seen by one or the other, and for this the auxiliary armed cruiser, a merchant vessel, is used. After explaining the procedure of coming up with and boarding a ship at sea, and all ships have to be boarded and examined, it is explained how apt for this duty are our naval reserve officers, who are accustomed to the handling of manifests and ships' papers generally. It is then noted that "it is absolutely impossible to examine a large cargo in mid-ocean and in heavy weather. I cannot emphasise too strongly that it is altogether safer and more humane for the neutral to be examined in a protected harbour. There seem to be two methods of dealing with a suspected blockade runner. Our method is to take the neutral

to the nearest British port for examination ; the German method is to torpedo at sight." A very neat touch this !

The Admiral proceeds to say that after an experience of twenty months as commander of the North Sea blockade service, he found that all neutral captains invariably preferred to be sent into a British harbour, where delay was reduced to a minimum and in-

concealed in coffee sacks ; cotton in barrels of flour ; rubber honey, made in form of honeycomb filled with a curious liquid mixture ; false manifests—this latter the most frequent form of faking. In several cases where the captain of the neutral realised that the game was up, he produced both the genuine and the faked manifests for our boarding officers to compare, a form



THE GRAND FLEET SWEEPING THE NORTH SEA.

spection was accomplished with safety and despatch. After telling how all British captains had received orders from the beginning to treat neutral captains and crews with all courtesy and consideration, a list was given of the methods obtaining in smuggling. They comprise double bottoms, decks, and bulkheads, concealing guns, rifles, and other firearms and ammunition ; copper keels and copper plates on sailing ships ; hollow masts ; rubber onions ; rubber

of frankness quite amusing. "On four distinct occasions," the Admiral concluded, "which have come under my direct personal observation, our blockading patrol have rescued neutral ships from imminent destruction by German torpedoes in the North Sea. The merchantmen were lowering their boats with the submarine standing off waiting to fire. A few well-directed shots from our guns soon disposed of the menace, and the neutrals were able to rehoist their boats

and proceed safely about their business. On another occasion we came upon a Scandinavian with masts broken off at the deck and the crew lashed to the bulwarks, while heavy seas swept her from stem to stern. Our men saved the crew at some risk to their own lives, stood by until the gale abated, and then towed the wreck to a British port for assistance and repair. We towed one

American ship, which had been drifting about helplessly for twelve days without coal or food, into a British port through the worst sort of a sea."

It will be seen from this, the best testimony that could be produced, how much neutrals have to be grateful for, and how little cause of complaint they can produce against the British blockade

CHAPTER XXI

THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND BANK

"ON the afternoon of Wednesday, May 31st, a naval engagement took place off the coast of Jutland." So began the fateful pronouncement of the Secretary of the Admiralty that caused men and women to hold their breath as they read it in their papers on the morning of June 2; for from this first official announcement but little comfort was to be extracted. The battle cruisers *Queen Mary*, *Indefatigable*, and *Invincible* were reported sunk, as also the armoured cruisers *Defence* and *Black Prince*. The *Warrior* was disabled, and after being towed for some time had to be abandoned by her crew; and further it was known that the destroyers *Tipperary*, *Turbulent*, *Fortune*, *Sparrowhawk*, and *Ardent* were lost, and that six others had not been accounted for. To put against all this, the communiqué announced that "the losses of the enemy are serious. At least one battle cruiser was destroyed, and one severely damaged; one battleship reported sunk by our destroyers during a night attack; two light cruisers were disabled, and probably sunk. The exact number of the enemy destroyers disposed of during the action cannot be ascertained with any certainty, but it must have been large."

The German Fleet having returned to harbour, instantly a glorious victory over England was proclaimed far and wide all over the world, and at first was believed by

friend, foe, and neutral. In our own country people waited and waited for further information, until time passed, and at long last, on July 7, was published the full text of Admiral Jellicoe's despatch on the Battle of Jutland Bank.

The following is a list of the officers in command in the battle:

Commander-in-Chief—Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, G.C.B., G.C.V.O.

Chief of the Staff—Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Madden, K.C.B., C.V.O.

Captain of the Fleet—Commodore Lionel Halsey, C.M.G.

THE BATTLE FLEET

1st Battle Squadron—Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.

2nd Battle Squadron—Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas Jerram, K.C.B.

4th Battle Squadron—Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, Bart., K.C.B., C.V.O., C.M.G.

4th Battle Squadron—Rear-Admiral A. L. Duff, C.B.

4th Battle Squadron—Rear-Admiral A. C. Leveson, C.B.


4th Battle Squadron—Rear-Admiral E. F. A. Gaunt, C.M.G.

5th Battle Squadron—Rear-Admiral H. Evan-Thomas, M.V.O.

THE BATTLE CRUISER FLEET

Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, K.C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O.

1st Battle Cruiser Squadron—Rear-Admiral O de B. Brock, C.B.



SERVING THE GUNS TO THE LAST.
(From the drawing by F. Matania. By permission of The Sphere.)

2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron—Rear-Admiral W. C. Pakenham, C.B.

3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron—Rear-Admiral The Hon. H. L. A. Hood, C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O.

THE CRUISER SQUADRONS

1st Armoured Cruiser Squadron—Rear-Admiral Sir R. Arbuthnot, Bart., M.V.O.

2nd Armoured Cruiser Squadron—Rear-Admiral H. L. Heath, M.V.O.

1st Light Cruiser Squadron—Commodore E. S. Alexander-Sinclair, M.V.O., A.D.C.

2nd Light Cruiser Squadron—Commodore W. E. Goodenough, M.V.O., A.D.C.

3rd Light Cruiser Squadron—Rear-Admiral T. D. W. Napier, M.V.O.

4th Light Cruiser Squadron—Commodore Le Mesurier.


It may be asserted without fear of contradiction that no despatch since that which recorded the battle of Trafalgar was awaited with more poignant interest than was that issued by Admiral Sir John Jellicoe concerning the conflict off the Jutland coast. It must have been a task of enormous difficulty to compile a coherent narrative of the happenings on this momentous day and night. But, now we have it, we are presented with a picture from which the veil is lifted—at all events during a brief and pregnant period—which has for so long, and so rightly, obscured the doings of the Grand Fleet. How often has the question been asked during the past two years—not, it may be observed, by those with knowledge of sea affairs—"What is the Fleet doing?"—this sometimes with a querulous note of discontent, as folk who have never studied these matters expected something in the way of spectacular battles, an offensive that was to shatter German sea power in the shortest possible period of time.

The first sentence written by the Commander-in-Chief disposes of all questioning now and hereafter, for he states plainly and without any circumlocution: "The ships of the Grand Fleet, in pursuance of the general policy of periodical sweeps through the North Sea, had left its bases on the

previous day in accordance with instructions issued by me."

More elusive than the *Flying Dutchman* had been the oddly named "High Sea Fleet," and, according to their temperament, the crews of our ships must have laughed or ground their teeth when they saw the reports in the German newspapers of how for months the gallant German had sought "the cowardly English Fleet" in vain. At last, after nearly two years, it was found by the Teuton, and the first person on whom he stumbled was Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, an officer whom he had met before to his own considerable discomfiture. Having found the Commander of the Battle Cruiser Squadron, he also discovered that he was not going to lose sight of him.

It was 2.20 P.M. on May 31 that the first report was made from *Galatea* that enemy vessels were in sight, and we mark what Beatty did on the instant. "The direction of the advance was immediately altered to S.S.E., the course for Horn Reef, so as to place my force between the enemy and his base." The Commander of the Battle Cruiser Fleet did not then know the strength of the enemy; all that he did know in that moment pregnant with fate was that waiting had come to an end and that the Germans were "out" at last. No matter in what strength they might happen to be, he was determined, in the phrase of Nelson, "that they should not part without a battle." By 2.35 it was evident that the foe was to the northward and eastward, and "that it would be impossible for him to round Horn Reef without being brought to action." At 3.31 five battle cruisers were sighted, and at 3.30 the first reports were received on board *Engadine* from a seaplane sent up from that ship. From the first low visibility hampered observation, and the seaplane flying only 900 feet up became the target for every gun that would bear from four enemy light cruisers. At 3.30 speed was increased to 25 knots and with 2nd battle cruiser squadron astern of the 1st, and the 9th and 13th destroyer flotillas taking



station ahead, the ships, in line of bearing, turned towards the enemy. Horn Reef must now have borne about S.E., and with Beatty steering as he was towards the shore there was no escape possible for the Germans. At 3.48 the action began at a range of 18,500 yards. At 4.8 the 5th battle cruiser squadron came into action at 20,000 yards, while the destroyers *Landrail* and *Lydiard* chased enemy submarines which threatened their larger sisters. The destroyers, which had been ordered to attack the enemy with torpedoes "when opportunity offered," moved out at 4.15 to do this, and at the same time the enemy destroyers did likewise. Eleven of our destroyers encountered a German light cruiser and fifteen destroyers, the balance on the German side being one light cruiser and four destroyers. The result of this engagement was that two enemy destroyers were sunk and the remainder had to retire on their main body, "but the British attack on the enemy battle cruisers was rendered less effective owing to some of the destroyers having dropped astern during the action." Having disposed of the German destroyers, the attack was pressed home on the battle cruisers, and *Nestor* and *Nomad* were so badly damaged that they subsequently sank. The Vice-Admiral states to the C.-in-C., "I propose to bring to your notice a recommendation of Commander Bingham (*Nestor*) and other officers for some recognition of their conspicuous gallantry."

While the light cavalry of the sea was thus demonstrating to the foe its inimitable dash and resolution, the larger units engaged were pounding one another at long range, and from 4.15 to 4.43 the conflict, says the Admiral, "was of a very fierce and resolute character."

At 4.38 *Southampton* sighted the enemy battle fleet, and course was altered by the Vice-Admiral—sixteen points in succession to starboard—meaning that the direction of Beatty's command had been exactly reversed while preserving the formation that they were in. *Southampton* and the light cruiser squadron held on towards the enemy battle fleet till within 13,000 yards, and were

received by what is described as "a heavy but ineffective fire"; which speaks badly for the gun-layers of the German battleships.

"Between 5 and 6 P.M. the enemy received very severe punishment, and one of their battle cruisers quitted the line in a considerably damaged condition . . . other enemy ships also showed signs of increasing injury."


All this time, that is from 4.40 P.M. when course was altered, Beatty was drawing the foe nearer and nearer to our swiftly approaching battle fleet; which fleet was tearing south under every pound of steam that their boilers could bear, to join up with their brothers of the cruiser squadrons and destroyer flotillas. Naturally it brings to the mind those men toiling deep down in the heart of every ship in the fleet, large and small, whose labours are apt to be overlooked when we dream of the crash of the screaming shell as it strikes home and rives the toughened steel armour, or tears through the ineffectual plates on the sides of destroyers and other small craft. We can also in imagination follow with dread the path of the torpedo as it rushes forth on its errand of destruction. All these implements of death, however, are powerless unless the men below who tend the fires and who nurse the engines are not of a competence and a courage adequate for the service of the British Navy. Great is the British engineer, and great also are the men he commands; and when we read an account of any battle in which the Fleet is concerned, we know that whatever else may happen there will be no failure in the department with which they are concerned. For them is not the rapture of the strife, for them none of the maddening excitement of the conflict, the visible joy of the blow struck home. But we do not forget, we others. We recognise the heroism which never fails—whether it be in peace or war—of those whose duty is done so quietly, whose labours allow of victory, to which they contribute in so unobtrusive a fashion. We know that failure to steam means failure to win; and

perhaps the highest compliment that we can pay to these officers and these men is the latent feeling that such failure is so far from the realms of the possible that we may rule it out of our consciousness altogether.

Here also we can pause for one moment to consider what Beatty had done already.

it," it was the enterprising leader of the battle cruiser fleet.

Certainly no leader ever had more magnificent material with which to work than had Beatty on this occasion. This is the tale of the destroyers *Onslow* and the *Defender* as told in the despatch :



BATTLE OF JUTLAND. SKETCH SHOWING THE GENERAL SITUATION AT THE OPENING OF THE ACTION BETWEEN THE BATTLE CRUISER FLEETS.

He had found and had held the enemy, he had shepherded them in such fashion that nothing but night and fog could save them from destruction. His part had been well and nobly played, and although we know that "'tis not in mortals to command success," certainly, if ever man "deserved

" At about 6.5 P.M. *Onslow*, being on the engaged bow of the *Lion*, sighted an enemy light cruiser at a distance of 6000 yards from us, apparently endeavouring to attack with torpedoes. *Onslow* at once closed and engaged her, firing fifty-eight rounds at a range from 4000 to 2000 yards, scoring a

number of hits. *Onslow* then closed the enemy battle cruisers, and orders were given for all torpedoes to be fired. At this moment she was struck amidships with a heavy shell, with the result that only one torpedo was fired. Thinking that all his torpedoes had gone, the Commanding Officer proceeded to retire at slow speed. Being informed that he still had three torpedoes, he closed the light cruiser previously engaged and torpedoed her. The enemy battle fleet was then sighted, and the remaining torpedoes were fired at them, and must have crossed the enemy track. Damage then caused the *Onslow* to stop.

"At 7.15 P.M. *Defender*, whose speed had been reduced to ten knots, while on the disengaged side of the battle cruisers, by a shell which damaged her foremost boiler, closed *Onslow* and took her in tow; shells were falling all around them during this operation, which, however, was successfully accomplished. During the heavy weather of the ensuing night the tow parted twice, but was re-secured. The two struggled on together until 1 P.M. 1st June, when *Onslow* was transferred to tugs. I consider the performances of these two destroyers to be gallant in the extreme, and I am recommending Lieutenant-Commander J. C. Tovey of *Onslow* and Lieutenant-Commander L. R. Palmer of *Defender* for special recognition. *Onslow* was possibly the destroyer referred to by the Rear-Admiral commanding 3rd light cruiser squadron as follows: 'Here I should like to bring to your notice the action of a destroyer—name unknown—which we passed in a disabled condition soon after 6 P.M. She apparently was able to struggle ahead again, and made straight for the *Derfflinger* to attack her.' " The *Derfflinger*, it may be remarked, is a battle cruiser of 28,000 tons, mounting eight 12-inch and twelve 6-inch guns!

Admiral Jellicoe was now approaching as rapidly as possible, and he records that so magnificent were the exertions of the engine-room department that some of the older battleships were exceeding all previous

speeds. The 3rd battle cruiser squadron was sent on ahead to reinforce Sir David Beatty; and Hood sent the *Chester* ahead of him to investigate. For twenty minutes the *Chester* engaged three or four enemy light cruisers, during which period Captain Lawson, we are told, handled his ship with great skill against heavy odds, and although she suffered many casualties her fighting and steaming powers were unimpaired.

Hood, by order of Beatty, then took station ahead and by 6.50 the battle cruisers were clear of our leading battle squadron, then bearing N.N.W. 3 miles distant. About this time, although visibility had diminished, the light was more favourable to us than to the foe; "at intervals their ships showed up clearly, enabling us to punish them very severely. From the report of other ships, and my own observation," continues Beatty, "it was clear that the enemy suffered considerable damage, battle cruisers and battleships alike. The head of their line was crumpled up, leaving battleships as targets for the majority of our battle cruisers."

It was at 6.14 that Admiral Jellicoe received a report from the Vice-Admiral, battle cruiser fleet, reporting the position of the enemy battle fleet, and the Commander-in-Chief formed the battle fleet in line of battle upon the receipt of this information. That mist and low visibility served the Germans on this occasion is instanced by what happened to the first armoured cruiser squadron. Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot was in action with the light cruiser squadrons of the enemy, and in his desire to complete their destruction chased until he came close up with the enemy heavy ships. *Defence* (flagship) and *Black Prince* were sunk; *Warrior* passed to the rear disabled, and sank afterwards, though most of her company were saved. The action between the battle fleets lasted intermittently, we are told, from 6.17 P.M. to 8.20 P.M. at ranges from 9000 to 12,000 yards; and the Admiral states that the heavy and effective fire kept up by the battleships and

battle cruisers of the Grand Fleet caused me much satisfaction, and the enemy vessels were seen to be constantly hit, some being observed to haul out of the line and at least one to sink. The enemy return fire at this period was not effective, and the damage to our ships was insignificant."

One of the most remarkable and satisfactory occurrences of the battle-fleet action was that *Marlborough* was able to remain in the line and continue the action after being

scene so late; the ships of the second battle squadron being in action only from 6.30 P.M. to 7.20 P.M. The fourth light cruiser squadron was ordered to attack enemy destroyers at 7.20 P.M. and again at 8.18 P.M., when they supported the eleventh flotilla. During these attacks four enemy destroyers were sunk; and here the Commander-in-Chief notes that: "After the arrival of the British Battle Fleet the enemy tactics were of a nature generally to avoid further



DESTROYERS ON THE HEELS OF THE RETIRING GERMAN FLEET.

torpedoed. At first she took a considerable list, but in the short space of nine minutes was again firing, and discharged fourteen rapid salvos at a ship of the König class, hitting her frequently until she turned out of the line. It is true that on the day following, Admiral Sir Cecil Burney thought well to shift his flag to *Revenge*, and the *Marlborough* was then ordered to a naval base. Even so she was still able to beat off a submarine attack en route.

It must have been a bitter disappointment to the battle fleet that they arrived on the

action, in which they were favoured by the conditions of visibility."

The battle, as a battle, was now over, as the enemy was in full flight for his home ports: all the same the British Fleet had not done with him, as he was attacked continuously throughout the night by the fourth, eleventh and twelfth flotillas under Commodore Hawkesley and Captains Charles J. Wintour and Anselan J. B. Stirling. Here the flotillas suffered loss, but more than made up for this by the damage that they inflicted on the enemy.

The following of His Majesty's ships were lost: *Queen Mary* (battle cruiser), *Indefatigable* (battle cruiser), *Invincible* (battle cruiser), *Defence*, *Black Prince*, and *Warrior* (armoured cruisers), and the torpedo-boat destroyers *Tipperary*, *Ardent*, *Fortune*, *Shark*, *Sparrowhawk*, *Nestor*, *Nomad*, and *Turbulent*.

In the "Admiralty Message of Approval," dated Admiralty, July 4, 1916, it is stated that "individual initiative and tactical subordination were equally conspicuous." This is a singularly happy phrase, particularly occurring as it does in a formal official document. In those few words are summed up the soul and the spirit of that mighty fleet that went into action on May 31. Without this happy combination then, would the Fleet have fallen below the expectations of that most severe critic of competence, its own Commander-in-Chief; also it would not have fulfilled the hopes of the nation at large. That the fleet of the enemy was not entirely destroyed was due to no lack on the part of our officers and men, but to the cruel mischance of hazy and misty weather, which prevented the completion of this task. Not only was mist and fog hanging about all day and in the subsequent night attack, but all those present concur in stating that the difficulties experienced from these causes was greatly aggravated by the smoke projected into the atmosphere from countless explosions of great and small ordnance. Where "tactical subordination" ended there "individual initiative" began. The reason for this is not far to seek to those who have some knowledge of the discipline of fleets. It meant that "interdependence absolute" which obtained between the higher command and those who commanded individual units; for Admirals Jellicoe and Beatty might well say with Nelson that "they had the happiness to command a Band of Brothers."

The Commander-in-Chief notes in his despatch that: "The conditions of low visibility under which the day action took place, and the approach of darkness, enhance the

difficulty of giving an accurate report of the damage inflicted or the names of the ships sunk by our forces, but after a most careful examination of the evidence of the officers who testified to seeing enemy vessels actually sink, and personal interviews with a number of these officers, I am of opinion that the list shown in the enclosure gives the minimum in regard to numbers, though it is possibly not entirely accurate as regards the particular class of vessel, especially those which were sunk during the night attacks. In addition to the vessels sunk, it is unquestionable that many other ships were very seriously damaged by gunfire and by torpedo attack."

The list of "enemy vessels put out of action, May 31-June 1, 1916" runs:


- 2 Battleships Dreadnought type, 1 Battleship Deutschland type (seen to sink).
- 1 Battle cruiser (sunk—*Lutzow*, admitted by Germans).
- 1 Battleship Dreadnought type, 1 Battle cruiser (seen to be so severely damaged as to render it extremely doubtful if they could reach port).
- 5 Light cruisers (seen to sink; one of them had the appearance of being a larger type, and might have been a battleship).
- 6 Torpedo boat destroyers (seen to sink).
- 3 Destroyers (seen to be so severely damaged as to render it extremely doubtful if they could reach port).
- 1 Submarine sunk.

Sir David Beatty in his despatch states that—"It is impossible to give a definite statement of losses inflicted on the enemy. The visibility was, for the most part, low and fluctuating, and caution forbade me to close the range too much with my inferior force. A review of all the reports which I have received leads me to conclude that the enemy losses were considerably greater than those which we had sustained, in spite of their superiority, and included battleships, battle cruisers, light cruisers, and destroyers."

It is only as time goes on that we learn the details of so important an action as this, and

it will be noticed in the despatch of the Commander-in-Chief that no details are given concerning how ships were lost. We heard since of the *Queen Mary*, one of our latest and finest battle cruisers, disappearing as if she had never been; of how no account can be rendered at all of the loss of *Black Prince*; of the *Defence* being hit with three salvos from a battleship in quick succession, and being fairly lifted out of the water and destroyed; of the

engine-room were not working. Their mad career came to an end, before they could communicate with the people below, by their running into one of our own destroyers and cutting her down to the water's edge. Eventually the destroyer leader limped home, steering from aft, and with 50 per cent of her company dead or wounded. But while we mourn for the dead, can we not all endorse this sentence from the despatch of the Commander-in-Chief: "I




THE KAISER CLASS.

Warrior towed out of action by the *Engadine* with her armour pierced in sixteen places, only to sink when the majority of her crew had been removed into safety; of a destroyer leader whose bridge was swept overboard, taking with it compass, chart-house, wheel, engine-room telegraph, and every soul standing there. On "monkey's island," above the bridge, the officers did not even know that this had happened, so great was the noise around them; but they became conscious that the ship was running round in a circle, and that the telegraphs to the

cannot adequately express the pride with which the spirit of the Fleet filled me."

Through the mouth of Sir John Jellicoe there spoke the sentiments of the whole British Empire, without exception of race or colour. We have known, even the land folk have known, that the Navy was a strenuous service; also have they known that it was a service with traditions incomparable and unassailable. From it they have expected much, and what they have expected the Navy has given in full measure, pressed down and running over. For the



A MODERN BATTLESHIP FIRING À BROADSIDE.
(Drawn by Charles J. de Lacy.)

Sea Service has proved itself in two years of warfare to be not only as it was called by our sailor-King, "the sure shield of Britain," but also a force so efficient and so terrible that now in the twentieth century it holds the seas in fee, as it has done since the days of Alfred, down through the glorious traditions of victory, reaching from the fourteenth century to the battle of the Jutland Bank. Unresting, unhasting, has the Navy gone about its work. Unresting, because the Navy sleeps not by day nor by night; unhasting, because perfect discipline wedded to the spirit of self-sacrifice that it has

proved itself to possess has rendered haste unnecessary in a service which is always waiting and watching. From Archangel to the Horn it keeps watch and ward; from China to Peru, East and West about, the shadow of the White Ensign and the Union Jack has never failed the lieges of King George, in whatsoever clime they may dwell. And as it has been, so we live assured it will continue to be, till peace returns to a troubled world, and they who have held the seas for Britain and the Empire can once again cast anchor in the haven where they would be.

APPENDIX I

ADMIRALTY MESSAGE OF APPROVAL

"HIGH EXPECTATIONS WELL FULFILLED"

THE following letter has been addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty :

ADMIRALTY, *July 4, 1916.*

SIR—My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty have considered your reports on the action off the Jutland Bank between the Grand Fleet under your command and the German High Sea Fleet on the 31st May, together with the report of the Vice-Admiral Commanding the Battle Cruiser Fleet, and those of the various Flag Officers and Commanding Officers of the Grand Fleet.

2. Their Lordships congratulate the officers, seamen, and marines of the Grand Fleet on this the first Fleet action which has occurred since the outbreak of the war, as a result of which the enemy, severely punished, withdrew to his own ports. The events of the 31st May and 1st June gave ample proof of the gallantry

and devotion which characterised all who took part in the battle ; the ships of every class were handled with skill and determination ; their steaming under battle conditions afforded a splendid testimony to the zeal and efficiency of the engineering staff ; while individual initiative and tactical subordination were equally conspicuous.

3. The results of the action prove that the officers and men of the Grand Fleet have known both how to study the new problems with which they are confronted and how to turn their knowledge to account. The expectations of the country were high ; they have been well fulfilled.

4. My Lords desire me to convey to you their full approval of your proceedings on this occasion.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

APPENDIX II

SHIPS THAT HAVE BEEN LOST IN THE WAR

This list, compiled from official sources, was published by the *Weekly Dispatch*, by whose kind permission it is here reproduced.

BRITISH NAVAL LOSSES.

| Date. | Name. | Fate. | Place. | By whom. |
|--------|------------------------|-------|-------------|--------------|
| 1916 | <i>Battle Cruisers</i> | | | |
| May 31 | Queen Mary . . . | Sunk | Off Denmark | German Fleet |
| " | Indefatigable . . . | Sunk | Off Denmark | German Fleet |
| " | Invincible . . . | Sunk | Off Denmark | German Fleet |

BRITISH NAVAL LOSSES—*continued.*

| Date. | Name. | Fate. | Place. | By whom. |
|------------------------------------|----------------------|---------------|------------------|------------------|
| <i>Pre-Dreadnought Battleships</i> | | | | |
| 1914 | | | | |
| Nov. 26 | Bulwark | Blown up | Sheerness | Accident |
| 1915 | | | | |
| Jan. 1 | Formidable | Sunk | Channel | German Submarine |
| Mar. 18 | Irresistible | Sunk | Dardanelles | Mines |
| " | Ocean | Sunk | Dardanelles | Mines |
| May 12 | Goliath | Sunk | Dardanelles | Torpedoed |
| May 25 | Triumph | Sunk | Dardanelles | Submarine |
| May 27 | Majestic | Sunk | Dardanelles | Submarine |
| 1916 | | | | |
| Jan. 9 | King Edward VII. . . | Sunk | .. | Mine |
| Apr. 27 | Russell | Sunk | Mediterranean | Mine |
| <i>Armoured Cruisers</i> | | | | |
| 1914 | | | | |
| Sept. 22 | Hogue | Sunk | North Sea | German Submarine |
| " | Aboukir | Sunk | North Sea | German Submarine |
| " | Cressy | Sunk | North Sea | German Submarine |
| Nov. 1 | Good Hope | Sunk | Off Chili | German Fleet |
| " | Monmouth | Sunk | Off Chili | German Fleet |
| 1915 | | | | |
| Oct. 28 | Argyll | Wrecked | E. Scotland | .. |
| Dec. 30 | Natal | Blown up | .. | Accident |
| 1916 | | | | |
| May 31 | Defence | Sunk | Off Denmark | German Fleet |
| " | Black Prince | Sunk | Off Denmark | German Fleet |
| " | Warrior | Sunk | Off Denmark | German Fleet |
| <i>Light Cruisers</i> | | | | |
| 1914 | | | | |
| Aug. 6 | Amphion | Sunk | North Sea | German Mine |
| Sept. 5 | Pathfinder | Sunk | North Sea | German Submarine |
| Sept. 20 | Pegasus | Sunk | Zanzibar | Königsberg |
| Oct. 15 | Hawke | Sunk | North Sea | German Submarine |
| Oct. 31 | Hermes | Sunk | North Sea | German Submarine |
| 1916 | | | | |
| Feb. 13 (about) | Arethusa | Sunk | East Coast | Mine |
| <i>Destroyers</i> | | | | |
| 1914 | | | | |
| Aug. 28 | Laertes | Badly damaged | Heligoland | German Fleet |
| " | Laurel | Badly damaged | Heligoland | German Fleet |
| " | Liberty | Badly damaged | Heligoland | German Fleet |
| 1915 | | | | |
| May 1 | Recruit | Sunk | Dutch Coast | German Submarine |
| May 7 | Maori | Sunk | Belgian Coast | German Mine |
| June 30 | Lightning | Badly damaged | East Coast | Mine or Torpedo |
| Aug. 9 | Lynx | Sunk | North Sea | Mine |
| Nov. 10 | Louis | Wrecked | E. Mediterranean | .. |
| 1916 | | | | |
| Mar. 10 (about) | Coquette | Sunk | East Coast | Mine |
| Mar. 25 | Medusa | Sunk | North Sea | Collision |
| May 31 | Tipperary | Sunk | Off Denmark | German Fleet |
| " | Turbulent | Sunk | Off Denmark | German Fleet |
| " | Fortune | Sunk | Off Denmark | German Fleet |
| " | Sparrowhawk | Sunk | Off Denmark | German Fleet |
| " | Ardent | Sunk | Off Denmark | German Fleet |
| " | Three others | Sunk | Off Denmark | German Fleet |

| Date. | Name. | Fate. | Place. | By whom. |
|----------------------|---|--------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|
| <i>Torpedo Boats</i> | | | | |
| 1915 | | | | |
| June 11 | No. 10 | Sunk | East Coast | German Submarine |
| " | No. 12 | Sunk | East Coast | German Submarine |
| Nov. 1 | No. 96 | Sunk | Off Gibraltar | In collision |
| 1916 | | | | |
| Mar. 10 (about) | No. 11 | Sunk | Off East Coast | Mine |
| <i>Submarines</i> | | | | |
| 1914 | | | | |
| Sept. 20 | AE1 | Sunk | Near Australia | Accident |
| Oct. 18 | E3 | Sunk | North Sea | German Fleet |
| Nov. 3 | D5 | Sunk | North Sea | German Mine |
| 1915 | | | | |
| Apr. 17 | E15 | Wrecked | Dardanelles | .. |
| Apr. 30 | AE2 | Sunk | Dardanelles | Turks |
| Aug. 19 | E13 | Wrecked and destroyed | Danish Island of Saltholm | German Destroyers |
| Sept. 20 | E7 | Sunk | Dardanelles | Turks |
| Nov. — | E20 | Sunk | Dardanelles | Turks |
| 1916 | | | | |
| Jan. 6 | — | Wrecked | Dutch Coast | — |
| Apr. 25 | E22 | Sunk | North Sea | German Ship |
| <i>Gunboats</i> | | | | |
| 1914 | | | | |
| Sept. 3 | Speedy | Sunk | North Sea | German Mine |
| Nov. 11 | Niger | Sunk | Off Deal | German Submarine |
| <i>Auxiliaries</i> | | | | |
| 1914 | | | | |
| Sept. 9 | Oceanic (armed liner) . | Wrecked | Off Scotland | Accident |
| Sept. 14 | Carmania (armed liner) . | Badly damaged | Brazil | Cap Trafalgar |
| Oct. 30 | Rohilla (hospital ship) . | Wrecked | Off Whitby | Gale |
| 1915 | | | | |
| Jan. — | Viknor (armed liner) . | Sunk | N. of Ireland | .. |
| Feb. 3 | Clan M'Naughton (ar- moured liner) . . . | Sunk | .. | .. |
| Mar. 11 | Bayano (armed liner) . | Sunk | Firth of Clyde | German Submarine |
| May 25 | Princess Irene (supply 'ship) | Blown up | Sheerness | .. |
| Aug. 8 | Ramsey (patrol boat) . | Sunk | North Sea | German armed lines Meteor |
| " | India | Sunk | North Sea | German Submarine |
| Oct. 28 | Hythe (mine-sweeper) . | Sunk | Off Gallipoli | In collision |
| Nov. 5 | Tara (boarding steamer) | Sunk | E. Mediterranean | German Submarine |
| 1916 | | | | |
| Feb. 10 | Arabis (mine-sweeper) . | Sunk | Dogger Bank | German Torpedo Boats |
| Feb. 29 | Alcantara (armed liner) . | Sunk | North Sea | Greif |
| Mar. 1 | Primula (mine-sweeper) | Sunk | E. Mediterranean | German Submarine |
| Apr. — | Aegusa (armed yacht) . | Sunk | Mediterranean | Mined |
| Apr. — | Nasturtium (mine- sweeper) | Sunk | Mediterranean | Mined |
| May 13 | M30 (monitor) . . . | Destroyed | E. Mediterranean | Turkish fire |

GERMAN NAVAL LOSSES.

| Date. | Name. | Fate. | Place. | By whom. |
|------------------------------------|---------------------------|---------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------------|
| <i>Battle Cruisers</i> | | | | |
| 1914 | | | | |
| Nov. 18 | Goeben | Badly damaged | Black Sea | Russian Fleet |
| 1915 | | | | |
| Jan. 24 | — | Badly damaged | North Sea | Adm. Beatty's Squadron |
| " | — | Badly damaged | North Sea | Adm. Beatty's Squadron |
| Aug. 20 | Moltke | Sunk | Gulf of Riga | British Submarine |
| 1916 | | | | |
| May 31 | Derfflinger | Sunk | Off Denmark | British Fleet |
| " | Lutzow | Badly damaged | Off Denmark | British Fleet |
| " | — | Badly damaged | Off Denmark | British Fleet |
| <i>Dreadnoughts</i> | | | | |
| 1916 | | | | |
| May 31 | — (Kaiser class) . . | Sunk | Off Denmark | British Fleet |
| " | — (Kaiser class) . . | Sunk ? | Off Denmark | British Fleet |
| <i>Pre-Dreadnought Battleships</i> | | | | |
| 1914 | | | | |
| Oct. — | Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse | Sunk | Baltic | Russian Fleet |
| 1916 | | | | |
| May 31 | Pommern | Sunk | Off Denmark | British Fleet |
| " | Three others | Badly damaged | Off Denmark | British Fleet |
| <i>Armoured Cruisers</i> | | | | |
| 1914 | | | | |
| Nov. 4 | Yorck | Sunk | North Sea | German Mine |
| Dec. 8 | Scharnhorst | Sunk | Falkland Isles | Adm. Sturdee's Squadron |
| " | Gneisenau | Sunk | Falkland Isles | Adm. Sturdee's Squadron |
| Dec. 11 | Friedrich Karl . . . | Sunk | Baltic | Russian Fleet |
| 1915 | | | | |
| Jan. 24 | Blücher | Sunk | North Sea | Adm. Beatty's Squadron |
| Oct. 24 (about) | Prinz Adalbert . . . | Sunk | Baltic | British Submarine |
| <i>Light Cruisers</i> | | | | |
| 1914 | | | | |
| Aug. 27 | Magdeburg | Blown up | Baltic | Russian Fleet |
| Aug. 28 | Mainz | Sunk | Heligoland | British Fleet |
| " | Köln | Sunk | Heligoland | British Fleet |
| " | Ariadne | Sunk | Heligoland | British Fleet |
| Sept 13 | Hela | Sunk | North Sea | H.M.S. E9 |
| Oct. — | Hertha | Sunk | Baltic | Russians |
| Nov. — | Karlsruhe | Sunk | West Indies | Explosion |
| Nov. 9 | Geier | Interned | Honolulu | U.S.A. |
| Nov. 11 | Emden | Ashore | Indian Ocean | H.M.A.S. Sydney |
| Dec. 8 | Nürnberg | Sunk | Falkland Isles | Adm. Sturdee's Squadron |
| " | Leipzig | Sunk | Falkland Isles | Adm. Sturdee's Squadron |
| 1915 | | | | |
| Jan. 24 | Kolberg | Sunk | North Sea | Adm. Beatty's Squadron |
| Jan. 25 | Gazelle | Badly damaged | Baltic | Russian Submarine |
| Mar. 14 | Dresden | Sunk | Juan Fernandez I. | H.M.S. Kent and Glasgow |
| July 4-11 | Königsberg | Destroyed | Rufgi River (German East Africa) | Monitors Severn and Mersey |
| Aug. 20 | — | Sunk | Gulf of Riga | Russian Mine |
| " | — | Sunk | Gulf of Riga | Russian Fleet |
| Nov. 7 | Undine | Sunk | Baltic | British Submarine |

GERMAN NAVAL LOSSES—*continued.*

| Date. | Name. | Fate. | Place. | By whom. |
|----------|----------------------------------|---------------|------------------|--|
| 1915 | <i>Light Cruisers—continued.</i> | | | |
| Dec. 17 | Bremen | Sunk | Baltic | British Submarine |
| 1916 | | | | |
| May 31 | Frauenlob | Sunk | Off Denmark | British Fleet |
| " | Wiesbaden | Sunk | Off Denmark | British Fleet |
| " | — | Badly damaged | Off Denmark | British Fleet |
| " | — | Badly damaged | Off Denmark | British Fleet |
| | <i>Destroyers</i> | | | |
| 1914 | | | | |
| Aug. 4 | Unknown | Sunk | North Sea | German Mine |
| Aug. 28 | V. 187 | Sunk | Heligoland | British Fleet |
| " | Unknown | Sunk | Heligoland | British Fleet |
| " | Seven Destroyers . . | Badly damaged | Heligoland | British Fleet |
| Sept. — | Taku | Sunk | Kiaochau | Japanese |
| Oct. 6 | S. 116 | Sunk | North Sea | H.M.S. E9 |
| Oct. 17 | S. 115 | Sunk | North Sea | { H.M.S. Undaunted and Destroyers Lance, Lennox, Legion, Loyal |
| " | S. 117 | Sunk | North Sea | |
| " | S. 118 | Sunk | North Sea | |
| " | S. 119 | Sunk | North Sea | |
| Oct. 20 | S. 90 | Ashore | China | Japanese |
| Nov. 25 | S. 124 | Badly damaged | Off Denmark | Collision with Danish ship |
| 1915 | | | | |
| Jan. 29 | — | Sunk | Off Denmark | Russian Submarine |
| July 26 | G196 class | Sunk | Off German Coast | British Submarine |
| Aug. 17 | — | Sunk | Gulf of Riga | Russian Destroyer Novik |
| Aug. 20 | — | Sunk | Gulf of Riga | Russian Fleet |
| " | — | Sunk | Gulf of Riga | Russian Fleet |
| " | — | Sunk | Gulf of Riga | Russian Fleet |
| Aug. 24 | — | Sunk | Off Ostend | 2 French Torpedo Boats |
| Oct. 14 | — | Sunk | Baltic | British Submarine |
| Oct. 15 | — | Sunk | Baltic | In Collision |
| 1916 | | | | |
| Feb. 15 | No. 44 | Sunk | North Sea | .. |
| Mar. 25 | — | Rammed | North Sea | H.M.S. Cleopatra |
| May 31 | — | Sunk | Off Denmark | British Fleet |
| " | — | Sunk | Off Denmark | British Fleet |
| " | — | Sunk | Off Denmark | British Fleet |
| " | — | Sunk | Off Denmark | British Fleet |
| " | — | Sunk | Off Denmark | British Fleet |
| " | — | Sunk | Off Denmark | British Fleet |
| | <i>Torpedo Boats</i> | | | |
| 1915 | | | | |
| May 1 | — | Sunk | Dutch Coast | Destroyers Laforey, Leonidas, Lawford, and Lark |
| " | — | Sunk | Dutch Coast | Destroyers Laforey, Leonidas, Lawford, and Lark |
| June 28 | — | Sunk | Baltic | Mine |
| Sept. 24 | — | Sunk | Off Belgium | British Monitors |
| Dec. 17 | — | Sunk | Baltic | British Submarine |

GERMAN NAVAL LOSSES—*continued.*

| Date. | Name. | Fate. | Place. | By whom. |
|--------------------|--|----------|-----------------|--|
| <i>Submarines</i> | | | | |
| 1914 | | | | |
| Aug. 9 | U15 | Sunk | North Sea | H.M.S. Birmingham |
| Oct. 23 | Unknown | Sunk | North Sea | H.M.S. Badger |
| Nov. 23 | U18 | Sunk | Off Scotland | British Patrol |
| 1915 | | | | |
| Feb. 28 | — | Sunk | English Channel | Steamer Thordis |
| Mar. 4 | U8 | Sunk | English Channel | British Destroyers |
| Mar. 10 | U12 | Sunk | .. | H.M.S. Ariel |
| — | U29 | Sunk | .. | .. |
| June 9 | U14 | Sunk | .. | .. |
| (about) | | | | |
| Aug. 26 | — | Sunk | Off Ostend | Squad.-Comm. Bigsworth in Aeroplane |
| Aug. — | U27 | Missing | .. | (German admission) |
| Sept. 24 | — | Sunk | Belgian Coast | British Monitors |
| " | — | Sunk | Belgian Coast | British Monitors |
| Nov. 7 | C8 | Interned | Terschelling | Dutch |
| (about) | | | | |
| Nov. 29 | — | Sunk | Off Middelkerke | Sub.-Lieut. Viney and Lieut. le Comte de Sincay (in aeroplane) |
| 1916 | | | | |
| Apr. 5 | — | Sunk | Off Havre | Anglo-French Flotilla |
| Apr. 8 | — | Sunk | Black Sea | Russian Torpedo Boat |
| (about) | | | | Strogyi |
| Apr. 27 | — | Sunk | East Coast | British Destroyer |
| May 31 | — | Sunk | Off Denmark | British Fleet |
| <i>Gunboats</i> | | | | |
| 1914 | | | | |
| Aug. 13 | Möwe | Sunk | S.W. Africa | Explosion |
| Aug. 17 | Tsingtau | Sunk | Kiaochau | Germans |
| " | Vaterland | Interned | Nanking | China |
| Sept. 30 | Soden | Captured | West Africa | H.M.S. Cumberland |
| Oct. 8 | Cormoran | Sunk | Kiaochau | Japanese |
| Nov. 6 | Jaguar | Sunk | Kiaochau | Japanese |
| " | Luchs | Sunk | Kiaochau | Japanese |
| " | Iltis | Sunk | Kiaochau | Japanese |
| " | Tiger | Sunk | Kiaochau | Japanese |
| <i>Auxiliaries</i> | | | | |
| 1914 | | | | |
| Aug. 5 | Königen Luise (mine- layer) | Sunk | North Sea | H.M.S. Lance |
| " | Prinz Adalbert (armed liner) | Captured | Falmouth | British |
| Aug. 15 | Sudmark (armed liner) . | Captured | .. | H.M.S. Black Prince |
| Aug. 27 | Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse (armed liner) . | Sunk | West Africa | H.M.S. Highflyer |
| Sept. — | Max Brock (armed liner) | Captured | Duala | H.M.S. Cumberland |
| Sept. 7 | Bethania (armed liner) . | Captured | West Atlantic | H.M.S. Essex |
| Sept. 12 | Spreewald (armed liner) | Captured | Atlantic | H.M.S. Berwick |
| Sept. 14 | Cap Trafalgar (armed liner) | Sunk | Brazil | H.M.S. Carmania |
| " | Itolo (armed liner) . . | Sunk | West Africa | French Fleet |

GERMAN NAVAL LOSSES—*continued*.

| Date. | Name. | Fate. | Place. | By whom. |
|----------|---|------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1914 | <i>Auxiliaries—continued</i> | | | |
| Sept. 14 | Rhios (armed liner) . | Sunk | West Africa | French Fleet |
| " | Gneisenau (armed liner) . | Sunk | Antwerp | Belgians |
| Oct. 10 | Graecia (armed liner) . | Captured | North Atlantic | H.M.S. Argonaut |
| Oct. 12 | Markomannia (armed liner) | Sunk | Simaaur Island | H.M.S. Yarmouth |
| Oct. 14 | Komet (auxiliary) . . | Captured | New Guinea | Australian Fleet |
| " | Ruchin (mine-layer) . | Sunk | Kiaochau | Japanese |
| Nov. 17 | Berlin (armed liner) . | Interned | Bergen | Norway |
| 1915 | | | | |
| Jan. 6 | Eleonore Woermann (supply ship) . . | Sunk | Pacific | H.M.A.S. Australia |
| Apr. 8 | Prinz Eitel Friedrich (armed liner) . . | Interned | Newport News | U.S.A. |
| Apr. 26 | Kronprinz Wilhelm (armed liner) . . | Interned | Hampton Roads | U.S.A. |
| Apr. — | Macedonia (armed liner) | Captured | Atlantic | British Cruiser |
| July 2 | Mine-layer (Albatross class) | Run ashore | Baltic | Russian Fleet |
| Aug. 8 | Meteor (armed liner) | Blown up | North Sea | .. |
| Oct. 18 | — (patrol boat) . . | Blown up | Baltic | .. |
| (about) | | | | |
| Nov. 20 | — (coast guardship) . | Sunk | Baltic | Russian Destroyers |
| Dec. 16 | Bunz (patrol boat) . . | Sunk | Off Denmark | .. |
| (about) | | | | |
| Dec. 26 | Kingani, Mangani and Hedwig von Wissman (gun-boats) . . . | Sunk | Lake Tanganyika (East Africa) | British |
| 1916 | | | | |
| Jan. 16 | Ander (patrol boat) . | Wrecked | Near Kiel Bay | .. |
| Feb. 29 | Greif (raider) . . . | Sunk | North Sea | H.M.S. Alcantara |
| Mar. 25 | Otto Rudolf (trawler patrol) | Sunk | North Sea | British Cruiser Squadron |
| " | Braunschweig (trawler patrol) | Sunk | North Sea | British Cruiser Squadron |
| May 13 | Mine-sweeper . . . | Sunk | Baltic | Mine |

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